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2ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of Sir William Mackinnon as 
a shipowner and as a man who played an important part in 
opening East Africa to British influence. By shrewdness 
and good fortune he took advantage of the dramatic progress 
in communications, which was part of the Industrial 
Revolution, and he built up a shipping company which 
became a major trading concern in the Indian Ocean.
Under the influence of humanitarian ideas, and particularly 
those of David Livingstone, he felt a duty to use some of 
his wealth to improve the lot of less fortunate people 
and so he engaged in various commercial and philanthropic 
enterprises in Africa, and the company which he founded., 
there towards the end of his life made a substantial 
contribution to British colonisation in East Africa.
He became supreme as a shipowner, and his business 
acumen was undoubted, but his involvement in international 
affairs exposed his weakness as a politician and as an 
administrator. In the whirlpool of the scramble for 
Africa he was out of his depth beside the political giants 
of the time.
3The Mackinnon Papers, which were the most important 
source of information for this thesis, reveal Mackinnon as 
a man of rather narrow outlook, but deep religious convictions 
who believed that good works received their just reward* 
Compared with many of his contemporaries, who were involved 
with Africa, such as Henry Morton Stanley, Cecil Rhodes and 
King Leopold of Belgium, he was not very imaginative but in 
his desire to spread the benefits of Christian civilisation 
he was more sincere and humane.
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7PREFACE
There is no biography or autobiography of William 
Mackinnon, and apparently only two attempts have been made 
to write about his whole life. The first was made by
J. Macmaster Campbell in 1934. This in fact was a lecture
delivered at Keil School which was later printed^". The 
second attempt was made by Margaret Macdougall in an article
p
in the Glasgow Herald in 1965 • Otherwise there seems to be 
nothing, which is surprising considering that by the time of 
his death Mackinnon must have been one of the richest men in 
Britain, and that many lesser people have been written about. 
There are probably two main reasons for the lack of books about 
him. First, information about his life till he was about 
thirty three is very scarce. Second, he was not absolutely 
pre-eminent in any field. He was prominent as an empire 
builder and as a humanitarian, but anyone seeking an archetype 
would turn to a different subject, such as Cecil Rhodes or 
George Taubman Goldie for a businessman-imperialist, and to 
someone such as Livingstone or Fowell-Buxton for a 
humanitarian.
Perhaps the reason is simply that Mackinnon did not 
achieve much political importance. He had his greatest
1. Articles in the Campbeltown Courier, 20 and 27 January,
1934.
2. Glasgow Herald, 6 March, 1965*
8opportunity to exercise political influence during the 1880fs 
in East Africa, hut on the whole he was unsuccessful. He was 
extremely shrewd financially, hut he did not have the 
administrative and political skill necessary to promote a 
commercial cum humanitarian enterprise. This is not 
especially surprising because, apart from any inherent 
deficiencies, he did not begin to gain experience in politics 
until he was over fifty years old, and his major company in 
Africa was not established till he was sixty five by which 
time his abilities were clearly in decline. Up to the age of 
about fifty his life was narrowly commercial, and indeed very 
little is known about him before 1856, when he formed his 
first shipping company. Mackinnon is nevertheless worth 
study because he made a major contribution to the growth of 
trade in the Indian Ocean and to British colonisation in East 
Africa.
After 1856 a great deal more is known about him chiefly 
because he then spent most of his time in Britain and much of 
the correspondence between him and his subordinates in India 
has survived. Also the company kept records which formed 
the basis for George Blake’s book, B.I. Centenary 1856-1956 
The book lists all the ships which had been owned by the 
company, indicates which were sold and variously lost, and it
1. G. Blake, B.I. Centenary, 1856-1956, London, 1956.
(The British India Steam Navigation Company is usually 
referred to as the B.I.).
9gives details about many of them. It also provides 
information about some of the captains, and relates stories 
by and about them. It proved an invaluable source, 4ut in 
this thesis the investigation has been carried much further, 
first in making use of the Mackinnon Papers, and of records 
in the India Office Library, and secondly in examining the 
effect of the revolution in communications which occurred in 
Mackinnon*s life-time,
The Mackinnon Papers, which were the main primary 
source for this thesis, have mostly been arranged chronologic­
ally according to author, but there is one tin trunk full of 
letters which have not been sorted, others contain account 
books of Mackinnon's various companies, and one box contains 
only the proceedings of the legal action which was instituted 
against him. Altogether, there is an extensive correspon­
dence, comprising thousands of letters most of which were 
addressed to him by business associates, and friends over a 
period of about thirty years. There are copies of his own 
letters, the most important letters are the incoming ones 
from people like James Macalister Hall of his own shipping 
company, Sir John Kirk, Henry Morton Stanley, Horace Waller, 
Sir Harry Johnston, and from high officials in the Foreign 
Office, and the India Office,
The Papers shed light on Mackinnon’s character, his 
relations with subordinates, and on the kind of problems
10
which concerned him about the B.I. Such problems as the 
competition from the P. & 0. Company, and from the French 
Messageries Imperiales. His correspondence with James 
Macalister Hall is of particular interest, because Hall was a 
very close friend; he was subordinate only to Mackinnon in the 
B.I.’s hierarchy, and the letters available (although mostly 
from Hall to Mackinnon) cover a period of about thirty years. 
Their correspondence reveals, among other things, Mackinnon’s 
anxiety about what would happen to the company after he and 
Hall died. It has always been implied, by those who dealt with 
the issue, that the huge merger between the B.I. and P. & 0. 
Companies which took place in 1914 was conceived and arranged 
by the then chairmen of the two companies^. But it is quite 
clear from the correspondence between Mackinnon and Hall that, 
during their last years, they seriously considered a merger with 
the P. & 0. as a possible way of safeguarding the B.I.'s future.
Documents in the India Office Library and the India
Office Records have been used to show how Mackinnon actually won
2
contracts to run subsidised shipping lines . They contain his 
applications and disclose the arguments which he used to support 
them. The reasons were usually along the lines that the
1. B. Cable, A Hundred Year History of the P. & 0., 1837-1937t
London, 1957/ p.206.
D. Divine, These Splendid Ships: The Story of the P. & 0.,
London, I960, p.175*
2. Mostly departmental documents in the India Office Records,
particularly Marine Department, Public Works Department 
and Political and Secret Department.
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promotion of legitimate trade was the best weapon against 
slaving, that a prosperous shipping line would help Britain 
against her commercial rivals, and that in return for its 
subsidies government would receive good value by way of 
regular and reliable postal services. These records also 
contain many of the comments of the officials and politicians 
who considered Mackinnon*s applications, and some light is
shed on the remarkable way in which he gained his first
contract, which had in fact already been offered to another 
company. A typical contract appears as an appendix to this 
thesis.
Finally, with regard to the B.I., particular emphasis 
has been placed upon the importance of the technological 
advances which were made in the nineteenth century. Mackinnon 
profited from the great growth in trade which was a feature 
of the Industrial Revolution, and in a sense his shipping 
company was part of the communications system which made such 
immense progress during his life-time on both land and sea.
It is worth dwelling on the story of the B.I., 
because although Mackinnon is most often referred to in
relation to his activities in Africa, it was in fact as a
shipping magnate that he was outstanding. His expensive 
ventures in Africa were only possible because he was able 
to finance them from the profits of the B.I. He
12
subscribed £25,000 when the Imperial British East Africa 
Company was founded, he granted £10,000 towards the 
administration of Uganda, he contributed at least £3,000 
for the Emin Pasha Belief Expedition, and he spent thousands 
of pounds on the construction of about seventy miles of road 
from Dar-es-Salaam. He also incurred considerable expenses 
over an experiment with Indian elephants in East Africa, in 
providing a vessel free of charge for Sir Bartle Prere’s 
mission to East Africa, and in assisting Leopold’s Congo 
enterprises in various ways* The B.I., in short, enabled 
him to be a sort of one man foundation for African development 
schemes.
Because of Mackinnon’s admiration for Livingstone 
and the close friendship which he developed with such people 
as Sir John Kirk and Horace Waller, one feels that he should 
have been actively concerned with African affairs during the 
1860fs, but it has not been possible to find evidence for 
this in the Mackinnon Papers, the Waller Papers, or elsewhere. 
Perhaps there are other documents yet to be unearthed, but 
Dr. Poskett, who has access to Kirk’s papers, has found 
nothing to show that Mackinnon was concerned with the 
Zambezi expedition or with the Universities Mission, so 
it appears that he did not become involved with East Africa 
till the early 1870's.
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The chapter on the City of Glasgow Bank deals with an 
aspect of Mackinnon’s career which, so far as I know, has not 
previously received attention, except to the extent that the 
case was reported, and that P.E. Tyson has written a chapter 
on Scottish Investment in American Railways1 . The action 
caused Mackinnon a great deal of anxiety and extra work for 
about eighteen months, but its significance from his point of 
view is that, out of a sordid situation, he emerged as a man 
of complete integrity and very considerable financial acumen.
The story of the Mackinnon Concession has already been
told many times, notably by Coupland in The Exploitation of 
2
East Africa , and by Miss de Kiewiet in her thesis on the 
I.B.E.A. Company . She made the important discovery that 
Lord Salisbury quite deliberately sabotaged the concession 
negotiations. The reason for their abrupt end had always 
been a mystery. The present thesis does not add to the well 
known story, but it places more emphasis on Mackinnon’s 
contribution to the failure of the negotiations, because a
1. R.E. Tyson, ’’Scottish Investment in American Railways” in
P*L. Payne, Studies in Scottish Business History,
London, 1967*
2. R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-90»
London, 1939 > PP*300-318.
3* M*J. Be Kiewiet, ’’History of the Imperial British East 
Africa Company, 1876-1895'1 (University of London Ph.B. 
thesis, 1955).
careful reading of the correspondence suggests that his early 
enthusiasm was not sustained. It is particularly noticeable 
that for the best part of a year he did virtually nothing to 
further the scheme. There appear to be two reasons for this. 
First, his attitude to African enterprises was ambivalent.
On the one hand he felt a duty to help, as he said,
”... the wretched people who have been trampled 
on and debased throughout the ages •. •11,
and on the other hand his very shrewd business sense made him 
doubt the commercial viability of the schemes. Second, his 
friend John Kirk was also inclined to have doubts on further 
reflection. He was keen for a major company to be established 
to secure British interests in East Africa, and to save the 
domain of the Sultan of Zanzibar from further disintegration, 
but when he saw the draft terms of agreement he realised that 
the company’s ability to raise revenue would be severely 
limited by existing treaties. Mackinnon's lack of drive for 
most of 1877 may also have been due partly to his health. He
was not very well, but perhaps more important was the fact
that he was chronically worried about his health, and by the 
threat to it from overwork.
By 1880 he was not the prime mover in any major concern, 
apart from his shipping company, and for the next five years 
he seemed to be looking for an opportunity to engage in some
scheme. He met Gordon for the first time in 1880, and for a
15
moment there seemed to be a possibility of involving Gordon in 
an East African enterprise, but this came to nothing, and for 
the next few years Mackinnon devoted most of his attention in 
Africa to supporting Leopold’s ventures in the Congo* He 
continued to do so long after it had become obvious to many 
people that Leopold was more interested in exploiting than in 
civilising Africans. This was mainly because Mackinnon took 
a more charitable view of human nature than, for example, 
Stanley did. He was inclined to believe what people said, 
unless they were Germans, and so he rather naively accepted 
Leopold’s publicity at its face value for longer than was 
reasonable.
All the time that he was supporting King Leopold, 
however, he seemed to be looking over his shoulder towards the 
other side of the continent, and to the negotiations which had 
failed in 1878. The possibility of launching some scheme in 
East Africa was raised with Gordon in 1880 and 1882, and then 
by Mackinnon and others in 1885, when it was proposed that a 
railway be built. He became the prime mover again in 1886 
when he promoted the expedition to rescue Emin Pasha, and 
within the next two years he obtained concessions and formed 
the Imperial East Africa Company. But characteristically he 
began to have misgivings about the company’s future almost as 
soon as it was formed. In December 1888 he said to the 
British Consul at Zanzibar:
16
11... We are pushing on with the company's affairs
in London with all the speed we can. I hope it
won't prove much labour and money wasted. The 
public maintain their interest in us, but know 
little of the undercurrent of opposing German 
influence. I have reason to believe that we 
have the personal sympathy of high personages 
in our views and efforts, but of course high 
political considerations must be supreme ...”
If Mackinnon included Lord Salisbury among the "high 
personages” he was mistaken, because Lord Salisbury was 
unsympathetic and even less confident in the company's 
future than Mackinnon was, having said, in the very month 
that the company got its charter, that he thought it would
probably go bankrupt one day.
Prom the outset the company suffered from German 
competition and inadequate support from the British government. 
It undertook responsibilities which were far beyond its 
resources, and before Mackinnon died in 1893 it was clear 
that it could not continue. He must have felt that it had 
failed, but in fact it achieved some success in his terms, 
because the British government declared a protectorate over 
Uganda in 1894, and over Bast Africa in 1895, and this was 
possible only because the company had maintained a British 
presence in the territories concerned during the previous 
few crucial years. If he had lived a little longer he 
would have been proud to see how he had contributed to the 
extension of British influence in East Africa.
1. MP. Mackinnon to Euan Smith, 26 December 1888.
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I. BEGINNINGS
Mackinnon was born on 23 March 1823, in Campbeltown 
near the end of the long Kintyre peninsula which points 
southwards from the west coast of Scotland towards Ireland, 
The landscape is of rugged, wild Highland beauty with rocky 
coasts and sweeping sandy bays. On a clear day one can 
enjoy the full flavour of this scenery by whichever route 
one approaches Campbeltown. There is the main road running 
down the west side of the peninsula facing Islay, or there is 
the more twisty way via Carradale with lovely views of Arran. 
It is possible to spend half a day travelling by boat from 
the mainland through the Kyles of Bute or to use the regular 
air service from Renfrew which takes forty minutes.
In about 1093, the town came under the control of 
Norsemen and later was adopted as a sort of capital by the 
Macdonald Clan which named it Kinlochkerran. It then became 
involved in the historic feud between the Macdonalds and 
Campbells. When King James VI of Scotland failed to subdue 
the Macdonald stronghold, he authorised the Campbells of 
Argyll to assault it, and he bequeathed the town and 
surrounding country to them in 1607^. The chronic struggle 
which followed led to the serious depopulation of Kintyre 
which was later hit by the plague of 1647*
1. Ordnance Gazetteer, Scotland, Vol.I, pp.227-229.
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Eventually the Macdonalds were defeated and their 
former citadel was renamed Campbeltown in 1609, by Archibald 
the NG-rim11, Seventh Earl of Argyll. He encouraged people 
who had supported him, from the lowlands and other parts of 
Scotland, to settle there and in the adjoining lands.
The prosperity of Campbeltown grew and received a
great stimulus with the introduction of a fishing bounty in
1765 • This was a subsidy paid to each vessel which had been
out on a fishing cruise for not less than three months. It
was based on a ships1 tonnage and the number of barrels of
fish caught, and it has been estimated that by 1785,
Campbeltown was earning £15,000 from this subsidy1 . The
townfs population also grew. It roughly doubled during the
eighteenth century, and reached its maximum size at the end
of the nineteenth century, when it had approximately twelve
thousand inhabitants, 54 distilleries, and 646 fishing boats.
These industries have declined since then, but during
Mackinnon^ lifetime Campbeltown was a relatively wealthy
2
town by West Highland standards .
It was also very puritanical. The immigrants from 
the Lowlands had strengthened the puritanical elements in 
Kintyre. They were very strict about teligious observance
1. C. Mactagart, Life in Campbeltown in the 18th century,
I p.14.
E
2. Personal letter from the editor of the Campbeltown Courier,
24 February 1967.
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and regarded most forms of recreation as sinful. As a 
result the moral tone of life in Campbeltown was set by- 
extremes. On the one hand there was much drunkenness, 
because so much alcohol was distilled cheaply in the town 
and because there were few recreations. On the other hand 
the Town Council and Church were severely restrictive in 
their views on drinking, gambling and other "vices”. This 
outlook prevailed into the nineteenth century and influenced 
Mackinnon, who came from a devout family and early took to 
religion and plain living.
New Road, in which he was born, was later re-named 
Argyll Street, but the town has not changed greatly since 
his day. Even the house where he was born stood till I960, 
and it had a plaque on it which said:
”In this house lived Sir William Mackinnon, Bart., 
the Founder of British East Africa. A leader who 
added fleets to the Commerce and great territories to 
the Dominions of the Country. His life guided by 
Christian Charity and Courage, is proudly remembered 
in this his native town. Born 1823, Died 1893*
In thy Fear will I worship toward thy Holy Temple. 
Ps. 3* Erected by his friend Lord lorne, 1894.”
The Council house now in its place bears a similar plaque^.
Mackinnon’s immediate forebears came from the island 
of Arran in about 1753* His parents Duncan Mackinnon and 
Isabelle Currie were married in 1798, and his father claimed
1. Personal letter from the Librarian, Campbeltown Public 
Library, 3 March 1967.
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descent from the Mackinnons of Arran who had received the 
Barony of Sliddery from Robert the Bruce. William acquired 
land in Skye, the traditional home of the Mackinnon Clan, 
but his greatest attachment was to Kintyre, where he bought 
the estates of Balinakill and Loup. Possibly he was 
attracted to Loup because his grandmother came from there'*'.
At any rate that is where he made his home.
Considering that he was the fourteenth child of a 
2
poor family , living in a small town, he got a surprisingly 
good schooling. Duncan Morrison's elementary school 
provided the usual basic teaching, but his exceptionally 
good education was derived from Dr. Brunton who was Rector
■3
of Campbeltown Academy, and a scholar of some repute . He 
was impressed by Mackinnon1s ability and gave him a great 
deal of private tuition. And he, more than anyone else, 
was responsible for Mackinnonfs abiding respect for knowledge.
Mackinnon1s lifelong devotion to religion also 
developed during this period. He owed this to his devout 
family, to the generally very religious attitude in 
Campbeltown, and to the fact that during his youth there 
raged a controversy over patronage in the Church of Scotland.
1. Personal letter from Mrs. G r . M .  Pollok, Mackinnon's great-
niece, 9 Pebruary 1967*
2. Ibid.
3. J. Macmaster Campbell, op.cit.
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Discontent about abuses in the Kirk had been simmering for 
a long time and matters were brought to a head in 1834, when 
a motion was passed in the General Assembly which said that 
no pastor could be appointed if his appointment were opposed 
by a majority of the male heads of families of the 
congregation. This came to be known as the Veto Act, and 
the jubilant majority insisted on its being put into effect 
as soon as possible. The measure, however, was highly 
controversial, and in a test case the Scottish Supreme Court 
virtually declared the Act ultra vires. Two years later, 
in 1839, the House of lords, hearing the case on appeal, took , 
a similar view and said that objections on the part of 
parishoners were irrelevant and could not override the rights 
of patrons.
Many who were dissatisfied with these decisions with­
drew from the established Church. numerous pastors gave up 
the emoluments and privileges they enjoyed with the Establish­
ment and formed their own Free Church in 1843* It has been 
estimated that the Church of Scotland lost about a third of 
its membership in this way. The Free Church in effect became 
a parallel organisation, with its own churches, manses, 
schools, finances and missionary projects.
22
lt... It provided a ministry zealous, orthodox, 
evangelical, narrow and strait-laced perhaps 
and self-consciously pietistic, but one that 
served Scotland well .
Mackinnon was twenty when the breach finally occurred 
within the Church, so the heated controversy was waged during 
the very impressionable years of his life. This may have 
caused him to be a particularly strong supporter of the sect. 
Certainly the Free Church at the village of Clachan, where he 
lived, and others were later sustained by him financially.
In spite of being far more able than his contemporaries 
in Campbeltown, Mackinnon did not leave to seek greater scope 
for his talents at the earliest opportunity. He first
2
entered business by running a grocery shop with a friend .
It was only when this failed that he moved to Glasgow and got 
a job in a mercantile firm. He did so well at this that he 
was taken on by a Portugese merchant who made him an assistant 
and after three years offered him a partnership.
He would probably have accepted had he not received a 
more attractive invitation to join Robert Mackenzie in 
Calcutta. The suggestion that they were old school friends 
is not plausible because Mackenzie was ten years older, but 
they were both from Campbeltown and clearly acquainted
1* J.H.S. Burleigh: A Church History of Scotland, Oxford,
I960, p. 356.
2. Personal letter from Mrs. G.M. Pollok, 9 February 1967.
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because Mackenzie invited him out, although Mackinnon had 
no wealth to contribute, and they established the firm of 
Mackinnon & Mackenzie within a few months of Mackinnon's 
arrival.
Mackinnon left.his home in 1846 and landed in Bombay. 
Prom there he travelled overland to Calcutta where he stayed 
with James Macdonald'*", a family friend, and started work in a 
sugar mill at Cossipore a few miles from the city up the 
Hoogly river. But he soon gave up this job to start the
new firm of Mackinnon & Mackenzie.
/
Before following his fortunes in business it is worth 
considering the climate of opinion in Britain at that time, 
because it clearly had some influence on the way in which 
Mackinnon conducted his enterprises. He grew up in a 
Victorian Britain which was expansive and self-confident.
Her navy was supreme and she dominated world trade. Her 
people believed in the inevitability of progress, and 
promoting trade overseas was considered not only good for 
business but also as part of a civilising mission. It 
brought money into Britain and took Christian morality to 
the primitive peoples of Africa, Asia and the Americas. 
Commerce and private enterprise were the agents for extending 
the benefits of British civilisation. The activities of
1. Personal letter from Mrs. G r . M .  Pollok, 9 February 1967*
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Mackinnon's companies perfectly reflected these attitudes.
For years the firm of Mackinnon & Mackenzie paid substantially 
for the maintenance of the Scottish Free Kirk in Calcutta, the 
B.I* supported anti-slavery action off the East African Coast 
and the I*B.E*A.^company was instrumental in furthering 
British influence in East Africa.
* * * * *
Before Mackinnon died, Victorian Britain had become 
rather disillusioned about its civilising mission; it had 
acquired more empire and doubts had arisen about the inevita­
bility of progress. But doubts and questions were hardly 
troubling public opinion during the formative years of his 
life. In these years Britain was confident that it should 
acquire no more empire. It believed in free trade and the 
minimum of government. The country preferred political 
influence and commerce to possession and rule. Force could 
be used reluctantly to protect business interests and to 
promote trade, but imperial rule was to be avoided. 4It 
could be expensive and it was not necessary for profitable 
commerce. Experience showed that the most rapidly expanding 
trade was with the United States and the territories overseas 
where European and particularly British emigrants had settled: 
Canada, Australia and South America. The emigrants to these 
countries had a greater taste for British products than had 
the inhabitants, for instance, of the countries round the
25
Indian Ocean. They were industrious and their economies 
were expanding. Other parts of the world were less 
attractive economically. Since the ending of the slave trade, 
for example, investment in West Africa had become infinitely 
more risky than investment in North America. There was the
4
constant menace of disease, a difficult climate and the threat 
of tribal warfare. Before the opening of the Suez Canal,
East Africa was too remote for the available trade and 
Zanzibar was regarded merely as an outpost of the Indian 
Empire. On the African continent only South Africa was of 
serious interest to Britain, but even here the interest was 
in the strategic value of the naval base on the route to 
India‘S.
Prom a political and economic point of view India was 
an exception to the general rule about overseas territories.
In 1847, when Mackinnon arrived in Calcutta, British official 
and public opinion was certainly against acquiring overseas 
possessions, but in the case of India British authority was 
already in existence. A considerable trade had grown up 
between the two countries and there were substantial British 
investments in the sub-continent.
British relations with the East, up to the middle of 
the nineteenth century, had fallen into three broad periods.
1. R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 
London, 1965, PP* 1-16.
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About 150 years of trading, starting seriously with the East 
India Company*s Charter in 1600, followed by about 50 years 
of conquest, followed after the Napoleonic wars by organised 
rule for the benefit of the Indians.
India was nominally governed by the East India 
Company, but its powers were being eroded gradually, and 
authority really lay with the British Government. A major 
breach of its privileges was the ending of its Indian trade 
monopoly in 1813* It finally ceased to be a trading concern 
when its monopoly of the China trade was ended in 1853-34, 
and it ceased to rule even nominally in 1858, after the 
Mutiny, when India came under a Viceroy.
India had moreover acquired great strategic importance.
About half of the British army was stationed there and at a
time when Russia was expanding into Siberia and Central Asia
this army acted as a shield against her southward expansion
as well as providing a vital element for British policy in
South East Asia, the Ear East and the Indian Ocean as a whole.
During the nineteenth century units of this army were used in
1
areas as far apart as China and Egypt . While Mackinnon was 
attracted to Calcutta by his friend Robert Mackenzie and 
Britain’s unique trade relations with India, he was fortunate 
to start business in the East on the eve of revolutionary
1. Robinson & Gallagher, op.cit., pp. 12-13.
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improvements in communications. These improvements together 
with the industrial revolution in Britain, of which they were 
an aspect, led to the doubling of trade between Britain and 
India during the period of his business life. The mid­
nineteenth century was a propitious time for an enterprising 
man to establish himself in India.
During the first half of the century India’s internal 
communications were very poor. The few roads were in bad 
condition and the only extensively navigable waterways were 
the Ganges and Indus. When the ending of the East India 
Company’s monopoly in 1813 > and the introduction of a regular 
steamship service in 1840 did not lead to the expected rapid 
growth in trade with Britain, India’s poor internal transport 
was regarded as chiefly responsible. The steamship service 
connected the two countries but the principal way of moving 
goods within India, by bullock-cart over rough roads, 
stultified business. Transport costs were unnecessarily 
high, British manufactures could not reach the majority of 
Indians and India’s exports were limited to a few commodities. 
Moreover products such as cotton often got wet and spoiled by 
the time they reached the ports.
With an estimated population of one hundred and fifty 
millions, India was regarded as a potentially very lucrative 
market, and commercial interests lobbied to have the country
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opened up by a network of railways. To try to persuade the 
reluctant East India Company, they argued that a railway 
system would strengthen its political and military control 
while reducing total expenses. These points were driven 
home when the Company met with disasters in Afghanistan in 
1842, and when it got involved in war with the Sikhs during 
the late 1840*s.
The influential merchants in Britain and India who
pressed for the construction of railways in the 1840fs were
largely the same as had urged the need for a government-
supported steamship service a decade earlier^. They had
mastered the technique of lobbying, and internal changes were
made to improve trade. Trunk roads were built, a railway
system was constructed, the electric telegraph and a cheap
postal system were introduced. Before 1850, expenditure on
public works in India was about £250,000 a year. By 1854
this figure had risen to £4,000,000 and a separate Public
2
Works Department was established .
In 1849 the first contract for railway construction 
was awarded, and in 1853 the first line, 21 miles long, 
running from Calcutta, was opened to the public. The real 
breakthrough in the improvement of communications occurred
1. D. Thorner, Investment in Empire, Philadelphia, 1950, p. 22.
2. H.J. Habbakuk, ’Free Trade and Commercial Expansion1,
Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol.II, (1940), 
p. 764.
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during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Lalhousie which lasted 
from 1848-1856, years which almost exactly coincided with the 
laying of the foundations of Mackinnonfs wealth in India. He 
arrived in 1847 and in 1856 established the Calcutta and 
Burmah Steam Navigation Company. Luring this period the firm 
of Mackinnon & Mackenzie built its business on the basis of 
agencies and general trading in the wide variety of goods 
which were flowing more easily with improving communications.
The construction of railways in India followed the 
greatest railway boom in Britain’s history. The 2,000 miles 
of Britain’s railways in 1844 were increased to 5*000 five 
years later. And an interesting feature of this expansion 
is that Lalhousie became head of the Railway Lepartment at the 
Board of Trade in 1845* His efforts to exercise greater 
government control over railway development in Britain were 
frustrated by powerful railway interests and their allies, but 
the experience he gained was most valuable in India, where he 
was able to secure more influence on behalf of the East India 
Company, which still nominally governed the country.
The contracts signed in 1849 provided that the two 
railways, the East Indian and the Great Indian Peninsular, 
should deposit their capital with the East India Company.
They could only draw on it with the consent of the Company 
and for projects approved by it. In return for this control
30
over development, the E.I. Company accepted considerable 
financial responsibilities. In particular, it agreed to pay 
5fo interest on all capital deposited with it^.
The Mutiny in 1857 emphasised the need for better 
communications. In that year only three hundred miles of 
railways were in operation. Had there been more, the task 
of re-asserting British authority would have been easier.
The moral was drawn and there was a deliberate and massive 
investment in railway development. It has been estimated
that about 75 million pounds of British capital had been
2invested in Indian railways by 1870 .
Telegraphic communications were also improving. As 
early as 1839 an experimental electric telegraph, twenty one 
miles long, was constructed in the vicinity of Calcutta under 
the direction of William 0 1Shaughnessy. He claimed it was 
the first long line ever constructed in any country, but he 
was not able to infect the East India Company or the public 
with his own enthusiasm and no serious progress was made for
*5
ten years . Then Dalhousie ordered the laying of long 
experimental lines above and below ground. Again his
1. Thorner, op.cit., p. 169*
2. l.H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital, London,
1963, p. 225:
3* Las, Economic and Social Development of Modern India,
Calcutta, 1959, PP* 109-111•
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experience in the Board of Trade proved useful, because he 
had been there when the first Act incorporating the electric 
telegraph company in England was passed. The experiments 
in India were successful and three lines were opened to the 
public in 1852, They also proved much more profitable than 
had been expected so the construction of more lines was 
authorised. In November Dalhousie was able to report that 
he had received a message from Agra, 800 miles away, in one 
hour fifty minutes. This was a dramatic moment and the 
thousands of miles of line laid during his Governor- 
Generalship revolutionised communications within India, but 
the time it took messages to pass between India and Britain 
was not cut so easily. Before the line to Bombay was 
completed, the telegraph from Calcutta to England took thirty 
five days. Thereafter it took twenty six, but the procedure 
was still tortuous. The first overland telegraph between 
Europe and India was completed in 1865> and the first direct 
cable between Britain and Bombay was laid in 1870. The 
advent of the telegraph over these long distances created 
a great disparity between the speed of news and goods. It 
also radically changed the nature of commercial dealings, 
although this was not welcomed by everyone, because 
manufacturers could get in touch directly with overseas 
markets and producers without having to negotiate through 
an intervening merchant.
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The third major improvement to internal communications 
was the introduction of a simplified postal service* The 
British "penny post", started in 1838, had proved so success­
ful that it was decided to introduce a similar scheme in India 
to replace the existing expensive, slow and rather chaotic 
arrangements* The new service “began in 1854 with a separate 
postal department under a Director-General* Basically it 
provided a uniform half anna postage for letters, one anna 
for newspapers and six annas for sea postage* The result 
was a rapid expansion in the amount of business transacted 
through the post and within five years the system was making 
a profit •
The high investment in public works and the great 
improvements to communications generally made for stronger 
government control but they also led to major economic 
changes. Easier access to the ports facilitated the export 
of foodstuffs and industrial crops. These exports brought 
money to the Indians, who were able to buy foreign manufactured 
goods, and thus the whole tempo of commerce was quickened* 
Within India legislative changes were also promoting 
business. By the early 1840*s internal customs duties 
had been abolished and export duties were being reduced 
gradually till only that on rice remained in 1874* These
1, Das, op.cit., p. 199*
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measures lowered the price of Indian goods while the 
abrogation of discrimination in favour of British shipping 
provided keener competition. Externally the steamship, 
the telegraph and later the opening of the Suez Canal were 
to increase trade.
Largely as a result of these developments the nature 
of Britain's commerce with India changed. Until the 
1850's India was known chiefly as a source of drugs, dyes, 
spices, oil, sugar, saltpetre and silk products, but whereas 
trade in these products remained static, other commodities, 
notably tea and cotton became important exports. The 
opening up of the country, particularly by railways, made 
specialised production for a market possible. The 
isolation of districts was diminished and the enormous 
variations of prices from one area to another was 
gradually reduced.
The growth in tea production also reflected its 
increasing popularity in Britain. The East India Company 
started an experimental tea garden in 1835, and officials 
of the Company and other British personnel began to grow 
tea privately on a small scale. After five years the 
experimental garden was handed over to the Assam Company, 
the first Indian Tea Company. The industry did not 
prosper however till the 1850's when it started a
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spectacular expansion over the next twenty years as the 
following figures for Assam show s
Year No* of estates Areas under Output of
under distinct cultivation tea in lbs.
proprietors (acres)
1850 1 1,876 216,000
1870 295 31,303 6,261,143
The tea habit was not only growing in Britain^ but Indian 
was gaining in popularity more rapidly than China tea.
The other commodity which came to the fore in this 
period was cotton. For a short time indeed India was 
Britain*s most important source of supply. Her share of 
Britain’s imports rose from 7$ in 1861 to about 66^ in 
1864 . Admittedly, Britain’s total, imports had dropped 
a great deal by 1864 and India’s position as the chief 
supplier of cotton only lasted till the disruption of 
imports from the United States, caused by the Civil War, 
was over. Nevertheless as a factor in the development of 
the Indian trade this interlude was important. The port 
of Bombay grew rapidly during the period, as the outlet for 
cotton and wheat from the Punjab and the United Provinces, 
and it has remained a port of first class importance ever 
since.
1. D.R. Cadgill: The Industrial Evolution of India in
Recent Times, London, 1924, p. 48.
2. Habakkuk, op.cit., pp. 774-775.
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In return India bought British textiles and 
manufactures; and until she developed her own industry, 
textiles constituted well over half of her imports from 
Britain.
*  * * *
In Mackinnonfs time Calcutta looked more metropolitan 
and had a larger European population than either Bombay or 
Madras. Besides being a major commercial centre in the 
East, it was also the seat of government in India till 
1912, so its British population contained a substantial 
official element. To a considerable extent this was 
recruited from the upper classes in Britain as the 
following quotation from Alexander’s East India magazine 
of the 1830*s shows:
”0f the number of Writers appointed from home 
during the past five years, three were the 
sons of noblemen, eight were baronets sons, 
twenty one the sons of clergymen, forty six 
the sons of Company’s civil servants, seventy 
four sons of officers in the Company’s army, 
thirty seven of officers in His Majesty's 
army and eight were sons of Directors” .
1. Quoted by R. Pearson, Eastern Interlude, Calcutta, 1954,
p. 216.
At the time of Mackinnon's arrival the members of 
this bureaucracy regarded themselves as very superior to 
the non-official Europeans* They had very little social 
contact with the non-officials while the Europeans as a 
whole did not associate with the Indians* Calcutta society 
was therefore highly stratified, but during the 1840's and 
50fs the city was changing in character fairly rapidly. 
Materially there were improvements; street lights were 
introduced in 1854, there was better sanitation and horse 
drawn cars came into use* Socially there were changes also.
First, the European traders who failed to make good 
were merging with the Eurasian community while those who 
prospered were joining the mercantile class. Second, a 
new category of European was coming to Calcutta: the
"mercantile assistant". In 1849 for example the firm 
of Mackinnon & Mackenzie brought out two assistants from 
Scotland: James Macalister Hall, a friend of Mackinnon’s,
and Peter Mackinnon, a nephew. Third, the Bengal Chamber 
of Commerce was established in 1853. This became an 
important organ for expressing the views of the commercial 
community. It helped raise the community's social status 
and acquired considerable political influence. In 1857, 
Mackinnon wrote to his nephew Peter in Calcutta saying:
"... I am glad you find the government officials affable
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and pleasant to deal with ..., hut he could not have 
written in these terms a few years earlier. Employees 
of Mackinnon & Mackenzie became prominent in the affairs 
of the Chamber, and in 1878 Duncan Mackinnon was elected 
its President. Finally, social change within the European 
community was accelerated when the Crown formally took over 
rule from the East India Company and selected its staff by 
competitive examination. This did not change the character 
of the civil service immediately, but it did reduce the 
importance of family connections and influence.
Very little is known about Mackinnon’s partner,
Robert Mackenzie, but it seems that he had inherited a
business in India from a relative Robert Mackwhinnie.*
He built this up by acquiring agencies till he was quite
a well known trader in Bengal by the 1840f s, but
unfortunately he was drowned in 1853, in a shipwreck
on his way back from Australia. Mackinnon and J.M. Hall
paid 51,000 Rupees to his brother for his share in the
z
firm which was now clearly headed by Mackinnon, with 
Hall, who lived with him at Cossipore, as his chief 
assistant.
Others who joined Mackinnon in India and made their 
careers with him included his nephew Peter Mackinnon and
x. AW. P. 2. z
3ff
Neil MacMichael. Maemichael lived at Ghazipur with Robert 
Mackenzie and later went to Australia where he stayed for 
years as the chief representative of Mackinnon’s businesses. 
Another nephew Duncan Macneill went out to India later and 
with Mackinnon*s help started his own line of small river 
steamers and obtained interests in tea and jute production.
Responsibility for the affairs of the various firms 
in India however remained in the hands of James Macalister 
Hall for about eight years after Mackinnon*s departure.
He carried out much of the work involved in establishing 
the Calcutta and Burmah Steam Navigation Company in 1856, 
while Mackinnon was on his honeymoon, and later negotiated 
contracts for the new firm. After a visit to England in 
1863 he returned to Calcutta with the clear intention of 
handing over. In January 1864 he reported that Peter 
Mackinnon*s health was fully recovered and that Peter was 
accepting greater responsibility very satisfactorily.
There were first rate assistants in every department and 
he felt he could leave Peter in charge at the end of the 
year **... without a shade of fear or cloud ...**^ . Considering 
that Hall became the second Chairman of the B.I., nearly 
thirty years later, from 1893-4, it is surprising that he 
was planning to retire from all but a very little business
1. MP. J.M. Hall to Mackinnon. Prom Calcutta, 7 January 1864
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as early as 1864* At that time his greatest ambition was 
to meet Mackinnon in Egypt in the spring of 1865, and travel 
with him to Jerusalem. He said:
”... this constant grinding with a mind occupied 
ever with £ s d and its relatives is good neither
for soul or body .
In the event his ambition was not realised. It is 
not absolutely clear why, but there seem to have been two
reasons. First, he fell off his horse and broke his collar
bone in November 1864. This did not recover as quickly as 
he had hoped and may have delayed his departure. Second, 
his father died in the spring of 1865. This was probably 
the deciding factor because he was then very anxious to get 
back to see his mother and sisters.
For Mackinnon himself the years in India provided 
invaluable experience in handling employees. While there 
he selected half a dozen subordinates, including relatives, 
who were to prove responsible and loyal but he also had his 
difficulties, particularly with the young men engaged to 
work in the new plantations. In 1865, Haworth, who managed 
the tea plantations, dismissed two European assistants 
"... for drunkenness and every other vice ...” . Three
1. MP. J.M. Hall to Mackinnon. From Calcutta, July 1864.
2. MP. Haworth to Mackinnon. From Calcutta,/ 1865.
years later he reported that a sub-manager had got into 
trouble for maltreating his coolies. When one of the 
coolies died the sub-manager was tried for manslaughter 
and sentence^ to two years in prison, where he died of 
cholera^". In another letter Haworth told of three 
plantation workers being killed by tigers.
Some of the difficulties arose because Mackinnon was
engaging in business enterprises of which there was little
experience. Plantations, for example, were a European
innovation and (with the exception of European owned indigo
plantations started in the eighteenth century) they were
2not introduced to India till the nineteenth century . This 
was because the East India Company, to safeguard its own 
interests, had placed restrictions on Europeans permanently 
acquiring land. Also there were few fertile but sparsely 
populated areas and communications were poor.
As some of these obstacles were removed, European 
sponsored industries, notably tea, coffee and jute, developed 
rapidly particularly in the decade after I860. Coffee had 
been introduced in the seventeenth century but there was 
little production and the first European coffee was not 
planted till 1840.
1. MP. Haworth to Mackinnon. Prom Calcutta, 2 October
1868.
2. Gadgill, op.cit., p. 48.
Mackinnon was not a pioneer in plantation production
but he was certainly in the field very early. In 1856,
the year he established his first shipping line he was
writing about his coffee plantation and in 1862, he
obtained a footing in tea production by forming the
Ramgah Company.* This was a Calcutta tea company for
which the firm of Mackinnon & Mackenzie were agents with
Mackinnon himself as the largest shareholder. He made
similar arrangements over the Howdie Hill Tea Garden,
while additional companies were under his relatives and
business associates such as Peter and Duncan Mackinnon,
J*M. Hall and Duncan Macneil. Between them they controlled
five tea companies by the 18701 s. Mackinnon was not
content merely to be the largest shareholder, he took a
genuine and personal interest in the way the companies
were run. Haworth who managed the tea estates wrote to
him in great detail about acreages, rainfall, irrigation
methods, the cost of labour, the time to plant seedlings,
nurseries, the height of the bushes and everything else
Z
concerning the progress of the plantations.
In the early years before the bushes had grown and 
before the management had gained experience the plantations 
ran at a loss. Even when they were well established 
serious setbacks were sometimes caused by uncontrollable
/. M -P. frtV io O v /tZ  fo  H o c k t^ u c r^  f / r f p y / P  f t £ Z  t
ffat^ay/C fa t zo Z2. d&c.
factors such as the climate, but by the late 1860fs they 
were becoming an asset. In July 1868, Hall estimated that 
the profit from the How Gong Tea Garden alone would be 
24,000 Rupees.
Haworth who was an enterprising and enthusiastic 
manager aroused Mackinnonfs interest by inventing a ”... 
system of steam tea making machinery”.* This was in 1866. 
Three years later he reported he was obtaining an estimate 
for the manufacture of it from the Eglington Engine Works. 
Whether this was the precursor of the kind of machine used 
in tea rooms now or not is unfortunately uncertain because 
the remaining correspondence about it ends abruptly. 
Mackinnonfs interest in it showed evidence of his keen 
eye for an innovation which might prove profitable as well 
as his curiosity about technical advances.
In addition to tea, Mackinnon and his associates 
also acquired interests in cotton and jute production.
India imported most of her textiles from Britain during 
the nineteenth century but a few mills were being built 
during the second half of the century. Again identifying 
the growing points of the economy at an early stage Mackinnon 
obtained an estimate in January 1864, from Hall and Haworth, 
of the cost of establishing a spinning mill. They said a 
capital outlay of about £100,000 would be required to buy
/ ,  A /./? o y f t  fa c f <2 ft*  f  '
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all the land and machinery necessary**". Various people were 
becoming interested in forming cotton spinning mills in India 
at this time because it had been shown that steam driven
machinery could be used to produce good twist and cloth from
2
short staple cotton alone . It is not clear how much 
capital Mackinnon finally put into this venture, but in 
August 1864, Hall reported that their firm at Cossipore had 
started oil crushing in a small way, while the very promising 
weaving and spinning side of the business would begin in two 
months with 88 looms at work.
Twenty years later he established the Garden Reach 
Cotton Mill, with his own Glasgow based firm of W. Mackinnon 
& Co. on control, Earlier he had acquired the Bombay Saw 
Mill, which made a particularly handsome profit in 1880
3
because of the employment created by the Afghan campaign . 
Altogether, excluding shipping lines, Mackinnon and his 
relatives and friends owned about ten companies (connected 
with growth industries such as textiles and tea production) 
in India, by the 1880*s.
1. MP. J.M. Hall to Mackinnon. Prom Calcutta, 17 July
186f*
2. MP. J.M. Hall to Mackinnon. Prom Calcutta, 21 January
1864.
3. MP. Peter Hall to Mackinnon. Prom Calcutta, 29
December 1880.
After he returned to Britain in 1856, he ran his 
businesses from Glasgow, London and, later, Balinakill.
In 1856 he married Janet Jameson, the daughter of a prominent 
Glasgow solicitor, but he continued to visit India 
periodically. These trips would have been more frequent 
had it not been for his marriage, his health and the need 
to care for his mother.
While he was on his honeymoon in Naples, in 1856, 
he wrote to his nephew Peter to explain some of these 
difficulties. He first thanked Peter for remitting £900, 
and said:
11... this will do me at present as I only want 
money enough to pay for the house in Buckingham 
Terrace which I bought - price £l,400...n
He then reported on his health but still with an 
eye on money.
11... and I have insured my life in £1,500, but I was 
obliged to pay a considerable extra prem. as the 
doctors reported my left lung slightly affected 
altho1 without any active disease. The extra is 
so considerable however that when I can spare the 
money I will cease to pay the premium and invest 
the £1,500 ... I dont know what to say about going 
out - I should like it very well next cold season 
if I am spared altho1 I hardly like to part with 
my mother. It is my intention now to have her 
live a considerable part of the time with us ...1
1. MP. Letter to Peter Mackinnon, 7 April 1856.
if 5 .
He did not say what his wife felt about the prospect 
of going, out to India, she may not have known herself at 
that time, but to judge from correspondence over his visit 
in 1863, it seems she was not very enthusiastic1 . In any 
case he was clearly very concerned by the doctor’s report 
because although he lived to seventy he was ever after 
chronically worried about his health.
Prom a business point of view it was probably best 
that he should begin to spend most of his time in Britain 
because his enterprises were spreading in kind and location. 
They included shipping, factories, plantations and agencies, 
and ranged from India to New Zealand, Australia, North 
America and Britain. The staff was growing and the inter­
locking directorships and interests of the various firms 
were becoming very complex. With poor world wide 
communications it was easier to orchestrate such multifarious 
affairs from Glasgow or London than from Calcutta or Bombay.
Although the basis of Mackinnon’s wealth was laid in 
India remarkably little is known concerning his life there.
He worked in Calcutta for about ten years but he has been 
remembered best for his involvement in the affairs of East 
Africa where he never lived at all. The Imperial British
1. MP. Haworth from Calcutta to Mackinnon in Bombay, 
12th May 1863.
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East Africa Company numbered among its directors three 
generals, Sir John Kirk, lord Brassey, formerly Civil Lord 
of the Admiralty, and other distinguished men of the time 
such as the philanthropists Thomas Powell Buxton and William 
Burdett-Coutts, whereas his companies in the East were run 
by his friends and relatives, who were virtually unknown to 
the public. These firms made his fortune, while the 
I.B.E.A. Company was a financial failure. The affairs of 
the I.B.E.A. Company were discussed by members of the British 
government from the Prime Minister downwards, but there are 
practically no records left about the firm of Mackinnon & 
Mackenzie from which Mackinnon began his spectacular rise 
in business. Africa brought him into close association 
with men as eminent as King Leopold and nearly broke his 
heart, but he retained a personal interest, as well as 
commercial links in India throughout his life.
He always seemed confident of business prospects in 
India. Not long after his marriage he was arranging to 
buy land there. He thought it would be such a good invest­
ment that he proposed to give it in trust to his wife"1".
In later years, when he had setbacks elsewhere, he regretted 
having branched! out from Calcutta. Although he became
1. MP. Letter from Mackinnon in Glasgow to John Mackenzie 
in Calcutta, 12 July 1858.
more emotionally committed to his ventures in Africa he 
seemed to feel a sense of obligation to India* When there 
was a serious famine in 1875 he sent the following telegram 
from his home at Balinakill to the Financial Secretary in 
Calcutta:
”Being anxious to facilitate Government arrange­
ments for purchasing £ood against expected famine 
have instructed Mackinnon Mackenzie place all spare 
tonnage by regular steamers from all ports at 
Government disposal reducing freights to Rupees 
ten (per ton) from Burmah ports and Madras and 
Rupees seven for distances under four hundred miles* 
Additional steamers sufficient convey fifteen thousand 
tons monthly might be arranged under Chartering Clause 
new contract deducting thirty percent from fixed rate. 
Kindly suggest anything further we can do” .
(The Government of India welcomed Mackinnon1 s offer 
and to judge from the following comments which appeared in 
a confidential memorandum written many years later it also 
very much appreciated his help:
”... In the year 1874, when the Bengal famine was at 
its height, Mackinnon persuaded his colleagues to 
abandon the prospect of profit, and he placed his 
steamers at the disposal of Government at a very low 
rate of freight. Enormous quantities of freight 
were thus carried at a time when scarcely any other 
steamers were available, and when Government would 
have been obliged to pay whatever rates might have 
been asked. There being no return trade, a loss 
was occasioned by this operation, but it enabled 
Government to meet the demand, and a special vote p 
of thanks was accorded for this valuable service ...”
1. MP. Mackinnon to Chapman, Financial Secretary, Calcutta,
6th December 1873*
2. British Museum. Brief Confidential Memorandum (India
Misc. public documents). Apparently writtenpin 1881.
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II. THE "B.I."
Mackinnon established firms in India when improvements 
to communications were increasing the flow of commerce, and 
he achieved success. Similarly, he entered the shipping 
business during a period of rapid technological progress and 
expanding trade, and for the most part was able to keep on 
the crest of the wave of change which carried him to 
prosperity.
The pressure for technological improvements was 
stimulated by the maritime rivalry between Britain and the 
United States and by the repeal of Britain’s Navigation Laws 
in 1849. These Laws had tried to protect British shipping 
by confining trade with Britain to British vessels, but 
they proved increasingly difficult to enforce, and their 
final abolition in 1849 made for keener competition. At 
the same time there was a demand for more tonnage to carry 
the bulky raw materials for the Industrial Revolution, and 
to carry emigrants from Europe. Britain herself was 
becoming a permanent importer of food on a large scale, 
which created a big demand for shipping space, and between 
1825 and 1854 an average of 52,000 people a year emigrated 
from Europe to America1. These developments led to an
1. G.E. Fayle: A short History of the World’s Shipping
Industry, London, 1933, p. 227.
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increase of over 50$ in the tonnage of British Empire 
shipping in the ten years after 1835 and accelerated the 
pace of technological innovation.
The first experiments with steamships were made in 
Prance in 1775* The next important developments occurred 
in America, then in Britain. 151 steamships were built 
in Britain in the decade after 1812 and by 1822 there were 
about 300 in the United States^*. All these were used on 
rivers, lakes and coastal services, because they were not 
economic on long runs. Even the "Savannah11, which was the 
first steamship to cross the Atlantic, went most of the way 
under sail. A crossing entirely under steam was not made 
till 1838, almost twenty years later, and about another 
score of years were to pass before steam began to compete 
with sail on long voyages.
The difficulty was that the early engines consumed 
vast quantities of fuel. This meant that a great deal of 
the space within ships was devoted to carrying coal instead 
of cargo; they could only use routes with good bunkering 
facilities, and they were expensive to run. These handicaps 
were not overcome till the invention of the compound engine 
and the adoption of the surface condenser principle. The
1. C.E. Fayle, op.cit., p. 229.
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compound engine employed steam under very much higher 
pressure and therefore used fuel much more efficiently, 
while the surface condenser produced fresh water which 
could be used over and over again. Previously, when sea 
water had been supplied to the boilers, there had been a 
great loss of fuel, because the water was being constantly 
replaced to avoid incrustation*1’.
The other change which helped to make steamships 
competitive on long runs was the use of iron in their 
construction. This technique was developed rapidly in 
Britain, largely because wood was scarce. The United 
States had virtually unlimited quantities of wood,. 
but in Britain suitable timber was rapidly becoming 
exhausted, so builders adopted iron, which was being 
produced in increasing quantities from Britain's factories. 
This had a revolutionary effect for two reasons. First, 
although iron is denser than wood, it is so much stronger 
that less material is needed. It was found that an iron 
ship weighed about 25$ less than a wooden one of the same 
size. This was particularly important for steamships, 
because size for size they were able to carry more fuel 
than before without loss of buoyancy. They also required 
more space than sailing ships to accommodate engines and
1. W*S. Lindsays History of Merchant Shipping. London,.1874, 
Vol. iv, p. 576
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boilers. Second, much larger ships could be built. It was 
not practicable to build wooden ships of more than about 300 
feet in length, but with the use of iron there was virtually 
no structural limitation. Their size was determined more by 
the capacity of harbours and canals and the needs of particular 
types of cargo. Altogether the salient changes were from sail 
to steam, wood to iron, paddle to screw propulsion and from 
simple to compound engines. The cumulative effects of these 
developments transformed the nature of the world*s sea trade 
during Mackinnon*s lifetime. This is well illustrated by the 
following table about four Cunard line ships:
1840. Britannia. Wood built. Paddle. Simple Side 
Lever Engines.
1855. Persia. Iron. Paddle. Simple Side Lever Engines.
1865. Java. Iron. Screw. Simple Inverted Engines.
1874. Bothnia. Iron. Screw. Compound Engines.
Name Tons
Gross
I.H.P. Average
Speed
Knots
Coal
per
day
tons
Bunker
Capacity
Tons
Cargo
Capacity
Tons
Cabin
Passen­
gers
Britannia 1,159 740 8.3 38 640 225 90
Persia 5,300 3,600 12.9 150 1,640 1,100 180
Java 2,697 2,440 12.8 85 1,100 1,100 160
Bothnia 4,556 2,780 13.0 63 940 3,000 340 x ;
1. The Bothnia could carry also 800 third class passengers.
2. C.E. Fayle, op.cM'.
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A surprising fact is that Mackinnon's first ship, 
the nCape !of Good Hope”, was a screw steamer. It is 
surprising because such ships were not competitive as 
early as the mid 1850’s. He was able to run it profitably 
however because he enjoyed a subsidy. Steamships could 
not compete with sail on long runs at that time unless they 
were subsidised, but many, like Mackinnon's, were to provide 
regular, reliable mail services.
Here it is worth mentioning another innovation which 
contributed to the eventual triumph of steam —  the 
introduction of scheduled services. They were started 
by the Black Ball line of the United States in 1816. 
Previously it was accepted that ships did not sail till 
there was a favourable wind, but this line showed that by 
using steam-tugs the vagaries of the weather could mostly 
be disregarded. Its ships departed on the first day of 
each month, whether they had a full cargo or not. Prom 
the point of view of passengers and traders, this idea 
brought a welcome degree of predictability and showed that 
steam could be more reliable than sail, even though it was 
not then as fast.
Steam really became competitive on most of the 
world's shipping lines at about the time of the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869* By coincidence the compound
ST2
engine was becoming a practicable proposition then, but 
the Canal gave an advantage to steamers, because it 
shortened the way to the East and opened a route well 
provided with bunker stations. Although this period 
is generally regarded as the turning point in the competition 
between sail and steam, the total tonnage under sail in the 
world did not begin to decline till about 1880, and it was 
not exceeded by that of steamships for another decade.
The run to Australia, lacking good bunker facilities, 
remained dominated by sail till well into the 1880’s.
* * * *
The first meeting to discuss the possibility of 
forming a steamship company to trade with India was held 
in London in 1822, and Lieutenant (later Captain) Johston 
was sent out to study the situation in India. Following 
negotiations there, the Indian government offered a prize 
of twenty thousand rupees to anyone establishing permanent 
steam communication between Britain and India before the 
end of 1826, either by the Cape of Good Hope or the Red 
Sea. There were to be two voyages out and two home, each 
one taking not more than seventy days^. On this news, 
sufficient money was raised in Britain and India for the
1. W.S. Lindsay5 op-clK p.
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promoters to have the "Enterprise” built, and she left 
England on the 16th August 1825• Her voyage via the 
Cape took 115 days, so it was expensive and slow and did 
not win the prize. From a commercial point of view it 
was a failure, and at the time it was also regarded as a 
poor advertisement for steamships, because the "Enterprise" 
spent ten of the days at ports replenishing her coal stocks, 
in spite of using sails for about 40fo of the way^. In 
terms of steam navigation, however, the voyage was a 
remarkable demonstration of the potential capacity of 
such ships over long distances. It was made only six 
years after the first transatlantic crossing by a steamship 
and four years before the first crossing by a British built 
steam vessel. The "Enterprise" herself was certainly not 
a complete failure, because she was bought by the East 
India Co. and used for carrying despatches between Calcutta 
and Rangoon during the first Burmese war. Moreover her 
performance induced the Company, over the next few years, 
to buy a number of small steamships for use on the major 
rivers of India and Burmah. In this capacity the ships 
were most useful and enabled the Company to keep its army 
in Assam better supplied. However they only proved what 
had already been demonstrated in North America, namely,
1. H.L. Hoskins, British Routes to India, London, 1928, p. 96.
athat steamers were practicable on inland waterways. The 
problems of speeding communication between Britain and India 
remained.
The route to the East via the Cape had been taken 
for granted for nearly 200 years but the Napoleonic wars 
and the need for more rapid communications of all kinds 
stimulated a search for alternatives. For about a decade 
after the voyage of the ’Enterprise”, various schemes were 
proposed and tried using overland routes. The two most 
popular were by the Eed Sea and across Egypt, or via the 
Persian Gulf and Euphrates and across to the Mediterranean. 
These traditional routes had been used since ancient times, 
but they did not have the capacity to cope with the volume 
of trade of the nineteenth century, and the East India 
Company was not prepared to spend the capital necessary 
to develop them. In this situation there was a feeling 
of considerable frustration within the mercantile community.
Exports to India had increased after the East India 
Company’s trade monopoly was ended, but expectations were 
not fulfilled. Poor communications were a major obstacle, 
so pressure was brought by businessmen in Britian and India 
to obtain government support for the introduction of 
steamships on the route to India and for the building of 
railways within India. Captain Grindlay, founder of the
banking firm of Grindlay & Co., argued in a manifesto of 
1837 that trade with the vast and populous country of India 
had not grown as it should, because of the East India 
Company’s monopoly, and because of the great distances 
involved* How that the monopoly had been ended he urged 
that the second obstacle of distance should be overcome by 
the use of steamships* India could then develop as a major 
exporter of raw materials for British industry and as an 
importer of British manufactures. A regular steamship 
service would also be useful politically. It would 
strengthen Britain’s position in India against possible 
internal disorder and against possible external inter­
vention, for example, by Bussia. He thought also that 
the production of cotton and silk should be promoted, so 
that India would be an alternative source of supply.
With remarkable foresight, he warned that supplies 
of silk from Europe and cotton from America might be 
disrupted in the evjent of war. The most interesting 
feature of the manifesto, however, from the point of view 
of the future B.I., was the case it put in favour of 
government support for steamship lines. It deployed 
arguments about Britain's strategic, political and 
commercial interests which were echoed twenty years 
later by Mackinnon when he applied for subsidies and mail
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contracts. The powerful lobby, of which Grindlay was a 
particularly articulate member, achieved success in 1840, 
when the British Government agreed to subsidise a regular 
service to be run by the P. & 0. between England and 
Alexandria. Two years later the East India Company, 
cautious and slow as usual, awarded a contract for a P. & 0. 
line between Calcutta and Suez. This was a logical development 
providing a good mail service, with only a relatively short 
distance for the movement of goods overland.
The annual subsidies were respectively £34,000 and 
£20,000 . Prom these two lines the P. & 0. extended its 
activities to Singapore and China, and by the end of the 
1840fs it was the dominant shipping company in the Indian 
Ocean. In 1853 it started a subsidised service between 
Singapore and Sydney, but this was closed a year later 
because of difficulties created by the Crimean War, and 
when tenders were invited for a new monthly direct line 
between Australia and Suez, the P. & 0. failed to win the 
contract. The contract was interesting, because it 
specified the use of screw steamers of not less than 
2,200 tons and offered a very generous subsidy. The 
European and Australian Company which agreed to run the 
line was so inexperienced, however, that it failed
1. D. Thorner, op.cit., pp. 35-56.
completely, and by 1859 the service was in the hands of
the P. & 0.
* * * *
Mackinnon entered this highly competitive field in 
1856, when he applied for a subsidised mail service contract 
between Calcutta and Burmah. The East India Company had 
been running the service itself, starting with the famous 
"Enterprise”, but it became persuaded that it would be more 
economic to allow another firm to do this with a subsidy*
Mackinnon returned to Britain, and in London and 
Glasgow raised £55,000 with which he established the 
Calcutta and Burmah Steam Navigation Company, registered 
in September 1856. He then submitted to the Court of 
Directors of the East India Company in London a scheme for 
running the steam service between Calcutta, Akyab, Rangoon 
and Moulme.in, with the possibility of extending it to 
Penang and Singapore and of linking with Madras. He 
said he could start from about the 15th March 1857- The 
Court forwarded the application to the Government of India, 
with the comment that it attached great importance to the 
application of private enterprise in the establishment of 
regular communications by steamers of adequate size and 
power, and would consider any measures for this purpose
which the Government might submit^". In fact the Government 
awarded the contract the following month to Livingston, 
Withers & Co*, and Mackinnon*s first attempt to win a 
subsidised service seemed to have failed. However, there 
was a surprising development. In March, 1857 this firm 
replied to the Government sayings
"... Our friends at home instruct us to request 
you, should there be no objection existing on 
your part, to transfer our agreement to Messrs. 
Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co., Agents of the Calcutta 
& Burmah Steam Navigation Co.,1 alleging as their 
reason for this request, that'in their opinion 
"Government will be well satisfied to find two 
steamers on the berth by the 1st April, quite 
equal to the service,” whereas it would take them 2 
some time to get out good and efficient steamers...”
Prom the tone of this letter Livingston, Withers 
& Co. were obviously sceptical about the reasons given by 
their "friends”, but whether Mackinnon who was also in 
Britain influenced these "friends" or not is not clear.
His letter of the 8th November, 1856 (quoted below) 
however, suggests that he knew a good deal about the 
other firms plans, but was nevertheless urging his cousin 
Peter Mackinnon to proceed with negotiations and arrangements 
for his own company. The Government of India agreed to the 
proposed transfer, and Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co. accepted
1. Letter of 5th November 1856 from the Court to the Govt.
of India, I.O.L. Becord Dpt: vol.101, 1856.
2. Letter of 18th March 1857* I.O.L. Public Consultations,
January - November 1857, Bange 88, vol. 44.
the contract on the terms which had been conveyed to 
Livingston, Withers & Co., with only minor modifications.
This event was a major turning point in Mackinnon1e life, 
starting his career in the shipping business.
The contract was with the East India Co., which 
still nominally governed Burmah. In itself it was not 
very valuable, but it guaranteed a certain income and gave 
considerable prestige to the company which won it. Moreover 
it began what was to be a mutually beneficial association 
with the Government of India. The Calcutta & Burmah Steam 
Navigation Co., and its successor the B.I., were regularly 
to carry troops for the government. The first occasion 
was during the Indian Mutiny, when Mackinnon's "Cape of 
Good Hope" carried most of the 37th Regiment of Foot 
from Ceylon to India.
The letter which Mackinnon wrote to his cousin 
Peter after he established the new company is worth quoting 
from, in view of the action subsequently taken by Livingston, 
Withers & Co. It is also illuminating about his capacity 
for keeping are eye on business and the other on religious 
observance. He said:
"... If you get a government subsidy the shares 
will at once go to a premium and for this end I 
trust you have exerted yourself to the utmost ...
6o
I believe that Livingston & Co. have done nothing 
whatsoever yet so you must get all you can from 
government and bind the Company by as few restrictions 
as possible. See and secure land for coal depots at 
Akyab, Rangoon and Moulmein. This I believe was 
promised to Livingston & Co. and is of some importance. 
Get too if you can moorings opposite our own office it 
would be very convenient and this I believe there 
should be no difficulty in securing. I trust these 
matters will be carefully and judiciously managed by 
you.
The Secretary will inform you that the steamers 
are not to leave any port on Sunday nor is there any 
cargo or coals to be loaded or discharged on that day. 
Keep this in view in your arrangements with the 
Government. The other directors and Secretary 
concur cordially in this matter with me, at which 
I am heartily glad for our own sakes were it no 
other or higher satisfaction. My opinion is the 
steamers should sail from Calcutta or Moulmein every 
alternate Tuesday and each terminous would be reached 
by Saturday night. If we have three steamers the^ 
line can be prolonged to Penang and Singapore ...” .
In fact Mackinnon’s first two ships, the ”Cape of 
Good Hope” and the ’’Baltic”, were not very suitable for the 
mail run between Calcutta and Burmah, and in June 1857 he 
told James Macalister Hall to adapt the ”Baltic” for the 
service. He explained, with his usual attention to 
detail, the changes which should be made to her cabins, 
poop and deck house, and estimated that the cost would be 
about £1,000. The ”Cape of Good Hope” was apparently not 
modified, probably because she became virtually a troop-ship. 
In any case she made a good start and Mackinnon reported
~ K P , ------------- ------------ -----------------------
1./Letter of 8th November 1856 from Mackinnon in Glasgow 
* to Peter Mackinnon in Calcutta.
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very proudly that she earned £3>000 on her first voyage^".
He thought her working expenses on the voyage could not 
have exceeded £1,000, but he emphasised that, if they were 
to get a clear idea of profits, they would have to keep 
earnings distinct from coal payments# He hoped to be able 
to divide 10$ on paid up capital by September, but in the 
meantime asked for detailed estimates of the running 
expenses of each ship on each trip. With simple as 
opposed to compound engines still in use coaling was a 
major item of expenditure. Mackinnon was very conscious 
of this, and in the same letter asked that account of the 
expenditure on coal on each voyage should be sent home, 
together with a note of the stock held at each port. To 
reduce overhead expenses, he also said that in future there 
was to be no coaling at Moulmein or Rangoon, only at 
Calcutta and Akyab.
With good management and good fortune to begin with, 
the ••Baltic” proved almost as profitable as the "Cape of 
Good Hope11. In June 1858, J.M. Hall reported that her 
last voyage had earned about £2,200 and that he had been 
able to remit £4,000 to each director.
1. He actually wrote ”30000” but one rupee was then worth
about two shillings.
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The good management was largely Mackinnon1 s, while 
the good fortune came in the form of trooping contracts. 
The government’s marine service had proved inadequate for 
moving troops during the Mutiny, hut Mackinnon was able to 
help in the emergency, and thereafter trooping contracts 
became a regular feature of his business. These were 
negotiated by Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co. as his agents, 
and it is interesting to note some of their terms. They 
offered to carry troops, Commissariat, ordnance stores 
and all other kinds of freight between all the ports of 
the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, as well 
as the ports of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. flUative 
troops’1 were to be carried as deck passengers at the 
uniform rate of half an anna per passenger mile, there 
would be double awnings on each deck, and each soldier 
would be allowed a space of six feet by one foot three 
inches. Pood, water and fuel would be provided at the 
standard Commissariat scale of six annas per head per day, 
and each soldier would be allowed 56 pounds weight of 
baggage free, in addition to narms and accoutrements”. 
European troops were offered a little more space and 
better supplies at slightly more than double the costs 
one rupee and four annas per day"1". The profitability
1. MP. Mackinnon/Mackenzie & Co. to the Secretary of the 
Government of India, 18th June 1865.
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of trooping contracts obviously varied a good deal, but 
Hall’s estimate that they would get a return of 8$ on the 
Abyssinian campaign indicates their value.
While the Mutiny brought Mackinnon unexpected and 
profitable business, it would be a mistake to believe that 
he owed his business success to good luck. Indeed, it 
could be argued that on balance fortune seemed to be against 
him at the outset of his career in shipping. During the 
period 1856-70 thirty nine ships were built or otherwise 
acquired for his companies and of these seven were somehow 
lost"1'. Considering that the B.I. and P. & 0. eventually 
merged, it is ironical that Mackinnon’s first ship;the 
’’Cape of Good Hope”; sank following a collision with the 
P. & 0 ’s "Nemesis” in 1859* The following year his ’’Calcutta” 
was wrecked off the coast of Ireland shortly after it was 
launched. The ’’Baltic” was later wrecked, the ’’Cheduba” 
was lost in a cyclone in the Bay of Bengal, and so on. One 
ship was even looted by pirates, but the story ended happily 
after years of haggling, when the Turkish government 
compensated the company.
1. G. Blake: op.cit., p. 253*
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The loss of the "Cape of Good Hope" and "Calcutta" 
were major set-backs for a newly established company, but 
considering the whole period of Mackinnon’s business life 
his ships were not peculiarly accident prone* Tragedies 
at sea were more common in the nineteenth century than they 
are now, because of the unsophisticated design of ships in 
the early days of steam navigation, the lack of aids such 
as weather forecasts and radar, and the absence of maps and 
coastal lighting.
* * # * *
The loss of ships during the 1850’s and ’60*8 caused 
setbacks to Mackinnon’s business in and around India, but 
his venture into the Australian trade began even less 
auspiciously. He and his partner Robert Mackenzie were 
induced to try and start training there by the Australian 
boom of 1852-53, but their enterprise was frustrated by 
Mackenzie’s death in 1853- Three years later Neil Macmichael 
went out to manage Mackinnon’s interests in Australia, and 
in 1862 almost suffered the same fate as Mackenzie.
<5
He was in the "White Swan" with about 45 others on 
his way from Auckland to Wellington when the ship struck a 
submerged reef. All but one of the passengers were 
government representatives, who were going to attend 
the opening session of the General Council in Wellington. 
Macmichael was asleep at the time, and did not even notice 
the impact. He was awakened by the voices of other 
passengers remarking that they felt peculiar tremors 
in their berths. The alarm was sounded, and people 
rushed up on deck in various states of undress. The 
ship gradually sank up to its bullwarks, and when the 
dawn broke they found they were grounded on a steep beach 
with a heavy surf running. The captain and mate were 
apparently useless, and everything depended upon the 
passengers. Eventually a boat was lowered and used 
to explore the coast for a safe landing place. When 
a suitable beach was found, the boat returned and removed 
all the passengers, beginning with the six women. For a 
time the ship's engines continued to run and her head kept 
towards the shore, but as soon as the water entered the 
engine room she was washed broadside onto the shore, where 
the surf smashed her to pieces. Macmichael at great risk 
put off in a boat to look in vain for his portmanteau, and 
the Postmaster-General of Hew Zealand with equal lack of
success looked for valuable government papers which were 
lost. Most of the men occupied an iron shed which they 
found about a mile away, and some camped outside while 
the women were taken to a squatter's house about four 
miles beyond. From there, two passengers who knew the 
area borrowed horses and rode 120 miles into Wellington, 
and got a relief steamer to pick up the other passengers 
within a few days'*'.
Quite apart from personal misfortunes such as these, 
business in Australia was generally bad, and Macmichael 
only seems to have been cheerful when he visited Britain 
in 1859> and when he received letters from Mackinnon which 
were usually encouraging to subordinates, and often ended 
on a note of moral uplift such as this which he wrote to 
his cousin in 1856:
"... Remember me also to all friends who ask for
me, and my dear Peter ever desiring for you above
all things else that you may grow in grace and
have every need for blessing."
Macmichael's reply to one of these letters is worth quoting 
in part because it sheds a little light on each of their 
characters. Writing from Sydney in I860 he said
1. MP. N. Macmichael to Mackinnon from Melbourne, 25th 
July 1862.
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"... I cannot thank you sufficiently for all your 
kind remarks - the spirit of them is so like 
yourself and so deeply affects me that I cannot 
well tell you how full my heart is A kind word
in a distant land is so refreshing - I have never 
before felt myself so far from home and have as 
strong a turn of homesickness as I ever felt
I have not I must confess been in the best of 
spirits since coming here for I find business so 
bad and credit shaken to its roots1that I am 
almost inclined to lose heart .
A month later he said the firm had lost £2,000 in 
bad debts since he went to Australia, and in 1861 he 
reported liabilities exceeding assets by about £11,000.
The surprising thing is that Mackinnon should have persisted 
in maintaining interests in Australia, when he clearly 
thought poorly of the prospects himself. When asked for 
advice on how a friendfs son should enter business in 1858, 
he wrote optimistically about the future in India, but said 
his own experience in Australia had been not only 
unprofitable but expensive.
Possibly Mackinnon, or someone of James Lyle Mackay’s 
calibre, could have made a success of the agency even in the 
1850*s, but the representatives after the death of Robert 
Mackenzie could not. In 1858 Mackinnon wrote in great 
detail to W. Hammill in Melbourne asking him to negotiate 
a subsidised mail service between Sydney and Singapore, but
1. MP. N. Macmichael to Mackinnon, 14 March 1860.
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nothing came of it* In addition Hammill mishandled his 
efforts to secure contracts in the railway building 
business in Australia. Mackinnon's main contact, Neil 
Macmichael, was a difficult personality who looked after 
other interests besides those of the B.I. In 1860 Jack 
Mactaggart left business in Australia worth over £20,000 
in his hands, and he seems to have known something about 
ranching, because he visited land which Mackinnon owned in 
Australia, and said it could only fetch an economic rent 
if it were fenced. He also advised about Mackinnon's 
property in New Zealand, which he visited while leaving 
his office in the hands of his nephew, a clerk and another 
young man. The fourteen years or so he spent in Australia 
were not a commercial success, and he seems to have 
quarrelled with many of his business associates, but 
it was perhaps the sensitive and more attractive side 
of his character which proved a handicap in business.
In 1862 he declined Mackinnon’s offer of a job in 
India because he feared someone might be displaced to make 
way for him, and also because he felt reluctant to accept 
another position from Mackinnon after losing money for him 
in Australia. In fact he did return to the B.I. office 
in Calcutta some years later, but this reaction in 1862 
was surprisingly unbusinesslike, and in the following year
he turned down another opportunity for a good steady income. 
He was offered £300 a year to run a sheep and cattle station, 
but declined, mainly because the squatters used to meet to 
hunt down Aborigines if any of their stock was stolen. 
Macmichael said he could not bear the idea of shooting a 
man for merely killing a sheep^*
Although Mackinnon might have got some enterprises 
to prosper in Australia under dynamic management, in the 
1850*s and ^O's, he was in fact faced with two major 
economic problems which no personality could entirely 
overcome. First, it was difficult to find enough cargo 
for the return trip. Distances between the chief Australian 
ports: Freemantle, Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne were
enormous and the staple exports were not being produced 
in a way to provide regular full cargoes. Second, 
steamships were not really efficient over such long 
distances during that period. As already mentioned 
it was the compound engine which made them competitive 
on long voyages with few bunkering facilities. It is 
no coincidence, therefore, that Mackinnon only began to 
operate a profitable shipping line to Australia in the 
18801s.
1. MP. N. Macmichael to Mackinnon, 20th November 1863.
Jo
In 1880 Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, the Prime Minister 
of Queensland, consulted him about the possibility of 
running a regular service to Brisbane. Ships bringing 
immigrants to Australia normally approached Brisbane from 
the South, putting in at Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney, 
where the passengers tended to disembark. Mcllwraith1s 
idea was to attract them to Queensland by providing a 
service which called first at Brisbane and the B.I. was 
an obvious company to approach, because it already had 
ships on regular routes to South East Asia.
A contract for £55,000 a year was signed for what 
was the longest mail service in the world'*', and in April 
1881 the first ship of the new service arrived in Brisbane, 
carrying freezing equipment and immigrants. The voyage 
from London took two months, and the problems of finding 
return cargoes remained acute. However, more immigrants 
were attracted to Queensland, and the trade with Australia 
was growing, and in 1887 various small shipping firms 
which had been competing, joined together to form the 
Australasian United Steam Navigation Company which included 
vessels from the B.I. Further rationalisation of the 
coastal shipping business round Australia was achieved 
years later by James Lyle Mackay, but the outstanding
1. G. Blake: op^cit.tp*:c.li2 and p. 114*
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feature of Mackinnon’s enterprise in Australia is that it
took almost thirty years to establish a profitable trade,
and it was always a minor sphere of interest for him.
Having mentioned the problems of his Australian ventures
one must ask why his business in India by contrast prospered
from the outset.
* * * *
Trade in India and the Indian Ocean was by no means 
easy, and a number of small steamship companies went 
bankrupt in the early 1850’s. The most noteworthy from 
Mackinnon’s point of view was the General Screw Steamship 
Company, from which he bought the ’Cape of Good Hope”. 
Although founded with substantial capital, this company 
was forced into liquidation, so why did Mackinnon succeed 
where others failed? There are short and long term 
reasons.
Immediately, he was fortunate to establish his 
shipping company at the time of the Indian Mutiny, which 
quite unexpectedly provided him with profitable troop 
carrying contracts. During the six years following the 
Mutiny the number of British troops in the Indian army 
was raised from 45,000 to 65,000, while the Indian element 
was reduced from 238,000 to 140,0001 . This change created
1* T* Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857-70,
Princeton, 1965, p. 297.
a demand for more troop carriers, from which Mackinnon 
benefited. The Mutiny also promoted his prospects by 
making the Government of India conscious of the need for 
better communications and mail services. It was thus more 
ready to offer subsidies on the security and steady income 
of which his firm depended for profits during its early 
years.
In the long run he was helped by the technological 
advances in navigation, which have already been described, 
by the general growth in trade and the opening of the Suez 
Canal. He was helped, that is, to the extent that he was 
able to take advantage of these developments, whereas his 
competitors who went into liquidation were not. Hia 
personal ability was thus a major factor in his success.
He appreciated the potential of steam navigation, 
for example, before most of his rivals, and was well in 
advance in ordering large screw steamers built in Scotland 
or Liverpool. These ships were particularly useful on 
routes where there were bulky cargoes, and from the middle 
of the century they began to displace the smaller ones, 
mostly built in North America. He was also more astute 
than most in foreseeing the possibilities of the Suez 
Canal. It was not entirely a coincidence that his ttIndia‘* 
(on its way to have new boilers fitted in Britain) was the
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first ship to pass through the canal carrying an Indian 
cargo.
In addition to his shrewdness in anticipating 
developments, his other outstanding quality as a businessman 
lay in his capacity to pay attention to details about people, 
ships, cargoes, prices, contracts and the many other aspects 
of his various enterprises* Not long hf.ter his shipping 
company was established he said to J.M. Hall:
"... You seem to be having trouble with Scanlan - .
Don’t stand any nonsense from him* He is a good, 
captain but we must not allow him to be anything 
but captain of his ship. 350/- a month was the 
wages promised the first year and no commission.
If he gets that and makes as much more out of the 
funding of the ship he is uncommonly well off and 
if that dont satisfy him you must just look out 
for someone else ...f
He was rather authoritarian in his attitude to 
subordinates but he expected them to be frank with him, 
and this contributed to improving the efficiency of his 
business. On one occasion his nephew Peter complained 
very plainly from Calcutta about a new B.I. ship which had 
been sent out to him. He said she was a "slop built" 
vessel altogether. The water closets for men did not 
work, while the water pipe connecting with the women’s 
one caused a flood in the cabin whenever water was put 
in the cistern. He concluded his complaints saying:
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"... I wish things were better attended to on your ^ 
side for they give much annoyance to passengers ...lf
These were strong words to address to the Chairman of the 
company, but Mackinnon*s reaction to fair criticism was not to 
discourage it but to rectify the defects. This policy was 
effective. It earned him the loyalty of his employees, it 
raised the standard of his service and his business prospered. 
The sense of loyalty was probably increased by his efforts to 
help fellow countrymen. Campbeltown whisky was bought for 
his shipping lines, local people were encouraged to buy shares 
in his companies and he offered employment to as many as he 
could. The two succeeding Chairmen of the B.I., J.M. Hall 
and Duncan Mackinnon, were from Campbeltown and others from 
Kintyre rose to prominence in his firms.
The first phase in the development of his shipping 
enterprise covered the period of the existence of the Calcutta 
and Burmah Steam Navigation Company. Pounded with two ships 
and £35,000 capital in 1856, its name was changed to the 
British India Steam Navigation Company with 17 ships and 
£400,000 in 1862. This phase was also the period of his first 
five year cohtract which began in 1857. When it expired in 
1862, he returned to India to negotiate fresh contracts, and 
had his fateful meeting with Sir Bartle Prere, who became a 
close and useful friend for the rest of his life. Prere was
1. MP. Peter Mackinnon to Mackinnon, 6 June 1863*
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in Calcutta as a member of the Governor-General1s Council.
He tried to overcome the social barriers among Europeans, and 
one means he adopted was to hold semi-public breakfasts once a 
week, when he was available to the various classes of this 
community. It was at one of these that Mackinnon was 
introduced, and proposed to run a line of coasting steamers 
calling at all ports between Calcutta and Karachi. Frere, 
who believed it was more economical for government to have its 
troops and mails carried by companies than to run its own 
services, said: w... You are the man I have been looking for
for years . ..M and took him to the Governor-General, lord 
Canning, who was favourably impressed1 .
In this year Mackinnon secured contracts for the 
following five services:
1. Calcutta to Akyab, Rangoon and Moulmein, twice
a month.
2. Calcutta to Chittagong and Akyab, twice a month.
3* Akyab to Rangoon direct, thence to Moulmein,
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, once a month.
4* Bombay to Karachi, twice a mont£.
5. Bombay to Basra, touching at five ports in^the 
Persian Gulf during eight voyages a year .
The proposal for a service calling at ports between 
Calcutta and Bombay required the approval of the Bombay 
government, and this was not obtained till Sir Bartle Frere
1. J. Martineau, The Life of Sir Bartle Frere, London, 1908,
p. 296.
2. M.P. Mentioned in a memorandum written by Mackinnon on
15 January 1868, and sent to the Government of India.
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bebameoGove.rnor there in 1863* The five year contract then 
obtained was of great importance for the B.I.'s position in 
the Indian coasting trade, because it provided for a monthly 
service calling at fifteen intermediate ports.
Mackinnon fully acknowledged his debt to Frere when he
said:
”... This great company took its first impulse from the 
encouragement given by Frere to a young and unknown man 
at his breakfast table in Chowringhee Road
In 1868 Hall, looking for a way of repaying Frere, 
suggested he would be a first class man to have on the 
board of the B.I., but on reflection realised that Frere 
as a member of the Indian Council would not accept such a 
position. Frere not only supported Mackinnon's applications 
to run subsidised services round India, but also, as Governor 
of Bombay, encouraged his enterprise in the Persian Gulf.
The British and Indian governments attached great strategic 
importance to the area between the Euphrates/Tigris delta 
and the Mediterranean, being particularly anxious to exclude 
Russian power. Sir Bartle Frere probably thought a regular 
B.I. service would help to assert British influence in the 
area, but he was also pursuing a long standing policy of the 
Bombay government, which sought a viable route which would 
avoid the Cape. lines via South Africa lead more naturally
1. Martineau: op.cit., p. 298.
*
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to Calcutta, whereas a route through the Mediterranean would 
enhance the relative importance of Bombay. As early as the 
1820*s, Mountstuart Elphinstone, while Governor of Bombay, 
put forward various proposals involving the transport of 
goods overland for short distances. One suggestion was 
that steamers should make contact across the Isthmus of 
Suez, but it was not considered practicable, and steamship 
enthusiasts were discouraged while these proposals were 
being discussed by the commercial failure of the voyage 
of the "Enterprise”.
The contracts which Mackinnon won in 1862 and 1863 
provided the basis for the B.I.’s growth over the next 
decade. The opening of the Suez canal in 1869 created 
special problems which will be mentioned later, but up to 
1868 the company grew very rapidly, as Mackinnon pointed 
out himself when he applied for renewal of the contracts 
in that year. He said, in 1857 his company only ran
50.000 miles a year, and owned three vessels averaging 
600 tons and 100 horsepower, while ten years later it ran
400.000 miles annually and owned 25 ships averaging 1,000 
tons and 200 horsepower. He claimed that their size and 
horsepower was 30$ in excess of contract requirements and 
that the B.I.’s trade was 200,000 tons annually. The 
average subsidy was just over three shillings and sixpence
$8
per mile, and three shillings on the Bombay-Calcutta line1 .
While the contracts of 1862 and f63 established the 
framework of the B.I.'s lines, Mackinnon continually added 
to this framework by applying for extensions or for more 
frequent services on existing lines where the volume of 
trade justified it. This created such a complex variety 
of contracts that the Director-General of India’s Post 
Office was consulted about the advisability of making all 
the B.I.’s contracts terminable on the same date. He 
appreciated the administrative advantages, but feared that 
individual proposals would not receive the attention they 
each merited if they were dealt with en bloc. He therefore 
proposed grouping the contracts into those between:
Calcutta and the ports of British Burmah and the 
straits;
Madras and Rangoon; Calcutta and Bombay; Bombay 
and Karachi, and Bombay and the Persian Gulf.
Where services were not connected, he thought it desirable
p
to deal with each one separately .
Mackinnon succeeded in obtaining subsidies, because 
he offered competitive terms and an efficient service, but 
he also became adept at deploying the kind of arguments 
which were attractive to the government^. When he applied
J u  TfCC fcV'H'h O l\
1. M.P. Sam^/memorandum of 15th January 18681
2. I.0.1. Collections to Despatches, 1868, Vol. 48.
3* A typical contract appears as Appendix I.
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in 1868 for renewal of the Bombay-Calcutta contract, for 
example, he said the greatest value of the line lay in the 
facilities it afforded for the transport of troops, stores 
and specie between the Presidency cities. The possession 
of a large number of steamers had enabled the company to 
provide eight ships for the Abyssinian expedition, as well 
as an extra one for reliefs between Madras, Rangoon and the 
Straits of Malacca. In addition, the existence of a 
regular and reliable service had stimulated trade at many 
of the ports and raised the revenue accruing to government. 
It completed the system of steam communication round India, 
and would be of greater value to the Post Office, so he 
claimed, if more frequent services were introduced.
Inevitably some of Mackinnon1s efforts to win 
contracts for subsidised services failed, but it is 
instructive to refer to them. In addition to his abortive 
attempt to establish a subsidised line between Sydney and 
Singapore, he also failed in 1858 to secure a contract for 
a service between Madras and Burmah. His letter from 
Europe to J.M. Hall in Calcutta, however, shows how he 
set about this sort of task. He said the P. & 0. was 
getting 6/8d. on the whole of their contract and the 
Australiasian Co. 13/4d. so Hall should be able to get 
at least 10/-. He continued rather optimistically to
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work out that if they could get 13/4d. per mile, a return 
voyage between Madras and Rangoon would bring £1,200 in 
subsidy, the distance between the two ports being about 
900 miles. He instructed Hall to make the arrangements 
in their own names if he got a promise of a good subsidy, 
as there would be no difficulty about establishing an 
independent company. He thought it would be easy to 
bring out a scheme such as he proposed on the Stock 
Exchange, then reflected that this perhaps would not be 
the best method as they might be worried by disagreeable 
shareholders.
Although he failed to get the subsidised service 
the implications of his remark are clear from a letter he 
wrote two months later to his friend John Pender. He 
asked Pender if he would like shares in a company he was 
hoping to establish. He said:
"... Until the line has been tested only a very 
small outlay will be required and it is therefore 
my intention for the present only to issue 1,000 
shares among ... seven or eight friends ... I feel 
pretty confident under ordinary circumstances of 
the success of the scheme, but as you will observe 
my intention is to enter upon it very cautiously ^
and to feel our way as we did with the Burmah Co. ..."
In 1864, Hall's attempt to obtain a subsidy for a 
monthly service to Singapore met with a cool reception. 
Writing from Calcutta, he told Mackinnon that the Governor-
1. MP. Mackinnon to John Pender from Glasgow, 25th August 
1858.
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General"*" took a very different view from that taken ,by Sir 
Bartle Frere about the claims of the B*I. on government. He 
thought government should withdraw from subsidising steamship 
companies, as they were doing in the case of railways. Hall 
ascertained these views in the first instance from one of the 
Governor-General *s staff, but they were confirmed some weeks 
later when a brief formal letter came in reply to the 
application, saying that in the opinion of the Governor- 
General in Council the advantages of the proposed service, from 
a postal and commercial point of view, would not justify the 
outlay of sixty thousand rupees a year.
/
In spite of set-backs such as these, however, a number
of extensions were secured in the period 1862-68, and two are
worth mentioning. --  The increase in the frequency of the
Persian Gulf service, because the B.I. largely pioneered the
area for British shipping, and the creation of the Netherlands
India Steam Navigation Co., because this took Mackinnon's
trading interests well into South East Asia.
* * * * *
In May 1865, W. Nicol & Co., as agents for the B.I. in 
Bombay, applied to the government of Bombay for the subsidised 
mail service between Bombay and the Persian Gulf, to be run 
twenty four instead of eight times a year. Mackinnon had
1. After the Mutiny the Government of India was headed by the 
Viceroy but he was often still called Governor-General.
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been fortunate in applying to run a line to the Persian Gulf 
in 1862 because the policy with regard to the Indian Navy was 
then under review. Prior to 1830 the Marine had been regarded 
as a fighting service, but from that year, when it became the 
Indian Navy, its primary function was to carry mail between 
Bombay and Suez and occasionally Basra. Many people argued 
that this was a function which could be performed more 
appropriately by private companies, and Mackinnon’s initial 
application was considered in the context of the debate on this 
issue. He was awarded the contract to run the subsidised mail 
service in 1862 and on 30 April of the following year the 
Indian Navy was officially abolished.^-
When the Company sought a more frequent service in 
1865 it claimed that the increase in trade between India and 
the Persian Gulf, which had followed the introduction of the 
B.I.fs steamers to this route, had rendered the existing 
facilities inadequate, and leading Persian merchants and 
others had pressed for a fortnightly service. The B.I., 
which had received eighty thousand rupees a year for the eight 
voyages, was now prepared to accept 160,000 rupees for twenty 
voyages a year.
The government sought the views of the people most 
concerned; the Postmaster-General and Commissioner for
1. J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1793-1880, 
p. 564.
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Customs in Bombay. The PMG did not think he would be 
justified in recommending doubling the subsidy from postal 
resources, although there had been an increase of 50$ in the 
number and value of correspondence since the question of the 
B.I.’s subsidy for the route was last discussed. However, in 
the absence of a subsidy from his department, he thought it 
might be met from increased customs duties. The Commissioner 
for Customs included a table with his comments, showing that 
the value of trade between Bombay and the Persian Gulf had 
almost exactly doubled from 1862-3 to 1864-5* He had no 
doubt that a fortnightly service would be a boon to the 
mercantile community and provide additional revenue for the 
state.
These reports from Bombay persuaded the government of 
India to recommend acceptance of the proposals experimentally 
for two years, but, as already mentioned, its support for 
subsidies in general was weakening and the recommendation was 
luke warm. Moreover it consulted its own departments after 
making the recommendation, and their comments were less 
favourable than those from Bombay.
The Public Works Department thought more frequent 
services were unnecessary for the Indo-European Telegraph, 
while the Political Department doubted if the steamship 
service provided on the rivers by the Euphrates and Tigris Co. 
would be able to cope with such a frequent service from Bombay.
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If this company could not meet the demand, the anticipated 
increase in trade would not he achieved. On the other hand, 
if it could sa& meet the demand, it would only be by providing 
an additional nine steamers on the river. The department did 
not explain how it arrived at the figure of nine but it warned
"... that the Pasha of Baghdad might throw difficulties in 
the way of nine English steamers being on the river ..."
These comments were available to the Court of Directors 
before a final decision was taken, and opinion in London was 
divided. Sir James Hogg, a member of the Secretary of Statefs 
Council, said the additional subsidy was not required for the 
Telegraph and could not be justified from the point of view of 
postal services or customs duties. If it were paid, he 
thought it would be for the benefit of private merchants, and 
he saw no adequate reason to incur heavy expense for that 
purpose. He said, if the trade were large and sound, there 
would be no lack of freight. Others on the other hand argued 
that the additional subsidy would further stimulate trade and 
lead to a net gain for government by way of higher revenues. 
Their views prevailed, and the application was approved on an 
experimental basis for two years'1’. The Persian Gulf service 
in fact proved a great success. In 1869 Mackinnon*s friend, 
Lieutenant General Sir William Pelly, who was on duty in the 
Gulf reported that the B.I.*s ships were running full and
1. I.O.L. Despatches to India 1865s Record Dept. Vol. 8. 
Minutes written between 8 and 29 December 1865*
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refusing cargo although the steamers were now larger than the 
original ones and running fortnightly instead of monthly1 •
The events which lead to the creation of Mackinnon*s 
Netherlands India Steam Navigation Company began in 1863* In 
that year the Dutch government offered a generous subsidy for 
the carriage of their mails in the East. The B.I., which 
already had a line to Singapore, was naturally interested, but 
a difficulty was that ships for the service had to be Dutch. 
This problem was finally overcome when Mackinnon founded the 
N.I.S.N. in 1868, with ships uhder the Dutch flag. As a 
separate company, it met the requirements of the Netherlands 
government, but many of its directors were the same as for the 
B.I., and most of the £156,360 capital with which it started 
was subscribed by B.I* shareholders and inevitably it worked 
closely with the B.I. On occasion B.I. ships were chartered 
by the N.I.S.N., and the two firms were able to "feed” each 
other. The B.I. operated as far as Singapore, while the 
N.I.S.N. started from there and ran services South-eastwards to 
the Dutch East Indies and on to Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne.
It paid its first dividend three years after its 
foundation, and steadily prospered. In the twenty five 
years of its existence it paid an annual average dividend 
of £11.3.10, and by 1890 was valued at £358,4102. In that
1. M.P. Pelly to Mackinnon, from Bushire, 14 August 1869.
2. M.P. Statement prepared for the liquidators.
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year it was decided that the company should go into 
liquidation, because the Dutch government was adopting 
monopolistic policies which were squeezing out companies 
like the N.I.S.N. In unfavourable circumstances a small 
firm such as this could not compete with the giants of 
South East Asia and the Par East, like the P. & 0., the 
Blue Funnel, Grlen, Castle and Shire lines*
Competition however was not entirely cut-throat*
There was a sort of conference system, and shipping lines 
cooperated over matters of common interest. One of the 
most important instances involving the B.I. occurred in 
1885, when 93 firms, headed by the P* & 0* and B.I., 
signed a petition to the Secretary of State for India 
asking for the inner harbour at Aden to be deepened. It 
was forwarded to the Secretary of State by Mr. Norwood, M.P., 
who said the shipping owned by the petitioners amounted to 
about 1-^- million gross tons. The Committee of Lloyds 
also sent a copy of a letter from their agents in Aden 
which said*
11... The bottom is mud and sand and nothing more 
than ordinary dredging work is required.
In addition to its commercial advantages, the 
importance to underwriters, in time of war, of a 
deep inner harbour of refuge behind the new 
fortifications at Aden appears to us to be great, 
inasmuch as it would enable vessels of all sizes 
to escape from an enemy’s line of fire
1. I.O.L. Public Works Department Records, 1885, Vol. 150, 
Letter of 27 April 1885.
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They also argued that a Port Trust would have an 
annual surplus of at least 100,000 rupees, judging from 
the surpluses accumulated in the past.
The Secretary of State sent the petition to the 
Governor-General in May, and referred to a request which 
he had made earlier for the establishment of a Port Trust 
to effect improvements to Aden harbour^*. He said, if the 
creation of a Trust would delay matters, the Aden authorities 
should be told at once to proceed with dredging operations 
as soon as practicable.
The Government of India did not treat the application 
with the urgency which might have been expected. Y/hen it 
finally replied in October, it said there was not enough
money in the Port Pund, and so the dredging operations
should be held over till a Port Trust was formed. Lord 
Randolph Churchill, who had in the meantime become Secretary
of State for India, was dissatisfied by the lack of
energy of the Indian government, and in his own reply 
pointed out that the question of improving the harbour 
was a pressing one. He hoped, soon to be informed that 
the matter had occupied the attention of the government of 
India and that of Bombay
!• I.O.L. Public Works Department Records, Vol. 150, 1885*
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rl... and that one has been appointed, whose first 
duty will be to take in hand the improvements in 
the harbour so much called for . ..nl
The answer from India came more quickly under this pressure, 
and in the following month it was reported that progress 
had been made in forming a Trust. In fact the government 
of Bombay did not pass the Aden Port Trust Bill till July 
1887* In the meantime there were more questions about it 
in the House of Commons, and further pressure from the Aden 
Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Shipping in the 
United Kingdom. Finally these interested groups were 
satisfied, when the Secretary of State told them he had 
received a telegram from the Viceroy dated 31st May 1888, 
stating that orders had been issued for the submission of 
detailed proposals for deepening Aden Harbour in anticipation 
of the formation of the Aden Port Trust. There was 
therefore reason for believing that the work would soon 
begin.
* * * *
The first two names among the 93 petitioners were 
those of the P. & 0. and B*I. The order in which the 
firms were listed presumably reflected their relative 
importance, but the juxtaposition ot these two was also 
symbolic of their close association as friendly competitors
1. I.O.L. Public Works Department Records, Letter of ICK.'l 
December 1885, Vol. 150, 1885.
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whpse fortunes ran closely in parallel till they finally 
merged in 1914.
The P. & 0., like the B.I,, had its origins in a 
commercial firm run hy two Scotsmen, Brodie M ’Ghie Wilcox1 
and Arthur Anderson, and, like the B.I., it became well 
established in the shipping business by a government 
contract to run a monthly mail service. That was in 
1837, and the service was between Britain and the Iberian 
Peninsula. For the previous few years it had been operating 
at a loss, but the subsidy of £38,000 a year made it a 
profitable concern. Like the B.I. also, it suffered an 
early misfortune when it lost one of its principal ships 
the ”Don Juan”, which at its launching was advertised as 
the largest ship of its type in the world. Finally in each 
case there was an interregnum after the death of the founders 
before another dynamic Scotsman took over. In the case of 
the P. & 0. the new source of strength was Thomas Sutherland, 
and with the B.I. James Lyle Mackay, who was later created 
Earl of Inchcape.
There were of course important differences, the most 
obvious being that of age. The P. & 0. was the first 
company to carry mail between Britain and her Empire in
1. Wilcox was half Scottish and half English.
the East on a commercial basis. As already mentioned, 
she won contracts to run a service to Alexandria, and later 
from Suez to Calcutta, and connected the two by a short 
overland route in Egypt. The original parent firm, 
equivalent to Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co., was established 
by Wilcox and Anderson in 1815, so the P. & 0. was a major 
concern by the time Mackinnon formed the Calcutta & Burmah 
Steam Navigation Co. in 1856.
The second important difference is that the P. & 0. 
primarily engaged in the long distance routes, while the 
B.I. was largely in the coastal business. In the main 
therefore their functions were complementary, with B.I. 
ships in many places acting as "feeders11, and the P. & 0. 
for its part often carrying passengers and cargoes to and 
from India, which were destined finally for ports best 
served by the B.I.* This distinction became less pronounced 
as the firms grew, and competition sharpened following the 
opening of the Suez canal. However trade was growing fast 
enough to accommodate both companies, while the Conference 
System and the tradition of friendship between them 
prevented cut-throat competition. The B.I.'s attitude of 
respect and defiance ia well illustrated by the tone of a 
letter which Hall wrote to Mackinnon in 1864* He said:
I. P. 2.06.
11... I am sorry the P. & 0. seem grumpy with us ... 
They have as much to fear from us as we from them, 
at the same time we must avoid anything like a 
challenge to them ... If they attack us without 
cause we will fight them vigorously, hut we will 
then have nothing to accuse ourselves of ...Ml
Friendship wit£ the B.I. did not of course protect 
the P. & 0. from other sources of competition, and in some 
ways the opening of the canal created peculiarly difficult 
problems for it.
The expertise and ships it had built up for its long 
distance routes lost much of their advantage with the 
opening of the canal, because the distances to the East 
were so drastically reduced and most of its ships were 
unsuitable for use in the canal. They were either small 
ones for home waters, or else relatively large liners 
designed to travel fast over long distances. These were 
extreme categories, not readily adaptable to the new 
situation created by the canal. The company suffered the 
keenest competition from the new class of tramp steamers, 
which were comparatively cheap to build and maintain.
These vessels became very profitable with the invention 
of the electric telegraph, which made it possible to notify 
them quickly of the availability of cargo at particular 
ports. It there were insufficient trade, they could be 
laid up at little cost. Lines like the P. & O.^on the
1. MP. Hall to Mackinnon, 6th September 1864-•
X,. j>/Vni6, op. o'/: P/iiT.
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other hand had been organised to cope with seasonal trade 
and to take advantage of prevailing winds. Their ships 
were too expensive to lay up, and to be economic had to be 
employed, if possible, all the year round. The other 
serious source of competition was the Messageries Imperiales, 
which had grown rapidly with the help of very generous 
subsidies from the Prench government, and competed directly 
with the P. & 0. over its major routes.
The tramp steamers and Messageries presented a major 
challenge from the mid 1860fs, while the Suez canal added 
more problems, so that the company passed through a very 
difficult decade. It finally triumphed under the leadership 
of Sutherland by acquiring its own cargo steamers to compete 
with the tramps, by cutting rates to rival the Messageries, 
and by building ships suitable for the canal route. It is 
a tribute to Sutherland that the P. & 0. finally prevailed, 
but there was clearly lack of foresight about the implications 
of the canal, otherwise the company would not have got 
into such serious difficulties. *
The canal was under construction for ten years, but 
the P. & 0. did not take advantage of that period to build 
suitable ships for it. One reason was that no one could 
forecast the full effects of the canal accurately. It was 
an unprecedented project, so there was no experience for a
93
guide, and doubts about it persisted to the end. Hall, who 
was in Egypt, wrote on the eve of the opening that people 
there did not speak at all confidentally of the success of 
the undertaking. Nevertheless the P. & 0* showed less 
imagination than could have been expected and, being very 
unprepared, was obliged to continue using the overland route 
across Egypt for years after the opening of the canal.
The suggestion that the British Post Office was
holding it to a contract to use the overland route and
railway, because this brought revenue to the largely British
owned railway system, only contains an element of truth.
The Post Office naturally argued that the company would save
money by abandoning the overland route, and that this saving
should be reflected in a greatly reduced subsidy, but it has
been implied that the Post Office was really insisting on
adhering to the overland contract by demanding an impossibly
large reduction in the subsidy for the canal route1 . There
were certainly protracted negotiations about the amount of
money which would be saved, but the company only made a positi’ve
application to run a cheaper service via the canal in
1873> because prior to that it did not have enough ships
2
for the purpose . In 1877, the directors admitted that
1. B. Cable; op.cit., p. 181.
2. D* Divine; op.cit., pp. 134 and 141*
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since the opening of the canal they had been obliged to 
build 80,000 tons of shipping and to sell 40,000 tons of 
older vessels at a sacrifice.
All major shipping lines experienced difficulties 
during the f60fs and early fS0fs, because they had to refit 
many of their ships at great expense to use the compound 
engine, while those trading between Europe and Asia were 
obliged to acquire vessels which could use the canal.
During this period the B*I. suffered less than the P. & 0., 
mainly because of the nature of its trade, but partly thanks 
to better management. With its activities confined almost 
exclusively to the Indian Ocean, it was not imperative for 
it to acquire a fleet of ships which could use the canal, 
although Mackinnon seems to have foreseen the effects it 
would have more shrewdly than the directors of the P. & 0. 
did. Its shorter routes on coastal services were also an 
advantage. They were not so directly challenged by the 
heavily subsidised Messageries, and they could compete more 
effectively with the new tramp steamers.
Prom the point of view of management, Mackinnon and 
J.M. Hall were at the height of their powers during this 
period, while the P. & 0. had entered its interregnum., 
Wilcox died in 1862 and Anderson who only survived him by 
six years continued to run the company autocratically, but
P ./Z £ ,
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without his earlier flare.
The B.I.'s greater adaptability at this time enabled 
it to catch up with the P. & 0. to a great extent, and largely 
explains why the two companies were about the same size at 
the time of the merger. At the end of 1915 the P. & 0. 
had 61 ships of altogether 548,564 tons and capital of 
£5,300,000. The B.I. had 126 ships totalling 587,071 tons 
and capital of £1,657,200^. These figures reveal some of 
the differences between the two companies. The P. & 0. was 
much more heavily capitalised, and for its long routes was 
using ships which were on average twice as large. The B.I. 
on the other hand, with its numerous coasters, had more than 
double the number of vessels.
After the opening of the canal, the B.I. competed 
more directly on long distance routes. A service was 
soon introduced between Basra (on the Persian Gulf) and 
London via Algiers and Lisbon, and in 1876 a line was 
opened between Calcutta and London via Madras and Colombo. 
Other services between the Indian Ocean and Britain were 
added, but they proved a disappointment financially and 
produced one of the few disagreements over major policy 
between Mackinnon and James Macalister Hall. Mackinnon 
wanted to diversify the company’s activities, but by the
1. D. Divine; op.cit., p. 168.
1880fe Hall was persuaded that it should remain specialised.
He argued that the long sea routes were a financial liability, 
which brought no compensating advantage, whereas he knew of 
no company with a better or more profitable coasting trade^*. 
The result of the debate was in practice a compromise, 
making the B.I. less specialised than in the pre-Suez 
period, but still with a service which largely complimented 
that of the P. & 0.
The close association between the two companies was 
personified in the career of James Lyle Mackay. He was 
born in Scotland in 1852, the year that Sutherland joined 
the P* & 0. at the age of 18. In 1874, two years after 
Sutherland became managing director of the P. & 0., Mackay 
joined the B.I. as a General Assistant in its Calcutta 
office. He was taken on for three years in the first 
instance, but his outstanding ability was soon apparent, 
and when the Bombay agency of Nicol & Co. failed, he was 
sent to clear up the business and reconstitute it under the 
name of the parent company: Mackinnon/Mackenzie. Following
the death of Mackinnon, he became the dominant personality in 
the B.I., and although he did not su^Seed to the chairmanship 
till 1913, he achieved distinction outside the company in 
the meantime. He received a knighthood in 1894, became a
1. MP. Hall to Mackinnon, 29th November 1886.
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member of the Council of India in London three years later, 
and was sent as Britain’s representative to negotiate a 
commercial treaty with China in 1901. He finally became 
very wealthy and was given an Earldom, but two episodes are 
worth mentioning to illustrate his character and the high 
esteem in which he was held.
In 1909> John Morley, the Secretary of State for 
India, offered him the Viceroyalty in succession to Lord 
Minto. Mackay was ready to accept, but Morley had been 
indiscreet. News of the offer leaked before he had 
consulted his cabinet colleagues and this caused offence. 
Moreover there was decisive opposition in the Cabinet on 
the grounds that Mackay had too many commercial interests 
in India.
In October 1921 he was offered the crown of Albania 
by an English representative of big business interests in 
the Balkans, who wrote:
"... I have been approached by official representatives 
of Albania, including the new Foreign Minister and the 
very influential deputies of the new Parliament ... to 
inquire whether under any circumstances you would 
consider accepting the dignity of Kingship of Albania ...”
This seems to have been a perfectly serious inquiry. The 
letter explained where the king would live, what his duties 
would be and where they might meet to discuss the proposition. 
The Tobacco Monopoly was about to be sold to an English
company and an Anglo—Persian group was negotiating for the 
oil concessions. If Lord Inchcape would not accept the 
crown, therefore, could he suggest another wealthy Englishm an 
or American with proven administrative ability. Inchcape*s 
reply was typically pithy:
MI duly received your letter of the 29th ulto 
and am sorry I have been so long in replying. It 
is a great compliment to be offered the Crown of 
Albania but it is not in my line 2
Yours sincerely,
Inchcape **■*■.
In the story of the B.I. Lord Inchcape is best 
remembered for arranging the B.I. and P. & 0. merger with 
Sir Thomas Sutherland. Although rumours that the P. & 0. 
was proposing amalgamations and extensions caused a steep 
rise in its share prices in 1912, the actual announcement 
of a merger with the B.I. two years later took financial 
circles completely by surprise, and there was great 
curiosity as to when the negotiations began.
Clearly Duncan Mackinnon had no part in them, 
because he was very jealous of the B.I.’s independence.
Formal discussions were not held, therefore, till Inchcape 
became chairman, but there were obviously private talks on 
the subject before then. Some authorities suggest that
1. H. Bolithoj Lord Inchcape, Lcr^dr^ f i U -fC>2%
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1 2 they began in 1901 , others imply 1905 * and there has
inevitably been speculation as to who first had the idea.
Was it the younger dynamic Inchcape who saw logic in
merging two companies with complimentary interests, or
the ageing Sutherland worried about the future of the
P. & 0. after his own departure? Opinion, where it has
been offered, is slightly in favour of Sutherland, on the
grounds that he saw no obvious successor to himself in the
P. & 0., and so had to look elsewhere for a man of the right
calibre to take over the firm. Prom this viewpoint Inchcape
was an obvious choice, because he had undoubted ability and
was from a friendly rival company. In fact there is
evidence that the idea originated with Mackinnon and
J.M. Hall and largely for the reasons which have been
attributed to Sutherland.
They discussed it as early as 1892 when they and 
the others who had built up the B.I. were old and ailing.
The v/ords which Hall used about himself in 1890 also applied 
to the other old hands by then. He said to Mackinnon:
”... I need to lay up so much now for repairs that 
you get very little use of me
1. B. Cable, op.c'ch P.Z0 6 .
2. D. Divine,
3. M.P. Hall to Mackinnon, 20 October 1890.
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The letters between these old friends during their last 
years almost always contained reports of someone's ill- 
health or death. On one occasion Hall cancelled a trip 
to Edinburgh because for the first time in months he was 
feeling so well and did not wish to risk catching a cold 
waiting about on station platforms. The following from 
his correspondence is typical of the remarks with which 
they ended letters to each other.
”... And for yourself William my earnest prayer 
is that you will soon be quite well again and 
we together be able soon to praise him whose 
goodness and mercy have followed us all these 
long years that are behind us ...” .
Of the close relatives, Hall's wife and Peter 
Mackinnon died in 1892, and business associates of long 
standing such as Monteath, one of the B.I. directors, were 
falling fast. To meet the inevitable end, Mackinnon 
encouraged some of the old members to leave the board 
of the B.I., and appointed younger men of ability in their 
place. But as no obvious successor to himself appeared, 
the idea of merging the B.I. with some other company arose 
as a possible way of securing the future. Commenting on 
Mackinnon's proposal in 1892, to put Edwyn Dawes on the 
board, Hall said:
1. MP. Hall to Mackinnon, 30th March 1893
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tt... If you decide on him dont you think it would 
he well to let him know what is in your mind, if 
you are really in earnest •.. as to parting with 
the whole concern I feel strongly that if a
sale he at all possible we shall never again he
ahle to negotiate it on as good terms as we may
get now ... I imagine you dont think the P. & 0.
would consider the idea of acquiring the concern .*.
The Co. is rich and Sutherland is ambitious. Our 
coasting trade would fit them admirably and the 
P. & 0. would then he without a peer-,among the 
shipping companies of the world ...fl
The P. & 0. was not the only firm considered in 
this context however, because a few months later Hall said 
there was a great race between Brocklebanks and Bibbys for 
prominence in the Eastern shipping trade. He wondered if 
one of them might consider buying the B.I., if the idea was 
suggested, and he mused about the commanding position and 
power which such a purchase would bring. He even speculated 
that they might combine to buy the B.I. because they were 
friendly although rival concerns.
These quotations from the correspondence between 
Mackinnon and Hall almost at the end of their lives and 
reference to the B.I. - P. & 0. merger does not complete 
the story of the B.I. It played a most important part in 
the development of East African trade which must be related 
in connection with Mackinnonfs involvement in the politics 
of the area. It must also be borne in mind as the principal 
source of revenue which enabled him to embark on expensive 
ventures in East Africa.
1. MP. Hall to Mackinnon, 8th January 1892.
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III. EAST AFRICA AND SMITH-MACKENZIE
Mackinnon established slender connections with 
East Africa soon after founding the B.I., by carrying 
Indian labour to East Africa and by engaging in the very 
modest trade which existed between it and India. In 1864 
he went so far as to invite James Liddell to be his agent 
in Zanzibar, but Liddell declined the offer and Mackinnon 
did not consider trying to run a regular line to East 
Africa till some years later.
In the early 160’s he was preoccupied with the task 
of building up his recently established services round 
India, and the Persian Gulf. It was not till 1865, that 
he sought to extend regular lines further westwards. In 
that year he applied for a subsidy to run steamers from 
Bombay or Karachi to Suez, via Aden and Muscat. The 
application was strongly supported by the Presidency of 
Bombay, but finally rejected by the Government of India 
on financial grounds. Mackinnon, however, did not give 
up, but revived his application the following year through 
W. Nicol & Co., his agents in Bombay. He may have been 
encouraged to persist with his application by the opinion 
of his friend, Lieutenant-General Sir William Pelly, who 
later became a director of the Imperial British East Africa
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Company* After making an uncomfortable journey out to 
India in 1865, Pelly said:
”... I am inclined to think that if any line 
of steamers of good speed and sure were to
start between India and Suez, they would carry
nearly everything before them ...11.
The application through W. Nicol & Co. was also 
rejected, but the success of Mackinnon’s enterprise 
in the Persian Gulf, and the prospect of the Suez Canal 
opening made the westward expansion of his business 
an inevitable objective. The results when he finally 
obtained his subsidies were disappointing from a commercial 
point of view, but they were important in drawing him 
into the sphere of East African politics.
When Mackinnon’s ships began trading with East 
Africa the commerce of the area was largely in the 
hands of Arabs who had driven the Portugese from it
at the end of the seventeenth century. In practice
Arab authority remained very tenuous till the rule 
of the great Arab, Imam Seyyid Said, who usurped the 
sovereignty of Muscat, the capital of Oman in 1806^. He 
reigned over Muscat till 1856, and using Muscat and Oman 
as his power base he extended his authority southwards
1. Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 1-15•
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along the coast of East Africa* He created a good small 
navy and collected first tribute, then customs from the 
increasingly arabised communities of the coastal towns*
He gradually became more absorbed by the affairs of 
JSast Africa than of Oman, and in 1840 he made Zanzibar his 
capital* The main reason for this decision was that he 
found it impossible to maintain his power adequately in 
both East Africa and Oman. In the days of sailing ships 
his ability to send vessels from one part of his domain to 
another depended too much on the prevailing winds which, 
in that part of the world affected by the monsoon, meant 
that they could sail northwards easily for about half of 
the year and southwards easily for the other half* It was 
largely because he recognised this difficulty that he 
arranged for the partition of his territories at his death 
between two of his sons - one to rule from Zanzibar and 
the other from Muscat*
He introduced cloves to Zanzibar from the Moluccas, 
and by the end of his reign the plantation industry which 
he had started in Zanzibar was producing about three 
quarters of the worlds supply. During the same period 
Zanzibar became the major port along the coast of East 
Africa for the export of slaves and ivory and for the 
import of goods from India and elsewhere*
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For more than 50 years after slave-trading was 
declared illegal in 1807, Britain's main concern in Africa 
was to put down the traffic in slaves, but the prohibition 
imposed on British nationals by the Act of 1807, did not 
stop foreigners whose trading reached unprecendented 
proportions in the 18301 s. In West Africa, to try to 
control this, and to promote legitimate commerce, the 
British established small bases along the coast - Sierra 
leone in 1808, the Gambia in 1816, the Gold Coast in 1801 
and so on. By this means the slave traffic was almost 
ended by the middle of the 1860’s, while the trade in 
tropical products such as palm kernels and ground-nuts was 
growing. The volume of the legitimate trade was in fact 
disappointing but British companies and business penetrated 
the interior without seriously involving the government for 
twenty years. The policy of trading and exercising 
influence without having to accept the burdens of imperial 
rule thus met with some success.
On the Bast coast the slave trade continued for much 
longer and legitimate commerce was slow to develop. Said’s 
hegemony over much of the East African coast made the 
campaign against the slave trade easier from a diplomatic 
point of view than in West Africa, where a major problem 
had been the existence of so many political authorities.
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However, this advantage was more than offset by the 
additional obstacles of East Africa. In particular it 
was much further away from Britain. Before the opening 
of the Suez Canal, the sea route to Zanzibar was twice as 
long as the one to Lagos.1 Another factor was that the 
interior of East Africa had not been explored. Britain’s 
position there derived primarily from her political interests 
in the western approaches to India, and from her humanitarian 
concern to put down the slave trade. Legitimate commerce 
was far less important in maintaining her influence there 
than it was in West Africa. Moreover the most lucrative 
form of the legitimate trade, the export of ivory, was 
almost inseparable from slaving. The quest for ivory 
drew traders further and further into the interior where 
they forcibly recruited people to carry ivory down to the 
coast. On arrival at Zanzibar, or at some other port, 
the ivory would be exported while the slaves would be 
sold to clove-plantation owners, shopkeepers or even to 
chiefs further inland. The export of ivory thus made it 
very difficult to end slave-trading on the mainland, 
particularly as those hunting elephants were inevitably 
well armed, and this slave trade continued long after the 
one at sea was stopped.
1. Coupland, Exploitation, p. 63*
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Britain, nevertheless, tried to pursue in East 
Africa the same policy as she had in West Africa, of 
exercising influence without being committed to direct 
rule. She did this principally by entering into an 
alliance with Seyyid Said. It was hoped that an under­
standing with him would give Britain an advantageous 
position in the trade of the area. Although the volume 
of commerce was very small it was envisaged that an important 
export trade would be developed with India. There was no 
really sound basis for this optimism but it was felt, after 
the spectacular growth of the clove industry that similar 
advances could be made with sugar and cotton plantations, 
and that there were vast natural resources to be exploited 
in the interior. It was also hoped that the French might 
be deterred from trying to establish a foothold in East 
Africa. They occupied the islands of Nosse-be and Mayotta 
between 1840 and 1843, so there was a real threat of French 
encroachment. Moreover it had not been forgotten that 
Britain had acquired, from France, places in the Indian 
Ocean such as Mauritius, as a result of the Napoleonic wars.
Finally, Said was expected to be an instrument in 
suppressing the slave trade. But in seeking to use him 
in this capacity tfce British Government placed him in a 
serious dilemma, because the majority of his important
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vassals derived most of their wealth and prestige from 
possessing slaves and trading in them, while the trade 
also provided him with a great deal of revenue. Thus, 
the more he was used as an agent for British policy, the 
more he lost authority within his own domain. He was 
fully aware of the threat to his position inherent in 
being associated with the humanitarian campaign, but he 
was obliged to co-operate under British pressure. In 
1822, largely at the insistence of the Governments of 
Bombay and Mauritius, he agreed to the Moresby Treaty 
whereby he undertook to confine the external trade in 
slaves by his subjects to the western side of the Indian 
ocean, and to the north of Cape Delgado. The object of 
this Treaty was to prevent the sale of slaves to British 
India and Mauritius, and by a second Treaty in 1845, he 
agreed to limit the trade to his African dominions.
During the early part of the century his relationship 
with Britain was very informal, but its practical importance 
to him became evident in 1824. In that year Captain Owen, 
who was doing a survey of the coast, was asked by the 
Mazrui Sheiks, ruling Mombasa, to take their town and 
mainland strip under British protection. They wanted 
support against Seyyid Said who, as ruler of Oman, was 
seeking to re-establish Omani power along the coast.^
1. Coupland, Exploitation, p. 168.
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Captain Owen on his own authority agreed to their request 
provided slave trading was abolished in Mombasa, so a 
convention to this effect was signed and Owen sought the 
approval of the British Government. This approval was 
not given however, largely on the grounds that it might 
infringe the rights and wishes of Seyyid Said. Having 
recently persuaded him to agree to the terms of the Moresby 
Treaty, the British could hardly side with his opponents at 
that juncture, so after 18 months Owen was obliged to haul 
down the British flag from Port Jesus, Mombasa.
This incident was significant for two reasons.
First, it showed the Sultan that Britain would protect 
his interests, at least in certain circumstances. Second, 
the fact that Owen's presence, with a small force, had 
stopped the slave traffic through Mombasa provided ammunition 
for those who were later to argue that naval patrols were not 
adequate, but should be supplemented by the establishment of 
British power at strategic places along the coast.
In the meantime, during the period when Mackinnon 
was beginning to take an interest in Bast Africa, the 
policy of the British government was to try to restrict 
the slave trade. This was done, first, by negotiating 
treaties for the suppression of the trade with the principal 
recipient countries, such as Persia, Muscat, Madagascar,
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and various Arab countries round the Persian Gulf, and, 
secondly, by trying to prevent the export of slaves from 
Bast Africa. In pursuit of this second aim the Sultan was 
persuaded, in 1845 > to restrict the trade in slaves to 
Zanzibar, and his other African towns and islands. The 
effectiveness of this policy depended on the Sultan’s ability, 
and willingness to control his own subjects, and on the 
ability of the British navy to prevent the smuggling of 
slaves•
In practice, neither was very successful. So many
of the Sultan’s subjects depended on the slave trade for their
livelihood that he was liable to endanger his own position
if he tried to control it too rigorously. The navy, for
its part, had the task of trying to distinguish between
vessels engaged in the legal and illegal trades. In other
words naval officers had to decide, whether a slaver was
plying between ports within the Sultan’s domain, or engaging
in illegal trade by carrying slaves from one of his ports to
one outside his jurisdiction. This was an impossible task,
but there were also other difficulties. Seven or eight
ships could not patrol about 4,000 miles of coast. The
navy’s sailors did not stay long enough to become experienced
at the job, and they did not know the language, which put
1
them at the mercy of untrustworthy interpreters .
1. Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 155-165*
1*!2
When the failure of the policy of restriction became 
manifest, and the Sultan, Seyyid Barghash, in 1870, refused 
to try to enforce more rigorous regulations, a Select 
Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to enquire 
into the whole question of the slave trade in East Africa. 
Prom the point of view of Hackinnon’s future involvement 
there, it is noteworthy that a number of his friends, or 
friends to be, gave evidence to the Committee: Sir Bartle
Prere; Sir John Kaye, and the Reverend Horace Waller.
Prere was already a friend, and Waller will be 
mentioned later, but Kaye, as Secretary in the Political 
and Secret Department of the India Office, was of immediate 
importance to Mackinnon. They first met in the spring of 
1870, when Kaye was authorised to ascertain privately, and 
in more detail, the terms on which Mackinnon was proposing 
to operate a line to Zanzibar. They must have got on well 
from the outset, because a few months later, in August,
Kaye wrote confidentially telling Mackinnon of the progress 
of his application. He said, f,highest authority” (that 
was the Secretary of State for India) opposed it, on the 
grounds that the line would primarily affect the slave trade, 
which was solely a responsibility of the Imperial government. 
The Secretary of State admitted that it might advance India’s 
commerce, but Kaye was convinced there would be no progress
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unless the British government undertook to pay most of the 
subsidy. Kaye favoured the project, hut said that as he 
was not in the financial department he was perhaps not so 
concerned about immediate financial difficulties and looked 
rather to future benefits^*.
The following month he declined an invitation to 
Balinakill because he was too busy, but thanked Mackinnon 
for a bag of grouse. Before the year was out however, 
they had become such friends that Mackinnon agreed to be 
one of two securities for a loan of £1500 which Kaye 
borrowed from the General Credit Co. to meet expenses
arising from the "unfortunate position" of his sons in
2
Australia . At about Christmas time, the same year, Kaye 
mysteriously received a chest of tea. When he deduced it 
was from Mackinnon, he wrote to thank him, saying
"... good tea is a great luxury ... Bad grocers 
tea has driven me to drink claret at breakfast .... 
but I shall go back now to the better habit ..."2
As a result of this friendship, Mackinnon enjoyed 
the benefit of Kaye's experience and knowledge of the civil 
service. In October 1871, for example, he advised Mackinnon 
to write to India about renewing the B.I.'s contracts, and
1. MP. Kaye to Mackinnon, 9th August 1870.
2. MP. Kaye to Mackinnon, 10th December 1870.
3. MP. Kaye to Mackinnon, 24th December 1870.
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to send a copy of his letter to the Secretary of State, so 
that it could he considered before the recommendation of 
the Indian government was received. He offered, if 
Mackinnon prepared the draft, to help with the wording 
of the letter so as to give the maximum force to the 
application. Finally he told Mackinnon to lose no time 
as he had a notion that others were in the field'1’.
John Kirk was the other person of particular importance 
to Mackinnon at this stage, and indeed for about another 
twenty years. Kirk was the son of a Scottish minister, 
and nine years younger than Mackinnon. He studied botany 
and also qualified as a doctor at Edinburgh University.
He showed enterprise at an early age by volunteering for 
hospital service in the Crimean War, and a year after 
returning from the Crimea, he joined Livingstone1s Zambesi 
Expedition as botanist and medical officer, from 1858-63*
When he got back to England his inclination was to become 
a botanist, but with his engagement in 1865> he decided 
that he should stick to medicine as offering the more 
lucrative career.
At about the same time the government of Bombay, in 
consultation with the Foreign Office, was considering filling 
vacant posts at Zanzibar. Dr. Seward, who had been Agency
1. MP. Kaye to Mackinnon, 27th October 1871*
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Surgeon there, became Consul, and Livingstone, who was on 
a visit to Bombay, recommended the appointment of Kirk as 
the new Agency Surgeon. This recommendation was accepted, 
and in 1866, John Kirk took up the posts of Agency Surgeon, 
Assistant to the Political Agent, and Vice-Consul. Thus 
began a period of distinguished service which ended twenty 
years later when he left Zanzibar.
It is not clear exactly when he and Mackinnon became 
acquainted, but as the governor of Bombay who agreed to the 
appointment was none other than Sir Bartle Prere, a link 
between Mackinnon and Kirk existed from the moment of Kirkfs 
appointment. A good deal more will appear about Kirk in 
the following pages, but for the moment it is only necessary 
to mention that he and Mackinnon were good friends by the 
early 1870's. Kirk stayed for part of his leave at 
Balinakill in 1874, and said that the days there were the 
pleasantest of his holidays. Possibly he was being unduly 
polite, but his sentiments were in marked contrast to those 
expressed later by Harry Johnston"*-.
When he returned to Zanzibar from this leave he 
presented a magnificent gun to the Sultan, which was a 
gift from Mackinnon. He also performed one of his many 
good deeds for Mackinnon by handing it over in the presence 
of Mackinnonfs new agent, Archibald Smith, so that Smith
1. See pages
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would be introduced to the Sultan in a favourable situation. 
Afterwards he reported that the gun had been a great success, 
and that the Sultan and Smith had got on well together.
Kirk and Kaye helped Mackinnon by performing services 
of this nature, by advising him about trade prospects, and 
other matters directly concerning his shipping interests, 
but they did two other things which were perhaps even more 
important.
First, they introduced him to new ideas and new people. 
Mackinnon obviously already knew of, and sympathised with the 
anti-slavery movement, but he now learned the Christian and 
humanitarian philosophy behind it. He got to know the 
leading philanthropists of the day, and his desire to spread 
the ,ftruth,f, as he saw it, found scope outside the religious 
controversies of Scotland. The spirit of the business 
tycoon, who had made a fortune in and around India, became 
tempered by that of the missionary. He not only took 
financial risks for the movement, but actually started to 
spend considerable sums without expectation of material 
reward. In 1873, for example, he put ships at the disposal 
of Sir Bartle Frerefs mission to East Africa at considerable 
expense and without hope of profit. His life which had 
largely been confined to business and the Free Church, 
found a new dimension.
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The second thing which Kirk and Kaye did was to give 
him an insight into the workings of government, Mackinnon, 
it must he remembered, had a narrow intellectual background. 
He had been educated in a fairly remote part of Scotland, 
and as an adult his reading had been largely confined to 
the bible, literature about the Free Church and company 
reports. Except for relations with India, he was extremely 
ignorant about foreign affairs and badly in need of guidance, 
because his venture into East Africa involved him with three 
important aspects of British policy. The campaign against 
the commerce in slaves, the effort to promote legitimate 
trade as the best weapon against slaving, and the anti­
imperialist sentiment which prevailed for most of the 
period of his concern with East Africa.
As a pious and prosperous man he fully appreciated 
the first two policies. The proposition that the trade in 
people could most easily be suppressed by developing a 
profitable commerce in goods had been preached for many 
years by Livingstone, Buxton and others, and it certainly 
appealed to Mackinnon. To him it was self-evident that 
business was a vehicle for civilisation, and it was an idea 
which had the merit of uniting commercial and philanthropic 
interests, beckoning them both to action. He was fully 
attuned to this movement and became a leading member of it,
1*8
but he never fully grasped the anti-imperialist aspect of 
government policy, which seemed to be against serious 
involvement or intervention. That at least appeared 
to be the case till the mid 1880*s when the “scramble for 
Africa” brought about a complete reversal of this policy.
The situation was further complicated for Mackinnon, 
because he became involved in what might be called a 
demarcation dispute between the Foreign Office and the 
India Office. The matter was never put so crudely, but 
it emerges quite clearly through the polished minutes of 
the top civil servants of the departments that he unwittingly 
provoked inter-departmental problems which lead to extensive 
delays over the handling of his contract applications. So 
long as his activities were confined to India, they were 
clearly the concern of the government of India and the India 
Office. The same was more or less true of the Persian Gulf, 
but this was not the case in East Africa. There, Zanzibar 
was historically of importance to Britain in relation to 
India, and it is noteworthy that India had the major voice 
in appointing its consuls.
However, by the time Mackinnon was entering the East 
African scene Britainfs over-riding interest there was in 
the suppression of the slave trade, which was a Foreign 
Office concern. The problem was where did the authority
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of one department begin and that of the other end? During
the last quarter of the century, as Britain became more
involved on the mainland, the Foreign Office gained
supremacy. But in the f60fs and early f70fs, while
Mackinnon was trying to establish a shipping service in
the area, the position was by no means clear and their
powers were fairly evenly matched. Operating in this
penumbra between two major departments of government it
took six years to establish the regular line to Zanzibar.
# * * *
The move to establish it goes back at least to 1866.
In September of that year the government of Bombay noted 
the inefficient state of postal communications with Zanzibar, 
and resolved that the Postmaster General should make 
suggestions as to the best means of improving them. Three 
months later the PMG underlined the point of the resolution 
by reporting that he had not received replies to letters, 
or information regarding the postal arrangements at Zanzibar, 
addressed to him by the Political Agent, so could only 
conclude that the means for corresponding with it were as 
uncertain and tedious as it was possible to be.
He followed this comment with the suggestion that the 
service could be improved most cheaply by running a vessel 
across the 1,200 miles from Zanzibar to the Seychelles,
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where it would connect with the regular French line 
between Mauritius and Aden.
This suggestion was given a great deal more force a 
few months later by a memorandum from Colonel Rigby^. He 
said that during his service in Zanzibar he had urged the 
establishment of a regular service between it and Bombay, 
pointing out that the trade of Aden, Muscat, and Basra was 
being diverted from Karachi and Bombay to foreign ships.
He said:
w... Zanzibar is also becoming the emporium for 
the sea-borne trade of Madagascar, Mozambique, the 
Comoro Islands, and the whole of the East coast of 
Africa. It is now the chief market in the world 
for the supply of ivory, gum, copal, cloves, and 
coweries, and has a rapidly increasing export 
trade in hides, oil seeds, dyes etc., while sugar 
and cottoh promise to figure largely in its future 
exports •.. All this valuable trade is at present 
lost to British merchants, because, until there is 
a postal communication with Zanzibar, it is impossible 
for them to compete with the foreigners
While the government of India was considering improving 
communications with Zanzibar, Mackinnon was pursuing his 
application to run a line between India and Suez. In 
February 1868, he sent a memorandum to the Secretary of 
State for India reminding him of the B.I.fs application of 
1865, which had been rejected. He argued that circumstances
1. Rigby had been an Indian Army Officer and then Consul at
Zanzibar from 1858-61.
2. I.O.L. Political Home Correspondence, vol. 35, File 1614,
1871. Rigbyfs memorandum of 3 March 1867.
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had changed so much since then, that the matter should be 
reconsidered. In particular, he said the area along the 
route concerned had become very much more important for 
Britain and India. The Egyptian government had established 
steam lines along the Red Sea, and it was reported that a 
French company, with government backing, was about to enter 
the same field. There was thus a real danger of British 
shipping being excluded from the coastal trade of the area. 
He thought this danger could only be overcome by adopting 
his proposals, as soon as possible, and making it clear 
that they were supported either by the British or the Indian 
government, so as to secure protection and the necessary 
facilities at the various ports of call.
He offered to run a service between Karachi and Suez, 
monthly for 17,500 rupees, or fortnightly for 52,000 rupees. 
It was difficult to estimate the volume of the existing 
traffic, and he doubted if the subsidies proposed would 
more than cover working expenses. However, he was prepared
to take the risk, because he wanted the B.I. to pioneer a
regular steam service along the new route, as it had already 
done in the Persian Gulf. He said that his Persian Gulf
service had helped in the suppression of the slave trade,
and piracy, and promoted legitimate trade to the benefit 
of the countries bordering the Gulf and India. He had no
1*2
doubt that the line now proposed would produce similar 
results, and, knowing that it was being considered by the 
government of India, he alluded to the question of Zanzibar*
He said that the communication between India, Muscat and 
Zanzibar, which the government of Bombay wanted, could be 
established more efficiently with the line he was proposing, 
than directly with Bombay, and he was prepared to run it1 .
This was Mackinnon1s first reference to a Zanzibar 
service, but in spite of official concern to improve 
communications with Zanzibar, this memorandum received 
little attention in the India Office, and on the 21st 
January, 1869, Mackinnon sent a personal and private letter 
to the Duke of Argyll, who had become Secretary of State, 
asking if his memorandum could be favourably considered.
A little later, the B.I. suggested an additional 
separate line between Aden and Zanzibar. According to 
Sir John Kaye, no action was taken on any of these applications 
for a long time, because of the extremely unsettled state of 
relations with Zanzibar and the Persian Gulf, and also 
because it had been considered inopportune to incur any 
obligations for the improvement of communications with these 
regions, whilst it was uncertain whether their political
1. MP. Mackinnon to the Secretary of State for India,
10th February 1868.
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relations would remain with the India Office or the Foreign 
Office1 .
These problems had not been resolved by 1870, but 
action could be delayed no longer because the questions of 
Zanzibar and the Persian Gulf had been looked into by two 
committees - one sitting at the Foreign Office, and the 
other a Special Committee of the House of Commons. The 
Foreign Office committee said:
”... We hope that some means may be devised for 
rendering the postal communication with Zanzibar 
more certain and regular, and looking to the growing 
importance of Zanzibar and its proposed establishment 
as the great central depot for all the liberated 
Africans captured in those parts we think it very 
important that steps should be taken for this 
purpose ...”2
In April 1870, the Postmaster General said he had 
received complaints about the inconvenience caused by the 
irregular service to Zanzibar. He referred to the 
committee’s report, and said that, although the correspondence 
between Britain and Zanzibar was very small and would not 
justify any great expense in maintaining communications, 
he would be prepared to recommend some contribution towards 
the cost, in the event of the Indian government accepting 
the offer of the B.I., or any other company to establish a 
regular service between Aden and Zanzibar.
1. I.O.L. Memorandum of 21st April 1870 from Sir John Kaye
^glS^jretary of State. Political and Home Correspondence,
2. I.O.L. Political siid Home Correspondence, vol. 35.
Pile 1614, 1871.
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The Foreign Office and India Office accepted the 
committee’s recommendation, so with the departments 
concerned all supporting the idea of improving communications 
with Zanzibar, Sir John Kaye sought permission to ascertain, 
privately from Mackinnon, details about his proposals.
Kaye obtained the permission he sought, and so began their 
acquaintance and friendship.
The situation was complicated a little further by 
the receipt of another application, this time from the firm 
of James Wiseman & Co., to run a service between Britain 
and Zanzibar, via the Suez canal* However, this was such 
a vague application that it was not taken very seriously, 
and in June 1870, Mackinnon, presumably on the advice of 
Sir John Kaye, submitted a fresh memorandum explaining his 
proposals in greater detail.
He pointed out that there was no regular service 
between Aden and Zanzibar, and indeed very little commerce 
of any kind on that route. There was a small irregular 
trade via the Cape, largely in the hands of French and 
Americans, but that between East Africa, India and the 
Persian Gulf was virtually the monopoly of Arabs and 
Indians. He thought the potential trade at Zanzibar was 
considerable, and could be developed by a regular service 
towards Aden, the Red Sea and India. But he warned that
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the cost of a service between Aden and Zanzibar would 
probably be greater than between almost any other two 
ports in the East, because of the high price of coal and 
stores of every kind at both ports, and the necessity (owing 
to the climate) of paying the highest wages to officers and 
engineers. He repeated that the B.I. would willingly 
assume a pioneering role in establishing a regular service 
along the coast of East Africa, as it had done between the 
ports of India and the Persian Gulf; and he suggested that 
it would add greatly to the importance of the proposed 
service if it were combined with a Karachi-Muscat line, 
and connected with the existing service between India and 
the Persian Gulf. This chain could be perfected if it 
were then to proceed to London via the Suez canal and some 
Mediterranean ports. Mackinnon was so enthusiastic about 
this idea, and so hopeful about the trading prospects that 
he concluded his memorandum by offering to run fortnightly 
services between all the ports specified for a consolidated 
annual subsidy of £50,000, or a monthly service for £32,000.
Action on the memorandum was delayed for the political 
and financial reasons already mentioned, and because the B.I. 
was no longer the only firm to be considered. But, as on 
past occasions, procrastination gave time for fresh issues 
to arise. In this instance the scope of the whole problem
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was widened by a memorandum from Edgar Layard (formerly 
Britain's Slave Trade Commissioner at the Cape of Good Hope) 
which urged consideration for a suggestion that there should 
be a steamship service from Britain round the whole of Africa# 
Layard referred to articles which had appeared in the Cape 
press putting the commercial case for such a service, and 
said he would deal with other aspects of the matter#
He said that such a service would reduce the period 
of telegraphic communication to the Cape from about 31 to 
17 days, but, from the point of view of Mackinnon*s 
application, the memorandum was important in supporting 
the case for a service to East Africa# It argued that 
an enormous trade lay undeveloped in East Africa, including 
Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Comoro islands; and its 
development only awaited
11.. • the abolition of the slave trade and the 
fostering care of commerce .
Layard said:
"I am convinced that regular communication 
would extend commerce and do more to check slavery 
than the presence of our squadron; and that 
civilisation must precede the missionary. I 
believe much better results would accrue from 
subsidising a company to run steamers, as suggested, 
than spending double the sum in increasing our 
squadron on that coast ..."1 
- -
1* 1872. LIV./.833-5# E. Layard to Mr Vivian, head
of the Slave Trade section of the Foreign Office,
2nd October 1871.
1*7
This was a familiar thesis, hut the Foreign Office 
circulated the memorandum to the India Office and Treasury, 
because Layard*s experience in the campaign against the 
slave trade and the cogency with which he put the argument 
gave it peculiar weight*
The Secretary of State for India said he would 
comment on Layard*s memorandum after considering all the 
projects arising from the reports of the two committees. 
However, as it was over a year since the committees had 
reported, and longer still since Mackinnon had applied to 
run a service, this reply was clearly intended to gain 
more time, because the questions of political and financial 
responsibility remained unresolved.
These questions did not only relate to the problem 
of finding money for subsidising a shipping line. The 
India Office had already asked the Foreign Office to share 
the expenses of the Zanzibar Agency, claiming that most of 
the expense arose from the campaign against the slave trade. 
The Foreign Office and Treasury had rejected this argument, 
but the reluctance of the India Office to commit itself on 
Layard*s memorandum is understandable. Its whole case for 
not contributing towards a B.I. service in East Africa, and 
for relinquishing some of the expense of the Zanzibar Agency, 
rested on the ground that it was not responsible for the
1?8
campaign against the slave trade, and should therefore not 
bear any of the financial burdens arising from it. If it 
became involved in formulating a policy against the slave 
trade, which serious attention to layard1s memorandum would 
have required, then its case for being regarded as an 
uninvolved party would have been greatly weakened.
(This further delay, as on past occasions, allowed 
time for fresh developments affecting Mackinnon*s application. 
In January 1872, Lord Kimberley told the governors of the 
Cape and Natal of proposals to establish a steam service 
between Aden and the Cape of Good Hope, via Zanzibar, 
Mozambique and Natal; and he invited them to contribute 
to the subsidy. He got no immediate response from the 
governors, but the Union Steamship Co. became acquainted 
with the contents of his memorandum.^ This was significant 
for the B.I., because the Union Co. had offered to run 
services between Britain and the Cape, via West Africa, 
and between the Cape and Zanzibar, for a large subsidy. 
However, on learning of Kimberley’s memorandum it reduced 
its terms for the Cape-Zanzibar route, in an effort to 
secure the goodwill of government for its proposed West 
coast services. At the same time fearing that the B.I. 
might try to extend its activities to the Cape, it suggested
1. Report of the Select Committee on the Cape of Good Hope
and Zanzibar Mail contracts, 23rd July 1873* P.P. (1873)
IX, pp. 235-243.
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submitting, to government, a joint application for the East 
coast service. The B.I. agreed to this and in June 1872, 
the two companies sent a joint tender to the Treasury, 
proposing that the B.I. should operate a line between Aden 
and Zanzibar for £10,000 and the Union Co. a line between 
Zanzibar and the Cape for £15,000 a year over ten years.
In August the Treasury forwarded this joint tender 
to the India Office, pointing out that at five shillings per 
mile, the route between Aden and Zanzibar would cost £11,050 
p.a. It also said that if the B.I. would run this portion 
of the service as part of its general Indian contract, the 
Director General of the India Post Office was prepared to 
recommend that the government of India should contribute 
£6,050 and the British Post Office £5,000.
It is worth digressing here for a moment to point 
out that some members of the India Office thought the 
Director General had undermined their case and been 
virtually disloyal in putting forward such an idea, even 
though he did so informally. Indeed he was obliged to 
write a memorandum defending his action. The man in 
question was A.N. Monteath, a close friend of Mackinnon^, 
who later became a director of the B.I. He joined the 
Plymouth Brethren in 1874, and surprised even Mackinnon 
with some of his religious views. When invited to the
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board of the B*I. in 1881, he said he would have to take 
the matter before the lord* The following day he declined 
because he felt he would be yoked
M... with others having aims and objects differing 
from what I might believe to be the lord's mind
A few months later he overcame his scruples and joined the 
board.
To return to the subject of the memorandum to the 
India Office, the Treasury hoped that the government of 
India would cooperate in supporting an undertaking
tt... which may not only prove of great assistance 
in suppressing slavery and promoting civilisation 
on the East Coast of Africa, but may confer great 
commercial advantages on India by affording a 
direct and regular communication between that 
country, Zanzibar and the English settlements 
of Natal and the Cape
In a letter of the same date addressed to the 
Postmaster-General, the Treasury said that the service 
was contemplated not primarily to meet postal needs, which 
were insufficient in themselves to warrant a large expenditure 
of public money, but as an indirect, and powerful agency in 
opening up trade and spreading civilisation in areas where 
the slave trade still prevailed, little checked by the more 
direct measures hitherto used for its suppression. Success
in suppressing the slave trade in West Africa had attended
1« MP. Monteaih to Mackinnon 20 May 1881.
2. I.O.L. Political Home Correspondence, 1873, vol. 41,
Pile 1886^ /? Sfufurr /S7Z.
131
the establishment of steam eommunication, and there seemed 
no reason why a similar result should not be obtained by 
the application of a similar policy to the East coast* The 
proposed service commended itself to the Treasury on grounds 
of economy as well as humanity, because the only alternative 
was to increase the naval squadron on the coast, and this 
would have been much more costly than subsidising a mail 
service.
Six months later, the Treasury, not having received 
a reply from the India Office, sent another letter, enclosing 
a copy of a contract with the B.I. for a service every four 
weeks, each way between Aden and Zanzibar for a subsidy of 
£10,000 a year; and of a contract with the Union Steamship 
Co. for a similar service between Zanzibar and the Cape of 
Good Hope. This letter called the attention of the 
Secretary of State to the proposal made in the earlier 
letter for a contribution of £6,000 a year from the government 
of India.
The agreement with the B.I. began in December, 1872, 
and was to run for 10 years, except that the Postmaster 
General could terminate it on the 31st January, 1880, by 
giving six months notice, if the contract with the P. & 0. 
for carrying mail between England and India, via Aden were 
not renewed after that date.
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The contract with the Union Company, began in 
February 1873 5 and was to run for 8 years'*'.
The Viceroy of India protested that the reference to a 
possible subsidy by his Director General had been "altogether, 
informal, preliminary and unauthorised ...", and said that the 
government of India was not prepared to contribute towards the 
cost of the Aden-Zanzibar line.
In the India Office it was remarked that the B.I* had the 
best of it, getting £10,000 for a six day voyage, while the 
Union Co. got £15,000 for a sixteen day voyage. However, the 
Secretary of State paid little attention to the details of the 
agreement. His over-riding concern was to minimise the 
involvement, interest and possible financial liability of his 
department. In April, 1873> therefore, he said that while he 
was ready to agree that Indian commercial interests were to a 
certain, though limited, extent involved in the establishment 
of postal communications between Aden and Zanzibar, he could not 
consider them as justifying so large a subsidy as £6,000 a year 
from the Indian Government. Wrangling between the two depart­
ments continued, but it was no longer of any significance for
2
Mackinnon, once he had his contract .
In view of the remarks in the India Office minutes, 
that the "B.I. got the best of it'1, it is worth noting that 
it deserved every advantage because it was so much more______
1. P.P.(1873), IX, p. 239.
2. ibid.
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efficient than the Union Company. Kirk was most annoyed 
about the matter and in 1876, he said to Mackinnon:
,fI am to send in a report showing how well 
and punctually your Company has done its work and 
how the Union has failed, it is really throwing 
away money to pay them a subsidy for the way they 
run. They do not wish trade but run only to coal 
at either end and earn their subsidy but it must 
be a very one sided document if they cannot be 
compelled to keep to time . ..”1
This chapter is primarily about Mackinnon’s entry
to East Africa, but it must be remembered that he was also
extending his operations in other directions at the same
time. In 1871, for example, he obtained a subsidy of
£15,000 a year to run a six weekly service to Port Blair
in the Andaman Islands, about 700 miles south of Calcutta.
Peter Hall estimated that they would make a profit of about
24,000 rupees per voyage on this . While negotiating for
the East Africa contract, Mackinnon was also pursuing an
application which he first made in 1864, to run a line to
Mauritius. This finally failed^apparently, because the
prospect of the island getting telegraphic communications
reduced its need for a regular postal service to such an
extent that it was not considered justifiable to pay the
subsidy which the B.I. would have needed.
* * * *
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 8th February 1876.
2. MP. Peter Hall to Mackinnon, 13th August 1870.
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When Mackinnon obtained his East African contract 
in 1872, he appointed Captain H.A. Fraser as his agent in 
Zanzibar• This appointment was unfortunate, and got the 
business off to a poor start in a way reminiscent of 
Mackinnonfs enterprise in Australia. It was an under­
standable mistake, however, because Fraser had served with 
the Indian navy and knew the Indian Ocean. He had also 
established his business in East Africa in association with 
W. Nicol & Co., the B.I.fs agents in Bombay. The business 
was on 2,400 acres of land bought in 1864, about 20 miles 
from Zanzibar. It comprised an oil and soap factory, and 
plantations, mostly of sugar cane.
From the point of view of Mackinnon, looking for an 
agent, Fraser was an obvious choice, because he had 
experience of India and East Africa, and was already 
indirectly connected with the B.I. through W. Hicol & Co. 
Moreover Fraser was clearly an unusual man, who could 
create a favourable impression on superficial acquaintance.
Stanley^ : , .ifor, j example, on a visit to Zanzibar, 
remarked on the apathy and inertness of the Europeans 
there, but conceded that there were three or four intensly 
busy men, among whom was Captain Fraser
”... one of the sturdiest of Scotchmen, a most 
pleasant mannered and unaffected man, sincere in 
whatever he did or-^said, who has lived in Zanzibar 
several years ...n
1* H ’?! "How I found Livingstone . London, 1895,
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Sir Bartle Frere was also favourably impressed when 
he visited Bast Africa, as head of the special mission.
In a report to Lord Granville, he said that the estate 
originally purchased by Fraser, in association with 
W. Nicol & Co. and a business house in London, had sub­
sequently been bought by a Hindu, British subject, from 
whom Captain Fraser leased it. Under Fraser’s management, 
h^jsaid, the area had been changed from an unimproved 
Zanzibar rice swamp into a well arranged and well cultivated 
tropical estate, and this had been done largely by giving
the freed slaves positions of responsibility. There can
be no doubt, he said,
**... that the consciousness of freedom has, in 
many ways, improved the moral and intellectual,
as well as the physical condition of these freedmen ..."
If it were demonstrated that enterprises could be 
run more profitably by free than by slave labour, then a 
major blow would have been struck at the slave trade in 
the area.
Frere also emphasised that there were a lot of 
children on the estate, because one of the arguments 
advanced for importing more slaves to Zanzibar, was that 
they were almost infertile and so it was necessary to keep 
importing them to maintain the labour supply. However, 
if, as Fraser*s„ estate showed, freed slaves could have
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children and lead normal family lives, then the case for 
freeing slaves, and ending the trade was considerably 
strengthened.
Frere ended his report about the estates on a hopeful 
note. He said that Captain Fraser1s example had not been 
lost on his Arab neighbours, some of whom were introducing 
machinery and constructing mills; and the Sultan himself 
had been impressed by Fraser’s efforts. Frere was convinced 
that if the slave trade and the status of slavery were 
abolished, no general or commercial interest in Zanzibar 
would permanently suffer. There would no doubt be political 
and social difficulties but he said:
”... Captain Fraser seems to me, practically and 
very completely, and the more effectively because 
in some respects almost unconsciously, to have 
solved some of the most difficult-,problems connected 
with the questions before us ..."
Fraser’s business seemed to provide the example 
needed of the greater efficiency of freedmen. In fact 
this judgement on Fraser’s enterprise was premature. But 
if people as different as Frere and Stanley could commend 
Fraser, why was he an unfortunate appointment as agent for 
the B.I,? There were two reasons. First, people disliked 
him on closer acquaintance, and second, he was dishonest.
1. P.P.(1873), LXI, pp. 802-6. Frere to Granville from 
Zanzibar, 12 February 1873.
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In November 1873 Kirk advised Mackinnon to establish his 
own premises in Zanzibar. He thought it would be a good 
investment to buy a site on the shore because the value of 
land was almost certain to rise. He also suggested that 
Mackinnon might negotiate, either to have a pier exclusively 
for his own company, or to land cargoes at the customs one, 
but he said:
”... one practical difficulty in arranging this 
must be the impossible temper and character of 
your agent ...”1
Kirk said that his own differences with Fraser would not 
adversely influence the issue, but unfortunately Fraser 
was on bad terms with too many other people. Coming from 
someone as judicious as Kirk, these were damaging remarks, 
but they were not inspired by personal spite because Fraser 
was also at loggerheads with the other people who would 
have been principal parties in negotiations: the Customs
Officer and the Sultan. He and the Customs Officer were 
deadly enemies, and the Sultan always dreaded becoming 
involved with Fraser.
His dishonesty became apparent in a minor way at an 
early stage, with sharp practice in the employment of slaves. 
The Act of 1843* prohibited British subjects from buying 
slaves, but Fraser tried to evade this law by hiring them
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon. From Zanzibar, 19th November 
1873.
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from Arab owners. He paid £5 per slave in the first year 
and lesser sums subsequently, finally freeing them at the 
end of five years. As about 700 slaves were involved by 
1867, the Consul, Seward, sought advice from the Foreign 
Office. He thought Fraser was merely using the device to 
"... cover illegality with a veil of philanthropy but
he feared that a way might have been found round the Act, 
which would stimulate the slave trade. In the event, the 
Foreign Office, after obtaining an opinion from the law 
officers, confirmed that Fraser was contravening the law, 
but fortunately for Fraser, Seward avoided having to take 
legal action against him by persuading the Sultan to free 
the slaves. Thereafter Fraser continued to employ them 
as free people, and it was thus that Sir Bartle Frere saw 
them at work^.
The true worth of his business and character was 
revealed in 1874, when he placed his affairs in the hands 
of the bankruptcy court. Kirk was away at the time, but 
Prideaux, who was acting Consul, and reported the matter 
to the Foreign Office, said Fraser deserved no consideration 
in view of his questionable behaviour towards his creditors. 
Moreover he had surreptitiously departed for Ratal, six 
weeks earlier, taking large shipments of sugar from his
1* R. Couplands 1 Livingstone1s Last Journey■ « London. 
1947, pp. 151-152.
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estates which should have been sold to pay his debts. The 
lease on Fraser’s estates had just ended, and another party 
had taken over, so Prideaux saw little hope of the creditors 
recovering their money.
Prideaux also said that during visits to England, 
Fraser had drawn bills on the
”... non-existent firm of H.A* Fraser & Co. of 
Zanzibar ... In fine Captain Fraser’s career 
at Zanzibar during the past few years has been 
of the most doubtful nature and the English name 
has been seriously compromised in consequence ...”
Mackinnon’s agency in Zanzibar survived in spite of 
Captain Fraser only because of the tact and good offices 
of John Kirk, With Fraser’s departure the agency was taken 
over by Archibald Smith, described by Kirk as ”... a healthy 
stout fellow for the place He was from Mackinnon’s
G-lasgow firm of William Mackinnon, and was joined in 1875, 
by E.N. Mackenzie, from Mackinnon/Mackenzie & Co. Mackenzie 
was also well liked by Kirk and others, but he often suffered 
from depressing fevers and was not happy in the climate of 
Zanzibar. However, he stayed long enough for his name, 
and that of Archibald Smith to be given to the firm of 
Smith/Mackenzie, which Mackinnon formally established in
1877, with a capital of £5,000.
—  —  - —  ■ “ 25
1. F,0. 84/1400. Prideaux to Lord Derby,/November 1874.
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The business began in a small way at a time when the 
B.I* only had five ships on the service along the East 
African coast. Much of the work merely involved the 
transfer of cargo to and from the shore, using small B.I. 
craft till the new firm bought its own. Until 18879 when 
an aqueduct was completed on the orders of the Sultan, the 
most arduous of the tasks was supplying water to ships. 
Zanzibar was a popular port of eall for this purpose, 
because its water had a reputation for being particularly 
pure, and it was bought for about 12 shillings per ton.
The early books of the firm are a little confusing, 
because during the 1870's the Maria Theresa dollar was in 
use at Zanzibar. local accounts were therefore kept in 
dollars, while foreign ones were kept in sterling. By 
the 1880's rupees were also in use and three currencies 
appeared in the records for about thirty years. The 
confusion was aggravated because the Zanzibar government 
started recording cents of a rupee in its accounts years 
before such coins were in circulation in East Africa.*^ "
Ten years after Mackenzie was appointed he went on 
a tour northwards with General Mathews, who was on secondment 
to the Sultan's service, ahd on the strength of their reports 
it was decided to move the firm's headquarters to Mombasa,
1. The History of Smith, Mackenzie & Co. Ltd, R&,
14.1
which has a much better natural harbour than Zanzibar•
This was a wise move, particularly as Mombasa later became 
the coastal terminous for the railway to Uganda.
During the early years the firm dealt with goods as 
orders were placed. Records of the first indents sent to 
London, for example, shavrequests for:
w... a quantity of fish hooks; three thousand 
tower muskets; two hundred navy pistols; one 
second-hand safe, six by four feet, for the account 
of the British Consulate; ten casks of cement; 
thirty copies of the Koran, together with a further 
five copies in superior binding, in all respects 
the same as Stanley’s ’Through the Dark Continent*; 
and thirty cases of dates from Busreh ...**
The last three items were for the Sultan, who was 
on very good terms with the firm as well as being its 
best customer. A half year account for 1877, shows that 
he had a turnover with the company of about £1800 a year.
His high opinion of the firm was to prove useful to 
Mackinnon in years to come.
In the meantime the commerce of Zanzibar grew.
With the opening of the Suez canal in 1869, Mackinnon had 
chosen a propitious moment to enter the trade of the area. 
The importance of the whole Bast African coast, and 
especially of the route between Aden and Zanzibar, was 
greatly increased by the opening of the canal.
1. The History of Smith, Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. ?J 7
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The sea route between Britain and Ceylon was more 
than halved, and for shipping: distance, time and costs,
to India, and to other countries of the Indian and Western 
Pacific Oceans, were greatly reduced. Previously, ships 
heading round the Cape of Good Hope had cut across the 
Indian Ocean and avoided East Africa. Now, although most 
of those passing through the canal still did not call in at 
East African ports, the Aden-Zanzibar route, and East Africa 
as a whole, nevertheless took on a new importance. Zanzibar 
was now 2000 miles nearer to London. Before the opening of 
the canal the sea route to Zanzibar had been twice as far, 
from Britain, as the route to Lagos.
The trade of Zanzibar increased considerably throughout 
the 1870fs, as appears from the following table of the numbers 
and tonnage of ships calling at Zanzibar (excluding warships 
and native craft) .
1871 1877 1879
Wo. Tonnage Wo. Tonnage No. Tonnage
Britain 17 10,459 48 42,487 69 76,265
Germany 17 7,467 15 4,653 13 5,940
U.S «A. 8 4,250 10 5,352 10 5,283
Prance 11 5,450 _4 3,259 _4
53 27,626 77 55,751 96 89,463
1. Coupland, Exploitation, P 3JL2 .
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Although this increase was impressive, it was not as 
great as had been hoped* Authorities such as Rigby, and 
Layard, whose memoranda are referred to above, had led 
people to expect a quite spectacular growth in commerce, 
with the introduction of regular steamship services. Soon 
after the service was started John Kirk had said:
11... ,fI am sure the line between Aden and Zanzibar 
will very soon be an immense success and do more 
for the-, country than anything the government could 
do ...”
The following year he prematurely thought that the 
growing legitimate commerce was finally ending the slave 
trade, and said to Mackinnon:
11.. • Though I look on you as the real suppressor 
of the slave trade, Sir Bartle and I have done a 
share and paved the way but without you had stepped 
in and done what you are doing all would have been 
labour in vain ... We shall thank God soon replace 
the slave traffic with something better and I have 
no doubt you will soon see ample rewards of a very 
substantial kindpin the shape of dividends for all 
your outlay ...1
Mackinnon himself had expected trade to grow more 
rapidly than it did, but his hopes rested on his experiences 
in India. There, his coastal service had flourished and 
brought him a fortune. It had also provided a major 
stimulus to commerce between the major ports of India
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon from Zanzibar, 19th November 1873.
2. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon from Zanzibar, 21st January 1874.
from Calcutta to Karachi. In East Africa, however, the 
situation was very different. Communications on land 
were much worse than in India. There was no rail or 
telegraph service; the administration was rudimentary, 
with the Sultan’s writ really only effective along the 
coastal strip near Zanzibar. Britain had no political 
interests in the area, beyond trying to end the slave trade, 
and to discourage intervention by other powers; and there 
was no investment of British capital to develop the 
resources of the territories.
By 1876, disappointment was being expressed in a 
mild way. In that year Kirk said he was surprised to hear 
that Mackinnon was contemplating running a bi-monthly 
service, even with a subsidy.
In February of the following year he said:
11... I find among your Captains an idea prevalent 
in which your agent, Smith, I think agrees that 
there is not trade for a bi-monthly line. I am 
inclined to agree with them if the line does not 
touch on the coast, but if as you propose it were 
to touch at a few places on the coast I think the 
trade would increase and the dhows that now do the 
work go off the line ...r|l
Clearly the heady optimism which had accompanied the 
opening of the regular service had evaporated, and the 
extent to which the trade of East Africa fell short of
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 5th February 1877
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expectations is shown by the following table of the B.I.'s
1
shipping in March 1893 :
Local Indian services 72 vessels 146,371 tone
Home lines 5 vessels 24,285 tons
Australian line 3 vessels 9,112 tons
Mauritius line 4 vessels 14,612 tons
East African line 2 vessels 2,915 tons
Although Mackinnon misjudged the prospects for 
shipping in East Africa by thinking too much in terms 
of India, there were parallels between the two situations.
The introduction of regular steam services to India 
in the 1840’s led, as later in East Africa, to an expansion 
of trade which fell short of expectations. The commercial, 
and other disappointed pressure groups then made strong 
demands for the improvement of internal communications in 
India. These demands began to be met during the late 
1850fs, under the Governor-Generalship of Lord Lalhousie, 
and later by the massive investment in railway construction.
In the case of East Africa there was a similar reaction 
among businessmen and officials. Paced with the disappointing 
results, they argued that the provision of regular steamship 
services alone was not adequate. The full potential of the 
area would only be realised if the interior were "opened up".
l.MP. Prom Minutes of meeting held on 21st and 22nd March 
1893.
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In India, Mackinnon established his coastal services 
after the interior had been "opened up", whereas in East 
Africa he faced a situation similar to that which had 
obtained in India in the 1830's. This was where he had 
erred in his assessment of the prospects for trade between 
Aden and Zanzibar. He had relied on his experience of 
India in the late 1850's and '60's, when he should have 
considered the picture of India as it had been a generation 
earlier. As a result, instead of reaping vast profits as 
a shipping magnate, he became involved in the expensive 
business of trying to "open up" East Africa. He was very 
willing to participate, but it became a highly complex 
undertaking, because it was not merely a question of 
improving communications. On the contrary, it was 
inextricably concerned with the campaign against the 
slave trade, and the desire to bring civilisation to 
the "dark continent", as well as considerations of inter­
national issues, which involved European and British 
domestic politics.
Mackinnon got involved in the missionary affairs of 
Africa at an early stage, and almost inevitably, Sir Bartle 
Frere who appeared at every turn during this period of 
Mackinnon's life, was concerned. In 1874, Sir Bartle, 
in his capacity as President of the Royal Geographical
1*7
Society wrote to the Secretary of the B.I*, to thank him 
for the B.I.fs service in carrying Livingstone's hody*
This incident was of little consequence in itself, 
but it is related because the gesture of carrying Livingstone's 
body free of charge was typical of Mackinnon and reminiscent 
of the earlier occasion when he had put a ship, free of 
charge, at the disposal of Frere*s Special Mission to East 
Africa. The incident also marked another small step 
forward in Mackinnon's involvement with humanitarian 
activities in Africa. The story of his enterprise in 
Africa will be resumed, but in the next chapter it is 
necessary to tell of his worst experience in business 
which arose from his connection with the City of Glasgow 
Bank.
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IV. THE CITY OF GLASGOW BANK
During the 1850fs and l60*s Mackinnon devoted most 
of his time and energy to business in India and the Indian 
Ocean* In particular he laid the foundations of the B.I., 
but at the same time he got involved in the affairs of the 
City of Glasgow Bank, which led eventually to his being 
sued for over £400,000. The fuse was lit, in a sense, 
from the moment of his association with the Bank in 1852, 
when his firm opened an account with it, but it took over 
twenty years for the explosion to occur. The story is 
worth telling because the events were a traumatic experience 
for Mackinnon, while the crash which preceded them was a 
major disaster in Scottish banking history.*
The Bank was established in 1839 > and by a contract 
made in 1840 its capital was declared as £750,000. Three 
years later this was increased to £1,000,000, and from then 
it functioned satisfactorily for 16 years. In 1856,
Mr. William Gemmel, a partner in a Glasgow wire rope 
manufacturing, and mercantile company, acquired bonds 
in the Racine and Mississippi Railroad Company, in the 
U.S.A. These were a first charge on the line, and the 
City of Glasgow Bank made advances on their security in 
1856 and 1857.
1. The Edinburgh Publishing Company, Report of the trial of 
the Directors: The City of Glasgow Bank, Edinburgh,
1879j pp. 3-4.
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In 1857 the Bank suffered its first serious set-back. 
There was a financial crisis which occasioned a run on all 
banks, and in particular on the City Bank, which paid out 
in one day, from its head office and branches, about 
£250,000 in gold, and considerably more in notes. The 
following day it did not re-open and Mackinnon’s advice 
was sought. He had bought £2,000 worth of shares in the 
Bank about six weeks before the stoppage, and soon after it 
he became a member of the Shareholders Committee, appointed 
to co-operate with the directors. A separate committee, 
an 11Investigating Committee11, found that the Bank had 
advanced £117,608 on the railway, while the bonds held as 
security for the advance were of a nominal value of £160,907*
Mackinnon was thus satisfied that the Bank was 
solvent, but the problem was to resuscitate it by finding 
the money for carrying out day to day business. His 
ambivalent attitude towards the Bank was formed during 
this crisis and was to persist. He had a very poor 
opinion of most of the directors and officials, and was 
therefore loth to become involved in their deliberations.
He said:
11... I sometimes feel depressed, the City Bank 
people are the most shilly shallying I have ever 
met anywhere, they positively do not desire to 
get their affairs put right, they do nothing but 
talk —  propose, discuss, reject ...Ml
1. MP. Mackinnon to J.M. Hall, 25th November 1857.
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At the same time their incompetence made him feel 
obliged to help. The City Bank held about £4,000,000 in 
deposits and if it were not resuscitated he thought the 
Western Bank, which was also in a critical condition, would 
go down, and then he said there would
”... be such widespread desolation throughout Scotland 
as will be remembered for generations to come, and it 
wont rest there but will reach in Liverpool, Manchester 
and London in such a way as to make the strongest 
tremble
Having decided that it was his duty to help the City 
Bank, Mackinnon spent most of November and December on its 
affairs, attending discussions of every kind. He went up 
to London with Salmond, the Bank’s manager, to try to raise 
a loan of £500,000 from the Bank of England. They started 
by having an interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
who passed them on to the Governor of the Bank of England, 
but Mackinnon was most disappointed with the response. He 
said:
”... In this crisis the Bank of England’s policy 
seems to be to put down the Scotch banks, and the 
Old Edinburgh Bank with the most contemptible 
feeling of rivalry and jealousy will not move 
to assist the City. Their wish evidently is 
to get the field to themselves ...”2
Paced with this attitude from the large institutions 
and with incompetence from the City Bank, Mackinnon was
1. MP. Mackinnon to J*M. Hall, 25th November 1857.
2. Or td , .....
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sorely tempted to withdraw from the whole affair, but his 
sense of duty overcame his distaste for the business and 
he stayed on. Then, fortunately for his morale, and the 
fortunes of the Bank, the Directors accepted his suggestion 
that depositors should be asked to allow their deposits to 
remain on four months notice. A circular was sent out 
making this request and letters of agreement poured in.
On the 8th December, a meeting of shareholders was held 
at which it was decided that the Bank should resume 
business. This was done on the last day of the month, 
and Mackinnon continued to be torn between getting more 
deeply involved and backing out altogether.
In March 1853 he said the Bank still had to overcome 
many difficulties before it could resume its former position, 
but with two or three exceptions he thought the Directors 
fell below the mark, and only one of the principal officials 
was fit for his position. Mackinnon remained greatly 
worried by the Bank’s affairs after it re-opened and, in 
March, he almost sold his shares and severed his connections 
with it. However, he again felt obliged to give advice, 
and did not make the final breach. Business confidence 
in Glasgow’s financing facilities had been seriously shaken 
by the stoppages of the previous year, and a great deal of 
mistrust remained, particularly towards the City Bank.
In July 1858, he wrote from Glasgow:
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”... I have been much occupied since my return 
here with various matters, among others the City 
Bank. Of which at the General Meeting the other 
day I was made a director, an honour not of my 
seeking* (There is much responsibility attached 
to it, and it will involve much labour and attention. 
However having had so much to do with it for the Iasi 
6 months I agreed to join the directors simply 
because I thought I could be useful to the Bank ...”
He attended to the Bank's affairs fairly dutifully 
for about 3 years, but from 1861, the magnitude of his 
shipping enterprise was such that it engrossed most of 
his energies. Between October, 1861 and October 1863* 
he was only in Glasgow for about four months, and he was 
only there 3 or 4 months for each of the succeeding 3 years. 
In view of his preoccupation with the B.I. he asked, on a 
number of occasions during this period, to be relieved of 
his duties, but each time he was pressed to remain while 
they looked for a successor. In 1867> to show that he waB 
really serious, he sold some of his shares in the Bank as a 
threat, because he would have been disqualified from being 
a director if he had sold all of them. This flshilly 
shallying” organisation still did not appoint a successor 
so he finally resigned on the 18th July, 1870. Pour years 
later he ceased even to be a shareholder. This was not 
because he distrusted the City Bank, but because he had 
decided to sell all bank shares and invest his money
1. MP. Mackinnon to J. Halliday, 9th July 1858.
elsewhere. The effect was to sever his connections with 
the Bank, but unfortunately he was not to hear the last of 
it.
The City of Glasgow Bank crashed irretrievably in 
1878. On the 2nd October it closed, and on the 5th a 
preliminary report was submitted which showed that it had 
an apparent deficit of £6,190,895* This was a great shock 
to the shareholders, because the Bank had grown into a 
fairly large concern with 155 branches, and its stock 
before this final closure stood at £240 per £100 share. 
Moreover, in July 1878, the directors had declared a 
dividend of 12?o, a reserve fund of £450,000 and profits 
of over £140,000. This however was clearly a misleading 
picture, and on the 19th October, the Manager, Secretary 
and Glasgow directors were arrested and accused of stealing 
£20,000 .-1-
The collapse was not so unexpected in professional 
banking circles, however, because the Bank had been 
suspect ever since the temporary stoppage in 1857* Indeed 
it was lack of confidence from this quarter that precipitated 
the catastrophe.
”... Early in 1878 bill brokers, suspicious of 
its soundness extracted an extra quarter or half 
of 1 per cent over the market rate in discounting 
its acceptances ...”^
1. Report of the Trial of the Directors  ^ op.cit., pp. 5-4*
2. C*A* Malcolm; The Bank of Scotland, 1695-1945# Edinburgh,
1948, p. 155.
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This was the last straw for the Bank, so it sought help from 
the other Scottish banks* These insisted on appointing an 
accountant to examine the books; and it was he who found 
the enormous deficit.
The particularly tragic aspect of the disaster was 
that, being an unlimited company, the shareholders had to 
meet the Bank’s liabilities. The liquidators called for 
£2,750 for each £100 share, with the result that most of 
the shareholders were ruined"*'.
A number of the directors of the bank were found 
guilty of fraud and sentenced to periods of imprisonment 
ranging from eight to eighteen months.
Mackinnon was of course in no way implicated in the - 
criminal aspects of this affair, but at a meeting of share­
holders on the 22nd of October, 1878, it was resolved that 
the affairs of the Bank should be wound up under voluntary 
liquidation. Y/hen Mackinnon's name was mentioned at this 
time, his friend, James Macalister Hall rather perceptively 
remarked that
H... All this trouble to you doubtless arises from a 
feeling of envy that one who had so much to do with 
the Bank at one time should have got free and be a 
rich man ...1
1. C.A. Malcolm; op.cit., p. 133*
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Mackinnon 'become involved formally when the liquidators, 
nearly two years later, sued him on two counts.
First, for the recovery of £122,565, with 5$ interest
from October 1878. The liquidators maintained that this
was the difference between what they realised on the
securities and what had been advanced irresponsibly by
the bank during Mackinnon*s period of office as a director
of the bank. Second, they claimed £311,666 which they
alleged had been paid to shareholders as dividends during
Mackinnon*s directorship, on the grounds that this money
was improperly paid out of the Bank's capital instead of
its earned profits.
* * * *
The liquidators alleged that Mackinnon and the 
other directors had violated the terms of the bank's 
contract by authorising large advances, either without 
security, or without adequate security, with the result 
that the bank had suffered serious losses.
Mackinnon maintained, on the contrary, that when 
he resigned his directorship the bank had a large reserve 
fund, and enjoyed a sound and increasing business. He 
attributed its insolvency to the practice, which started 
after he resigned, of granting large unsecured advances.
Moreover he disputed the liquidators contention that the 
bank’s reserves had been small# On the basis of the 
report which they themselves submitted in December 1880, 
it appeared that after paying all the creditors in full, 
there should have been a surplus# If the liquidators were 
experiencing difficulty in meeting demands, this was 
because they had realised the bank's securities hastily 
and without proper consideration#
The Racine and Mississippi Railroad Company, for 
which the advances were made, was established in 1852, to 
construct a railway from Racine, on Lake Michigan to 
Savanna on the Mississippi. By the Autumn of 1855>
68 miles had been built, as far as Beloit, and in order 
to complete the next portion to Preport the company 
issued mortgage bonds for $1,000 each, bearing interest 
at 8/o. It was these bonds that Gemmel contracted to buy, 
and it was on their security that the Bank made its first 
advances, from the spring of 1856 till its temporary 
stoppage in November, 1857. In 1858, a firm of stock­
brokers called Thomson & Y/atson sold its shares in the 
Racine to the Bank, and the following year Gemmel renounced 
his bonds in favour of the Bank, thus giving it a controlling 
interest in the railway project.
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The liquidators argued that the Racine bonds held 
by the Bank were not worth half their nominal value at the 
time of the temporary stoppage in 1857• The question of 
valuing the bonds was highly controversial, but for the 
moment it must be noted that problems were not resolved 
by the Bank gaining a controlling interest. The liquidators 
were in fact able to point to a series of set-backs. In 
February 1858, the railway was in such embarrassed circum­
stances that it was unable to pay interest, and a few 
months later, under pressure from its creditors, it had 
to sell a large number of tools and rails which the Bank 
bought for £884.
Mackinnon admitted this, but pointed out that the 
Bank had given extensive credits, for which it held bonds 
of the Racine Co., before he became a director and before 
the stoppage in 1857* At the time he joined the board he 
thought the Racine bonds were unsaleable, but he claimed 
that the policy of the Bank thereafter led to an appreciation 
of their value. The purchase of the rails and tools had 
also been arranged before his directorship but he did not
Most of the information for the rest of this chapter was 
obtained from the record of the proceedings in Court - e.g. 
’’Note for the liquidators of the City of Glasgow Bank 
against William Mackinnon”. The ”Proof for Parties” and 
the ”0pinions of the Judges” concerning the liquidators 
’’Note”. These are with the Mackinnon papers.
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think the purchase unwise. On the contrary, he thought 
it necessary to ensure that work on the line continued. 
However, he felt that any complaints the liquidators had 
ahout these transactions were irrelevant because they 
occurred before he held any position of responsibility 
in the Bank.
Accepting this contention the liquidators pointed 
to subsequent difficulties caused by what they called 
mismanagement. In the spring of 1859, the eastern section 
of the line was surrendered to the Farmers loan Trust 
Company to act as trustee for the bondholders. The idea 
was that the section should be redeemed 5 years after the
line reached Freeport. At the request of the Bank, the
Trust Company appointed George A. Thomson of the stockbroking 
firm, and two others to manage the line on behalf of the 
bondholders. In April 1859, the directors of the Bank, 
at a meeting attended by Mackinnon, resolved to spend 
^170,000 so that work on the line could continue.
Mackinnon admitted agreeing to this, but said that 
the Bank had already advanced £117,000 on the security of
Kacine bonds when he became a director. The Investigation
Committee, which looked into the Bank’s affairs at the time 
of the temporary stoppage in 1857, regarded the bonds as 
good security for the advances, but when Mackinnon joined
1*0
the Board, he thought they had no present or soon realisable 
value. Only part of the railway had been made; its 
equipment was poor; and, unfinished, it could not earn 
enough to cover its working expenses and pay interest on 
the bonds. The Bank was advised by reliable authorities 
in America that completion of the line as far as Freeport 
would open it up to traffic and make the bonds marketable. 
Mackinnon was very reluctant to agree to further advances 
when he became a director, but he was convinced that the 
alternative would have meant abandoning the advances already 
made, and sacrificing the Bank's bonds.
He also justified the handing over of the railway 
to the Farmers Loan and Trust Company. He said that the 
railway was potentially valuable. Griven the kind of 
country through which it was passing, it would have a 
great deal of freight when completed. There were, however, 
two difficulties. First, the depression in America made 
it impossible to raise money there for the completion of 
the project. Second, the existing management was untrust­
worthy. In the circumstances he thought it was prudent to 
put the affairs of the railway into the hands of the Farmers 
Trust Company which he said, was 11... of the highest 
position and influence ..." Far from having no securities, 
he maintained that the Bank's advances were a first charge 
on the railway.
Itl
The liquidators next alleged that the Bank poured 
good money after bad in 1860, by buying more railway bonds, 
but Mackinnon said that was done on the recommendation of 
the Bank's American advisers who thought it was desirable 
for the Bank to give protection to its earlier advances by 
securing greater control over the line. Mackinnon's 
counsel maintained that these additional bonds were bought 
very cheaply and realised at great profit in the ultimate 
sale.
However, further complications arose in 1860, when 
the railway was completed to Freeport. It was then 
expected to connect with the Illinois Central Railway, 
so that the Racine Company could dispense with the extension 
of its own line to the Mississippi. The Illinois Central 
Railway had agreed to an exchange of traffic between the 
two compahies at Freport, but when the Racine line actually 
reached Freeport it went back on this agreement. In this 
situation the Bank's American advisers said that although 
the Racine Company’s bonds had greatly increased in value 
since the line reached Freeport, it was essential, if they 
were to be marketed profitably for the line to extend to 
the Mississippi. The Bank accepted this advice and agreed 
to advance up to $200,000 so that the work could be carried 
out by another company, the Northern Illinois Railway
It2
Company, which had a charter authorising it to construct a 
line betv/een Freeport and the Mississippi.
The liquidators again alleged that the advances were 
made without adequate security. Mackinno# was in India 
when these additional advances were agreed to in 1862, but 
he was satisfied that the Bank had proper securities. He 
said that in 1863, it got from the Northern Illinois 
Company, 483 first mortgage bonds of #1,000 each, bearing 
8c/o interest, in respect of the advances up to that date, 
and they were exchanged in 1866, for 582, lc/o bonds of the 
Western Union Railway Company. Mackinnon maintained that 
a large amount of interest was paid on them, and that they 
proved a valuable asset at the time of the final stoppage 
in 1878.
The Western Union Railroad Company was a new company 
created by Mr. Thomson out of the Racine and the Northern 
Illinois companies. The way in which the new company was 
financed, however, gave the liquidators grounds for 
complaint against Mackinnon because he and 5 other directors 
of the Bank agreed to provide £5,000 each for the purchase 
of more Racine bonds. The liquidators said, that the Bank 
opened accounts for each of these directors to enable them 
to make the purchase, and later improperly transferred the 
cost of the operation to its own debit account, thus
1'63
relieving the directors of liability and losing money for 
the Bank*
Mackinnon admitted that the Bank had opened accounts 
for the directors concerned, but this was because it had 
agreed to give credit for 80j£ of the cost. It got bonds 
for any credit it gave, and when it finally sold them it made 
a profit of between 60 and 80 per cent.
Mackinnon*s firm of W. Mackinnon & Co., and Mr. J.N. 
Fleming provided money, in 1865? on their own account for 
the Northern Illinois Railway because the Bank declined to 
give any further advances. The grading of the extension 
of the line from Fulton to Port Byron was completed but it 
could not be opened for lack of rails, and Mackinnon and 
Fleming provided the funds necessary for the purchase of 
rails in return for Northern Illinois bonds which were later 
exchanged for those of the Western Union Company which was 
then being created. These bonds were transferred to the 
Bank in 1869, at cost price and with the interest and charges 
up to the time of transfer. In agreeing to this transaction 
Mackinnon maintained that he sacrificed a good deal of the 
profit which had already accrued, and which was in prospect, 
to facilitate a deal which the Bank was negotiating at the 
time.
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In 1866, Thomson and others in America planned to 
construct a large store and grain elevator to handle the 
grain traffic at the Racine terminal of the newly created 
Western Union Railway Company. The idea was to provide 
storage capacity and facilities for loading steamboats on 
Lake Michigan. The liquidators alleged that the Bank, with 
Mackinnon*s approval, irresponsibly advanced money for this 
project while Thomson was financially embarrassed, and as a 
result heavy losses were sustained when the shares had to 
be sold in 1879*
Mackinnon admitted that Thomson got into financial 
difficulty in 1867, because one of his principal associates 
withdrew from the scheme and thereby threatened to prevent 
it being completed. However, he justified the advance of 
0200,000 on four grounds. First, that storage and elevator 
facilities were available at Chicago and Milwaukie for other 
rail companies, so that it was essential for the Western 
Union to have similar facilities if it was to compete 
effectively. Second, the provision of these facilities 
would bring more business to the railroad and so enhance 
the value of its bonds to the benefit of the Bank, which 
was the chief shareholder. Third, the project had 
progressed considerably entirely at the risk of Thomson 
and his associates before the Bank made any advance, so it
1$5
was helping to complete what promised to be a sound 
enterprise, and the securities which included a lien over 
the elevator, were good. Finally, Mackinnon claimed that 
the project, which came to be known as the Racine Warehouse 
and Dock Company, earned a net income of between $13,000 
and $14,000 from 1870 to 1877* He thought this fully 
justified the confidence which the Bank had shown in making 
the advance, and he attributed th loss on the final sale to 
the incompetence of the liquidators.
In 1869, a meeting of bond and stock holders of the 
railway company was held in Glasgow at which it was decided 
to establish a small Committee of Supervision to provide a 
direct means of communication between the managers in 
America and interested parties in Britain. The three 
men who comprised the Committee were each in some way 
associated with Mackinnon. John Fleming had joined him 
in providing credit for the Northern Illinois Railroad when 
the Bank had declined to do so in 1865. James Macdonald 
was manager of the General Credit and Discount Company of 
which Mackinnon was a director, and the third member was 
J.M. Hall, Mackinnon's great friend from the B.I.
The Committee’s main task was to sell some of the 
interests in the railroad on behalf of the Bank and other 
shareholders. As will be explained more fully later, after
lengthy negotiations half of the Bank's holding of common 
stock was sold in 1869, to Alexander Mitchell, who was an 
American hanker, President of the Milwaukie and St. Paul 
Railroad Company and a director of the Chicago and North 
Western Railroad Company. Mitchell enhanced the value of 
the Racine, particularly, by constructing a line to join it 
with the Milwaukie and St. Paul lines and by building a road 
running westwards from the western side of the Mississippi, 
which improved access to the rapidly developing state of 
Iowa. The amount which Mitchell paid was accepted not 
because it was considered the proper value, but because a 
sale of half of the stock to him and his associates secured 
their active cooperation thereby raising the value of the 
stock retained by the Bank.
A basic argument of the liquidators, however, was 
that this policy did not lead to a satisfactory appreciation 
of the securities held by the Bank. They claimed that in 
July 18^9, they were worth £579,328, and that they were 
never worth more at any time between then and the end of 
Mackinnon's directorship in 1870. Mackinnon on the other 
hand thought they were worth a lot more than the liquidators 
alleged, but he maintained that he could not be held 
responsible for any losses sued for in the first action 
because:
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1* The liquidators sold the securities without 
reference to him* Had he been notified, he 
would have been prepared, though not bound, 
to take over the securities held by the Bank 
and to pay the advances and interest on them.
With the rapid increase of population in the 
area between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi, 
and the growth in the grain trade Mackinnon was 
sure that they could have been sold more profitably, 
had the liquidators awaited a more favourable 
opportunity or sought his advice.
2. The Bank had confirmed and adopted the policies 
complained of by the liquidators, and Mackinnon*s 
part in formulating them had not been challenged 
within a reasonable time.
3* Mackinnon*s policy had been to protect the substantial 
investments in America which were made before he 
became a director. This policy enjoyed the 
support of the majority of shareholders so the 
action against him was misconceived.
4. The claim for £122,565*2.8 could not be insisted 
upon pending a settlement of the other action 
against him.
This latter point appears to have been conceded, 
because the next move on the part of the liquidators was 
on the 13th November 1880, when they sued in the First 
Division Court of Session for recovery of £311,666.16.9*
The liquidators did not resume the claim for £122,565 
because it became evident during the proceedings in the 
second action that they would not succeed. The Lord 
President of the court stating his opinion in the second 
case made it clear that in his view the Bank’s investment 
policy during Mackinnon’s directorship had improved the 
value of its holdings in America, and not otherwise. In
1*8
1870, when Mackinnon resigned as a director the nominal 
value of the securities in the railway projects was 
£974,000, for a debt comprising principal and interest 
of £905,000. His Lordship’s impression of the real value 
of these securities was that
”... after many years of anxious and careful treatment 
of the investments of this portion of the Bank’s 
funds, the directors had got it into comparatively 
smooth water, and were possessed of a property or 
investment of a sound description.
Certainly this impression is very strongly 
confirmed by the undoubted fact, that in 1870 
the investment began to pay interest, and continued 
to do so down to the stoppage of the Bank in 1878.
The average of the interest varied from time to ^ 
time, but the average of the eight years was 4$ ..•M
Later in the same proceedings another judge, Lord Leas, 
argued that the policy of making further advances to the 
Racine Railway Co., which Mackinnon advised when he joined 
the Bank, was sound. He said, that when Mackinnon became 
a director in 1858, the Bank was limited to choosing 
between two courses of action. It could either try 
to make the railway a paying concern, or it could call 
another meeting of the shareholders and recommend winding 
up the Bank's affairs. The latter course could hardly 
commend itself to Mackinnon or the other directors because 
it was only 7 months since the shareholders had resolved, 
after the stoppage in 1857, that the bank should continue.
1. MP. Opinions of the Judges.
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Further advances had been made since the date of the 
resolution and that of Mackinnon*s appointment, so it 
was most unlikely that the shareholders would agree to 
the winding up of the bank and thereby suffer greater 
losses in 1858, than they had been willing to suffer 
7 months earlier. The judge in effect thought that 
the resolution of December 1857, still held good in July 
1858, when Mackinnon became a director, and that it 
provided a mandate for the policy of granting further 
advances and trying to make the railway a paying concern. 
Another judge, Lord Mure, approved Mackinnon*s action even 
more explicitly and said:
**... the loss on realisation arose from no fault 
of the part of the Respondent. It has arisen 
under a liquidation rendered necessary by the 
culpable and reckless, and in some respects criminal 
mismanagement of the Bank, begun after the Respondent 
had ceased to be a director; and a careful examination 
of the evidence bearing on this part of the case, has 
left a strong impression on my mind that if the 
realisation had not been forced on by one of the 
greatest monetary catastrophes that ever occurred, 
no loss would have been sustained. And I think 
there are pretty strong grounds for holding, that 
if the realisation had to be made now, there would 
not only be no loss, but a considerable profit in 
the result ...**1
Faced with such opinions from the bench it would 
have been fruitless for the liquidators to pursue their 
claim for £122,565, which basically rested on the allegation
1 .  LIP. Opinions of the Judges.
1V0
that Mackinnon had "been responsible for making unjustified
and unsound advances*
* * * *
The second case was argued very much more on points 
of law and accounting procedure. Why was Mackinnon alone 
sued? Who were the liquidators acting for? Is there a 
time limit within which such actions must be brought? How 
are dividends paid in practice, and so on.
This second action was brought on the grounds that 
v/hile Article 45 of the Bank's contract required dividends 
to be paid out of net profits, Mackinnon and the other 
directors had wilfully misapplied funds by paying them out 
of capital. Direct loss of funds was not alleged. This 
distinguishes it from the other case in which the liquidators 
said that when Mackinnon retired as a director large sums had 
been advanced on the American railway projects in such an 
irresponsible way that money was lost when they were obliged 
to sell shares.
However influential he may have been as a director, 
Mackinnon felt that any major policy decisions taken while 
he was on the board of the bank were collective ones. But 
when he asked why they were suing him only, instead of taking 
the more obvious course of including all the directors, the
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liquidators said they were entitled to because they were 
alleging dereliction of duty and not the breach of a formal 
contract. In strictly legal terms this seems to have been 
a tenable argument (at least one of the judges thought so) 
but the liquidators were negatively claiming a right to sue 
only one director; they did not positively state why they 
were doing so. One assumes that Mackinnon was the only 
former director in a position to pay over £300,000, but the 
absence of a satisfactory explanation of this issue did not 
enhance the liquidators case. It also introduced an 
unpleasant personal flavour into the proceedings which was 
upsetting for Mackinnon. Early in 1881, he wrote to his 
friend Richard Irvin, who as head of the firm of Richard Irvin 
& Co. had been the Bank’s chief financial adviser in America, 
saying:
”... I feel as if the attempt to ruin me is a dishonest 
attempt, intended to extort money from me by the 
threat of a protracted lawsuit ...1
I feel my enemies the liquidators and those acting 
with them are bitter and malicious in their action 
and that trully without cause. They have given me 
much work and worry and seem relentless ...”^
Almost as distressed as Mackinnon was his old friend 
James Macalister Hall, who at the beginning of 1881, said:
1. MP. Mackinnon to Richard Irvin, 15th January 1881.
2. MP. Mackinnon to Richard Irvin, 16th February 1881.
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"... I have not been writing you lately because 
I could be of no use to you and I dreaded to worry 
you with my letters ... You have been as much in 
my thoughts as ever all the same, and I have not 
ceased to remember you to Him who directs the 
path of all those who to Him Commit their ways ...rf
The true extent of Mackinnon's liability was made even 
more indeterminate on the liquidators showing because they 
still had some unsold securities. Until these were sold the 
amount of money available to the liquidators could not be 
known, nor, therefore, could it be known what shortfall, if 
any, would have to be made up by Mackinnon in the final 
analysis if their claim succeeded.
Mackinnon felt that in the circumstances the liquidators 
were, as he told Irvin, trying to extort money from him by the 
threat of protracted legal action. He thought they were 
acting in pursuit of this policy, and being vexatious in 
bringing two cases against him; leaving the extent of his 
liability vague and implying that he might become involved in 
litigation with shareholders. He considered that the first 
action embraced any reasonable claim that the liquidators 
might have and that the second was irrelevant.
Another aspect of the whole affair which added to 
Mackinnon's sense of grievance was that so much time had been 
allowed to elapse. How could the liquidators justify
1. MP. Hall to Mackinnon, 1st January 1881.
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instituting proceedings against him ten years after he had 
ceased to be a director of the bank, and six years after he 
had severed all connections with it?
The court did not lay down a period within which such 
actions should be brought, but Lord Shand, in his ’’Opinion”, 
stated that proceedings should normally be instituted within a 
year, or within two years in exceptional circumstances. This
would enable a respondent to preserve rights of relief, or the
right to demand repayment of dividends from anyone liable to
do so. There was certainly widespread agreement that it was
unfair to start proceedings after such a lapse of time, to 
judge from the contemporary press reports, but Mackinnon also 
challenged the case against him in broad terms by arguing that 
the distinction between capital and interest was not so sharp 
as the liquidators asserted.
Accepting this point, the court said that in order to 
convict Mackinnon of paying dividends out of capital the 
liquidators would have to prove that:
a) he knew interest on the railway investment though 
due was not being paid;
b) it was credited to the profit and loss account 
and divided as profit;
c) he did not have reasonable grounds for believing 
that the interest was well secured and would 
ultimately be recovered.
mMackinnon, as a director of the Bank relied on the 
Bankfs advisers in America for information about the state 
of the market and the progress of the railway. The principal 
advisers were Messrs. Irvin of New York (Richard Irvin, the 
head of it became a personal friend of Mackinnon1s) and Mr. 
Thomson who managed the railway. Irvin & Co. was a firm with 
a very high reputation and wide experience. Thomson was 
inclined to be too sanguine, but he was energetic, competent 
and honest.
James Macalister Hall, who visited the United States on 
behalf of the Bank with Mr. Dunlop^ in 1866, took a more
pessimistic view of the railway venture than Mackinnon did.
2
However, Leresche , who went out later thought that the 
prospects were good, and in his "opinion1 on this issue 
Lord Shand said:
"... it is I think clear from the contemporaneous 
correspondence and documents that there never was 
a time when the parties either in America or in 
this country were led seriously to doubt that the 
Bank was fully secured. That circumstance is 
decisive of the present question. That Mackinnon 
had reasonable grounds for his opinion and belief, 
is proved by the fact that he had the assurances 
of so many others on whose opinions he relied, who 
knew the district and the railways thoroughly, that 
the property was most valuable and improving . .."*
1. Mr. C. Dunlop was a former director of the bank.
2. Leresche later became Secretary of the bank.
3. MP. Lord Shand in the "Opinions of the Judges".
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Another point which must he made is that the problem of 
valuing the shares of the Racine Railway was very much more a 
matter of judgement than is normally the case because for most 
of the period of Mackinnon*s directorship of the Bank, the 
line was under construction. While it was being built the 
value of the shares depended on the potential success of the 
enterprise. It was only expected to be highly profitable 
once it was completed to join the Mississippi with the Great 
Lakes. It is most unlikely that Mackinnon would have agreed 
to finance the project in the first instance, but as the Bank 
had already advanced £117,000 when he became a director he 
thought that the money could best be recovered by finishing 
the line and making it viable. The value to be placed on the 
securities which the Bank continued to buy during Mackinnon*s 
directorship, however, depended for most of the time on an 
assessment of how profitable the scheme would be when completed.
There was, nevertheless, a very unusual feature of the 
financial arrangements which Mackinnon had to explain. Luring 
the 12 years of his directorship, the Bank only received in 
cash about of the interest from its investment in the 
American railways. The balance of £311,666 was held in the 
form of securities in America. This of course was the basis 
for the liquidators second claim. They maintained that the 
securities were not worth this amount, that they did not really
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represent interest and that consequently the Bank had 
improperly paid dividends out of capital. The distinction 
between capital and interest was not so clear-cut as the 
liquidators implied, and the difficulty of assessing the value 
of the securities has already been discussed, but Mackinnon 
had to explain why only about l-g$ of earned interest was 
received as cash over so long a period, and he gave two reasons
First, for most of the period concerned, and particularl; 
from 1862 to 1870, the exchange rate was such that the Bank 
would have sustained a considerable loss if it had transferred 
money from America to Britain, The Civil War, and its 
aftermath, greatly depreciated the value of the American 
dollar so that it virtually never reached the par rate of 05 
to the £. Instead, during this period the rate ran at 6, 7 
or 8 to the £, and even reached 10^ to the £ in December, 1864•
The second reason, closely associated with the first, 
was that the Bank found it extremely difficult during this 
period to sell its American railway shares satisfactorily.
The Bank received offers on a number of occasions from which 
it could have recovered capital and interest with profit in 
dollar terms. ... The Chicago and North Western Railroad 
Co. offered to purchase in 18639 1864 and 1867; offers were 
made particularly after the creation of the Western Union 
Railroad and a number of times after the line reached
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Savanna, on the Mississippi. However, the difficulty always 
was that the profits in dollars would have been converted 
into a loss in pounds by the unfavourable exchange rate. 
Giving evidence on this point, Mackinnon said:
ff... If the Bank had realised their interest in 1867 
or any of the subsequent years, I should have 
recommended the money to be left in America and 
invested there ...fl
His idea was to invest the funds in America till the exchange 
rate returned to par, when they could have been transferred 
to Britain without loss on the exchange. Although he agreed 
to the Bank providing additional credit for the railway 
undertaking, he only did so to ensure its completion. In 
fact he thought the Bank held too many railway securities and 
on at least two occasions serious efforts were made to try to 
sell some of them, very largely on his initiative. The 
extent of his involvement and interest in the ensuing 
negotiations which took place, particularly in 1866 and 1869, 
is partly reflected in the following table of his attendance 
at Board meetings of the Bank:
In 1866 25 meetings
In 1867 8 meetings
In 1868 1 meeting
In 1869 11 meetings
In 1870 5 meetings.
178
His initiative in 1866 was mainly prompted "by the 
widespread commercial crisis which afflicted Britain as well 
as America. In view of the charges which were levelled 
against Mackinnon it is worth noting here that in 1867, 
following the severe crisis, he recommended that the unpaid 
interest should no longer he placed to the credit of the 
profit and loss account to appear as part of the profit for 
dividend. This recommendation was rejected, hut as he 
considered the question to he a matter of opinion, rather 
than principle, he accepted the decision of the majority of 
directors while continuing to voice his objections periodically 
till he finally resigned in 1870.
In the meantime the other directors did accept the 
proposal that James Macalister Hall and Henry Dunlop should 
visit America on their hehalf. Hall said
H... I understood that Mr. Dunlop and I were sent 
out to America in order to accomplish the conversion 
into money of the Bankfs interest in the railway 
stock. I understood from the directors that they 
had heen trying to market their securities hut had 
not heen successful ...*'1
Hall and Dunlop were not authorised to conclude a deal, 
hut merely to negotiate with interested parties and notify 
the Bank. Reporting to Mackinnon ahout the visit, Richard 
Irvin said:
1. MP. Part of Hallfs evidence during proceedings.
179
**... You could not have sent representatives more 
entirely acceptable personally, nor more correct 
and judicious in their endeavours ... but ... the 
times have been unpropitious, and circumstances 
extremely perplexing and vexatious have arisen 
during their efforts, so that they have laboured 
under serious and depressing disadvantages. These, 
however, have been far from discouraging them, and 
they carry home an offer for the property which we 
all think quite below the value, being not one half, 
and that too on credit, of what it could be credited 
for, but it is for the friends interested on your 
side to say whether they prefer to accept it, or 
take the chances of another season . ..**1
Hall recommended that the offer which they brought back 
should be accepted, but Mackinnon and the other directors of 
the Bank thought it not sufficiently attractive. The effort 
had thus been fruitless, but within 18 months Mackinnon had 
begun arrangements to send Mr. Leresche out.
Leresche was engaged in a small business in London, 
when through Mackinnon*s influence he was appointed Secretary 
of the London Committee of Shareholders of the Western Union 
Railroad Company. He later became Secretary of the Bank, but 
in the meantime, as Secretary of the Committee, he learned 
about the American investments and was sent there for about 
three months from July, 1868. His terms of reference were 
similar to those given to Hall and Dunlop, and his visit was 
important for two reasons. He supported Mackinnon*s view 
that the railway enterprise would be a success in the long 
run, and he began the negotiations with Mr. Mitchell who
1. MP. Richard Irvin to Mackinnon from New York, 14th 
January 1867.
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bought a substantial number of the Bank’s shares in the 
railway the following year, Leresche's assessment of the 
situation was perceptive and interesting because it was 
similar to Mackinnon’s. He said:
”... I thought it a sound, solid, and developing 
property; it was running through one of the richest 
parts of the western States. I thought there were 
resources still to be developed. I thought the 
line had been built ten years too soon. Of course 
the custom in the States is different from ours; 
in this country we wait till a town is fully peopled 
before supplying a railway, while there they build a 
railroad accross the prairie and take people to the 
place ...”1
Mr. Mitchell, with whom the Bank finally reached an 
agreement, was a prosperous business-man with great experience 
of railway management. Mackinnon played a vital part in the 
negotiations, and he was particularly requested by Richard 
Irvin, and others, not to resign till negotiations were 
concluded. The most significant feature of the agreement 
was that Mitchell paid #325,000 for stock in the enterprise, 
and Mackinnon said:
”... The importance which I attached to the Mitchell 
agreements was this, that we were getting a man 
into the management who had enormous facilities 
for controlling railway traffic. He took two 
million of stock, and the moment he went in he^ 
gave life and vitality to the whole thing ...”
1. LIP. Part of evidence given by Leresche in ’Proof for
Parties”.
2. MP. Part of evidence given by Mackinnon in ”Proof for
Parties”.
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Here it is worth summarising what was achieved in 
respect of the railway project while Mackinnon was a director 
of the Bank, When he joined the Board in 1858, the Bank had 
advanced £117,000; 80 miles of railway had heen completed
and the line was unprofitable. When he resigned in 1870, 
the Bank's stake in the enterprise amounted to £905,000 
(including the unpaid and accumulated interest); the line 
was 180 miles long and a paying concern. Interest was paid 
on the bonds at yfo for three years from 1870, at ifo from 
1873, and from 1873 to 1878 the Bank received an average of 
£40,000 a year as interest‘d.
In the view of the Court, the profitability of the 
railway after the conclusion of the Mitchell agreements 
disposed of the liquidator's general indictment of Mackinnon1s 
policy. In fact his idea of recouping the original outlay by 
advancing enough additional money to complete the line and 
make it a viable enterprise paid off. If the Bank had not 
failed there is every reason to believe that it would have 
continued to receive a substantial amount of revenue from 
the line,
The liquidators thus failed to establish their general 
proposition and the Courts reasons for rejecting their claim 
can be stated briefly:
1. IIP. Lord Mure in the "Opinions of the Judges".
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1. It had not been established that Mackinnon had 
been a party to any proceeding which could fairly 
be described as paying dividend out of capital.
2. At the stage which the liquidation had reached,
the liquidators had no title or legitimate interest 
to maintain the claim.
3. The claim was barred by the lapse of time combined 
with the action of the managers and directors of 
the Bank between 1870 and 1878, and by that of the 
liquidators in disposing of the railway securities 
without reference to Mackinnon.
These were the formal reasons given by the Lord Presides 
but he also had objections to the liquidators* case because 
they were obviously claiming more than they could justly 
dispose of. They failed to give an adequate explanation of 
how they could fairly dispose of the money if they succeeded 
in their claim.
The Court came to its conclusion unanimously and 
without difficulty, and judgement was given on the 23rd 
December, 1881. It was an immense relief to Mackinnon who 
had lived in the shadow of litigation for 18 months. His 
counsel said the cases had involved as much inquiry and work 
as twenty ordinary ones, and Mackinnon had had an anxious and 
exhausting time furnishing material for his own defence while 
also running his multifarious enterprises.
The liquidators emerged rather badly from the 
proceedings. It was widely thought that they had been 
unfair in suing Mackinnon alone, particularly so long after
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he had left the Bank. More materially it cost them over 
£20,000, and they failed early in 1882, in their efforts to 
appeal to the House of Lords.
Bor Mackinnon on the other hand the judgement brought 
not only relief, but considerable credit as is shown by the 
following comments made by the judges while summing up and 
delivering their "Opinions".
Lord President: ”... It does not appear that he (Mackinnon)
ever made use of his knowledge or influence as a 
director to procure any pecuniary or other 
advantage to himself ... During his tenure 
of office it appears that he gave more of his 
time and attention to the Bank*s affairs than 
could well be expected from a man engaged in 
extensive mercantile transactions on his own 
account ...”
Lord Deas: ”... In conclusion, I must observe that whatever
opinions may be formed as to the legal questions 
involved in this case, it is a great comfort to 
find that there is no trace throughout of any 
interested or selfish motive on the part of 
Mackinnon, in what he did or concurred in doing.
He never made the Bank in any way a convenience 
to himself or his friends, as we know to have 
been done by other directors at a later period 
of the Bank!s history ...”
Lord Mure, referring to Mackinnonfs evidence said: ”... and
I may observe that I never read evidence given 
apparently in a more fair and full and frank 
manner, carrying truthfulness on the face of it ...”
These remarks were particularly welcome to Mackinnon 
because many of his friends, including Sir Bartle Prere and 
Sir Lewis Pelly, were in the Court. The decision, however,
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was not only popular with his friends. When he returned 
home to Balinakill after the case, he received a tumultuous 
welcome from the villagers of Clachan who pulled his 
carriage up the avenue while the horses walked free,1 
Also the press which reported the decision extensively, 
did so in favourable terms. The following conclusion 
to a full two column report which appeared in The Standard’ 
is typical of what appeared in other papers at the time:
11 The main importance of the decision to the 
public is that it has been authoratitively 
pronounced that an honest and conscientious 
Director cannot be made amenable for the faults 
of his colleagues and successors, and that a 
shareholder who has sold out whilst a Company 
is presumably solvent, as Mackinnon did, is 
released from the terrible responsibility of 
unlimited liability,p This is not only law, 
but common justice.1
While the affairs of the City Bank were deteriorating 
and moving towards the dramatic collapse of 1878, the 
situation in East Africa was becoming more complicated, 
and the story of Mackinnon1s involvement there must be 
resumed.
1. M. Macdougall, op.cTt".
2. The Standard, 24th December 1881.
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V* THE MACKINNON CONCESSION
When Seyyid Said died in 1856 he was succeeded at 
Zanzibar by his third surviving son Majid, and at Muscat 
by his eldest son Thwain. Thwain was dissatisfied with this 
arrangement largely because the revenues of Zanzibar were 
about twice as great as those of Muscat and also because 
Zanzibar had become much the most important of the two places. 
He maintained that only the Omani people had the right to 
separate East Africa from Oman, so that Seyyid had acted 
illegally in dividing his realm. Thwain also claimed that 
a payment which Majid had made to him was in recognition of 
the paramountcy of Muscat over Zanzibar. However he did not 
confine himself to quasi-constitutional argument. In March 
1859 he set sail from Muscat with a number of ships intending 
to capture Zanzibar, and he might well have succeeded had he 
not been ordered back by a British naval vessel which had been 
sent by the Government of Bombay to intercept his move.
Later in the same year the British again intervened to 
save Majid. On this occasion the British Consul at Zanzibar, 
Rigby, with tfce help of Royal Navy personnel put down an 
attempted insurrection at Zanzibar led by Seyyid Barghash, 
a younger brother of Majid’s. When Barghash surrended he 
signed a promise to leabe Zanzibar and not to listen in 
future to the advice of the French or the El-Harthi - a
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tribe which had been chronically recalcitrant even during 
the reign of Seyyid Said - but would only heed the views of 
the British Government. The French, anxious to dislodge 
the British from their influential position in East Africa 
had backed Thwain and Barghash. However the threat offered 
by Barghash was removed when he left Zanzibar, while that 
from Thwain was frustrated by the intervention of the Royal 
Navy and by British arbitration in the dispute between him 
and Majid. The arbitration recommendations for settling 
the dispute were approved by the Government of India early 
in 1861, and embodied in decisions known as the Canning 
Award, after Lord Canning who was then Governor-General of 
India. The most important of these, firstly, confirmed 
Seyyid Majid in independent sovereignty over Zanzibar and 
its African territories and, secondly, provided that he 
should pay 40,000 Crowns a year to Thwain as consideration 
for the concessions made by Thwain.
From Mackinnonfs point of view the important brother 
was Seyyid Bagghash who acceded in 1870 and lived till 1888. 
It may seem surprising that the British who were largely 
responsible for getting Barghash expelled from Zanzibar, 
should have welcomed him as the new ruler about ten years 
later, but there were two reasons for this. First, the 
British officials at Zanzibar, notably Kirk and Churchill
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(who was Consul at the time) had come to the conclusion that 
Barghash was the ablest as well as the obvious candidate to 
accede following the death of Majid in 1870. Second,
Barghash had come to realise that British rather than French 
power was decisive in East Africa at that time, so he had 
turned very much more pro-British than he had been 10 years 
earlier. The value of Britain’s goodwill was underlined 
early in October 1870, when Majid died, by the arrival of a 
British naval vessel at Zanzibar and also by the news of the 
crushing defeat of the French army by the Germans at the 
battle of Sedan a month earlier.
Barghash was very reluctant to assist in the campaign 
against the slave trade but probably realised that his 
position depended on British goodwill, so he gave the 
impression that he would provide at least as much help as 
his predecessor. Kirk, who succeeded the ailing Churchill 
as Consul at the end of 1870, soon established good relations 
with Barghash, but found him quite untrustworthy and "utterly 
devoid of principle or honour11.^ However the only serious 
alternative to Barghash was Seyyid Turki, who had acceded at 
Muscat, but he seemed unlikely to be any better, so in 
August 1871 Barghash was recognised as Sultan of Zanzibar. 
Sultan Barghash was thus the most important local potentate 
with whom Mackinnon had to negotiate during the first 10 years 
of his enterprise in East Africa.
1. Coupland, Exploitation, p. 100.
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It will be recollected that Mackinnon had secured a
10 year contract in 1872, to run a regular service every
4 weeks between Aden and Zanzibar in return for an annual
subsidy of £10,000. Trade had grown following the introduction
of this service but not to the extent expected, so after 3 or
4 years the disappointed parties, including Mackinnon and the
British officials at Zanzibar, came to the conclusion that
commerce would only flow adequately if the interior were
"opened up". The similarity between the idea of opening up
Africa in the 1870fs and of opening up India a generation
earlier has already been noted. It now remains to,consider
the factors which influenced the implementation of the idea
in Africa - the achievements of the explorers,^ political
developments in Europe and Egypt, and the views of people
in Zanzibar, notably Kirk and Barghash.
* * * *
The most important of the explorers was David 
Livingstone, not only because his journey across Africa from 
Lttanda on the Atlantic to Quilimane on the Indian Ocean 
furnished valuable information, but perhaps even more because 
his exploits aroused interest in Britain for African affairs.
The British public had been ignorant about Africa and 
uninterested, but his astonishing triumph stirred people's 
imaginations and gave new impetus.: to the humanitarian and
1. Ooupland, Exploitation, pp. 102-133*
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anti-slavery movements, and in 1857 the British Government 
provided him with £5000 with which to equip an expedition 
for the exploration of the Zambesi. Prom the point of view 
of Mackinnon’s future enterprise these developments were 
particularly significant for two reasons* First, Livingstone 
was a great advocate of the idea that the promotion of 
legitimate trade was the hest way of ending the slave trade* 
This was not a novel notion but being expounded by a man of 
Livingstone1s stature and experience it profoundly influenced 
Mackinnon and his contemporaries. Second, the expedition 
which set out in 1858 included John Kirk as Medical Officer 
and Botanist. The knowledge which Kirk gained of the 
interior, and in particular of the Zambesi and Shire valleys, 
was to prove very useful when he became an official in 
Zanzibar, and advised Mackinnon about road-building and 
other schemes. Mackinnon became a fellow of the Royal 
Geographical Society in 1865, but surprisingly there is no 
evidence to show that he took any active interest in the 
exploration of East Africa until the early 1870fs when the 
B.I* won a contract to run a subsidised line to Zanzibar.
In the year that Livingstone completed his crossing 
to Quilimane Captain Richard Burton, of the Indian Army, and 
Lieutenant John Speke arrived in Zanzibar to lead an 
expedition to explore the "Sea of Ujiji". They reached
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this "Sea", which was later named Lake Tanganyika, in 
February 1858, and in August, while Burton was laid up with 
Malaria, Speke saw another huge lake which he called Victoria 
Nyanza. He suspected that it was the source of the Nile but 
was not able to confirm this till 4 years later when, on a 
second expedition with a fellow officer A.J. Grant, he found 
the place where the river flows out of the lake.
The British expeditions were preceded and followed by 
German ones, and for some years from 1859 there were a series 
of German explorers in East Africa: Albrecht Roscher, Baron
von der Decken and others'1'. By 1862 the main features of the 
geography of East Africa were known and with the death of 
Livingstone in 1873 the great period of exploration there ended
The men who put the principal physical features of the 
area on the map were not concerned exclusively with geographi­
cal exploration in the limited sense of the word. They were 
also interested in the economic potential of the interior. 
Livingstone reported on the existence of gold and copper 
deposits and considered the suitability of some areas for 
cotton growing, while Burton noted the main items of trade
during his travels and devoted 32 pages of appendix his
2
book, The Lake Regions of Central Africa , to information 
about commerce, imports and exports. He said:
1. Coupland, Exploitation, p. 109*
2. R,F. Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa. A
Picture of Exploration, London, I860.
tt... The subject of exports will be treated at 
some length; it is not only interesting from 
its intrinsic value, but it is capable of 
considerable development, and it also offers 
a ready entrance for civilisation ... Hitherto 
British interests have been neglected in this 
portion of the African continent and the name of 
England is unknown in the interior. Upon the 
island of Zanzibar in 1857-8, there was not an 
English firm; no line of steamers. connected it 
with India or the Cape, and, during the dead season, 
nine months have elapsed before the answer to a 
letter has been received from home ...fl
The main articles for export which he listed (ivory, 
copal, hippopotomas teeth, rhinocerous horns, cattle, skins, 
hides and horns) were not very exciting but the general 
tenor of his reports clearly called for a policy which would 
improve communications in the interior, and between East 
Africa and other parts of the world, particularly India and 
Britain.
Speke’s expedition of 1859 was encouraged by the
Government of Bombay which hoped that the exploration of
East Africa would lead to an expansion of its trade with the
area. In fact Speke did not relate much about the economic
potential of the parts which he explored, but his description
%
of the primitive and barbarous conditions and of the 
degrading slave trade must have stirred those who felt that 
there was a duty to bring civilisation to Africa1 .
1. J*H* Speke, The Source of the Nile, , (E6L
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There was no quick or important commercial expansion 
following these expeditions largely because communications 
remained so primitive and because the depredations of the 
slave trade were so disruptive socially. However, by the 
middle of the 1870fs an important sector of British public 
opinion was ready for an attempt at opening up East Africa.
H.M. Stanley who set out in 1874 to explore the area of the 
great lakes and the source of the Nile stimulated speculation 
even further by reporting encouragingly about the potential 
wealth of Uganda. He said:
M... The productions of the land are of great variety, 
and, if brought within reach of Europeans, would 
find a ready market - ivory, coffee, gums, resins, 
myrrh, lion, leopard, otter and goat skins, ox-hides, 
snow white monkey skins and bark cloth besides fine 
cattle, sheep, and goats. Among the chief vegetable 
productions are the papaw, banana, plantain, yams, 
sweet potatoes, peas, several kinds of beans, melons, 
cucumbers, vegetable marrow, manioc and tomatoes.
Of grains there are to be found in the neighbourhood 
of the capital, wheat, rice, maize, sesamum, millets 
and vetches.
The soil of the lake coast region from the 
extremity of Usoga to the Alexandra Nile is of 
inexhaustible fertility ...m1
Mackinnon would have been particularly interested in 
Stanley*s reports because the European members of Stanley’s 
expedition, plus boats, dogs and general property were 
shipped out to Zanzibar in 1874, at half price by arrangement 
with the P. & 0. and the B.I.
1. H.M. Stanley: Through the dark continentf London, 1878,
p. 401.
The growing keenness to open up East Africa was also
encouraged by the quickening tempo of political developments,
while Mackinnon, who had established his shipping interests
in the area was, by temperament and background, very receptive
to ideas for tapping the resources of the continent. His
experience in India made him confident that the improvement
of communications from the interior to the coast would bring
a great expansion in trade. At the same time he had been
persuaded by the ideas of Livingstone, Fowell-Buxton and
others to believe that the promotion of legitimate commerce
was the best way of ending the slave trade. The immediate
political changes which accelerated the formulation of
practical plans for the opening up of East Africa stemmed
from Egypt.
* * * *
Since Mahammad Ali had launched an invasion from Egypt
in 1819, and annexed the northern part of the Sudan, Egyptian
authority had been exercised as far south as Gondokoro. Her
influence in the area was weak but her businessmen and traders 
earned large profits from the commerce in ivory and slaves, 
and British diplomatic pressure for her to end the slave trade 
was quite unavailing until Ismail, Muhammad Ali*s third son, 
became Khedive in 1863* Ismail was anxious to extend 
Egyptian rule south of Gondokoro, to gain greater control
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over the ivory trade, to exploit the natural resources of 
the area, and to promote legitimate commerce, but at the 
same time he seemed prepared to try to end the slave trade.
In 1869 he invited Sir Samuel Baker, who had discovered the 
second source of the Nile in lake Albert, to become ^Governor— 
General of the Equatorial Nile basin1*. Baker, who accepted 
the appointment for 4 years, was charged with carrying out 
Ismail*s economic policy as already outlined, and also with 
establishing a series of military outposts and opening the 
huge lakes to navigation. He completed his period of 
service but was unable to fulfil his mission. Even his 
success ih closing the upper Nile as a route for the slave 
trade was of limited value because an alternative route 
was opened across the deserts
Ismail however did not despair, and in 1873 he 
appointed Colonel Charles George Gordon, who had acquired 
a considerable reputation in China, to be Baker*s successor 
with the rank of general, and with similar terms of reference.-1 
Gordon later became slightly concerned with Mackinnon*s 
schemes, and certain aspects of his policy in the Sudan had 
repercussions in East Africa so they are worth mentioning,
Gordon believed in Ismail*s sincerity and was eager 
to carry out his mission because he was horrified by the 
slave trade and convinced that legitimate commerce was the
1. R. Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889,
Oxford, 1961, pp. 86-119*
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best weapon against it* He first set himself the task of 
advancing southwards towards the great lakes and establishing 
military outposts at intervals along the route* However, 
the difficulty of maintaining commuhications, with Cairo as 
a base over 2,000 miles away, was so great that he came to 
the conclusion that his administration would be much easier 
if he could secure access to the sea along the coast of East 
Africa, less than 500 miles distant. This idea certainly 
had merit, and the railway from Mombasa which reached Lake 
Victoria in 1902, was to prove the best overland route to 
Uganda.
In the meantime Gordon*s suggestion, made to Ismail 
in January 1875> was that a force of 150 men should be sent 
to establish a station in Formosa Bay and then to push inland 
towards Mutesa. He recommended that Captain McKillop, who 
was already working for the Khedive, on secondment from the 
Royal Navy, should be in command of the force."1' The 
execution of the plan however was poor. In the first 
place, Formosa Bay is only about 250 miles north of Zanzibar 
island, so it was well within the area claimed by the Sultan 
of Zanzibar, but Gordon had not troubled to find this out 
before proposing his scheme. Secondly, by the time the 
Khedive replied in November, Gordon had decided not to try 
to reach the sea himself. He said:
1. Coupland, Exploitation, p. 275*
M... I have quite given up any idea of going to
the sea with these troops ... He [the Khedive]
sent off IvIcKillop and Long to Juba and told them
to wait for me. They will wait a long time I 
expect. I am not going to try this with the 
undisciplined wretched troops I have here; and, 
though he knows it, he does nothing to help me ...M
Gordon was annoyed with the Khedive for saying he would 
send the force to the mouth of the Juba, instead of further 
south to the mouth of the Tana river or some suitable place 
in Formosa Bay. But the Khedive was anxious to keep as far 
north as possible because he was more aware than Gordon of 
the likely opposition from the Sultan of Zanzibar, although, 
in his final instructions to McKillop, he said that the 
Egyptian force could establish itself at any unoccupied place
in Formosa Bay. McKillop thus set out, poorly equipped and
instructed, for a vague rendezvous to await Gordon who had 
decided not to try to reach the sea anyway. This ill-fated 
expedition succeeded in taking two towns along the coast - 
Barawa and Kismayu. Thereafter it sent agents along the 
coast to assert the Khedive’s rights, which only had the 
effect of spreading alarm and bringing Kirk northwards, in 
the naval vessel H.M.S. Thetis, to investigate the truth of 
the rumours which had reached him. He found the Egyptians 
under an Egyptian commandant at Barawa. They were hostile 
and aggressive, but when threatened with bombardment from 
the Thetis they agreed to the terms of an ultimatum in which
1 .  G . B .  H i l l ;  C o lo n e l G ordon i n  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a . ,  London,
1881, p. 151.
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Kirk refused to recognise the a u t h o r i t y  of the commandant, 
and in which he insisted on the rights of British Officers 
in what he regarded as the Sultan's territory* The local 
people clearly did not welcome the Egyptians, and Kirk was 
pleased to find that the inhabitants of the other towns he 
called at, Merka, Mogadishu and Lamu, were ready to resist 
the Egyptians. Having displayed sufficient authority at 
Barawa, and ascertained reactions along the coast, he returned 
to Zanaibar and sent a report to the Foreign Office.
He made three important points. First, he said 
Britain's primary objective of suppressing the slave trade 
could be advanced best by supporting the Sultan of Zanzibar 
who was very much subject to British influence, and perforce 
fairly cooperative. Second, failure to support the Sultan 
would lead to anarchy and disruption of trade which would be 
damaging to British interests. Finally he thought Britain 
had a duty to protect the interests of the British Indians 
who had settled along the coast of East Africa, and who had 
suffered considerable losses when, as British subjects, they 
had been dispossessed of their slaves.
In a sense the issue resolved itself very much into a 
conflict of personalities. Ismail and Barghash were 
competing for the commerce of central Africa, while Kirk 
and Gordon were pursuing different policies for ending the
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slave trade. Ismail sought control of the ivory trade of 
the area, while Barghash wanted to strengthen his very vague 
authority there. Kirk and Gordon were at least not in 
conflict about aims. They agreed in desiring to end the 
slave trade but not on the means for doing so, and unfortun­
ately they never met to discuss the matter. Gordon thought 
he could suppress the trade by extending the Khedive's rule 
into the southern Sudan and Uganda, but Kirk doubted the 
sincerity of Ismail's anti-slavery views, and Gordon was 
later to have his doubts as well. In the meantime Kirk 
could point to the fact that the policy in the Sudan had 
achieved very little whereas the slave trade along the East 
Coast had been very appreciably reduced. Moreover he 
questioned the Egyptian claim to central Africa which had 
been put on the map largely by British explorers1 .
In the event Kirk did not have to take any further 
action against the invaders because in December 1875 the 
Khedive ordered McKillop ahd his force to return to Egypt.
The British Agent and Consul-General in Cairo had been 
pressing him to recall the expedition, and on hearing of 
the ultimatum which Kirk had delivered at Barawa, Ismail 
realised that British authority in the area had been offehded 
in addition to the fact that the population along the coast 
was obviously against Egyptian encroachment.
1. Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 275-293^
McKillop's view of the plan was that if it were to be
attempted again the best place to make for would be Mombasa'*'*
This is noteworthy because Mombasa was later chosen as the
coastal terminus for the railway to Uganda. However, for
the moment the point of interest is that although Gordonrs
scheme was not revived, and the Khedive failed to establish
a foothold in East Africa, the abortive invasion nevertheless
had considerable repercussions.
* * * *
The most immediate result was to bind the Sultan more 
closely to Britain. He fully appreciated that he would 
probably have lost some of his territory if it had not been 
for British intervention. It made him aware that his 
territory was strategically, and probably economically much 
more valuable than he had realised. In other words it was 
attractive to other powers. It was more than an annexe to 
the British Empire in India, or merely an area where Britain 
was anxious to end the slave trade.
Kirk reporting to lord Derby on the aftermath of the 
Egyptian invasion said:
”... I told H.H. that during the time the Egyptians 
held part of his dominion he from his very weakness 
could do nothing, but now that they had been induced 
to remove under pressure from Great Britain he would
1. Letter which McKillop wrote to Gordon, but which got into 
Kirkfs hands by mistake. Quoted by Coupland .1 
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find his work must begin and that if in reoccupying 
his lost possessions he did not do more than he 
ever had done - not only to secure life and property 
at the coast stations, but to develop also the 
immense natural resources of the interior and open 
up the country to civilisation and commerce he would 
be considered unworthy of the assistance he had 
received and pave the way for fresh assaults on his 
authority, as it was not to be expected that his 
dominion was to be maintained unless for the good 
of mankind and of the people over whom he ruled .
This advice contained a pretty clear hint that Barghash 
could not count on British support unless he took steps to 
develop his territories and to improve the lot of the people 
within them. A major difficulty however was that he had 
neither the capital nor the personnel for such a programme, 
and if he invited Europeans to help him they might take over 
his territories entirely. At about the time that Barghash 
was pondering this dilemma Mackinnon and 4 or 5 friends were 
considering the possibility of starting a development scheme 
in Africa themselves. Dor Mackinnon this was an important 
period during which he began to move decisively out of the 
narrow confines of the shipping business, so it is worth 
trying to assess the factors which influenced him.
In the first place, running the B.I. and making a 
fortune out of it was no longer wholly satisfying. In this 
respect his temperament was similar to King Leopold1s, with 
whom he was soon to become closely associated. Leopold’s
1. P.O. 84/1452 Kirk to Lord Derby, 11th January 1876
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capacity was too great for the limited duty of being 
King of Belgium, and Mackinnon’s energy likewise required 
more scope than could be afforded by the B.I. Mackinnon 
was then just over 50 years old and he had no children 
on whom to lavish some of his wealth or to whom he could 
give his affection.
He was attracted to East Africa because the B.I. 
had established trade connections there and because the 
interests of many of his friends lay in that direction. 
Here it is worth repeating that Mackinnon heartily 
disliked the slave trade and believed, like many others, 
that the promotion of legitimate commerce was the best 
way of ending it. As a humanitarian and a shipping 
magnate, therefore, there was every reason for him to 
support schemes which might increase the volume of 
legitimate trade. Capital expenditure on the mainland 
would obviously lead to immediate loss, but on the analogy 
of what had happened in India there was good reason for 
hoping that in the long run business activity would be 
stimulated sufficiently to bring a profitable return on 
the initial outlay. Livingstone had reported on the
202
existence of gold and copper deposits (admittedly well 
outside Barghash1s domain) and diamonds had been discovered 
in Griqualand West in 1867, so it was expected that 
extensive mineral deposits might be found in East Africa. 
Mackinnon was also particularly influenced by the views 
of Grodon, whom he greatly respected, who said that the 
land to the south of lakes Albert and Victoria was 
enormously rich”1".
With the benefit of hindsight one can see that Mackinnon 
over-rated the economic potential of East Africa, but given 
his experience in India and the kind of assessments which were 
being made by people who had personal knowledge of Africa it 
was not unreasonable for him to make a substantial capital 
investment. This is particularly true when one considers 
that he was not motivated solely by a desire for profit. 
Although he believed that good deeds were justly rewarded, 
his wealth was already more than adequate so he was not
1. MP. Horace Y/aller mentioned this view of Gordon’s 
in a letter to Mackinnon of the 12th January 1877.
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especially anxious to increase it. An opportunity for him 
to do something practical on the East African mainland 
occurred when Leopold convened an International Geographical 
Conference in September 1876.
King Leopold II of Belgium had been interested in 
engaging in projects overseas for some years and in 1876 he 
convened an International Geographical Conference which was 
attended by 10 British delegates including Sir Bartle Prere,
Sir Thomas Powell Buxton, Grant and Mackinnon. The purpose 
of the Conference, as he outlined it, was to consider ways 
of promoting civilisation in Africa. The aims he said would 
not be commercial, but scientific, philanthropic and 
charitable. The Conference supported these aims and proposed 
that a major base should be established at the mouth of the 
Congo and linked by overland routes, with small stations, 
to another major base in the vicinity of Zanzibar. The 
scheme would lead to the opening up of the centre of the 
continent and help to attack the slave trade at its source.
In order to carry out these proposals the Conference establishec 
the t!Association Internationale Africaine11 with Leopold as 
President and thereafter the delegates returned to their 
respective countries.'*'
In practice the Association split up into separate 
national groups, and what remained nominally international
1. De Kiewiet, op.ci^., PP. 13-15.
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became a front for Leopold*s own activities.
The reasons for the split are not entirely clear, but 
the British delegates, on returning home, seemed to have been 
most influenced by the view of Foreign Office officials who 
pointed out the major difficulties whicji would be involved 
in launching ambitious schemes on an international basis.
In the event the British delegates did not form a national 
committee, but instead they established the **African 
Exploration Fund** as a branch of the Eoyal Geographical 
Society. This ended their connection as a group with the 
A.I.A., but Mackinnon who had been impressed by the spirit 
of the Conference retained his association with Leopold and 
also sought ways of putting some of the ideas into practice. 
In September, while still a guest of Leopold*s he wrote to 
Kirk to tell him about the proceedings of the Conference and 
about some of the proposals which had been made. In reply 
Kirk said that Grant*s scheme for a telegraph line from 
Egypt to Khartoum, then to Ujiji and the Cape was quite 
visionary in the conditions of Africa. An army would be 
needed to reach some of the places where a chief might have 
removed-portions of the line to fcake bracelets, or a tree 
might have fallen across it or an elephant pushed the poles 
down. He thought it would be better to have a line along 
the coast to run from Lamu to Zanzibar, to Mocambique then
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on to the Cape with branch lines to Madagascar and Mauritius,
11... the inland telegraph,11 he said, "will never 
work until the roads have.been made and then it 
must follow them.
I think I can answer for the Sultan that he 
will help and assist the work* You must get 
the P.O. officially to instruct me to use my 
influence. This is of course essential and I 
feel assured all concessions will be obtained
He thought that Par-es-Salaam well governed would 
totally eclipse Zanzibar and attract all the trade, but the 
Sultan could hardly be expected to make a grant which would 
have the effect of ruining his place without bringing him 
any advantage* On the other hand, Kirk said,
n... If he were to place himself under us as a 
protected prince the whole question alters and 
the dominion would be one well worth having. Ho 
doubt this is the radical measure but the government 
seems too apathetic to allow any such hope a chance 
of being carried out. I am personally for it both 
on account of the country and ourselves* The 
Sultan would be better off than now * *.w.
He said that the northern or Somali district was 
occupied by blood-thirsty people who would not allow peaceful 
settlement. It was the most healthy district but south of 
Lamu was quiet. He was not hopeful however about any of 
the East African rivers with the possible exception of the 
Zambesi. This was navigable for limited purposes and would 
undoubtedly form the highway to Nyasa once the Portuguese 
were got rid of"*".
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 17th October 1876.
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At about the time Mackinnon received this letter he 
attended a meeting in Glasgow at which it was proposed to build 
a highway across the continent from the East Coast,
The postal service between London and Zanzibar took 3 or 
4 weeks, so Mackinnon had to wait about 7 weeks to get replies 
from Kirk. On this occasion when he wrote to Kirk about the 
proposal from the Glasgow meeting, Kirk told the Sultan and 
reported the matter to the Foreign Office.
Barghash having been persuaded that it would be desirable 
to have his territories developed was very keen and wrote a 
letter to Lord Derby which Kirk enclosed with his own report.
In this letter Barghash saids
fl... I was pleased much when told by the honoured Dr. Kirk 
of the intention to open roads to Lake Hyasa and the Sea 
of Ujiji and the Ukerere of Uganda, and I should wish these 
my friends to know by your Lordship that it is my desire to 
help them all that I can
Lord Derby forwarded a copy of Barghashfs letter to
Mackinnon at about the time that his friend and leading
2
humanitarian, the Reverend Horace Waller , told him that Gordon 
might be persuaded to take an interest in a development scheme 
in Africa.
Gordon appeared on the scene with the bewildering changes
of mood which seemed to be characteristic of him. When he
1. F.O. 84/1454i Barghash to Lord Derby, 14 December 1876.
2. Horace Waller was lay Superintendent of the first U.M.C.A.
expedition and editor of Livingstone1s Last Journals. He 
was an important missionary, anti-slave trade propagandist 
and link between various people such as Mackinnon and 
Gordon.
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first wrote from the Sudan to tell Waller that he was due for 
leave he said:
”... Let me ask you to leave me alone. I want quiet 
while at home ... I do not want to see either Sir B.F. 
or Sir H.R. or Grant or any of the men who worry about 
Africa. I am afraid this will cause offence, but I am-, 
callous if it does. I have had a hard life of it ...rf
Almost exactly a month later he reported that he had 
left the Khedive!s service and said:
”... I am however little disposed to let matters rest in 
Africa in the state they are and if any opening could be 
seen by which I could benefit the people I am willing to 
accept the service . ..”2
The encouraging letter from Barghash and the possibility 
of getting the active support of Gordon persuaded Mackinnon to 
formulate (or perhaps to revive) ideas for a much more ambitious 
scheme than that of building a road.
Waller was particularly excited by the offer from 
Gordon and said:
”It seemed as if some unseen hand was leading him into the 
presence of four or five men and ladies who sat round^a 
breakfast table in Burlington Street about a year ago^ ...
If you look closely upon him you will see the spirit of 
Clive in this man - let us try by,Godfs help to make him 
a Clive or greater if we can ...”^
1. W.P. Gordon to Waller, 12 October 1876. These references
by initials were probably to Sir Bartle Frere and Sir 
Hercules Robinson.
2. W.P. Gordon to Waller, 11 November 1876.
3. W.P. Waller to Mackinnon, 12 January 1877*
4. W.P. Waller to Mackinnon, 18 January 1877* It is not clear
who the four or five people were, but in addition to 
Mackinnon and Waller the group almost certainly included 
Lady Burdett-Coutts.
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Waller told Gordon that Mackinnon had the means and 
influence to gather together the raw materials for a venture 
which would have for its historical type the East India 
Company of old* Gordon jumped at the words and said that 
they expressed exactly all he felt* He said to Waller:
w... My idea is that they should get from. th^LSultan 
of Zanzibar a concession for 10 years for opening 
the country giving rights to levy troops and securing 
freedom from custom dues and monopoly of the trade 
and I imagine the Sultan would require to have some 
advantage in all this in the shape of an export due ...,f
He said that questions concerning concessions were nothing to
him and he did not want to get mixed up in the commercial
side of things because he might then not be granted leave
from the army. He could however find the best line to the
interior, establish posts, raise troops, command them and
see to the communications with headquarters. He said this
1
would suit him better than the general command .
The only slight note of discord at this stage came 
from Horace Waller, who warned that it would be useless to 
try to make Gordon work with the King of the Belgians, 
because Gordon felt that large undertakings with Kings at 
their head bore with them the seeds of failure* This however 
did not worry Mackinnon who was quite ready to proceed 
independently of Leopold. He was probably much more
1. MP. Gordon to Waller, 17th January 1877
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influenced by the information which came in the same letter 
about Gordon’s achievements in the Sudan* Gordon claimed 
that during his period of service in the Sudan he had 
realised £140,000 from ivory alone, and that after spending 
£50,000 on the troops and other overheads a clear profit of 
£90,000 had been left for the Khedive.
The drafting of the scheme, which came to be known as 
the Mackinnon Concession, thus began in an air of considerable 
optimism. It appeared probable that the experienced Colonel 
Gordon would join the enterprise; the prospects of securing 
profits seemed good, and Barghash sounded welcoming. Horace 
Waller, who was chronically over-optimistic suggested that 
his brother Gerald should go to Zanzibar about the end of 
January and come back "... with all signed sealed and 
delivered ... ”. But these rather wild hopes were dashed 
a few days later by Gordon himself who said that the Duke 
of Cambridge, who was Commander-in-Chief of the army, had 
instructed him to return to the Khedive’s service. This 
in fact saved Gordon from a mood of indecision as he had just 
told Waller that he was very troubled in mind because his 
brothers and some of his friends regarded his action, in 
thinking of going to Zanzibar, in some sort of scheme with 
Mackinnon, as gross treachery to the Khedive^.
1* W.P, Gordon to Waller, 19th January 1877*
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Mackinnon was disappointed by these developments and 
tried to see Gordon in order to persuade him to change his 
mind, but Gordon flatly refused and so the two men did not 
meet till 1880.
In the meantime in spite of his disappointment 
Mackinnon went ahead with the scheme, and in February he 
received a cautiously encouraging letter from Kirk, who had 
travelled southwards from Zanzibar to see if he could get 
any information which might be of use if Mackinnonfs scheme 
progressed. Kirk said that he had been to the district 
south of Kilwa and up to Cape Delgado and had been pleased 
to find a new industry reconciling people to the ending of 
the slave trade. The new industry was the collection of 
rubber, and it required so much labour that people wished 
they could get back their tribesmen who had been shipped 
abroad as slaves. He said it was only a year since rubber 
had attracted attention as a last resource to replace the 
failing slave trade but already the harbours smelled of it, 
and agents were travelling inland for as long as 8 days with 
goods to try to tempt the villagers to collect rubber. He 
added that in the previous year Kilwa alone had yielded 
#400,000 worth and the
”... region has other undeveloped resources including 
coal and iron that one day will be of use and value ...”
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 5th February 1877.
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This letter from Kirk gave Mackinnon further grounds 
for believing that the proposed concession would be profitable 
in the long run. By early March the draft concession was 
ready and Gerald Waller arrived with it in Zanzibar on the 
4th April, 1877**^ On Kirk’s advice he left it in Zanzibar 
and proceeded southwards to Mocambique, with Smith, of 
Smith/Mackenzie, for about 3 weeks. Kirk had apparently 
feared that the proposals would become known if Gerald Waller 
remained in Zanzibar for no obvious purpose. Waller returned 
to Zanzibar on the 29th April, and in the meantime Barghash 
had given Kirk a copy of the draft concession. Kirk had 
it translated and sent a report about it to the Foreign Office.
He told Lord Derby that he had made it clear to Barghash 
that the proposal for the concession did not in any way come 
from or through the British Government, but was sponsored 
principally by Mackinnon, and Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton. The 
sponsors said that the idea of the concession had been 
suggested to them by the Sultan’s offer to help any friends 
with schemes for the development of his territories, and 
their aims could be summarised as follows:
a) The civilisation of Africa and the opening up 
of trade on the coast and in the interior.
b) To assist the Sultan's praiseworthy efforts
to put an end to the infamous trade in slaves, 
rather than to obtain immediate gains for
themselves.
1. De Kiewiet, op.cit., p. 32.
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(c) To secure to the Sultan, as soon as possible, 
the actual control and government of the vast 
territory which formed part of his dominions.
(d) To occupy the territory between the coast and 
the Victoria Nyanza in the Sultan*s name so
as to prevent the Egyptian Government from ,
extending its baneful influence in that direction .
Having explained the purpose of the proposals, Kirk 
proceeded in the same letter to give his own views about them. 
The most important requirement he said was to insert a clause 
to safeguard the rights which had already been granted to 
foreigners by treaties, but the draft would have to be revised 
in other respects because the promoters of the scheme clearly 
had most imperfect information about the actual conditions 
in East Africa. However, if Barghash agreed, after the 
revisions had been made, to waive his powers over the mainland 
in favour of Mackinnon!s proposed company, Zanzibar might 
soon be made a prosperous and powerful kingdom. The slave 
trade might be totally suppressed and works of public utility 
carried into distant parts of the continent. left with the 
same revenue as he already had, but with only the islands of 
Zanzibar and Pemba to govern, the Sultan would be able to 
devote a great deal more money to their development, and 
perhaps be encouraged to do so by the progress which would 
be taking place on the mainland. Kirk concluded his assess­
ment of the prospects by saying:
1. P.O. 84/1485, Kirk to lord Derby, 10th April 1877.
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11... On the other hand it is impossible to foretell 
how far a gigantic scheme such as the present may 
lead, when once the Company has at its disposal a 
trained military force, and^virtually rules a rich 
country of such extent ...1
A very similar reservation must have occurred to
Barghash, and indeed it is possible that Kirk made his final
comment after his preliminary discussion with Barghash,
because, although as an agent of the British Government it
was Kirk's duty to report the proposed concession to the
Foreign Office, it was also clearly imperative for him to
discuss it with the Sultan as soon as possible. In addition
to his duties in these two directions he also felt obliged
to advise his friend, Mackinnon, as much as he properly
could within the limits set by his official position. It
is hardly surprising, therefore, that he said: ”... Really
2
it is on me the whole work has fallen ...n
Although Mackinnon was the principal sponsor of the 
scheme, in April 1877, he was not in a position to forward 
it as much as Kirk. He did not know East Africa, he did 
not understand the Foreign Office as well as he had got to 
know the India Office, and he was not on close terms with 
the Sultan. Kirk was thus the only person familiar with 
the principal parties - the Foreign Office, the Sultan and
1. F.O. 84/1485, Kirk to Lord Derby, 10th April 1877.
2. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 19th April 1877.
Mackinnon - and on the 16th April he went to have a fuller 
discussion of the proposals at Barghashfs request. He 
explained that his own function was to ensure that misunder­
standing did not arise between the parties, and he told 
Barghash bluntly that the concessions would deprive him of 
his authority on the mainland. He was quite prepared, 
therefore, for Barghash to refuse to entertain the idea of 
foregoing his powers in favour of a private company, 
particularly as the sponsors were Christians and he was a 
Moslem ruler. But to his surprise Barghash said he had read 
the proposals and found so much that was good in them for 
his people and country that he would be prepared to yield 
his personal powers and rights, if there was some guarantee 
that the improvements could really be effected and that his 
people would not be expelled or lose their trades.
In addition to the reasons which he gave to Kirk, one 
may surmise that Barghash was also interested in the scheme 
because the Egyptian invasion had demonstrated his impotence 
and he hoped that a company such as Mackinnon proposed would 
afford him the protection he needed.^ If it were a success 
it would also provide him with an assured income, and he 
probably assumed in April 1877, in spite of Kirk’s assurances 
to the contrary, that the scheme had some measure of support 
from the British government.
1; Be Kiewiet, op.cit., p. 33*
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A few days after his meeting with Barghash Kirk wrote 
a long letter to Mackinnon giving a realistic appraisal of 
the prospects. As it may have made Mackinnon more cautious 
and a little less enthusiastic it is worth quoting from at 
length. Kirk warned that many of the concessions sought 
were rendered worthless because they had already been given 
by previous treaties. He said:
w... You will find that the Sultan can give few 
special rights to any one company, nation or 
individual ... I think the upshot will be you 
can have absolutely no exclusive rights that will 
be of the smallest value until they become exclusive 
in practice by the command you will have of roads - 
artificiallynade, for by treaty you cannot stop 
anyone going as now across country ... My impression 
is that the government of the coast will be an expense 
which it will be difficult to recoup by taxes on the 
native population and I doubt the Sultan or you being 
able under existing treaties to tax foreigners 
(Indians inclusive)
A few days later Kirk reported again to Lord Derby, 
and said that having read Barghash!s confidential memorandum 
on the draft concession, he thought there were so few points 
for discussion left that there would be no difficulty in 
obtaining the concession provided the company would adhere 
to its offer after knowing how few special rights it could 
enjoy. Hothing further could be done at Zanzibar however 
unless someone with greater power than Waller and a good 
knowledge of Arabic negotiated personally with Barghash on
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 19th April 1877-
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behalf of Mackinnon. But he urged that advantage be taken
of the progress which had been made because if the negotiations
failed there were others in the field seeking concessions.
A letter had been sent from France in October 1876 inviting
t
the Sultan to join in a scheme of King Leopold*s. At the 
same time concessions had been sought which would have given 
France a prominent position on the East Coast. Kirk said 
that Barghash had rejected these approaches but other 
proposals had been made since - the Church Missionary Society 
was considering making a road inland from Saadani; a scheme 
had originated in Scotland for getting a concession over a 
large stretch of coast south of Kilwa and finally a party 
was expected to arrive to survey the best line for a road 
to Lake Nyasa . This sort of activity moreover was not 
confined to the Sultan’s domain, because Kirk reported that 
an old opium grower was on his way to Mocambique with a large 
concession from the Portuguese.
Kirk said that the Sultan had shown himself ready to 
cede his authority if concessionaires could guarantee him a 
good personal income and the development of his territories.
In the circumstances, therefore, it was likely that a transfer 
of administration would take place sooner or later, , and he 
thought it important that this should fall into British hands
1. P.O. 84/1485, Kirk to Lord Derby, 25th April 1877*
i (rtd.
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rather than into those of a rival and possibly hostile power. 
In April 1877 Barghash was still clearly in favour of 
British enterprise, but his views might change and Kirk’s 
considerable influence over him could disappear at any moment.
The following week Kirk wrote to Mackinnon, also 
urging that there was no time to lose. In this letter 
however he emphasised the threat from Egypt. He said that 
marauding parties from the Egyptian army had almost reached 
the "Tanganyka by the Albert Lake”. Then he made the 
following rather surprising remarks about Gordon who had 
returned to the Sudan in the Khedive’s services
”... Gordon Pasha has proved the curse of Central 
Affica so far as results show yet. He knows 
what Ismail did in his rear. I hear what his 
men are doing in front when he is not there .. . 
it is the most palpable farce making him governor 
of a quarter of Africa without honest men under 
him. But when the end of his China mission was 
to go off discouraged by the low cunning and treachery 
of a mandarin he will come out of this still worse and 
only be a deplorable failure.he He has to do with far 
too great a master of the art of cunning ...nl
In this same letter Kirk said that the international 
treaties presented insuperable difficulties to obtaining, 
concessions in Pemba or Zanzibar, but he thought they might 
be overcome on the mainland ”... through the Crown right to 
land not actually under good title . He did not 
indicate how much land this was, but he was aware that the
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 4th May 1877.
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tone of the letter was at variance with the discouraging 
one which he wrote on the 19th April, because he said:
'*.. . You must read my letters with regard to date for 
things change and I change my views with changing 
circumstances .
Gerald Waller got hack to Zanzibar on the 29th April, 
but after a few days left for England which then became the 
centre of activity. He took with him a letter from Barghash 
to Mackinnon in which Barghash suggested some amendments to 
the draft concession. Barghash1s chief objection seems to 
have been to the proposal that the concessionaires should 
have power to appoint judges, because he did not want 
Christians appointing Hohammadan judges on his behalf. He 
also wanted an interpreter, and had written to ask if Dr. 
Badger, a scholar of Arabic, could help. Barghash*s 
objections however were minor. The real difficulties were 
the existing international treaties, which Gerald Waller said 
crossed their proposals in so many ways that they altered 
the basis of the whole plan.
When the memorandum on the concession finally reached 
Lord Derby in the Foreign Office he ordered that comments 
on it should be sought from the India Office, Board of Trade 
and the Colonial Office. In the meantime he only remarked 
on the Sultan*s favourable reaction and said:
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 4th May 1877*
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”... I cannot think the Sultan knows what he is 
doing. He is thinking of giving away nearly 
all his power and for no corresponding advantage . ..w
Departmental wheels turned very slowly and for the 
rest of the year Mackinnon awaited the views of the British 
Government, In July he said that W.H* Wylde, of the slave 
trade section of the Foreign Office, had given him privately 
a copy of Kirk*s official despatches about the concession.
His impression was that opinion among officials was favourable, 
but he told Kirk that there was no point in Badger or any 
negotiator going to Zanzibar until it was clear that the 
British Government was not opposed to the proposals.
Towards the end of August he wrote a personal letter 
to Lord Derby which was in effect a reminder. He said that 
before undertaking such a massive project the interested 
parties would wish to know whether the British Government 
looked with favour upon it or whether it would object to it.
In the latter case he said he would abandon the enterprise 
entirely, but reluctantly, because he had reason to believe 
that the Sultan, who:
11... was most anxious to develop the resources of 
his country would be willing to grant similar 
concessions to the subjects of other foreign powers 
who are assured of the support of their governments 
and would make great sacrifices to obtain the 
concessions in question ...r|2
1. F.O. 84/1485* Minute by Lord Derby, June 1877*
2. MP. Mackinnon to Lord Derby, 23rd August 1877*
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Mackinnon hoped however that the British Government 
would feel justified in supporting his scheme because if it 
were successful it would not only root out slavery from the 
Sultan’s dominions but also develop the great resources of 
that part of Africa and open vast regions to British commerce. 
Mackinnon enclosed with his letter a copy of one from Burghash 
proposing some amendments to the draft.
Mackinnon was told informally by Wylde about the 
progress of the deliberations over the scheme within the 
departments, but it appears that lord Derby never sent a 
direct reply to Mackinnon*s letter of the 23rd August. This 
however did not surprise Kirk who told Mackinnon that nothing 
would ever happen if he waited for the approval of Lord 
Derby. Kirk thought government would approve a thing once 
it was started and sure to go on without its support, but 
in this case Mackinnon was up against more than the usual 
inertia. The Khedive of Egypt, Kirk alleged, had friends 
near enough to the heads of department to have secured 
copies of the correspondence about the proposed concession 
and was no doubt using all his very considerable influence 
to frustrate the scheme1.
Quite apart from any characteristic dilatoriness on 
the part of Lord Derby, Ministers consulted naturally looked
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 18th September 1877.
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with extreme caution and little enthusiasm on a scheme which 
was so ambitious and could have so many unforeseeable 
consequencies• In September, the India Office stated that 
so far as Lord Salisbury could see there were
M... no Indian interests concerned which would 
justify him in expressing a judgement either adverse 
or favourable to the proposed arrangement . ..f,l
This was very reminiscent of the attitude which the 
India Office had adopted a few years earlier when Mackinnon 
had applied to run a regular subsidised shipping line to 
Zanzibar. The India Office had then tried to avoid 
contributing towards the subsidy on the grounds that the 
proposed line would be most important as a measure against 
the slave trade which was the responsibility of the British 
government.
Activity on the concession did not, however, cease 
altogether. In December Mackinnon sent a fresh draft to 
lord Derby which had been revised following the changes 
suggested by Barghash, and said that he proposed to send it 
with an accredited agent to Zanzibar. He had earlier told 
Kirk of his intention, and Kirk had informed Barghash who 
still seemed keen in spite of the long delay. Kirk personally 
welcomed the move but said that Dr. Badger should be available 
to interpret otherwise there would be a hitch. He admitted 
that many people found Badger difficult, but he did not.
1. P.O. 84/1596, Sir 1. Mallet from the India Office to the 
P.O., 13th September 1877.
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In August Mackinnon had said that he would abandon 
the enterprise unless government looked favourably upon it, 
but in December he decided that Gerald Waller and Badger 
should nevertheless go out, because by then he was confident 
that he would soon receive a favourable reply. In fact the 
reply he was expecting was not received till February 1878, 
and then it was very non-committal•
The Foreign Office had waited many months for comments 
from the other departments consulted,1 and then in January a 
lengthy memorandum, which summarised the views received, was 
prepared for the Foreign Secretary. The India Office had 
added nothing to Lord Salisbury’s remarks which have already 
been quoted, and the Board of Trade considered itself 
virtually unconcerned because most of Zanzibar’s trade was 
with India. Lord Carasrvon at the Colonial Office thought 
the proposals would have to be much more fully explained 
before government could permit, let alone support the scheme. 
On the other hand he was not opposed in principle to a plan 
which might contribute to the extension of civilisation.
He was merely anxious that the British Government should 
retain some control over the company’s political activities 
while avoiding involvement in any detailed financial 
arrangements between it and the Sultan.
1. he Kiewiet, op.cit., pp. 34-36.
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The Government of India which was the last to reply 
was also the most favourable towards the scheme It took
the view that it would benefit rather than harm Indian 
interests, although the project was primarily an Imperial 
concern. It also supported Kirk’s contention that if the 
scheme were to be implemented it should be done while British 
influence was still paramount in Zanzibar.
All the comments and papers were referred to the Law 
Officers who advised that the intended company was competent 
to carry out the scheme without the sanction of government, 
but that the execution of the proposals might involve it in 
the commission of acts which were forbidden without the 
licence of government. On the other hand if government were 
in any way to give the company authority to carry out the 
undertaking it might on some future occasion be involved in 
difficulties with the Sultan of Zanzibar or with other 
foreign powers.
This was the one possible danger in the scheme which 
Wylde, who had drafted the memorandum, foresaw. He pointed 
out that the amended draft which Mackinnon had sent in 
December excluded the clauses which would have infringed 
existing treaty rights; and he said that if government 
confined itself to affording the promoters of the scheme 
only such support as British subjects engaged in legal
2&
undertakings normally got there should not be any complications 
with foreign governments. But he added that if a scheme of 
such vast scope were successfully carried out, it would have 
very considerable political and commercial repercussions.
In other words its effects would be unpredictable and 
difficulties could arise.
In spite of this however he thought the scheme commended 
itself as a measure for developing the resources of Africa and 
opening new markets for British manufactures. He also 
thought it should be encouraged as a means towards ending 
the slave trade. He was sure that the trade would cease 
wherever the company’s authority was established, and so the 
British government would be saved the considerable expense of 
maintaining a squadron along the East African coast'1'.
The Foreign Office finally replied on the basis of 
Wylde’s memorandum. The letter, dated 19th February 1878, 
was very cautious and non-committal, but it said that as the 
concession would contribute to the suppression of the slave 
trade it commended itself to such support as the British
p
government could properly give to such an undertaking .
Thus government neither formally approved nor opposed the 
scheme, but left itself free to pursue whatever policy it
1. F.O. 84/1527 of 21st January 1878.
2. F.O. 84/1526, F.O. to Mackinnon, 19th February 1878.
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wished as the situation might develop. For Mackinnon this 
was sufficient. He said he would at once take the necessary 
steps to get the concession ratified1 , and in April Gerald 
Waller sailed for Zanzibar accompanied by Badger, who was 
the interpreter for Barghash.
In spite of the delay of a year since the first draft 
was submitted, Kirk was able to report on the 4th May that the 
Sultan was still "hearty in the scheme”, and that all was 
going well. Gerald Waller and Badger were well received, 
but within a few days Barghash decisively changed his mind 
and put insuperable obstacles in the way of negotiations. In
particular he would not cede a monopoly of the ivory trade or 
allow extra duties on ivory to be levied. Various reasons 
were suggested for this surprising turn of events.
Kirk said it was unfortunate that Mackinnon had found 
delay necessary, and also that the revised draft had been 
submitted so abruptly because it gave Barghash an opportunity 
to suggest that it was really Mackinnon who had changed the 
scheme. It was also thought that Badger1s tactlessness and 
outbursts of bad temper had seriously offended the Sultan, 
and finally that the Sultan had been persuaded by the many 
influential Arabs who were opposed to the proposed concessions. 
They realised that the concessionaires would end slavery which
1. F.O. 84/1527, Mackinnon to F.O., 22nd February 1878.
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was fundamental to their economy and that serious inroads 
would he made into their profitable ivory trade.
A powerful Arab lobby might well have induced Barghash 
to break off negotiations, but if so it would have been most 
likely to succeed during the 12 months between Gerald Waller’s 
first and second visits to Zanzibar rather than immediately 
after he had been warmly welcomed back to Zanzibar. The 
theory that such a pressure group was principally responsible 
for the breakdown of negotiations thus does not satisfactorily 
explain the suddenness with which they were ended, and the 
real reason did not emerge till later. In October Kirk said:
11... I have lately too got insight into some matters 
connected with the concessions that surprise me, 
there were influences I fear that were not known 
then and the Sultan got hints from quarters that
I did not suspect . .."1
Referring to the failure in another letter he said:
11... but there were other influences and I have a 
strong suspicion that the proposed concession met 
with disfavour in influential quarters
Miss Be Kiewiet has shown that the disfavour and hints 
came from Lord Salisbury, and were passed to Barghash through 
Br. Badger . The clearest evidence for this is given in a
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 17th October 1878.
2. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 3rd May 1879*
3* Be Kiewiet, op.cit., p. 43*
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private letter from Badger to Salisbury which accidentally 
got into the Poreign Office records. In this letter, 
written in July, Badger said:
"The Sultan was most grateful for the hints 
which your Lordship conveyed to him through me 
and it is not improbable that they cooperated to 
induce him to use greater caution in the matter 
of the proposed concession . ..nl
This explanation certainly makes Barghash*s sudden 
change of mind comprehensible, and it strongly suggests that 
Badger's tactlessness, and outbursts of ill-temper were part 
of the plan to sabotage the negotiations.
But Badger must have played his part well because Kirk 
who was a shrewd judge of people did not suspect him at the 
time. This is a little surprising, nevertheless, because 
on a previous occasion he had been given cause to suspect 
Badger of scheming.
Luring Barghash's visit to England in 18759 one of 
the favours for which he had asked was that the Queen should 
decorate Kirk. This had been most embarassing for Kirk 
because Lord Lerby had assumed that Kirk had suggested the 
idea to Barghash. In fact Kirk had known nothing about it 
and said:
1. Badger to Lord Salisbury, 3rd July 1878, quoted by 
Le Kiewiet.
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"... it was unlikely the Sultan should have hit 
upon it, I always think it must have been some 
of Badgerfs work . .."1
Whatever the truth of that, there is no doubt that 
Badger, as Lord Salisbury's instrument was immediately 
responsible for the breakdown of negotiations in May 1878.
In the long run however it is arguable that Mackinnon had 
already lost opportunities for securing the concession by 
the lack of energy which he displayed after April 1877•
There is no single letter such as that from Badger to Salisbury 
to give solid support to this view, but the record of events 
is illuminating.
Towards the end of April 1877, Kirk reported on the 
state of the negotiations to the Poreign Office. He said 
good progress had been made, and that advantage should be 
taken of it because there were other interested parties ready 
to step in if the negotiations failed. A few days later, 
at the beginning of May, he warned Mackinnon of the danger 
and urged him to lose no time. He also explained at length
p
the amendments which would have to be made to the draft . 
Mackinnon received this letter at the end of May when Gerald 
Waller arrived to give him full details about the situation, 
but there is no evidence that he followed Kirk's advice.
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 24th August 1877.
2. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 4th May 1877*
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In July he merely told Barghash that he had taken no 
further action on the concession proposals because they were 
being considered by the British government. In August, 
Gerald Waller visited the Poreign Office on his behalf and 
Mackinnon wrote what was in effect a reminder, but he 
apparently did not send a revised draft of the proposed 
concession to the Poreign Office till December, although he 
had known what amendments were necessary much earlier. He 
certainly did not give the impression that he felt any sense 
of urgency, and his dilatoriness after April 1877 was in 
marked contrast to his display of energy during the winter 
of 1876-77. Then he had news of the considerable revenue 
which Gordon had raised from ivory in the Sudan; the 
possibility of engaging Gordon as an administrator; a letter 
from Barghash asking for capitalists to develop his 
territories, and a mildly encouraging letter from Kirk. In 
that situation he had, within a matter of weeks, produced a 
draft for the proposed concession and arranged for Gerald 
Waller to go out to Zanzibar. Prom about the time of 
Gerald Waller’s return, however, the tempo of events seemed 
to become much slower. Certainly during the following 12 
months Kirk urged Mackinnon on a number of occasions to press 
more strongly for the conclusion of an agreement with 
Barghash, and when negotiations failed in May 1878, the first 
reason he suggested for the failure was the long delay. His
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actual comment to Mackinnon was:
**... It is unfortunate as I^always said that you 
found delay necessary ...M
Sir Harry Johnston put it more strongly when he wrote:
11 in 1876 the Sultan offered the lease of nearly all 
his continental territories to Mr., afterwards Sir William, 
Mackinnon, the Chairman of the British India Steam 
Navigation Company. But Mr. Mackinnon was an over­
cautious man. Instead of accepting, and then forcing 
the hand of the British government, he refused to take the 
Sultan*s concession unless he could first obtain a British 
guarantee, an action to which the government was naturally 
unwilling to commit itself ...w2
It was of course easy for Kirk and Johnston, who had no 
money at risk, to say that Mackinnon was too cautious, and 
Johnston rather over-simplified the issues, nevertheless there 
is no doubt that Mackinnon*s approach had lost some of its 
earlier thrust.
The reason is not altogether clear, but Kirk*s letter 
of the 19th April 1877, which has already been referred to, 
could well have been responsible because Mackinnon appeared 
keen on the project until about the time he received it.
The significance of the letter is that it gave a very 
realistic and sobering assessment of the financial prospects, 
and here it must be recalled that Mackinnon regarded the 
proposed concession, to a great extent as a commercial 
enterprise. He envisaged that it would be a vehicle for
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 31st May 1878.
2. H.H. Johnston, A History of the Colonisation of Africa by
Alien Races, Cambridge, 1913, p. 375*
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civilisation, and he was prepared to spend a good deal of 
capital to get it established, but in the long run he expected 
to have a profitable company. Kirk in his letter, however, 
cast grave doubts on this expectation because he said:
n... the present government such as it is, is paid 
for out of the Customs revenue but you are to 
give that to the Sultan and bring(?; only additional 
taxes to pay the government you are to set up.
It seems to me there will be a long time 
unremunerative and I do not see where the profits 
are until public works give you a practical hold 
of the trade, but then Indians and others will go 
on your roads pay your fares and compete in your 
markets. If you can get the powers the Khedive 
holds it is very well but it seems to me that 
like him you will only get this in new and distant 
countries, so that you must push on rapidly far 
inland to the lakes and not delay on the coast 
where there will be more money going out than 
comes into your treasury - until by giving settled 
government the trade had increased - but then you 
will only share in this trade with others
This was surely sufficient to make Mackinnon pause 
in what had been a hasty and over-optimistic approach, because 
he could only conclude from Kirk*s letter that while expenditure 
would be heavy future profits were not assured.
One cannot be certain that Mackinnon would have 
secured the concession if he had pressed for it more strongly 
but it seems likely, as Kirk suggested, that the British 
government would have accepted a fait accompli, particularly 
while Lord Derby was Foreigh Secretary, because he appears
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 19th April 1877*
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to have been less strongly opposed to the scheme than Lord 
Salisbury was* In this connection it should be noted that 
Lord Salisbury only took over as Poreign Secretary on the 
2nd April 1878, and so only had a few days in this capacity 
before Gerald Waller and Badger departed for Zanzibar. 
Precisely why Lord Salisbury decided to sabotage negotiations 
is not clear, but in general terms the reasons for his 
opposition are evident.
Mackinnonfs proposed concession was so ambitious and 
large in scope that it would, sooner or later, almost 
certainly have got the British government more deeply 
involved in the affairs of East Africa, but there was no 
point' in risking such an eventuality while existing policies 
were achieving satisfactory results. Britain held a 
dominant position in East Africa, she exercised considerable 
influence through the Sultan of Zanzibar, and the campaign 
against the slave trade at sea had succeeded. Moreover, 
Kirk's warnings about the existence of other interested 
parties were not taken very seriously. No European power 
was making territorial claims and in the late 1870's 
Parliament and British public opinion would certainly have 
opposed any extension of British commitments over East 
Africa. In short Mackinnon's initiative was about 10 years 
too early.
* * * #
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Mackinnon who had no reason for suspecting Lord 
Salisbury of being actively hostile to the concession was 
disappointed and surprised by the sudden breakdown of 
negotiations, but he retained an interest in East Africa by 
following the fortunes of the road which was being builht from 
Lar-es-Salaam towards Lake Nyasa. This project had been 
proposed at the meeting of businessmen held in Glasgow in 
November 1876, after Mackinnon had returned from the Inter­
national Geographical conference inspired with a desire to 
initiate some practical scheme for development in Africa*
The idea was to build a highway across the continent from 
the East Coast, but a few months after it was formulated it 
became overshadowed in Mackinnon*s mind by the more grandiose 
concession scheme. Plans for the two schemes nevertheless 
continued simultaneously and in May 1877 Mr. Mayes, who was 
in charge of the road project, started constructing it from 
Lar-es-Salaam.
Surprisingly Mackinnon did not know of this till July, 
when he sent a telegram saying that the area near Kilwa should 
be inspected for a suitable route* He followed this with a 
letter explaining that he and Fowell-Buxton wanted the 
shortest possible road from the coast to Lake Nyasa, and for 
this reason considered Lar-es-Salaam too far north’*’. As he 
and Fowell-Buxton were financing the road they certainly had
1* MP* Mackinnon to Kirk, 26th July 1877.
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a right to decide where it should he sited, but this episode 
illustrates one of the weakest aspects of Mackinnonfs venture 
into Africa: he had no first hand knowledge of the area,
and he did not visit any of his projects there. Had he seen 
white ants in action or the devastation which floods can cause 
during the rainy season he would have had a better appreciation 
of the difficulties of constructing a dirt road and wooden 
bridges, and he would not have entertained the quite 
unrealistic idea of building a trans-continental highway.
He had successfully built up an efficient shipping 
service round India partly because his 10 years experience 
there provided him with a detailed knowledge of the potential 
trade, the various ports, the important people in business, 
the problems of communications and so on. Even when he 
started to run the B.I. from Britain he had a fund of personal 
knowledge on which to base his judgements, and although he 
left India in 1856 he continued to visit it periodically till 
the 1870's. In the case of Africa, however, he relied 
entirely on second-hand information. Kirk had the most 
detailed knowledge of the local situation, but he was only 
incidentally concerned with Mackinnon's African ventures.
He was a long way off, and letters from Zanzibar took about 
three weeks to reach England, so that communications between 
them were necessarily limited. Moreover Kirk saw matters
235
from the point of view of one who had spent his career at 
Zanzibar trying to uphold the authority of the Sultan as a 
means of exercising British influence. His attitude was 
that of the political agent on the spot, but his sense of 
what was comercially viable was not as sound as Mackinnon’s. 
Bor example, he was over optimistic about the possibility 
of promoting industries to replace slaving as a basis for 
prosperous trade. Mackinnon’s discussions about Africa among
people resident in Britain were mostly with civil servants,
businessmen, and humanitarians. They all represented 
particular interests so that a really coherent policy did 
not emerge, and the first draft of the concession, in Kirk’s 
words, revealed that the sponsors had most imperfect informa­
tion about the actual conditions in East Africa.
As regards the road, Kirk replied to Mackinnon’s letter 
pointing out more strongly than he had before why he thought 
it advisable to start north of Kilwa. He had said earlier 
that if he were to invest money in a scheme which aimed at
doing good and making money it would be to open a road from
Zanzibar to Lake Victoria'*’. However if Mackinnon wanted 
his road to go towards Lake Hyasa he recommended Bar-es-Salaam 
as the best starting place. He said that in fact it would 
be only about 50 miles longer, but he gave three positive
1. MP* Kirk to Mackinnon, 5th February 1877*
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reasons in its favour. First, he foresaw Par-es-Salaam as 
the port of the future, so he expected that it would attract 
more trade than Kilwa. Second, a road from Kilwa might 
eventually pass through Portuguese territory, because he 
thought the Portugeuse might well succeed in their desire 
to extend their area of authority northwards to include the 
lake. In the circumstances it would be foolish to build 
a road which might run through disputed or Portuguese 
territory. Third, a road from Par-es-Salaam would pass 
all the way through lands known to be rich in commerce^.
A month later he reported that Mayes had prospected
a route for 70 miles from Kilwa and come to the conclusion
that the first 30 miles would cost about £300 a mile to
construct because there would be so much hill cutting and
so many morasses to cross. This contrasted with the cost
of the road from Par-es-Salaam, which was worked out at the
2
end of the year to be running at about £52 per mile . In 
the letter reporting Mayes1 ..findings Kirk also said that 
from his own point of view a road from Par-es-Salaam would 
be preferable because he could more easily keep an eye on it.
Mackinnon was finally persuaded by these arguments 
and work on the road from Par-es-Salaam was resumed, but
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 24th August 1877•
2. MP. G. Waller to Mackinnon, 10th Pecember 1877.
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valuable weeks had been lost and Mayes left in September.
He had been ill-tempered and temperamentally unsuited to the 
task, but he was succeeded by the Morris brothers who were 
technically less competent. As a result of these problems, 
by December, only 5 miles had been added to the 11 miles of 
road which had been built by the beginning of August.
Early reports on the first few miles of road out of 
Dar-es-Salaam were encouraging - there were plenty of people 
to use it and the ants had not had sufficient time to destroy 
the wooden bridges. The reports became more pessimistic 
however as the road progressed. In February 1879 Lieutenant 
0 fNeill, who had especially inspected the road, told Kirk 
that all the bridges along the road were in a state of rapid 
decay and would bear no pressure, the ants having destroyed 
the timbers. And he said the promoters were under a complete 
delusion if they thought they possessed a road immediately 
available for wheel traffic, bullock waggons and the like^.
Two years later Kirk inspected the road which was then 
73 miles long and reported about it to Lord Granville who 
had become Foreign Secretary. Kirk was most sympathetic 
to the project about which he had given so much advice, but 
he could not conceal the fact that the promoters were not 
going to achieve their aim. He said¥
1. PP. LXIX, 1880, pp. 533-4.
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,f... The road itself is well constructed and will 
require little to keep it open. As a philanthropic 
undertaking it has been eminently successful and its 
civilising influence on the people through whose 
country it passes is very apparent... Mackinnon 
and Sir T* Fowell-Buxton, by whom the Dar-es-Salaam 
road has been made, must be congratulated on the 
benefit conferred by them on the country, although 
their hopes of reaching Nyasa are I am afraid doomed 
to failure ...
He went on to say that because of tetse flies it would 
be useless to use bullocks or horses as beasts of burden.
More space has been given to the road spheme than its 
importance strictly merits. But it is of interest because 
it was the first practical scheme for development which 
Mackinnon undertook on the African mainland, and because 
it illustrates his unrealistic approach to such schemes.
Early in 1879 it was already evident to Mackinnon
that the road would not be a commercial success by itself,
so in March he applied to Barghash for another concession.
This was very much more modest than the earlier one, but he
sought to lease or buy the houses and land of Dar-es-Salaam,
2
including harbour rights. He wanted certain mineral
rights as well as the lease of customs and taxes, and strips 
of land alongside the road. Kirk!s assistant, Vice-Consul 
Holmwood, advised Mackinnon that he would be most likely to 
succeed if he were to go out to Zanzibar and negotiate
1. PP.(1.88?)^ LXV, p. 566.
2. De Kiewiet, op.cit., p. 51.
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personally, but there is no reason to suppose that this 
would have brought success, because whatever reasons Barghash 
had for rejecting the proposals in 1876 presumably still 
applied. In any case, in May he told Mackinnon that he 
could not cede Bar-es-Salaam because if he did it would be 
difficult for him to resist similar applications from other 
peoplex •
Kirk*s view was that Stanley, who had not yet become
a friend of Mackinnon!s, but who was in Zanzibar at the time,
had put suspicions into Barghash*s mind by saying that he
was surprised to find Barghash still ruling for he had
expected to be told that the English under cloak of one or
other of their schemes for trade had ousted him entirely and
taken all power out of his hands. Stanley had advised the
2
Sultan to beware of all such schemes .
Barghash was given cause to resist granting further 
concessions a few months later when he was forced to pay a 
heavy indemnity to France for what the French alleged was a 
breach of treaty on his part when he stopped the landing and 
sale of arms by a Frenchman to Somalia. If treaties were 
used as a pretext for selling arms to the Sultan*s enemies 
then he was unlikely to grant more concessions. Indeed
1. MP. Sultan to Mackinnon, 3rd May 1879*
2. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 3rd May 1879*
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Kirk suspected that France was deliberately adopting a high­
handed and iniquitous policy to prevent further concessions
1
being granted to others •
As far as Mackinnon was concerned this episode made 
no difference because by then he had abandoned any idea of 
taking more independent initiatives in Africa* He was later 
to change his mind, but for the moment the mail which he 
received at the beginning of June, from Zanzibar left him 
thoroughly frustrated* It had brought him Barghash*s 
rejection of his second application for a concession; Kirk’s 
view of Stanley’s intrigues, and news that in the opinion 
of Lieutenant O ’Neill it was better for most of the way to 
walk alongside rather on his Lar-es-Salaam road. Mackinnon 
did not abandon the road on receipt of this report, but he 
ordered that for the time being the aim should be to 
construct it only as far as the Kingani river, well short 
of Lake Nyasa which was the original objective.
The ever optimistic Gerald V/aller knowing of Mackinnon*e
inclination to turn his back on Africa did his best to keep
his interest alive* Among other things, he said Badger was
hopeful that Barghash would get a railway in his territory
and, if he did, Mackinnon would undoubtedly be asked to 
2undertake it . But Mackinnon who was in no mood to make
1. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 26th July 1879*
2. MP. G* Waller to Mackinnon, 10th June 1879*
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further overtures to Barghash ignored this* He did however 
allow work on the road to proceed, although without any 
enthusiasm, and he continued to cooperate with King Leopold 
of the Belgians.
He had shown his willingness to help Leopold when he 
had offered to reserve some land near the harbour, for the 
Belgian Committee, if he obtained the Bar-es-Salaam lease.
In the event he was unable to assist in this respect because 
the negotiations failed, but he went to considerable expense 
to procure Indian elephants for Leopold’s expedition in 
Africa. If the Indian elephants could withstand the climate, 
the plan was to establish a station, possibly on the shore 
of Lake (Tanganyika, where with their help African elephants 
would be caught and trained.
One riding and three burden elephants were obtained 
through the Bombay branch of Mackinnon/Mackenzie, and early 
in May 1879 James Lyle Mackay arranged for them to be shipped 
to Zanzibar with enough fodder for a voyage of 25 days.
They arrived in good health, and after some difficulty and 
excitement were landed safely. By mid-July they had walked 
to the end of the Buxton/Mackinnon road. Having travelled 
inland for 23 days Mr. Carter, who had been engaged by 
Mackinnon to look after the elephants, proclaimed the 
experiment a great success because the elephants had passed
2£2
through tetse infested country apparently without ill-effects 
and they had lived off the local vegetation easily^".
like the road, however, this scheme got off to a
promising start hut soon ended in failure. By November two
of the elephants were dead, and by June 1880 not only were
they all dead, but Carter and his principal assistant
Cadenhead were also dead, having accidentally got involved
2
in an inter-village battle and been killed . There was thus 
no prospect of establishing a station for catching and 
training African elephants, and for Mackinnon this ended 
18 months of fruitless endeavour in Africa.
Thereafter, until 1884, he showed little interest in 
the affairs of East Africa beyond what was necessary from 
the point of view of the B.I.fs service. He continued to 
correspond with Kirk, but the road project was stopped in 
1881, &nd his principal involvement in Africa for a number 
of years was through his association with Leopold. Otherwise 
he was pre-occupied with the large business of the B.I.; 
the trouble and litigation over the City of Glasgow Bank 
and a land settlement scheme in Florida.
1. MP. Carter to Mackinnon, 6th August 1879*
2. Couplandj Exploitation;
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VI• THE CONGO ---  EAST AFRICA --- EMIN PASHA.
While his enterprises in East Africa were ending in 
disappointment, Mackinnon had to devote a great deal of 
attention to the B.I. In particular he had to cope with 
the problems which had been created by the opening of the 
Suez Canal (described in chapter II) and in 1878 the City 
of Glasgow Bank crashed*
Although the crash did not concern him directly, the 
proceedings which were instituted against him within two 
years were to keep him extremely busy and anxious till the 
end of 1881* Indeed, it seems probable that the psychological 
depression, and the physical exhaustion, caused by the 
protracted case partly account for the fact that during the 
early 1880*3 he ceased to be the prime mover in any major 
concern except his shipping company* Nevertheless, his 
attention was always being drawn to fresh ventures. He was 
by then wealthy and well known, and his support was sought 
frequently* In addition to Leopold, two men who approached 
him for help at that time are worth mentioning, because they 
were fairly eminent: Sir Robert Morier and General H.S.
Sanford.
Morier was Britain’s Minister at Lisbon from 1876-1881, 
Minister at Madrid from 1881-1884, and ambassador at;St. 
Petersburg from 1884-1893* He became acquainted with
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Mackinnon during his period at Lisbon, and cooperated with
him through a group of people centring on the Luke of
Sutherland and Stafford House, which was associated with
railway construction schemes'*'. The group included General
Sir Arnold Kemball, who later became a director of Mackinnonfs
I.B.E.A. Company, and Lonald Currie, who founded the Castle
shipping line. Morier was negotiating for the settlement
of an Anglo-Portugese Indian dispute, and as a means of
winning Portugese goodwill he revived a proposal which had
been made by Lord Lytton, his predecessor at Lisbon, for
the construction of a railway between Marmagoa, the port
for the Portugese colony of Goa, and the British Indian
2
railway system at New Hubli . Y/hen he secured the treaty, 
he said that he had in great part to thank the Stafford House 
Committee for his success. He thought it was the association 
of such names as those of the Luke of Sutherland!s and 
Mackinnon*s which had given credibility to the railway 
scheme^, and there is no doubt that Mackinnon gave it much 
attention during the Autumn of 1879^* A contract for the 
construction of the railway was signed between the Portugese
1. R. Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the nineteenth century,
Oxford, 19F2T"pT ‘ --------  -----------------------
2. Ibid., p. 87*
5* MP. Morier to Mackinnon, 14 June 1879*
4* Sanford Papers. Mackinnon to Sanford, 19 October 1879*
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Government and the Stafford House Committee at the end of 
April 1881. It was not completed till 1888, but most of 
it was open by 1886^.
Morier and Mackinnon appear to have lost touch with 
each other some time after the railway agreement, because 
in 1889 Morier wrote to Mackinnon sayings
”1 hardly know whether you remember me, but I have not 
forgotten the Deus ex Machina who came to my assistance 
in a day of trouble and enabled me to carry out a very 2 
important treaty which has turned out a perfect success.”
Morier was then ambassador at St. Petersburg and this 
was the beginning of a letter in which he sought Mackinnonfs 
support for a scheme to promote commerce between Britain and 
Siberia by opening a route round the north of Norway.
Mackinnon contributed £500 towards the cost of an expedition 
in 1889, but this failed, because although the ship from 
England reached the mouth of the river Yenisey it missed
the expedition from the interior to the mouth of the Yenisey
\
and so the exchange of cargoes which had been planned did
not take place. Mackinnon ceased to be associated with
the scheme after this, but valuable expeditions were arranged
•5
on a number of occasions, afterwards till 1903 •
1. Information kindly supplied by Agatha Ramm.
2. MP. Morier to Mackinnon, 11 July 1889*
3. Information kindly supplied by Agatha Ramm.
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The other notable person who sought Mackinnon*s help 
at about the same time as Morier did, was General Sanford, 
former United States Minister at Brussels, a member since 
1877 of the executive committee of the A.I.C.\ and an 
unscrupulous and close associate of Leopold’s. He and 
Mackinnon were brought together by their involvement in 
Leopold's affairs. They corresponded about the experiment 
with elephants, about Leopold's policy in the Congo and about 
Sanford's own more modest enterprises, such as his ivory 
trading scheme. They also co-operated, particularly during 
1884, in Leopold's campaign to secure international 
recognition for the A.I.C. But in 1879, and the early 
1880's Sanford's main concern with Mackinnon was to obtain 
his help for a land development project in Florida.
Sanford had bought 12,000 acres in Florida in 1870, 
and later sold 581 acres for establishing the town of Sanford. 
The value of the rest of the land had increased many times by 
1880, but he needed more land for speculation and development, 
hence his overtures to Mafikinnon. He even gave his daughter 
the middle name of Mackinnon as part of his policy of 
ingratiating himself.
Mackinnon was not very enthusiastic about the project, 
but he thought it had in it the elements of commercial success
1. A.I.C. Association Internationale du Congo.
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and advanced £8,000^. The idea was to attract large numbers 
of immigrants to the area and to sell land to them* The 
railway had already reached Florida, which was acquiring a 
reputation as a good region for growing oranges and other 
fruit. Sanfordfs company, "The Florida Land & Colonisation 
Company", in which Mackinnon had a stake, advertised in Italy 
and other parts of Europe and spent money to provide basic 
amenities such as water supplies. However, Mackinnon appears
to have taken no further very active part in the scheme after
the advance which he made in January 1880. In May he told 
Sanford that he could not help any more because he was over­
burdened with work and had heard that an action might be 
brought against him over his previous connection with the
p
City Bank . In fact Mackinnon was wise not to become too 
closely involved with the Florida company, because its 
affairs did not run smoothly, and its main problem seemed 
to be Sanford, who was at loggerheads with the other 
directors. Mackinnon was not one of them, but he received 
many complaining letters from Sanford, so in March 1884 he 
suggested that Sanford should raise enough money in America 
to buy out the British shareholders and bondholders, and 
establish the company in America entirely under his own 
control. He thought this would be the only way of overcoming 
the chronic ill-feeling between Sanford and the London based
directors-^._________ _________________________________ __
1. Sanford Papers. Mackinnon to Sanford, 15 January 1880.
2. Ibid., Mackinnon to Sanford, 27 May 1880.
3. MP. Mackinnon to Sanford, 3 March 1884.
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In spite of previous set-backs, however, Mackinnon 
remained more interested in Africa than in the Florida project, 
and in February 1880 he received a letter from Gordon, who said
"3 years ago I gave you a memo, of my ideas of what 
ought to be done to establish a sort of Hudson's Bay 
Company in Africa. Are you prepared to carry this out, 
if so I will be inclined to help as far as I can. I do 
not like Belgians. I could not negotiate with Kings.
I must be king of the territory as far as apts. go. I 
do not believe in Kirk. I think he would never be
content with a passive post. Waller thinks otherwise
«1• # •
This letter was a little embarassing for Mackinnon, 
because he liked Kirk and Leopold, so he answered it rather 
cautiously. He said he would write to Kirk about the 
concession scheme and mention that Gordon might be willing to 
carry it out. Gordon reacted to this by retreating from his 
forthcoming position. He told Mackinnon not to press the 
matter and that the value of his own services were over-rated, 
but they nevertheless had their first meeting a few days later.
Gordon said he found Mackinnon poorly, and so did not 
like to nbother him to effectual steps11, but in spite of this 
Mackinnon was able to stimulate Gordon's interest in East 
Africa and persuade him to visit Leopold who, according to 
Gordon, wanted nothing to do with the Sultan of Zanzibar but 
desired to enter Africa at some point between Egyptian and 
Zanzibar territory. Leopold also wanted Gordon to go to 
Zanzibar with a view to obtaining from the Sultan the cession
1. B.L.S. MS. Acc. 4031* Gordon to Mackinnon, 5th
February 1880.
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of a port 1 to the International’1 or to Mackinnon and others♦ 
G-ordon was not hopeful of success and doubted if any 
’’unrecognised1 area existed between the domains of Zanzibar 
and Egypt.
Mackinnon enquired about this at the Foreign Office and
ascertained that the Zanzibar territories did not extend beyond
2 degrees north, so that there was a neutral zone as far as 10
degrees north where Egyptian territory began. But he added
1that there were no good ports in the Zone . The following day 
Mackinnon wrote a long letter to Kirk which is worth quoting 
extensively because it sets out the various possibilities for 
East Africa which he was then contemplating, and it also 
illustrates the extreme naivety of some of his ideas. He said:
’’Some little time ago I mentioned to you when I heard 
Gordon had finally quitted the Egyptian service that I 
thought it quite possible Gordon’s services might be 
secured for such work as we had in view. I hope by next 
mail to learn whether you think it possible that the Sultan 
would yet make such a concession as would enable us to 
avail of Gordon’s services. You know I never met Gordon 
until quite the other day ... His manner is exceedingly 
modest and pleasing. He absolutely shrinks from public 
praise and is exactly the reverse of Stanley, whom by the 
way he does not at all admire ... if you knew him personally 
you would both become fast and firm friends, and if embarked 
on the same good work you could really accomplish great 
things ... Gordon has been to visit the King at Brussels 
The King I believe would be willing to give him 
absolute control of all his African operations, including 
Stanley’s, but Gordon says it would be quite impossible for 
him to work with Stanley in any capacity ... I have an 
impression if the Sultan would concede a port up toward the 
north of his seaboard .•. that Gordon would be prepared to 
enter there and work upwards •.. settling and arranging
1. N.L.S. MS. Acc. 4031* Mackinnon to Gordon, 11 March
1880.
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the country and putting down the internal slave trade 
in the country beyond the Sultan’s dominions, as well 
as opening it up to trade and civilisation. I suppose 
we know very little of the country between 1 and 2 North 
latitude and lake Nyanya (?). It would be a great 
matter for Africa to have that territory regulated and 
administered by a man like Gordon. I believe however 
he would under no circumstances bind himself at present 
to longer service than two years.
Perhaps you would add two or three words to the 
telegram which I hope you will kindly send me such as 
"Northern suggestion feasible" or "Northern suggestion 
impossible".
If there should appear to you any probability of 
the Sultan being disposed again to entertain the old 
concession either in whole or in part I believe we could 
arrange matters at home so as to secure all necessary 
support and to ensure the thing being well worked in 
every way provided only you saw your way to giving it 
a good share of your personal attention and help in 
directing and controlling it at Zanzibar . ..ftl
All this correspondence and activity in fact achieved 
very little. The situation was reminiscent of the winter of 
1876-77 when Gordon first irrupted into Mackinnon's affairs. 
The immediate result in 1880 was the negative one of stopping 
Gordon from offering his services to Barghash. He said to 
Waller:
"... I told the King that after what he had said I would 
not enter the Sultan’s service. This is the effect of 
the visit to Brussels^ ... Had I never come to Brussels  ^
I would have gone with the Sultan, it is now too late ..."^
1. N.L.S. MS. Acc. 4051* Mackinnon to Kirk, 12th March
1880.
2. W.P. Gordon to Waller, 4th March 1880.
3. W.P. Gordon to Waller, undated April 1880.
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He did not even visit Zanzibar because Kirk thought 
he could do little good there. Kirk’s reply to Mackinnon 
is unfortunately not available, but it was almost certainly 
discouraging. There was no reason why Barghash, who had 
broken off negotiations in 1878 should wish to resume them 
in 1880. The situation had not changed greatly so far as 
he was concerned.
One effect of these abortive ideas was to turn 
Mackinnon’s and Leopold’s attention more firmly towards 
the Congo and away from East Africa.
They had already co-operated over the experiment with 
elephants, and Mackinnon had shown an interest in the Congo 
by contributing money for the foundation of the ’’Comite 
d ’Etudes du Haut Congo” in 1878. This interest continued 
even though Leopold, to consolidate his own control, returned 
all non-Belgian capital in 1879* Mackinnon, nevertheless, 
still had a financial inducement, because Leopold said that 
any of the original subscribers, such as Mackinnon and 
Hutton, would be given preference in commercial, industrial 
and financial operations. Mackinnon also wanted to assist 
for philanthropic reasons, and believed that Leopold was 
primarily concerned for the welfare of the Africans. It 
was no doubt flattering to be asked for assistance by 
royalty, and the fact that Leopold was a king probably
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helped to make his declared intentions more credible. In 
any case Leopold was a very astute publicist and often used 
others to project a favourable image. In 1880, for example, 
Sanford said to Mackinnon:
11... there is one consideration about which I may 
talk to you in confidence and which will probably 
not be mentioned directly to you. Namely the 
question of finances! ... He (the King) has 
now got himself involved in a very considerable 
fixed expenditure, with no end of possible and 
uncertain outlay ahead, and his ardour in the 
cause is leading him still deeper into expense 
and unknown obligations ... The whole entourage 
is opposed to this expenditure and fear that private 
fortune and private expectations based upon it may 
be prejudiced. He has not thus far exceeded his 
income but is in the way of doing so
Sanford went on to say that the King was not given 
to calculation and needed protection from himself, lest he 
ruin himself financially while pursuing his purpose of 
bringing civilisation to Africa. Mackinnon accepted this 
very naive view of Leopold and provided help for a time by 
paying some of the cost of carrying labour to work in the 
Congo, and by trying to recruit British people with experience 
of India and elsewhere. In 1882, 230 men were shipped from 
Zanzibar, and a year later the Sultan gave permission for 
another 200 to be recruited. Labour was also obtained from 
further afield, and in March 1883 Mackinnon received a 
telegram asking for his help in carrying "five to six hundred
1. MP. Sanford to Mackinnon, 14 February 1880.
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coolies11, apparently Chinese from Hong Kon£. The require­
ments in terms of skills were later listed as follows:
4 shoemakers, 6 tailors, 12 carpenters, 6 joiners, 10 Black­
smiths, 24 gardeners and 532 ordinary workmen and porters. 
Recruiting was never easy, and Indian and Chinese labour was 
sought in various places, until Lord Derby, as Colonial 
Secretary, gave permission in 1885 for the Association to 
recruit in Sierra Leone.
Besides supporting recruiting generally, Mackinnon 
tried to enlist Cordon, and it is worth quoting a letter 
which he wrote to Cordon in July 1882, because it sheds 
light on his own motives for cooperating with Leopold and 
for wishing to be associated with what he regarded as 
civilising enterprises in Africa. He said:
11... I believe already an amount not far, if at 
all, short of £100,000 has been expended on this 
Congo scheme by His Majesty and he is still spending 
on a large scale without desire for other reward 
than is found in the privilege of doing good on a 
great scale to the wretched people who have been 
trampled on and debased throughout the ages.
I am sure a work like this cannot fail to attract 
and command your sympathy and to excite in you as it 
does in me a desire to lend a helping hand. The1 
King will await your reply with much anxiety ...”
Cordonfs reaction was not favourable. He was not
2
prepared to go out in circumstances which invited failure ,
1. N.L.S. MS. Acc. 4031* Mackinnon to Cordon, 27th July
1882.
2. Ibid., Cordon to Mackinnon, 9th November 1882.
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and in particular he thought there was no hope of exercising 
government in the Congo until there was a flag1 ; but a year 
later he changed his mind in a surprising and typical manner. 
He said he would resign from the army provided the King would 
pay him £500 a year, the amount he would lose by resigning.
H... if the King takes me, let H.M. clearly know 
I am for sale for life for £500 a year
In January he wrote to Mackinnon from Brussels and said:
ft... H.M, wishes me to go to Congo next month and 
wait events (i.e. till Stanley gives up) ... I 
promised the King in 1880 to come if he wanted me 
so I am bound to go and have no option ..."3
This was an odd letter considering what he had said 
in 1880, but before he could take up his duties he was 
appointed to command the Sudan expedition which led to his 
death. The largest fish which Mackinnon helped to play for 
was thus lost, but Mackinnon continued to support Leopold's 
efforts in the Congo, particularly by joining the opposition 
to the proposed Anglo-Portuguese treaty.
The Portuguese laid claim to the Lower Congo, and by 
the end of 1882 the British Government had indicated that 
it was willing to enter into negotiations with a view to
1# N.L.S. MS. Acc. 4031* Gordon to Mackinnon, 17th 
November 1882.
2. Ibid., Gordon to Mackinnon, 17th November 1883*
3* Ibid., Gordon to Mackinnon, 2nd January 1884.
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recognising the claim on certain conditions. This move was 
prompted by news of French activity in the Congo, The 
French explorer Savorgnan de Brazza had made a "treaty" with 
a chief on the north shore of Stanley Pool, and it was feared 
that this might be the beginning of a serious extension of 
French authority which would lead to the restriction of trade. 
Portugal was an old ally which, it was hoped, would be 
susceptible to British influence, whereas France would 
certainly not be. If the Portuguese claim were acknowledged, 
therefore, it was anticipated that she would have the 
responsibility of governing the area, while British businessmen 
continued to enjoy the major share of the trade. Thus the 
French would be frustrated, while the extent of British 
influence would be made less obvious by the existence of 
formal Portuguese authority.
Alternative policies were annexation by Britain or 
recognition of the A.I.C.'s authority over the areas which 
it claimed to control. With public and parliamentary opinion 
still opposed to territorial expansion, annexation could not 
have been accepted as government policy, and it was not 
seriously considered. Recognition of the A.I.C.'s authority 
was a more attractive possibility, buttthe status of the A.I.C. 
was not clear. Britain could not sign a treaty with such 
an organisation as though it were a foreign power. Moreover,
2«
as it was not backed financially by any government, but 
depended upon private subscriptions, its viability was in 
doubt. When negotiations with Portugal began the A.I.C. 
was regarded as a rather impractical philanthropic enterprise, 
and it was not taken very seriously by the British government 
until the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884*
Negotiations with Portugal therefore began in December 
1882, and a treaty was signed in February 1884, but it was 
never ratified for three main reasons. First, because 
Britain stiffened her terms. Second, because a strong lobby 
campaigned against the treaty in Britain, and finally because 
France and Germany opposed it.
Britain*s terms were stiffened largely on the advice 
of Percy Anderson who had become the civil servant at the 
head of the Africa section of the Foreign Office in February 
1883* He thought that the guarantees offered by Portugal 
were full of loopholes and, in particular, he objected to 
the fact that they were only offered for ten years. He 
suspected that the Portuguese would use the period to consoli­
date their position and thereafter abolish the liberal 
tarriff structure.
Anderson’s objections were soon supported by a powerful 
lobby in Britain, which was opposed to the proposed treaty.
The traders who provided the main strength for the lobby
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preferred the existing anarchic situation to the prospect of 
Portuguese rule, which they feared would impose high tariffs 
and he run by extortionate officials. They were led by James 
Hutton, who was an energetic supporter of Leopold1s, a friend 
of Mackinnon*s and soon to be President of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce. Added to the protests of the traders 
were those of the humanitarians and Protestant groups - most 
notably the Baptist Union. The humanitarians objected 
because they doubted the sincerity of Portugal*s anti-slavery 
policy, while the Protestants felt that Portugal, as a Roman 
Catholic country, would hinder their missionary activities.
Being a businessman, a humanitarian and a Protestant, 
Mackinnon was naturally an active member of the lobby. His 
association with Leopold gave him an additional reason, and 
indeed some people, such as Dilke (the Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs) thought that Leopold really controlled the 
lobby. There is no doubt that Mackinnon still held a very 
naive view of Leopold’s motives because as late as January 
1885 he described t)ie A.I.C. as 1 the noblest and most self- 
sacrificing scheme for Africa's development that has been or 
ever will be attempted.fl^  But, in fairness to him it should 
be remembered that Leopold's methods had not been fully 
exposed by the mid-1880's; his machine for the exploitation 
of the Congo had not attained its later ruthless efficiency
1. Sanford Papers, Mackinnon to Sanford, 5 and 13 January
1885.
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and many shrewder men than Mackinnon were also deceived.
But, to revert to Dilke*s opinion, it would exaggerate 
Leopold*s influence to suggest that men like Mackinnon and 
Hutton only opposed the treaty because he wanted them to.
They had their own very cogent reasons, although Leopold must 
have discussed the matter when Hutton and Kirk visited him in 
February 1883, and it is possible that he proposed that 
Mackinnon should lobby the Foreign Office, while Hutton 
organised opposition from commercial interests.
At any rate Mackinnon sent a memorandum to the Foreign 
Office in February in which he outlined the International 
Association*s activities in the Congo^. He followed this up 
on the 19th of March with a letter to Lord Granville (who was 
then Foreign Secretary) which began as follows:
**You were good enough to say you would receive a 
short memorandum from me regarding the conditions which 
would probably satisfy the commercial community of'this 
country and at the same time meet the wishes of His 
Majesty the King of the Belgians and provide that security 
for his noble work without which it cannot ultimately
succeed ... I believe it would be ... in accordance with
His Majesty*s wishes if things were allowed to remain on
their present footing and no treaty made. I am sure it is
also the desire of the entire mercantile community in this 
country that no extension of Portuguese sovereignity should 
be permitted**.
In the brief memorandum which he sent with the letter 
he said:
1. Anstey, op.cit., p. 127*
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w... the object of any present diplomatic action with 
regard to the Congo should be to secure rights actually 
existing, and to avoid creating or sanctioning any 
exclusive rights, or any claims which could interfere 
with free legitimate commerce, or with mission work or 
which could help to revive the slave trade . ..H .
He then suggested that Britain should undertake to 
police the river from its mouth as far inland as it was navig­
able, as a precaution against the revival of the slave trade. 
He thought that Portuguese claims should be recognised in so 
far as they had actually been exercised, provided they did not 
interfere with free navigation or the river or with the 
principles already mentioned. He proposed that the claims of 
the A.I.C., which he called the Belgian Association, should be 
recognised on a similar basis^-.
In making these suggestions Mackinnon was expressing 
views shared by Leopold, because shortly after he wrote the
letter to Granville, quoted above, he received one written by
2Devaux , at the King’s request, asking him in any discussions 
about the treaty to emphasise the importance of policing the 
mouths of the Congo . These ideas, however, made little 
impression at the Foreign Office.
There, the official view was that Mackinnon had not 
made any practical suggestions, and in particular it was not
1. P.O. 84/1804, Mackinnon to Granville, 19 March 1883.
2. Devaux was King Leopold’s Chef du Cabinet.
3. MP. Devaux to Mackinnon, 20 March 1883.
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understood how Britain could police the river while acknowledg­
ing the sovereign/’ty of Portugal on the banks. Granville, who 
apparently agreed with this view, which was minuted to him, 
merely thanked Mackinnon for his letter and memorandum, but the 
matter could not be dismissed so easily, because Mackinnon, 
Hutton and Leopold had also discussed ways of arousing 
opposition in Parliament. As soon as Strauch, the Secretary 
of the A.I.C., knew that the question of the Anglo-Portuguese 
treaty was to be raised in the House of Commons, he sent 
documents to Mackinnon
f‘... to show that the claims-^of the Portuguese were 
without any foundation ...,! ,
and Mackinnon agreed to circulate them to influential people.
The pressure on members of Parliament bore fruit in the form of
a number of questions, and finally in a debate, on the 3rd of
April, during which Gladstone conceded that the treaty would
not be ratified before Parliament had been given an opportunity
to consider it. This was a notable triumph for opponents of
the treaty. The government feared defeat if a vote were taken
in the House, so it decided to postpone ratification pending
international approval. Thus Hutton and Mackinnon and M.P.'s
such as John Slagg and Jacob Bright, who had African interests,
played an important part in preventing ratification of the
treaty by prolonging negotiations. Their agitation also
1. MP. Strauch to Mackinnon, 23 February 1883.
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obliged the Foreign Office to press for an exceptionally
i
liberal treaty . Had negotiations been concluded a year 
earlier, international reaction might not have been so hostile. 
As it was the Anglo-Portuguese treaty was decisively blocked by 
German and French opposition, which largely arose from 
Britain*s position in Egypt.
In 1881 a revolt of the Egyptian army ended Anglo-French
financial control in Egypt, and the two countries planned a
joint expedition to restore their position, but a domestic
crisis prevented the French from participating, and the
exclusively British expedition led to British occupation for
over 30 years. This annoyed the French, who sought revenge by
frustrating British designs elsewhere, and compensation by
annexing territory in other parts of Africa. The Germans had
2their own reasons for exploiting the situation .
First, Bismarck was anxious to provide France with some
cause which would distract her from the humiliating defeat of
1870, and the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Second,
Germany had developed ambitions for empire, but she thought
that Britain regarded them unfavourably and a quite unnecessary
■5
misunderstanding aggravated German suspicions . In February 
1883 Bismarck had asked if Britain would protect the German 
settlement of Angra Pequena in South West Africa, but he did
1. Anstey, op.cit., p. 142.
2. Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., pp. 76-121.
3. Ibid., p. 173•
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not receive a reply. He then repeated the question but only 
got vague answers during the ensuing six months. The delay 
arose because the British government was consulting the govern­
ment of Cape Colony, and because it did not attach much 
importance to the inquiry. Bismarck was thus offended and 
driven to the conclusion that Germany should pursue her 
colonial ambitions without British support. This gave him 
added reason for trying to widen the rift between Britain and 
Prance, and his policy in this respect was largely successful 
because between the end of 1883 and the beginning of 1885, 
Germany annexed South West Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons and 
a large part of East Africa. Finally, Bismarck was anxious to 
win more popularity before the German elections which were due 
to be held in the autumn of 1884, and as the British 
ambassador in Berlin reported he had “discovered an unexplored 
mine of popularity in starting a colonial policy
The result of the rather short-lived Franco-German 
entente was to prevent ratification of the Anglo-Portuguese 
treaty. France had protested against it in March, and in June 
Bismarck said that Germany would not recognise it. The Foreign 
Office could treat petitions from people like Mackinnon and 
Hutton fairly lightly, but it could not ignore Bismarck. It 
could not afford to court diplomatic isolation over a relati­
vely minor issue like the Congo, particularly while it was so
1. Gifford and Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa, Yale,
1967, p. 7.
anxious to avoid German hostility to British policy in Egypt. 
Hopes of ratification were therefore abandoned, and Britain 
agreed to send representatives to the Berlin West Africa 
Conference which began in November.
In the meantime Leopold had been pursuing his own 
devious policy. Overtly, at least, he was less hostile to the 
proposed treaty than either Mackinnon or Hutton were. Hutton 
advocated outright rejection and Mackinnon favoured either 
rejection or drastic modification, but Leopold would apparently 
have been content with amendments to safeguard the interests of 
the A.I*C. The reasons for his moderation are not altogether 
clear, but it seems that he may have received a hint, early in 
1884, to the effect that the British Foreign Office might in 
certain circumstances expose and publicise the nature of the 
treaties which the A.I.C. had made with chiefs in the Congo.
The Portuguese in their own interests had already started to do 
this, because in January 1863X, T.V. Lister, an Assistant Under­
secretary at the Foreign Office, had said to Mackinnon:
w... I saw the Stanley treaties which were circulated by 
the Portuguese government and knowing the thoroughly 
liberal aims of the Belgian Association I did not for one 
moment imagine that they were intended to effect anything 
more than the protection of the Congo trade from the 
exclusive designs of de Brazza and the opening of that 
trade to all the world, but the wording of the treaties I 
saw was certainly calculated to convey the idea of a 
strict monopoly ...
1. MP. T.V. Lister to Mackinnon, 4 January 1883*
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In spite of this, Lister hoped that an arrangement might 
he made with Portugal which would not interfere with the 
Association’s work. He still seemed to believe in its liberal 
aims, but a year later many people might have been persuaded 
that international trade would be more severely restricted by 
the A.I.C. than by the Portuguese, and this prospect was 
probably largely responsible for Leopoldfs approach. He was 
also preoccupied during the early months of 1884 negotiating 
for recognition of the A.I.C, In April he persuaded the 
United States to recognise its flag, on the understanding that 
Americans would enjoy free trade in the Congo basin, and on the 
following day Prance agreed to recognise it, on the under­
standing that she would have a pre-emptive right to the 
A.I.C.’s territory if the A.I.C. ever had to sell. After the 
agreement with France became known, opinion in Britain began to 
turn against Leopold, and the A.I.C. The agreement was 
considered anti-British, while the sincerity of Leopold’s 
ideals came to be questioned openly.
The British Foreign Office, like almost everyone else, 
had misunderstood and under-estimated the A.I.C, The 
following minute written a year earlier, apropos of a letter 
from Mackinnon to Granville, expressed the typical Foreign 
Office view of the Association:
wIt is not a Belgian nor an English company, 
it has no charter or recognised position, it seems 
to be a small geographical and philanthropic society 
composed of members of various nationality who have
%%€
been indulging their taste for exploration and 
road making at^the expense of the King of the 
Belgians •..•M
The Foreign Office only began to appreciate the nature of 
the A.I.Cfs activities in 1884. This was largely on the 
basis of the information which Harry Johnston brought after 
his expedition to Y/est Africa, where he had met Stanley and 
seen the work of the A.I.C. at first hand.
In the face of mounting suspicion, Leopold embarked 
upon the difficult task of trying to obtain recognition for 
the A.I.C. from Britain. He wrote personally to Granville, 
and also sent Strauch to try to explain and justify the 
agreement with France. Mackinnon, whose faith in the 
idealism of the A.I.C. was unshaken, helped by introducing 
Strauch to as many influential people as possible, while 
Hutton campaigned even more vigorously, and Stanley lectured 
at various important commercial centres in England on behalf 
of the A.I.C. A few days after Britain recognised the 
A.I.C. Strauch thanked Mackinnon for his help in the 
following extravagant terms:
M... If the Association has been recognised by England, 
there is certainly nobody who has done more than you 
did to obtain that end. By your unceasing efforts and 
most valuable assistance the Association has now 
secured the friendship of England. The King addresses to 
you his warmest thanks and H.M. desires me to assure 
you that H.M. never will forget what you have done for 2 
______ the great African work which we should call your work .rt
1. F.O. 84/1804, A Minute to lord Granville about Mackinnon's
memo, of the 19th March 1883, which is quoted above.
2. MP. Strauch to Mackinnon, 18th December 1884.
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The efforts of Mackinnon, Hutton and Stanley did not 
decisively move public opinion, or shift the stand of the 
government. The A.I.C.'s pre-emption agreement with Prance 
had caused too much resentment, while its real purposes were 
becoming increasingly suspect as more was revealed about the 
exclusive treaties it had made with various chiefs. The 
fact that Britain recognised the A.I.C. before the end of 
the year owed less to the campaign of these men than to 
Leopold's astute diplomacy, and to developments at the 
Berlin West Africa Conference.
France had recognised the Association because she 
feared the extension of British influence. Although the 
treaty with Portugal had not been ratified, there was still 
the prospect that it might be, and Britain seemed to present 
a greater threat to the French position than Leopold did.
The British government conversely recognised the Association 
largely as a move against the French. She, like almost 
everyone else at the time, thought that the A.I.C. would 
almost certainly have to sell out to the French unless it 
were supported. Paradoxically, therefore, the pre-emption 
agreement, which was unpopular in Britain, had the effect of 
rallying help for the A.I.C. France had a high tariff 
policy so that, from a commercial point of view, any fate 
for the Congo was considered better than French dominion.
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Beaction in G-ermany was very similar. By May 1884 Bismarck 
had laid the foundations for a Franco-German entente, and he 
was resentful of British policy in Africa. But he was 
surprised by the pre-emption agreement and, fearing the 
prospect of French domination in the area, he began 
negotiations with Leopold, which culminated in German 
recognition of the A.I.C. in November. This was given 
in return for a guarantee of freedom of trade for German 
citizens, and a guarantee that this freedom would be maintained 
even if the A.I.C. had to sell the territory to some other 
power.
At almost the same time the Berlin West Africa 
Conference began. This met under Bismarck!s presidency 
and had been convened with very little reference to Britain.
The significance of this was not lost on those who were 
anxiously hoping that Portuguese ambitions would be frustrated. 
In January 1885 Hutton reported that Consul Holmwood feared 
that Lord Granville would stand by and do nothing, and that 
they would have to look to Germany to help them out of the 
difficulty1.
Fourteen powers were represented at the Conference, 
the most important being Germany, France, Great Britain, 
Portugal, and the A.I.C. The A.I.C. was not legally a state,
1. MP. Hutton to Mackinnon, 27th January 1885*
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so it was not officially represented in the same way as the 
other parties to the Conference, but its interests were more 
than adequately cared for* Colonel Strauch and another man 
were sent by Leopold in an unofficial capacity, but more 
important was the presence of two strongly pro-A.I.C. members 
in the Belgian delegation and the presence, as co-opted 
members in the American delegation, of Sanford and Stanley, 
who were both very active members of the A.I.C."*'.
In the circumstances Leopold's cause came out of the 
Conference very well. The A.I.C. was recognised by Britain 
and Belgium, and at the last meeting Bismarck referred to the 
area as "the Congo Free State”. With the territory thus 
firmly established as a legal entity, Leopold devoted his 
energy more wholeheartedly to the economic exploitation of 
the new state, and still with the support of Mackinnon,
Hutton and Stanley.
The most ambitious project was for the construction 
of a Congo railway. Before the end of 1885 a Congo Railway 
Syndicate had been formed with 26 shareholders, including 
Mackinnon, Hutton and Stanley. They proposed not only to 
run a profitable railway but to take part in the economic 
development of the territory, and for this purpose they
1 S.E. Crowe, The Berlin West Africa Conference, 1884-5, 
London, 1942, p. 97*
2 «
sought major concessions from the Congo Free State with 
regard to taxation, mineral rights, the provision of land 
and so on. The extent of the concessions demanded in fact 
were so great that they brought negotiations to an end.
In September 1886, the Free State government said that it 
would not grant a charter because the proposed company would 
be too powerful for the sovereignty of the state. The fact 
that the promoters of the company insisted that it should 
be registered in Britain, and subject to British law gave 
added weight to the Free State’s fears and to Belgian jealousy.
The upshot of this was that a Belgian syndicate was 
formed to build the railway, and British business did not 
get such a large share in the economic life of the Congo 
as it had expected. This was not an altogether surprising 
development, because Leopold had been noticeably less frank 
with his non-Belgian colleagues throughout the year. By 
April, Stanley was so annoyed at being kept in the dark that 
he said:
111 might have been spared my suffering had 
the King been as generous to^me as I have ever 
been to my loyal blacks ...”
In September when he heard that their projected 
railway scheme was off he said:
1. MP. Stanley to Mackinnon, 6th April 1886.
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11.. • I can see that everyday the King is closing the 
Congo against the English and seems resolved to make 
it more and more Belgian* Sanford is faithful to 
the King, and knows a great deal but will not tell 
because of the trading concessions he has obtained
Mackinnon's relations with Leopold also cooled 
considerably, but he did get a financial stake in the Congo. 
When the Congo Railway Company was established in 1889, be 
became a director and "William Mackinnon and Consorts" held
the second largest block of shares in the company; the
2
largest being held by the Belgian government . Mackinnon 
also subscribed £800 to the Katanga company, but altogether 
he did not get an opportunity to participate in Congo projects 
to the extent which he had expected while he had been helping 
to frustrate the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, and to secure 
British recognition of the A.I.C. As the A.I.C. became 
established internationally, so Leopold felt less need to seek 
the support of his British friends by offering them generous 
terms. Mackinnon’s reaction to this change of attitude on 
Leopold’s part was surprisingly charitable, but he was 
probably less concerned than he might have been because his 
own interest in Africa was swinging back to the east coast. 
* * * * *
1. MP. Stanley to Mackinnon, 18 September, 1886.
2. R. Anstey, op.cit., p. 208.
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Interest in East Africa began to increase seriously in 
1884, with the intensification of international rivalry over 
the continent, and the first moves were made by private 
individuals rather than governments. Early in 1884 Harry 
Johnston set out on an expedition to the Kilimanjaro area.
This was primarily a scientific expedition, arranged on the 
initiative of Kirk, but it acquired considerable political 
importance. In July, Johnston wrote from Chagga to Lord 
Edmund Pitzmaurice, Parliamentary Under-secretary, painting 
a picture of the area in the most rosy colours. He said 
it was as large as Switzerland and
ff... capable of producing every vegetable production of 
the tropical and temperate zones, free from the tsetse 
fly, and inhabited sparsely by peaceful agriculturalists, 
skilled in native manufactures and capable and desirous 
of instruction
He thought it very suitable for European settlement and that 
it must become English, French or German within a few years.
He pointed out that it was strategically situated between 
the sea and the great lakes of the interior, and he said 
that he could make it a colony as English as Ceylon without 
exciting much notice and for not more than £5,000. He 
gave a quite unrealistic idea of the difficulties which
1. Johnston to Fitzmaurice from Chagga, 10 July 1884.
Quoted by R. Oliver in Sir Harry Johnston and the 
Scramble for Africa, London, 1957, pp.
would "be involved, but his letter was taken seriously at 
the Foreign Office because Britain was concerned by the 
increasing interest shown in East Africa by other powers.
She had been obliged to abandon the proposed treaty with 
Portugal about the Congo in the face of Bismarck’s declaration 
that he would refuse to recognise it. At the same time 
Germany was establishing her position at Angra Pequena, so 
that Johnston’s warning that the Kilimanjaro district would 
fall to some power within a few years was firmly underlined. 
His idea that it might be made a British colony was not 
pursued, however, largely because Kirk, who was consulted, 
said he saw no immediate threat to the district from any 
other pov/er. Moreover he thought that a general scramble 
might be provoked if a British claim were made to the area, 
but he was not then aware that Carl Peters and three other 
Germans were on their way to East Africa on behalf of the 
Society for German colonisation. Nor did he know when 
Peters and his party landed at Saadani two days before 
Johnston departed for England. The detection of the 
Germans was made more difficult because they travelled 
under false names, and ironically they made the voyage from 
Aden aboard a B.I. ship.
Although Granville accepted Kirk’s assessment of the 
situation, evidence of increasing German activity in East
Z & 3
Africa continued to mount. On the 1st of October Gerhard 
Rohlfs, who made no secret of his support for German 
colonisation, became Consul-General at Zanzibar. And in 
December 1884 Peters returned to the coast, having made a 
number of fftreaties” with chiefs, purporting to surrender 
the sovereignty of large inland areas to his company. The 
German government had denied that there was any particular 
significance attached to the appointment of Rohlfs, and 
Peters had been warned by Bismarck that he could not expect 
government support for his enterprise. The German government 
had thus not openly declared any special interest in East 
Africa, but a body of opinion was growing in the British 
Foreign Office which advocated a more interventionist policy 
there in anticipation of claims being made by other powers.
In particular, a memorandum was prepared for Gladstone, the 
Prime Minister, in December 1884 which recommended, in 
effect, that Britain should annexe territory in East Africa. 
The argument was that the east coast was strategically more 
valuable than the west coast because of Britain's commit­
ments in India. Its highlands had a climate which was 
suitable for European settlement, the humanitarian crusade 
against the slave trade was concentrated in East Africa, and 
according to the memorandum, its commerce could be expanded 
vastly. It was therefore urged that Britain should
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establish her authority in East Africa before others did,
while merely seeking in West Africa the maximum freedom of
1
trade and leaving territorial responsibility to others .
Gladstone was not impressed by these arguments and saw 
no need for doing anything, but German activity became more 
intense and overt. On the 3rd of March 1885, the day after 
the Berlin West Africa Conference ended, Germany published a 
Schiitzbrief announcing that she had taken over the territories 
acquired by Peters, In the absence of any objection from the 
British government the strongest opposition to German 
encroachments came from private individuals like Mackinnon 
and Hutton,
In April Consul Holmwood, while on leave in England 
from Zanzibar, had asked Hutton to consider reviving the 
idea of Mackinnon’s Concession scheme of 1878, with certain 
modifications. The most important was his suggestion that 
the port of Tanga should be leased from the Sultan and a 
railway built from there to the foot of mount Kilimanjaro, 
in the first instance. He thought this might later be 
extended to the great lakes and so create a relatively quick 
route by rail, lakes and river between Zanzibar and Khartoum. 
Holmwood, in his letter, stressed the relative attractions 
of the highlands to the west of mount Kenya. This area,
1. P.O. Memorandum of 9 December 1884. Quoted by Robinson 
and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 191.
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later known as the rtWhite Highlands” of Kenya, had been 
crossed the previous year by Thomson, and Holmwood was sure 
that it was rich in minerals and suitable for European 
settlement•
Hutton naturally consulted Mackinnon about the proposed 
scheme and they sent a memorandum about it to Lord Granville, 
They enclosed with it a draft based on Holmwood1s suggestions, 
as well as a copy of Mackinnon's Concession of 1873, and 
sought immediate adoption of their proposals
”... in order to maintain and extend British influence 
in East Africa, to develop British trade and to deal 
in a practical manner with the slave trade of the 
interior ...w^
Lord Aberdare followed up this memorandum, two days
later, with a personal letter to Lord Granville, in which
he said that he thought money could be raised for the
railway provided concessions were obtained from the Sultan.
He also said that Mackinnon did not favour Saadani, but would
rather have the railway terminous at Dar-es-Salaam, because
2
he had already spent money on a road from there •
1. P.O. 84/1737, signed by Lord Aberdare (Chairman of the
National African Company headed by Tubman Goldie), 
Mackinnon, Hutton, Henry Lee, Baron de Rothschild,
John Slagg and Jacob Bright (two politicians with 
West African interests), and W.H. Holdsworth, 22 
April 1885.
2. P.O. 84/1737, Lord Aberdare to Lord Granville, 24 April
1885.
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Anderson, having interviewed Mackinnon, Hutton and 
Holmwood, wrote a memorandum on the 24th of April setting 
out the position as he saw it. He said:
w... The origin of the scheme was fear of the Germans 
cutting us out in Zanzibar - a fear not unfounded.ft
The latest estimate he had for constructing the railway 
to Kilimanjaro was £700y000¥ but as far as the British govern­
ment was concerned the promoters demands would in his opinion 
have amounted to
,f... (1) British protectorate over Kilimanjaro.
(2) Government support for the negotiations for 
the concession. (3) Government undertaking for 
the security of the concession.n
He thought there would be difficulty in dealing with a 
demoralised Sultan and foreign jealousy, but he said,
”... if the Sultan were prepared to grant a concession with 
provision for full respect for foreign treaties and for 
maintenance of his sovereignty, I see no reason why we 
should object, with the territorial limits suggested, or 
even why we should not let Kirk^give friendly assistance 
to commercial negotiations ...”
The following day Yilliers lister, who received 
Anderson’s memorandum, said:
tf... To my mind the weakest part of the scheme is that 
which has been most lightly passed over - the necessity 
for the complete subjection of the Masai ... Mr. Mackinnon 
and his railway might civilise these unpleasant savages, 
but considering their existence H.M.G. should keep very p 
clear of all guarantees of protection for the enterprise.”
1. F.O. 84/1737, Anderson memorandum of 24 April 1885*
2. F.O. 84/1737, Minutes by T.V. lister, 25 April 1885.
In fact the Foreign Office reacted by telling Bismarck 
about the scheme, and saying that Britain would not consider 
supporting it if it might in any way conflict with German 
interests. In reply the Foreign Office was asked to defer 
any decision until a map was available to show the extent of 
the German protectorate. The map was ready towards the end 
of June, and the German government expressed no opposition, 
in principle, to the scheme. Any difficulties, it said, 
could be settled amicably.
In practice the difficulties which arose were not with 
Germany. Kirk had privately expressed the view that the 
Sultan would probably not grant a concession on the lines 
of the old Mackinnon Concession, but the real difficulties 
were between the sponsors and the British government. On 
the 2nd of July Anderson wrote a memorandum about a discussion 
which he had held on the previous day with Hutton. In this 
fce said that Hutton
”... had no faith in the likelihood of a railway 
paying for years to come, notwithstanding Holmwood*s 
sanguine anticipations, and felt that there must be 
some mode of getting a return, through the Sultan, 
of the capital expended.
I said that if the Syndicate would be satisfied 
with obtaining the contract for farming the customs, 
which would be in the market this year, there would 
probably be no great difficulty as to their securing 
it, but that I understood that Mr. Mackinnon would 
not be content without much more solid security.
23g
He replied that he thought that Mr. Mackinnon 
is half-hearted about the scheme, and that he had 
heard from him that., the P.O. did not seem to think 
it practicable ...n
The report about the views of the Foreign Office 
appears to have been incorrect, but it comes as no surprise 
to learn that Mackinnon was half-hearted about the scheme, 
because the view taken in this thesis is that he was also 
half-hearted about his first concession scheme by the time 
negotiations collapsed in 1878. We have Hutton*s word for 
it that Mackinnon was half-hearted in 1885, and there is 
evidence which suggests that this was a fair assessment of 
Mackinnon*s views. In March 1884 Mackinnon said to San^fords
** ...I feel over-burdened with work and begin to fear 
this state of matters on my health ... My object 
now is and for some time past has been to curtail 
rather than extend my business engagements. I do 
not wish to make money as my wants are not great 2 
and I have already quite sufficient for these . ..**
A year later Harry Johnston was taken to see Mackinnon 
by Albert Grey (the future Earl Grey), who was very keen to 
follow up the achievements of Johnston’s Kilimanjaro 
expedition by establishing some kind of British protectorate 
over the area. Johnston recalled in his autobiography that 
they went
1. P.O. 405/94, Memorandum by Anderson of 2nd July 1885.
2. LIP. Mackinnon to San^ford, 3rd March 1884-
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"... to see Mr. Mackinnon at the Burlington Hotel. We 
were admitted sans phrase, and Grey urged Mackinnon 
impetuously to take up my concession and send men out 
to settle on it and make East Africa British. Mackinnon 
declined. He refused to have any faith in East Africa
ttl• • •
If Mackinnon really had so little faith in the future of 
East Africa, one may ask why he bothered to get involved in its 
affairs at all? The answer is that his attitude was ambi­
valent. As a humanitarian he felt it was his duty to try to 
bring the benefits of civilisation to the "dark continent", and 
he was anxious also to make a mark politically. In this 
connection it is worth noting that he only failed by 484 votes 
to get elected to Parliament in 1885- On the other hand his 
acute business sense made him very sceptical about the prospects 
of profiting from East African enterprises. His reluctance to 
risk money on doubtful ventures was strengthened by his chronic 
concern over his health, and the threat to it from over-work.
The upshot was that the proposals based on Holmwood's 
memorandum came to nothing. Mackinnon in effect wanted a 
government guarantee for any concession, but the government 
was not prepared to give it. Anderson thought that British 
traders were being unduly timid, but subsequent events were 
to justify Mackinnon1s scepticism.
1. H.H. Jofcmston, The Story of my life, London, 1923> P* 139*
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In the meantime German influence was extended in 
East Africa. She established a protectorate over Witu 
and the surrounding area, and then declared that she only 
recognised the Sultan’s sovereignty over Zanzibar and Pemba. 
Barghash protested strongly against these moves, but in the 
absence of backing from the British government, his protests 
were of no avail. Indeed, far from objecting, Gladstone 
welcomed Germany as a colonising power. With continuing 
difficulties in Egypt, the Mahdist rising in the Sudan, where 
Gordon had been killed in January, and the danger of war with 
Russia over the Penjdeh incident, Britain had no desire to 
add to her problems by quarrelling with Germany about East 
Africa. The old policy of exercising influence by supporting 
the Sultan was therefore abandoned, and the British and 
German governments agreed to appoint commissioners to 
investigate the "just limits of the Sultan’s domain". In
other words they agreed to settle their differences amicably 
at the Sultan’s expense. Kirk who had been primarily 
responsible for carrying out the old policy was most incensed 
by the turn of events and said to Mackinnon,
"... you can have no idea of the position I have held 
for several months, never sure but I would be 
sacrificed to make way for German schemes to which 
I am of course an obstacle ..."1
1. IviP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 31st August 1885.
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lord Salisbury did not feel so obliged to help the 
Sultan as Kirk did, but British policy did become a little 
more resolute after he took over as Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary in June 1885. His government, like 
Gladstonefs before it, was in danger of being accused on 
the one hand of wasting money on jingoistic wars and of 
burdening the country with additional responsibilities, and 
on the other of failing to secure British interests in the 
face of competition from European powers. Governments tried 
to avoid this dilemma by establishing spheres of influence, 
formally or otherwise - the proposed treaty with Portugal 
was an example of this - but by the middle of 1885 inter­
national rivalry had become so intense that Lord Salisbury 
was prepared to pursue a more forward policy than he had 
advocated before. In 1878 he had sabotaged the negotiations 
for Mackinnon’s Concession, but by 1885 he was willing to 
encourage British private enterprise in Africa. Some 
years later he said:
"When I left the Foreign Office in 1880, nobody 
thought about Africa. When I returned to it in 1885> 
the nations of Europe were almost quarrelling with each 
other as to the various portions of Africa which they 
could obtain. I do not exactly know the cause of this 
sudden revolution. But there it is. It is a great 
force - a great civilising Christianising force."1
1. Lady G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, 
vol. iv., London, 1921, p. 310.
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The e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  L o rd  S a l i s b u r y ’ s v ie w s  had changed  
was i l l u s t r a t e d  e a r l y  i n  1886, when he a c c e p te d  a recommenda­
t i o n  w h ic h  K i t c h e n e r  had made i n  December 1885, and p ro p o s e d  
l e a s i n g  a p o r t  a t  Mombasa, The pu rp o s e  was l a r g e l y  to  
c o u n te r  th e  G-ermans, who had o b l ig e d  B a rg h as h  to  cede r i g h t s  
a t  D a r -e s -S a la a m  i n  O c to b e r  1885, a f t e r  th e  D e l i m i t a t i o n  
Com m ission had been s e t  u p .  The p r o p o s a l  was f r u s t r a t e d  
by o p p o s i t io n  fro m  th e  T r e a s u r y  and th e  A d m i r a l t y ,  b u t  L o rd  
S a l i s b u r y  was a l r e a d y  f u r t h e r i n g  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  i n d i r e c t l y .
In October 1885 Anderson, acting in his "private1 
capacity, but with Lord Salisbury’s approval, advised Harry 
Johnston to hand over to Hutton the rights which he had 
obtained from his tz^eaties with the chiefs of the Taveta 
area. Johnston accepted this advice and on the 31st 
October sent his "agreements1 to Hutton saying,
as my c o n c e s s io n a i r e  you may l a y  c la im  to  
p r i o r  r i g h t s  to  th e  p o r t i o n s  o f  th e  c o u n t r y  h e r e i n  
d e s ig n a t e d ,  and th e s e  r i g h t s  u n d e r  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
w i l l  r e c e i v e  due s u p p o r t  f ro m  H e r  M a j e s t y ’ s 
C o m m iss io n er on th e  Z a n z ib a r  D e l i m i t a t i o n  Com m ission . , *  
You h e r e  po ssess  th e  l a s t  chance o f  s e c u r in g  K i l i m a n j a r o  
and th e  d i r e c t  r o u t e  to  th e  V i c t o r i a  N yansa . . . "  .
J o h n s to n  em phas ised  t h a t  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  r e g a r d e d  
th e  a g re e m e n ts  as p e r f e c t l y  l e g a l ,  b u t  H u t t o n ’ s p ro b le m  was 
how to  r e a c h  a d e c i s i o n  q u i c k l y  enough, becau se  th e  B r i t i s h  
C o m m is s io n e r ,  H e r b e r t  K i t c h e n e r ,  v/as due to  l e a v e  on th e
1. MP. H.H* Johnston to Hutton, 31st October 1885*
6 t h  Novem ber, and M a c k in n o n , th e  o b v io u s  man to  c o n s u l t ,  
was o u t  o f  London. H u t to n  s e n t  a copy o f  J o h n s to n 1s l e t t e r  
to  M a ck in n o n  and s a i d :
“ T h is  c o n c e s s io n  may fo rm  th e  b a s is  o f  th e  
a c t i o n  we p rop ose  to  ta k e  f o r  th e  R a i lw a y  Company 
and i f  I  have y o u r  c o n s e n t I  p ro p o s e  i n v i t i n g  a  
s m a l l  m e e t in g  o f - ,S la g g ,  H o u ld s w o r th  and o t h e r  
M . P . * s h e re  . . .  “ .
H u t t o n Ts l e t t e r  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  becau se  i t  shows t h a t  
th e y  had n o t  abandoned hope f o r  th e  r a i l w a y  schem e, and  
M ack in n o n  must have s e n t  h is  a p p r o v a l  im m e d ia t e ly ,  becau se  
H u t to n  was a b le  to  t e l l  K i t c h e n e r  t h a t  he w o u ld  a c c e p t  th e  
c o n c e s s io n .
N o th in g  much happened f o r  some t im e  a f t e r  t h i s ,  b u t  
i n  M arch  1886 th e  P o r e ig n  O f f i c e  a u t h o r is e d  an e x p e d i t i o n  
to  th e  K i l i m a n j a r o  a r e a .  I n  th e  l e t t e r  to  M a c k in n o n  
a b o u t t h i s ,  i t  was s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  German g o v e rn m e n t had  
been in fo r m e d  t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  c a p i t a l i s t s  who w ere  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  o p e n in g  up th e  a r e a  m ig h t  be a la rm e d  l e s t  
th e  German e x p e d i t io n  i n t o  th e  i n t e r i o r  s h o u ld  e n c ro a c h  
on t h e i r  r i g h t s  to  th e  T a v e ta  C o n c e s s io n s  and m ig h t  wi&h 
to  send a g e n ts  to  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  The German  
go v e rn m e n t r a i s e d  no o b j e c t i o n  p r o v id e d  i t  was u n d e rs to o d  
t h a t  th e  q u e s t io n s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  S u l t a n * s  r i g h t s ,  w h ic h
MP. H u t t o n  to  M a c k in n o n , 2nd Novem ber 1 8 8 5 .
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were to be examined by the Commission, were not pre-judged. 
The Foreign Office gave permission for an expedition on 
this understanding, but at. the same time asked Mackinnon 
to comment on a reference in the German reply to negotiations 
between the German East Africa Company and the English 
company'*". Mackinnon said that he had not been directly in 
communication with Carl Peters, who represented the German 
company, but, he said,
M... through a third party I have been asked whether 
the friends interested with me in the concession 
referred to would dispose of it to the parties 
represented by Dr. Paters and his German associates 
and join them to the extent of -g in a proposed 
German/English Syndicate to facilitate raising of 
capital in London and elsewhere for the German 
East Africa Company.
The proposals do nit commend themselves to those 
interested with me in the Kilimanjaro district and 
a verbal reply to this effect was promptly given ..."
However, he said that negotiations had taken place 
two or three months previously about the possibility of 
Dr. Peters and his organisation acquiring 70 miles or so of 
road which had been built from Dar-es-Salaam. Having
ascertained from the Foreign Office that British interests 
would not be served by retaining rights to the road, he 
had expressed his willingness to sell it, provided Sir Thomas 
Powell Buxton consented. He had also told Peters that,
1. P.O. 84/1783* P.O. to Mackinnon, 27th March 1886.
subject to government approval, he was willing to discuss 
arrangements for B.I. ships to call at points on the Somalia 
coast and at Dar-es-Salaam^* He was expecting Peters to
call on him at any time, but the negotiations apparently 
did not make much progress because in August they sent a 
memorandum to the Foreign Office entitled f!Keport of an 
exchange of views between Mr. Mackinnon and Dr. Peters on 
East African affairs, stating the points which the parties 
consider a possible basis of a mutual understanding between 
the German and English interests in East Africa11. Basically 
they were agreed that cooperation would be of mutual benefit, 
but they differed about the areas involved. Peters 
claimed that the German company had acquired rights over 
the bulk of the central east African continent - from the 
Tana to the Ruvuma river and apparently including the 
Kilimanjaro district. Mackinnon did not recognise German 
claims to the Kilimanjaro or HKenia provinces”, and he 
thought that a lot of the territory concerned belonged to 
the Sultan. However, if their governments agreed, he said, 
he would not object to repaying the German company for any 
outlay it had incurred in any territory which became the 
property of the British company . These amateurish 
negotiations ended in some confusion when Mackinnon thought
1. F.O. 84/1783, Mackinnon to F.O., 9th April 1886.
§. F.O. 84/1790, Memorandum of 14th August 1886.
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that Peters had said that Bismarck either had or would 
subscribe to the German company, Peters was very 
embarrassed by this and apologetic letters, trying to clear 
up the misunderstanding, followed, but by then their efforts 
had been overtaken by the Anglo-German boundary agreement at 
the end of October. This agreement also settled the problem 
of the Kilimanjaro district.
The small expedition, authorised by the Foreign Office 
and outfitted by Smith/Mackenzie, had arrived in the district 
in June, and in September the leader, J.W. Buchannan, had 
returned to Zanzibar with confirmation of the treaty for the 
Taveta district. This did not cover the whole area of 
Johnston’s treaties, but spheres of influence were established, 
about six weeks later, when the British and German governments 
agreed s
a) To recognise the Sultan’s sovereignty over a 
coastal strip about ten miles wide, and over 
the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Mafia and lamu.
b) That the British government would support 
negotiations for lease of the customs duties
at Bar-es-Salaam and Pangani to the German East 
Africa company.
c) That the mainland would be divided into British and 
German spheres of influence. The British sphere 
to be north of a line running from the mouth of the 
river Umba to the northern base of Kilimanjaro and 
then to the point where the first degree of south 
latitude strikes the east side of Lake Victoria.
1. Coupland, Exploitation, op.cit., p. 474.
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The major weakness of this agreement was that it did 
not define boundaries to the west of the spheres of influence, 
so that Uganda and the region round lake Victoria remained 
open to continued rivalry. At the same time the need for 
some kind of settlement of European interests in the area was 
becoming acute, because Egyptian authority had been destroyed 
in the Sudan, except in Equatorial Province which was the 
most southerly part of it.
The death of Gordon in January 1885 had stimulated 
interest in the Sudan and in the following month the govern­
ment, hoping to restore its lost prestige, ordered the 
construction of a railway between Suakin, on the Bed Sea, 
and Berber which is about 500 miles to the west of it on the 
Nile. After wasting a good deal of money the government 
abandoned the scheme in May, but the humanitarians who had 
supported it held a meeting on July 22, 1885, at which they
tried to mobilise private enterprise in support of a venture
1into tropical Africa ♦
Prom the point of view of Mackinnon the meeting was 
significant for two reasons. First, many of those were to 
help him when he sponsored the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition 
a year later were present. People such as Stanley, Hutton, 
Horace Waller, and Baroness -Burdett-Coutts. Second, the
1. R. Gray, op.cit., p. 192.
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Emin Pasha F.elief Expedition was in some respects fore­
shadowed, because Stanley appealed to those who lamented 
the death of Gordon to unite their influence and to raise 
sufficient funds to send an expedition via the Aruwimi, a 
tributary of the Congo, to contact remnants of the Egyptian 
administration"*', After the meeting Baroness Burdett-Coutts 
and Cardinal Manning formed a committee to promote an 
expedition, but although nothing came of these initiatives 
the ideas then aired were readily revived when news of Emin 
Pasha aroused fresh interest the following year,
2
Emin Pasha- , who had been one of Gordon’s subordinates, 
still held out in Equatorial Province, and news about his 
perilous position began to reach the outside world largely 
through letters which he wrote to Mackay, a missionary in 
Uganda, and R.W. Felkin, an Edinburgh doctor who had been 
a friend of Emin’s since they met in the Sudan in 1878.
Felkin had also been a missionary in Uganda for a short time 
having travelled out via the Nile route in 1878 and returned 
in 1879.
A more dramatic source of news, perhaps, was the 
German explorer, Junker, who emerged from Equatoria during 
the summer of 1886. A letter from him prompted Holmwood,
1. R. Gray, op.cit., p. 194.
2. Emin Pasha was born in Silesia as Edouard Schnitzer.
who was then Consul at Zanzibar, to send the following 
telegram to Iddesleigh:
’’News from Uganda, 12 July. Junker left for Zanzibar. 
Terrible persecution broken out, all native Christians 
being put to death. Missionaries in extreme danger, 
urgently requests our demanding from King their being 
allowed to withdraw. Emin at Wadelai holds province, 
but urgently needs amunition and stores. Objects, if 
he can avoid it deseiting the 4,000 loyal Egyptian 
subjects there. No time to be lost if assistance 
decided on.” -^
In the same month Holmwood recommended that an
2expedition should be sent inland to suppress Mwanga , who 
had been persecuting Christians in Buganda, and also to 
establish a base by Lake Albert
1 from which any further operations .. . for the retention 
of the Upper Nile could be taken effectively and without 
anxiety.IT^
Equatorial Province was attractive strategically 
because it appeared as if it might give control of the sources 
of the White Nile, and of the area between the Congo Free 
State and the spheres of British and German influence where 
European authority had not been established. Emin’s plight 
also had an appeal to the public which was well expressed 
in the Times which referred to
1. F.O. 84/1775, Holmwood to Iddesleigh, 23 September 1886.
2. ^anga was the Kabaka of Buganda.
3. F.O. 78/3930, Holmwood to Baring, 25 and 27 September
1886.
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"... the marvellous resistance of the solitary European 
to a host of furious fanatics to whom Gordon himself 
had succumbed *.. England was not originally responsible 
for his tenure of his post or safety, except so far as 
most Englishmen are proud to accept a measure of 
liability for the acts of General Gordon. Its present 
relation to Egypt, and the course it has pursued in the 
n have rendered it liable for his lieutenant now 
• • •
Mackinnon had, of course, become involved in the Emin
Pasha affair well before the Times * leader was written. As
early as 29 September he had told Sanford that "the opportunity
which his (Stanley) going there offers of extending British
influence from the coast up to Wadelai is one which if ... not
2taken advantage of now, will be lost for ever.1
This view appears to have received encouragement very 
largely from Kirk who>i as soon as he knew the terms of the 
Anglo-German Agreement at the end of October, told Mackinnon 
that they had the best line for a railway if ever one was made.
,!We also have the Equatorial Province now held by the 
brave Emin Bey, well governed and quiet to this day ..., 
and you will see we have an opening as good as any
A week later he said "Our hands are free and we hold the 
situation if we act at once"^. It was later suggested that 
Wadelai might be the last in a chain of stations from the 
coast.
-*-• Times, 2 December 1886.
2. Mackinnon to Sanford, 29 September 1886, cited.by I.R. Smith,
"The Emin Pasha relief expedition 1886-90" (Oxford 
University Ph.D. thesis, 1969).
3. IIP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 30 October 1886.
4. MP. Kirk to Mackinnon, 6 November. 1886,.....................
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Kirk’s letters conveyed an exaggerated idea of what 
had been secured for British interests in the interior, but 
Mackinnon was convinced that the time had come for action and 
in mid-November he wrote to Sir James Fergusson at the Foreign 
Office and said, that there was a general feeling in the 
country in favour of opening communications with Emin, and
he thought that government should take some action and consider
securing Stanley’s services, A few days later he forwarded 
a letter from Stanley in which Stanley offered his services 
free of charge, estimated that the expedition would cost about 
£20,000, and forecast that Emin could be reached by June 1887* 
On November 20 Sir James wrote a brief memorandum recording 
that he had separately and several times seen Mackinnon and 
Hutton about the Emin scheme. He said:
"Mr. Mackinnon offers to find £10,000 for the 
establishment of trading posts on route and Mr, Hutton
says that others including himself will subscribe, their
object being to form a large trading colony from the 
Mombasa base ...
The question is whether H.M.G. can find such a sum 
as is required for a private expedition though^for an 
object political as well as philanthropic ...”
He went on to suggest that enquiries be made to 
ascertain if the Egyptian government would be willing to 
contribute. Mackinnon told the Foreign Office that he would 
be willing to find £10,000 if a similar amount were made 
available through Her Majesty’s Government, This allowed
1. F.O. 84/1784. Memorandum of 20 November by Sir James 
Fergusson.
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for the government obtaining the money from other sources, 
and the government of Egypt soon agreed to subscribe, but 
Salisbury made it very clear that the British government 
would not get deeply involved, because he sent the following 
reply to Hutton:
"If Mr. Stanley goes it is possible he may be 
seized and detained ... If he goes at the cost and 
under the auspices of H.M. Government the responsibility 
of rescuing him will fall on them ... no renunciation of 
this on/fte*Y part could release them.
While therefore willing to give all facilities 
within their power, they cannot take any action which 
would make the expedition other than a private effort."
Hutton was not happy about this reply and told 
Mackinnon that he would contribute £1,000, provided it was 
not to be a mere relief fund. He regarded it as government’s 
duty to relieve Emin, but if they would do nothing, he thought 
Mackinnon could raise money without difficulty by an appeal to 
the public. His own idea was to form a "Syndicate for 
establishing British commerce and influence in East Africa 
and for relieving Emin Bey". He sent a draft for this 
purpose to Mackinnon in which he explained that the main 
objects of the Syndicate would be
(1) To take over and extend the Taveta Concession.
(2) To open a direct route to Victoria Nyansa and the
Sudan.
(5) To obtain a government sanction to administer the
area under a chartered company similar to that of
the Royal Niger Company.
1. MP. Quoted by Hutton in his letter to Mackinnon of
27 November 1886.
293
The area in question was in fact very ill-defined and
was to depend on negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar,
Roughly, however, it was to exclude territory already claimed
by other powers, but to comprise an area from the Sultan’s
domain along the coast to Lake Victoria. One objective of
the scheme was to equip an expedition, with Stanley in command,
to relieve Emin. Hutton suggested that £60,000 should be
raised in the first instance, of which between £10,000 and
£15,000 should be spent on the expedition. Although the
relief expedition would only be part of the scheme he expected
it to contribute to the wider purposes because the draft stated
that any concessions, treaties, properties or other advantages
obtained by Stanley would be for the benefit of the Syndicate'1'.
Mackinnon did not entirely agree, so before the end of
December Hutton produced an amended draft which had been
prepared after consultation with Sir Percy Anderson. This
dealt in more detail with the administrative role proposed for
2the Syndicate and provided even less money for the expedition , 
but Mackinnon had by then decided to go ahead with it.
He could not disapprove in principle of Hutton’s 
proposals, because they clearly owed a great deal to his own 
earlier attempt to get concessions from the Sultan, but unlike 
Hutton he was prepared to back a relief expedition without
1# MP. Hutton to Mackinnon, 27 November 1886.
2. MP. Hutton to Mackinnon, 21 December 1886.
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having a lot of other declared objectives. He knew from 
experience that prolonged negotiations would be necessary to 
establish the sort of commercial enterprise which Hutton wanted 
but he felt that no more time should be lost.
In insisting that the matter was urgent Mackinnon shared
1
the views of Kirk and Anderson , but as regards objectives the 
principal parties were not in agreement. Baring’s purpose was 
the most straight forward. He wanted Emin evacuated so that 
the last vestiges of Egyptian claims to Equatoria could be 
severed. Salisbury and Iddesleigh were anxious that the 
Government should not be held responsible for the expedition. 
They did not want Emin to become another Gordon or V/adelai 
another Khartoum, so their immediate objective was the same as 
Baring’s, but Professor Sanderson has suggested that Salisbury 
approval of the expedition
’’may well represent his first steps towards a policy 
which he was gradually to develop in the course of
1887 and 1888 --- that of encouraging private enterprise
to peg out claims in regions of East Africa where the 
Germans were sooner or later likely to be active.”^
Here, one might argue that Salisbury took his first 
steps towards this policy in 1885 when he encouraged Johnston 
to hand over his Taveta Treaties to Hutton, but the difficulty 
of determining all of Salisbury’s motives is illustrated by
1. FO., 84/1775, Memo by Anderson, 18 October 1886.
2. G.N. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile,
1882-1899, Edinburgh, 1965, P» 34.
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referring to the rather different opinion of R.O. Collins, 
who said that, to Salisbury and Anderson, in 1886,
"Equatoria was devoid of any economic or strategic 
importance. Their bemused interest in the plight of 
Emin Pasha sprang from VictorianTpcharity, not from 
unscrupulous designs of empire."
Here it is perhaps relevant to refer to Salisbury’s 
frequently quoted suggestion that
"the Germans should be placed in possession of our 
information. 2 ^  really their business if Emin 
is a German."
Anderson’s motives underwent a change. Initially he 
and Kirk wanted the expedition to help Emin to withdraw , but 
after the Anglo-German Agreement and the arrival of letters 
from Emin offering his Province to Britain, Emin was told at 
the beginning of December, that the expedition would help him 
to remain^. Anderson’s change of mind may also have been 
occasioned by his suspicion of German designs, aroused by the
5
suggestion that Junker should lead the Relief Expedition .
When Mackinnon heard of this suggestion he stipulated that 
the leader of the expedition must be an Anglo-Saxon .
1. R.O. Collins, "Origins of the Nile Struggle", in Gifford
and Louis, op.cit., p. 140.
2. P0. 84/1775, Salisbury, Minute on Holmwood to Iddesleigh,
23 September 1886.
3. P0. 84/1775, Memo, by Kirk, 13 October 1886. Cited by
Smith, op.cit., p. 93-
4. Kirk to Emin, 1 December 1886. Cited by Smith, op.cit., p.93«
5. Collins, op.cit., p. 123.
6. Gray, op.cit., p. 201.
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Mackinnon's motives, although mixed, are fairly clear* 
He was attracted by the romantic idea of rescuing Emin, he 
anticipated that some profit might be made from the stores 
of ivory which were reputed to exist in Equatorial Province, 
there was a possibility that Emin might remain as his company 
agent, and in a way which he did not specify in detail he 
hoped that the expedition would promote his commercial 
ambitions in East Africa* In the second week of December, 
therefore, he sent a telegram to Stanley, who had just begun 
a lecture tour in America saying:
"Your plan and offer accepted* Authorities approve.
Funds provided. Business urgent. Gome promptly.
Reply.
Anderson understood from Mackinnon that Stanley would
go as the private agent of a private company, and that if he
lost his life there would be no more obligation on the British
Government to avenge him than there was to avenge Bishop 
2Hannington . Stanley got back to England in time to attend 
the first meeting of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee on 29
3
December 1886, but it was not clear what had been approved .
The Government hoped to assuage public opinion, with 
someone else accepting the expense and responsibility for the
1. H.M* Stanley, In Darkest Africa, p. 34.
2. FO. 84/1794. Memo, of 30 November by Anderson following
conversation with Mackinnon.
3. Sanderson, op.cit., p. 33.
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expedition, but the principal backers had opposite objectives. 
Baring and the Egyptian Government wanted it to help Emin to 
withdraw, while Mackinnon and his Committee wanted it to help 
him to remain. The first duty of the expedition was to carry 
letters from the Egyptian Government confirming that they were 
abandoning the Sudan and urging Emin and his followers to 
withdraw and return to Egypt1* If they declined to do so they 
could remain as the employees of some other agency, and thus 
the different objectives of the chief sponsors could be 
reconciled.
* * * * *
The Committee approved the action already taken by
Mackinnon, who was Chairman, and put £2,000 at Stanley’s
disposal with authority to spend it at his discretion to meet
2
current expenses. The Relief Fund was raised as follows :
1* D. Middleton, The Diary of A«J* Mounteney Jephson. Emin
Pasha Relief""Expedition, 1887-1889, Cambridge, 1969, p* 53.
2. H*M. Stanley, In Darkest Africa, London, 1890, p. 35*
Other members present were: the Hon* G. Dawnay, Col.
Grant, Ld. Kinnard, Sir P. de Winton who became the 
Secretary. The Committee was later increased by the 
addition of W.A.L* Bruce, W. Burdett Coutts, James Hutton, 
Sir John Kirk, G* Mackenzie and Sir Lewis Pelly.
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Sir William Mackinnon, Bart.........
£
2,000
Peter Mackinnon, Esq., ............. • • • 1,000
John Mackinnon, Esq. ............. • • • 500
Baroness Burdett-Coutts ............. • • • 100
W. Burdett-Coutts, Esq. ... • • • 400
James S* Jameson, Esq................ • tt 1,000
Countess de Noailles ............. • t t 1,000
Peter Denny, Esq., of Dumbarton ... t • • 1,000
Henry Johnson Younger Esq., of the Scottish
Geographical Society ............. • • # 500
Alexander 1. Bruce, Esq., of the Scottish
Geographical Society ............. • # • 500
Messrs. Gray, Dawes & Co. of London • • • 1,000
Duncan Mac Ueil Esq. ............................... t « • 700
James P. Hutton, Esq., of Manchester t t t 250
Sir Thos. Powell Buxton ............. # • • 250
James Hall, Esq., of Argyleshire . . . • • • 250
N. McMichael, Esq., of Glasgow ... • • • 250
Hoyal Geographical Society, London • • • 1,000
Egyptian Government ............. • • • 10,000
£21,500
The next meeting was a special one held on the 9th 
January 1887, in Mackinnon's absence, to consider a proposal 
from the Congo Free State that the expedition should follow 
a route from the Congo. The route already approved was" 
westwards from Zanzibar via the south end of Lake Victoria, 
but the Committee decided that the Congo route would be 
preferable provided sufficient naval transport was assured 
to the expedition on arrival at Stanley Pool. This assurance 
was received three days later, so Stanley was authorised to 
use the route, and before the end of the month Barghash had 
given permission for the 500 Zanzibaris who were being 
recruited to be taken to the Congo.
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Various reasons were given for the decision to go 
via the Congo. In his autobiography Stanley said:
11... The advantages of the Congo route were about five 
hundred miles shorter land journey and less opportunities 
for desertion of the porters ... It also quieted the 
fears of the French and Germans that behind this 
professedly humanitarian quest we might have annexation 
projects ..."
What he did not mention was that he had visited Leopold
on 30 December, a few days before the Congo Free State made
its proposals to the Committee, nor that Leopold had refused
2
to release him unless the Congo route were used . Another
unmentioned consideration was that if he travelled from the
east coast it might appear that he was following in another*s
footsteps, whereas on the west coast he was familiar with the
way as far as Stanley Falls and would be more or less on his 
3Own ground .
The Helief Committee had favoured the east coast route 
this would have enabled Stanley to make treaties 
which could be used in support of claims for the company 
which Mackinnon hoped to charter^. However, as it could 
hardly over-rule Stanleyfs washes it appealed to the British 
Government to provide a ship to carry the expedition from
1. Stanley, Autobiography, London, 1909* P* 355.
2. Smith, pp. 118 and 129-130.
3. Middleton, op.cit., p. 50.
4* Smith, op.cit., p. 129*
300
Zanzibar to the Congo, on the grounds that its funds would 
not he sufficient to enable it to fulfill the objects of the 
expedition using the Congo route, because of the cost of 
transport from Zanzibar to Banana Point♦ In support of 
its appeal it said:
11... the adoption of the Congo route would prevent any 
misfortune happening to the missionaries, French and 
English now in the power of Mwanga, King of Uganda ...”
It was feared in London and Paris that Mwanga might
react to the presence of an expedition near his borders by
2killing the British and French missionaries .
Leopold’s motives for what Stanley described as his 
generous offer of assistance were not explained in any detail, 
but he presumably hoped to use the expedition as a lever to 
strengthen the Free State’s position and to extend its 
territory north-eastwards to the area of the headwaters of the 
Nile, and even the Sudan, where the authority of European 
powers had not been established. He also had hopes of 
securing Emin’s services. Stanley fell in with Leopold’s 
wishes, because he was employed by the Congo Free State and 
because he had, in any case, originally favoured the Congo 
route. Nevertheless he had almost certainly resolved to 
satisfy Mackinnon by using the East Africa route to Zanzibar
for his return journey .__________._______ _________________
1. I I P .  Relief Committee to Salisbury, 12 January 1887.
2. Sanderson, op.cit., p. 35.
3. Smith, op.cit., p. 131.
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In the event Leopold was to be disappointed by the 
expedition, and the British government did not agree to 
provide a ship, although the Admiralty supplied over one 
thousand tons of coal free of charge for use by the B.I.'s 
ship Madura.
Stanley left England on the 21st January 1887 and, 
having spent a little time in Cairo, arrived at Zanzibar on 
the 22nd February. While there he claimed to have settled 
"several little commissions" satisfactorily. He said,
"... one was to get the Sultan to sign the concessions 
which Mackinnon tried to get a long time ago ..."^
It was typical of Stanley to claim the credit, but he 
certainly did not deserve it all because it was on the very 
day he arrived at Zanzibar that Barghash sent a telegram to 
Mackinnon saying:
"We are ready to agree to the concessions you 
formerly proposed if an influential association under 
your Presidency is formed and British government 
approves "•  •
Holmwood later explained that he had gone to the palace 
at Barghashfs request, where he had found the Sultan on the 
verge of distraction after his succession of troubles.
1. Stanley, In Darkest Africa, p. 68.
2. F*0. 84/1852, Barghash to Mackinnon, 22 February 1887.
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tfAfter reviewing the position in all its bearings11, 
Holmwood said, "I stated my conviction that his best 
chance at the present juncture was to offer an unreserved 
acceptance to the Concession scheme which had been 
suggested by Mr. Mackinnon .. .1
Holmwood said it was late in the day and he did not 
know how far the British government might support the scheme, 
but the Sultan agreed to the proposal and Holmwood drafted the 
telegram which was sent on the same day^. That was on the 
22nd February, and Stanley did not meet Barghash until the 
following day, when he presented a personal letter from 
Mackinnon, which concluded as follows:
"... I pray you in these circumstances to communicate 
freely with Mr. Stanley on all points ... as freely 
as if I had the honour of being there to receive the 
communications myself.
With the repeated assurance of my hearty sympathy 
in all the affairs that concern your Highness*s 
interests ...fl^
Having delivered this letter, Stanley had a long 
conversation with Barghash, during which they must have 
discussed the terms of some sort of concession scheme, because 
at the end, according to Stanley, Barghash said:
"Please God we shall agree. When you have got 
the papers ready we shall read and sign without further 
delay and the matter will be over.'1^
1. MP. P.O. 84/1852, Holmwood to Foreign. Office, 14 March
1887.
2. Quoted by Stanley, In Darkest Africa, p. 62.
3. Ibid., p. 62.
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Many people realized that Barghash had not much longer 
to live and that an important stage had been reached in the 
history of Bast Africa, and Kirk and Holmwood had been urging 
him for some time to enter into some kind of agreement.
What followed Barghash1s decision will be related in 
the next chapter. As regards the Emin Pasha expedition, 
Stanley left Zanzibar abroad the Madura with over 600 people 
on the 25th of February, 1887, and arrived at the mouth of 
the Congo on the 18th of March. He did not meet Emin Pasha, 
however, for another 13 months, and when he did he was 
disappointed by Emin’s manner and appearance. He had 
expected a tall, resolute, heroic, military figure, but 
instead he thought Emin small, insignificant looking and 
indecisive, ou#t# he later complained to Mackinnon, saying:
"... You are aware that our instructions were to carry 
relief to Emin Pasha, and to escort such as were willing 
to accompany us to Egypt ... Instead of meeting with a 
number of people only too willing to leave Africa, it 
was questionable whether there would be any except a few 
Egyptian clerks ..."
Emin and his Sudanese troops were probably equally 
unimpressed because the advance party of the expedition was 
extremely ragged and so exhausted that it could bring little 
relief. However, Stanley became increasingly exasperated as 
the days passed, and on the 3rd of May he put three proposi­
tions to Emin. First, that Emin should remain in Egyptian
1. MP. Stanley to Mackinnon, 17 August 1889*
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service and accompany him to Egypt. Second, that Equatorial 
Province might he governed by the Congo Pree State with Emin 
as governor, holding the rank of general, and on a salary of 
£1,500 a year. This proposition was made on Leopold’s behalf 
and the alleged purpose was to prevent the lapse of the 
province to barbarism. It was made, however, on the under­
standing that the province would yield a reasonable revenue. 
The third proposition was that Emin should accompany Stanley, 
with such soldiers as were loyal, to the north-east corner of 
Lake Victoria, and there allow Stanley to establish him in 
the name of the East Africa Association'*".
In a letter to Mackinnon, Stanley said:
11... my idea was to make use of his great force as a 
colony of men amenable to law and discipline, by which9
_________    • _i_     *i n _ _   _ i ri j  j   __• _  i * __ __ ri «iII• • • •your territory could be governed and disciplined 
In reply Mackinnon said:
11. .. I entirely approve of everything you have done and
all that seems to be in your mind to do with regard to
Emin and the territories between Mombasa and the centre 
of the continent ... The company ... is in a position 
to give effect to' any arrangements you have made with 
Emin, or to any engagements you have undertaken for them
... We count on having you - after you have had a rest
at home - to act as Chief Administrator of the company’s 
affairs at Mombasa as long as you like ...”5
1. Stanley, In Darkest Africa, p. 386. Note: The East
Africa Association had been established in 1887 with 
Mackinnon as President.
2. MP. Stanley to Mackinnon, 3 September 1888.
3. MP. Mackinnon to Stanley, 5 April 1889*
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Before Stanley received Mackinnon1s reply Emin had 
rejected the first proposition because he was sure that most 
of his people would not agree to return to Egypt, and he 
rejected the second apparently on the grounds that he could not 
change his allegiance from one flag to another so readily, and 
because he was doubtful if adequate communications could be 
maintained between the Congo Free State and Equatorial Province. 
In the circumstances he thought the last proposition was the 
most reasonable. His soldiers were unwilling to return to 
Egypt and he could not expect the thousands of refugees, women 
and children, for whom he felt responsible to travel such a 
long way, but he thought they could manage a journey as far 
as lake Victoria.
Stanley said he had no authority for making the final 
proposition, but he was confident that it would be approved.
He was in an embarrassing position because when leopold had 
urged the expedition to use the Congo route, one reason he had 
given was that he was unwilling to allow a break in Stanley’s 
connection with the Congo State. On the other hand in 
^ackinnon’s letter to Barghash, which Stanley must have seen, 
Mackinnon said that Stanley’s
”... services would be entirely devoted to the expedition 
during its progress, and he cannot deviate from its 
course to perform service for the Congo State
1. Stanley, In Darkest Africa, p . 61.
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By 1888 Stanley favoured Mackinnon’s scheme, partly 
because of the treatment which he had received at the hands 
of Leopold from 1884-1886, and partly because of the difficulty 
of the route from the west coast which he had experienced. 
Certainly at the end of the expedition he said to Mackinnon:
,fI considered myself only as your agent.**^
He may not have been told the precise terms of the offer
p
to be made from the Bast Africa Association , but he must have 
known the kind of outcome that Mackinnon hoped for. This was 
stated clearly by Mackinnon for example in a letter which he 
wrote later in the year to George Mackenzie, the Administrator 
of the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.)^. He 
said:
M... We are all extremely anxious to be first with Emin 
and if possible to get him to join hands with the Company. 
You are aware that Dr. Felkin has had a great many letters 
from Emin authorising him to make arrangements with a 
company like ours to take Emin and his Province under our 
wing leaving him to govern as he has hitherto done. This 
authority Felkin has availed of to make a transfer to us, 
subject to ratification by Emin, and this document is 
being put in legal form for Pelkinfs signature. Although
1. MP. Stanley to Mackinnon, 19 January 1890.
2. Peters said that, according to Emin, Stanley produced an
agreement from the British East Africa Company which Emin 
was virtually forced to accept. C. Peters, Hew Light 
in Darkest Africa, London, 1891, p. 545.
3. The I.B.E.A. Company obtained a Boyal Charter on 3 September
1888.
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we do not regard it of much account it would still 
form a document which we can present to the Foreign 
Office and request their protection in carrying it
out, that is, in the event of the Germans attempting,
as tjey tnreaten to do, to annex Emin and his province
The draft agreement between the I.B.E.A. Company and
Dr. Felkin, on behalf of Emin, stated that all the rights
which Emin had acquired over the province should become vested
in the Company. These rights included all powers of military
command and civil administration. The company would try to
have the province declared a British dependency and, if
requested by the company, Emin would seek confirmation of
the agreement from the Egyptian government. One clause
provided that Emin could continue as governor and administrator
2
for as long as he wished .
In fact this agreement was not implemented. Two or 
three weeks after Stanley had put the propositions, he turned 
back on his tracks to find the Rear Column of his expedition , 
but while he was away, Eminfs soldiers revolted and held Emin 
prisoner.
One of the ironies of the expedition was that its 
arrival made the Sudanese soldiers extremely suspicious of 
Emin, and without their trust he was useless for either
1. MP. Mackinnon to Mackenzie, 50 November 1888.
2. MP. Draft Agreement, dated 27 October 1888.
5. Middleton, op.cit., p. 57.
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Mackinnon or Leopold. Although the soldiers later repented 
and released Emin, most of them declined to follow him, which 
was probably a relief to Stanley. Having imprisoned Emin they 
might have subjected him to far worse treatment**".
In the circumstances Emin had no choice but to leave the 
province, and so he and Stanley began their journey for the 
east coast in May 1889, accompanied by over 500 refugees.
The story did not have a happy ending however, because the two 
men became estranged and by the time they reached the coast the 
last thing Emin wanted was to travel any further with Stanley.
It is not surprising that they quarrelled. Their 
temperaments were very different and so were their expectations 
of the expedition. To judge from his book, In Darkest 
Africa , Stanley hoped to rescue a gallant hero and to take
him back to England or Egypt in triumph, or else to establish
him in the service of the British East Africa Company, or of 
the Congo Free State. Emin's hopes were perhaps most clearly 
expressed in letters which he wrote to Dr. Felkin. In 
December 1885 he had said:
”... As to my future plans I intend to hold „
this country as long as ever it is possible ...”
1. Sanderson, op.cit., pp. 38-39*
2 . Quoted by R.W. Felkin in his introduction to Gr. Schweitzer's
The Life and Work of Emin Pasha, London, 1898, p. xxv.
The letter quoted is one from Emin Pasha dated 31
December 1885*
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L a t e r  he s a id  t h a t  i f  E g y p t  e v a c u a te d  th e  p r o v in c e  he 
m ig h t  be a b le  to  g o v e rn  i t  in d e p e n d e n t ly  as R a ja  B rooke  
g o v e rn e d  S a ra w a k . I n  t h a t  case he w ould  e i t h e r  s e e k  E n g la n d ’ s 
p r o t e c t i o n  o r  be p e r f e c t l y  in d e p e n d e n t .
11. . . A d e f i n i t e  a rra n g e m e n t  w i t h  a s y n d ic a t e  o f  E n g lis h - ,  
c o m m e rc ia l men w ould  i n  n e i t h e r  case be d i f f i c u l t  . . . “
The r e s u l t  o f  th e  q u a r r e l  was t h a t  Em in a c c e p te d  em p loy­
m ent u n d e r  th e  Germ ans, b u t  i n  1892  he was k i l l e d  i n  th e  Congo.
I f  th e  Emin P asha R e l i e f  E x p e d i t io n  d id  n o t  end h a p p i l y  
f o r  E m in , i t  was n o t  a success f o r  M a ck in n o n  o r  L e o p o ld  e i t h e r .  
I n  S ep tem ber 1 888  th e  A d m i n i s t r a t o r - G e n e r a l  f o r  F o r e ig n  
A f f a i r s  f o r  th e  Congo F re e  S t a t e  e x p re s s e d  g r e a t  annoyance and 
r e g r e t  a b o u t th e  d i s a s t e r s  w h ic h  had b e f a l l e n  th e  e x p e d i t i o n .
He was p re s u m a b ly  t h i n k i n g  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  o f  th e  a s s a s s i n a t i o n  
o f  M a jo r  B a r t t e l o t ,  th e  l e a d e r  o f  th e  R e a r  Column, and o f  th e  
s u b s e q u e n t d e a th  fro m  f e v e r  o f  James Jam eson, who was second  
i n  command o f  th e  R e a r  Column. He hoped t h a t  any f u r t h e r  
e x p e d i t io n s  w ould  ta k e  th e  r o u t e  fro m  th e  e a s t  c o a s t ,  and added  
t h a t  th e  Congo S t a t e  had had n o t h in g  b u t  t r o u b l e ,  a n x i e t y  and 
v e x a t i o n  s in c e  th e  d e p a r t u r e  o f  S t a n l e y ’ s e x p e d i t i o n ,  and he 
d o u b ted  i f  th e  K in g  w ould  a l l o w  any more such e x p e d i t i o n s  to
p
use th e  Congo r o u t e - .
1 .  F e l k i n ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  X X X I I .  The l e t t e r  q u o te d  i s  one fro m
Emin Pasha d a te d  2 O c to b e r  1 8 8 6 .
2 .  MP. L e t t e r  o f  29 S ep tem ber 1 8 8 8  fro m  F .O .  to  M a c k in n o n .
E n c lo s e d  one o f  25 S ep tem b er fro m  L o rd  V i v i a n ,  th e  B r i t i s h  
Am bassador i n  B r u s s e ls ,  to  S a l i s b u r y  i n  w h ic h  th e  v ie w s  o f  
th e  A d m in i s t r a t o r - G e n e r a l  w ere  g iv e n .
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Prom M a c k in n o n ’ s p o i n t  o f  v ie w  th e  e x p e d i t i o n  was 
a ls o  a d is a p p o in t m e n t .  Emin was n o t  b ro u g h t  back  to  
E n g la n d  i n  a b la z e  o f  g l o r y ,  and th e  e x p e d i t i o n  l a s t e d  
l o n g e r  and c o s t  more th a n  had been e x p e c te d .  A l t o g e t h e r  
S t a n l e y  was away f o r  a b o u t t h r e e  y e a r s ,  and e a r l y  i n  1890  
M a c k in n o n  asked th e  E g y p t ia n  g o v e rn m e n t f o r  a f u r t h e r  £ 5 , 0 0 0 .
" . . .  on a c c o u n t  o f  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  exp en ses  caused  
by th e  u n fo r e s e e n  d u r a t i o n  o f  th e  e x p e d i t i o n  
a r i s i n g  i n  g r e a t  p a r t  f ro m  th e  d e la y  o f  Emin  
P ash a  i n  coming to  a d e c is io n  .
The E g y p t ia n  go v e rn m e n t a g re e d  to  p a y ,  and a f u r t h e r  £ 4 ,5 0 0
was r a i s e d  by p r i v a t e  s u b s c r i p t i o n ,  o f  w h ic h  M a ck in n o n
c o n t r i b u t e d  £ 1 ,0 0 0  -  tw ic e  as much as anyone e l s e .  A 
f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n t  made a y e a r  l a t e r ,  w h ic h  must have  
been a lm o s t  th e  l a s t ,  showed:
R e c e ip t s  £ 3 2 ,3 6 7 *  1»10
Paym ents £ 3 1 ,8 3 4 *  1 .  7
B a la n c e  £ 5 3 5 *  0 .  3
The e x t e n t  o f  M a c k in n o n ’ s d is e n c h a n tm e n t  w i t h  Emin  
was r e v e a l e d  i n  a l e t t e r  w h ic h  he w ro te  i n  November 1891  
to  C a p t a in  L u g a rd ,  who was th e  I . B . E . A .  Company’ s a g e n t  
i n  U g anda . He s a id :
l y  R e f e r r e d  to  i n  R e l i e f  C om m ittee  M in u te s  o f  7 t h  M arch  1 8 9 0 .
''a
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H . . . Emin P asha i s  r e p o r t e d  to  have d e s e r te d  f ro m  th e  
German s e r v i c e ,  t a k i n g  w i t h  him  a German o f f i c e r  
(S tu h lm a n )  and a p a r t y  o f  t r o o p s ,  and c ro s s e d  i n t o  
B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r y .  H is  e x a c t  o b j e c t  i s  n o t  known, 
b u t  i t  i s  supposed he may have  had m is c h i e f  i n  v ie w  
i n  Uganda o r  to w a rd s  th e  A l b e r t  N y a n s a . W h a te v e r  may 
be h is  d e s ig n s ,  he has been  d isow ned and r e p u d ia t e d  by  
th e  German g o v e rn m e n t,  and t h e r e f o r e  i f  you s h o u ld  come 
upon him i n  any p a r t  o f  th e  t e r r i t o r y  a s s ig n e d  by th e  
T r e a t y  o f  J u ly  1 1890 to  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e ,  th e  b e s t  
t h i n g  you can do w i l l  be to  a r r e s t  h im  and send him  
to  th e  c o a s t  a p r i s o n e r  . . . ” 1
E a r l i e r  K i r k  had s a id  t h a t  Emin was a g r e a t l y  o v e r r a t e d  man, 
who w ou ld  have been  an encum beranee to  them .
A l t o g e t h e r  M ack in n o n  s u b s c r ib e d  £ 3 ,0 0 0  to  th e  e x p e d i t i o n  
and g o t  no money b a c k .  He d id  n o t  e x p e c t  to  g a in  when he made 
th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s , b u t  m a t t e r s  m ig h t  have tu r n e d  o u t  
d i f f e r e n t l y ,  because  Emin e s t im a t e d  t h a t  th e  p r o v in c e  made 
a n e t  p r o f i t  o f  £ 8 ,0 0 0  a n n u a l l y ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  to  w h ic h  i t  had 
a l a r g e  s t o r e  o f  i v o r y .  I n  t h e e v e n t ^ t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  Emin  
ended any im m e d ia te  p la n s  f o r  a n n e x in g  E q u a t o r i a l  P r o v in c e ,  
b u t  i n  th e  m eantim e M ack in n o n  had g o t  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company 
e s t a b l i s h e d .
Prom th e  p o i n t  o f  v ie w  o f  B a r in g  and S a l i s b u r y  th e  
e x p e d i t i o n  d id  a c h ie v e  th e  p u rp o s e  o f  re m o v in g  Emin fro m  
E q u a t o r i a ,  and i t  a ls o  made im p o r t a n t  g e o g r a p h ic a l  d i s c o v e r i e s .
1. MP. Mackinnon to Lugard, 6 November 1890.
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VII. THE I.B.E.A. COMPANY AHD I HE END
A h i s t o r y  o f  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company was com m issioned  
by M a c k in n o n 1 , and th e  s t o r y  o f  th e  company has been t o l d
2
a g a in ,  th o r o u g h ly  and more i m p a r t i a l l y  by M is s  De K i e w i e t  , 
so i t  w i l l  n o t  r e c e i v e  h e re  th e  e x t e n s iv e  t r e a t m e n t  w h ic h  
i t  r e a l l y  m e r i t s  as th e  c u lm in a t io n  o f  M a c k in n o n ’ s e f f o r t s  
i n  A f r i c a .  To a l a r g e  e x t e n t  th e  company em bodied th e  id e a s  
w h ic h  had been p u t  fo r w a r d  f o r  th e  a b o r t i v e  c o n c e s s io n  scheme 
i n  1 877  and 1 8 7 8 ,  b u t  th e  im m e d ia te  e v e n ts  w h ic h  l e d  to  i t s  
f o r m a t io n  began a t  th e  end o f  O c to b e r  1886  w i t h  th e  A n g lo -  
German d e l i m i t a t i o n  a g re e m e n t .  T h is  r e c o g n is e d  th e  s o v e r e ig n ty  
o f  th e  S u l t a n  o f  Z a n z ib a r  o v e r  a n a rro w  c o a s t a l  s t r i p ,  and 
e s t a b l i s h e d  a boundary  b e tw een  B r i t i s h  and German s p h e re s  o f  
i n f l u e n c e  w h ic h  r a n  fro m  th e  m outh o f  th e  r i v e r  Wanga n e a r  th e  
c o a s t ,  to  th e  e a s t e r n  sh o re  o f  Lake V i c t o r i a  w here  i t  c u ts  th e  
1 d e g re e  s o u th  l a t i t u d e .  The a g re e m e n t l e f t  so many q u e s t io n s  
u n a n s w e re d , h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  r i v a l r y  b e tw e e n  E u ro p e a n  powers  
c o n t in u e d  u n a b a te d  i n  E a s t  A f r i c a ,  and S u l t a n  B a rg h a s h  d e c id e d  
t h a t  he c o u ld  b e s t  p r e v e n t  f u r t h e r  en cro a c h m e n ts  o v e r  h is  
t e r r i t o r y  by e n t e r i n g  i n t o  an a g re e m e n t w i t h  M a c k in n o n .
I t  was f o r  t h i s  re a s o n  t h a t  i n  F e b r u a r y  188 7  he s e n t  to  
M a c k in n o n  th e  t e le g r a m ,  w h ich  Holmwood had d r a f t e d  f o r  h im ,
1 .  P . L .  M c D e rm o tt ,  B r i t i s h  E a s t  A f r i c a  o r  I . B . E . A . ,  London,
1 8 9 3 .
2 .  M. de K i e w i e t ,  o p . c i t .
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s a y in g  t h a t  he was w i l l i n g  to  a g re e  to  th e  c o n c e s s io n s  
f o r m e r ly  p ro p o s e d , p r o v id e d  t h e r e  was an i n f l u e n t i a l  
a s s o c i a t i o n  u n d e r  M a c k in n o n ’ s p r e s id e n c y  and th e  B r i t i s h  
G overnm ent a p p ro v e d .
M ack in n o n  w ent to  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  a b o u t  th e  
p r o p o s a ls  e a r l y  i n  M arch  and saw S i r  P e rc y  A n d e rs o n , who 
m in u te d  t h a t  th e y  w ou ld  have to  be c a r e f u l  w i t h  M a ck in n o n  
because  he k e p t  t a l k i n g  o f  th e  need f o r  more th a n  o r d i n a r y  
g o vern m en t s u p p o r t ,  b u t  wouPd n o t  d e f i n e  w h a t he m e a n t.
” . . .  I  t h i n k , ” s a id  A n d e rs o n , ,ft h a t  w hat i s  i n  h is  
mind and Holmwood's i s  a b lo w  a t  th e  G erm ans. They  
a re  d r i v i n g  I  b e l i e v e  a t  w hat w ou ld  p r a c t i c a l l y  be 
a B r i t i s h  P r o t e c t o r a t e  o v e r  Z a n z ib a r  .
M ack in n o n  a p p a r e n t l y  m et S a l i s b u r y  a t  a b o u t th e  same 
t im e ,  because e a r l y  i n  May S a l i s b u r y  r e f u s e d  to  g r a n t  a n o th e r  
i n t e r v i e w  a b o u t th e  p r o p o s a ls  on th e  g rounds  t h a t  t h e i r  
p r e v io u s  d is c u s s io n s  had le d  to  m is u n d e r s t a n d in g s . M a c k in n o n  
t h e r e f o r e  w ro te  a memorandum i n  w h ic h  he s a id :
, f . . . I  f e e l  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  th e  success  o f  th e  
p rop osed  u n d e r t a k in g  t h a t  H .M .G . s h o u ld  a f f o r d  i t  
th e  f u l l e s t  m easure o f  c o u n te n a n c e  and s u p p o r t  i t  
can g iv e  to  any s i m i l a r  u n d e r t a k in g  such as t h a t  
g iv e n  to  th e  N o r th  Borneo and N ig e r  C om panies .
W ith o u t  t h i s  and w i t h o u t  some m easure o f  a s s u ra n c e  
t h a t  a m a i l  s e r v ic e  u n d e r  th e  B r i t i s h  f l a g  s h a l l  
c o n t in u e  to  be m a in ta in e d  as a t  p r e s e n t ,  a t  l e a s t  
once i n  f o u r  w eeks , I  f e e l  t h a t  i t  w ou ld  n o t  be 
e x p e d ie n t  t h a t  I  s h o u ld  p ro c e e d  f u r t h e r  i n  th e  
m a t t e r  . . . ”
1. FO. 84/1860. Minute by Anderson. About 21 March 1887.
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He w arned t h a t  th e  S u l t a n  m ig h t  abandon hope o f  
r e c e i v i n g  B r i t i s h  h e lp  and p la c e  h i m s e l f  i n  th e  hands o f  th e  
G erm ans. On th e  o t h e r  hand i f  g o vern m en t p r o v id e d  th e  
n e c e s s a ry  s u p p o r t ,  M a ck in n o n  s a id  t h a t  he w ou ld  do h i s  b e s t  
to  make th e  u n d e r t a k in g  a success  and a b e n e f i t  to  B r i t i s h  
commerce and i n f l u e n c e ,  a l th o u g h  i t  w ou ld  e n t a i l  p e r s o n a l  
and f i n a n c i a l  s a c r i f i c e s ,  and a g r e a t  d e a l  more w ork and  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 1 .
S a l i s b u r y * s  comments w ere  v e r y  f r a n k  and in d e e d  
re m a rk a b le  c o n s id e r in g  th e  p a r t  w h ic h  he had p la y e d  i n  
f r u s t r a t i n g  th e  p r o p o s a ls  i n  1 8 7 8 .  He m in u te d ,
11. . . We know t h a t  M a ck in n o n  was n o t  i n  e a r n e s t  i n  a  
n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  t h i s  k in d  he u n d e r to o k  t e n  y e a r s  a g o .  
fi'he e x t r a o r d i n a r y  s l o v e n l in e s s  o f  h i s  p r e s e n t  
p ro c e e d in g s  make me do ub t h i s  b e in g  i n  e a r n e s t  now.
The u n d e r t a k in g  w h ic h  he asks me to  s u p p o r t  i s  q u i t e  
n e b u lo u s .  We do n o t  know e x a c t l y  th e  r i g h t s  th e  
u n form ed  company i s  to  have  o r  th e  amount o f  t r a d e  
f ro m  th e  p o r t s  in c lu d e d  i n  th e  s p e c i f i e d  c o a s t  w h ic h  
i s  to  y i e l d  th e  customs d u t ie s  on w h ic h  th e  s o lv e n c y  
o f  th e  company w i l l  dep end .
I  do n o t  t h i n k  we can a f f o r d  to  be e q u a l l y  
i n d i s t i n c t  i n  o u r  r e p l y .  I f  i n  answ er to  a r e q u e s t  
f o r  Borneo t r e a t m e n t  and an a s s u re d  m a i l  c o n t r a c t  we 
r e p l y  by p ro m is in g  th e  f u l l e s t  a s s is t a n c e  c o m p a t ib le  
w i t h  I m p e r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  eng agem ents ,  
we s h a l l  be h e l d ,  and j u s t l y  h e l d ,  to  have  e n c o u ra g e d  
him  to  e x p e c t  th e  two s p e c i f i c  t h in g s  f o r  w h ic h  he 
asks . . . ** ^
1 .  P .O .  8 4 /1 8 6 5 ,  M a ck in n o n  to  P . O . , 7 May 1 8 8 7 .
2 .  P .O .  8 4 /1 8 6 5 ,  S a l i s b u r y ,  u n d a te d  m in u te  a b o u t  M a c k in n o n 's
memorandum o f  7 May 1 8 8 7 .
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S a l i s b u r y  c a r e f u l l y  c o r r e c t e d  th e  d r a f t  r e p l y  to  
M a c k in n o n  so t h a t  th e  f i n a l  l e t t e r  was v e r y  c a u t i o u s l y  w o rd e d .  
M a c k in n o n  was t o l d  t h a t  a g r e a t  c o m m e rc ia l e n t e r p r i s e  such as 
he c o n te m p la te d  w ou ld  r e c e i v e  a l l  th e  a s s is t a n c e  w h ic h  c o u ld  
be g iv e n  c o n s i s t e n t l y  w i t h  aue r e g a r d  to  th e  p u b l i c  e x c h e q u e r  
and th e  a s c e r t a i n e d  r i g h t s  o f  o t h e r s .  I f  as M a c k in n o n ’ s 
p r o j e c t  d e v e lo p e d  he made s p e c i f i c  r e q u e s t s ,  S a l i s b u r y  w ou ld  
g iv e  d e f i n i t e  answ ers b u t  i n  th e  m eantim e S a l i s b u r y  th o u g h t  
t h a t  more harm th a n  good w ould  s p r in g  fro m  vague c o u n te n a n c e s  
o f  s u p p o r t .
M ack in n o n  d id  n o t  g e t  th e  amount o f  e n c o u ra g e m e n t fro m  
go vern m en t t h a t  he had hoped f o r ,  b u t  a f t e r  h i s  p r e v io u s  
f r u s t r a t i o n s  he was v i r t u a l l y  o b l ig e d  to  a c c e p t  a lu k e w a rm  
re s p o n s e  fro m  S a l i s b u r y .  M a jo r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  had f a l l e n  
th ro u g h  i n  1 8 7 8 ,  and th e  S u l t a n  o f  Z a n z ib a r  had r e j e c t e d  h i s  
more m odest a p p l i c a t i o n  th e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r .  I n  1 8 8 0  th e  
is s u e  had been r a i s e d  by G ordon b u t  to  no e f f e c t ,  and i n  1885  
th e  p r o p o s a ls  p u t  fo r w a r d  by M a c k in n o n , L o rd  A b e rd a re  and  
o t h e r s  had come to  n o t h in g .  I n  th e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  th e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  May 1887  was a c o n s id e r a b le  im p ro v e m e n t,  because  
M a c k in n o n  a t  l e a s t  had a f i r m  o f f e r  fro m  B a rg h a s h  and no 
o p p o s i t io n  fro m  th e  B r i t i s h  G o vern m en t. M o re o v e r  he was th e n  
64 y e a r s  o ld  and n o t  i n c l i n e d  to  d e la y  m a t t e r s  i n  th e  hope o f  
s e c u r in g  b e t t e r  te rm s .
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From S a l i s b u r y ' s  p o i n t  o f  v ie w  th e  a r ra n g e m e n ts  w ere  
n o t  v e r y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  e i t h e r ,  b u t  w hereas  M ack in n o n  had w anted  
some s o r t  o f  c o n c e s s io n  i n  E a s t  A f r i c a  f o r  t e n  y e a r s ,  i t  i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  S a l i s b u r y  had changed h i s  m in d . I n  1 8 7 8  he had  
s a b o ta g e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a c o n c e s s io n ,  b u t  i n  1887  he 
a l lo w e d  M a ck in n o n  to  p ro c e e d .  The re a s o n  was n o t  t h a t  he had  
any h i g h e r  o p in io n  o f  M a c k in n o n , b u t  t h a t  r i v a l r y  be tw e e n  
E u ro p e a n  powers had g r e a t l y  i n t e n s i f i e d  i n  A f r i c a .  I n  1 878  
B r i t a i n  had b e e n , th ro u g h  h e r  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  th e  S u l t a n  o f  
Z a n z i b a r ,  th e  d o m in a n t power on th e  E a s t  A f r i c a n  c o a s t  fro m  
Mozam bique to  S o m a l ia .  T h is  dom inance had been b ro k e n  
im m e d ia t e ly  a f t e r  th e  B e r l i n  West A f r i c a ,  i n  1 8 8 5 ,  by th e  
German S c h u t z b r i e f  w h ic h  had b ro u g h t  u n d e r  h e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
th e  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  i n  E a s t  A f r i c a ,  p r e v i o u s l y  a c q u i r e d  by C a r l  
P e t e r s .  I n  1 8 8 7 ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  S a l i s b u r y  in s u r e d  a g a i n s t  th e  
n o r th w a r d  e x te n s io n  o f  German t e r r i t o r y  by a l l o w i n g  M ack in n o n  
to  l e a s e  th e  s t r i p  o f  c o a s t  fro m  th e  r i v e r  (l.mba to  K i p i n i ^ .  
T h is  a ls o  had th e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  h e lp in g  to  b lo c k  any German 
a t te m p t  a t  p e n e t r a t i o n  to w a rd s  Uganda and th e  U p per N i l e ,  
w h ic h  w ere  becom ing i n c r e a s i n g l y  im p o r t a n t  f o r  B r i t a i n  i n  v ie w  
o f  h e r  p o s i t i o n  i n  E g y p t .
C o n e e rn in g  M a c k in n o n 's  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  re n e w a l  o f  th e  
s u b s id y  o f  £ 7 ,9 5 0  a y e a r  f o r  th e  B . I . ' s  s e r v i c e  b e tw e e n  Aden,
1. Sanderson, op.cit., pp. 42-44.
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Z a n z ib a r  and L i n d i , S a l i s b u r y  was more f o r th c o m in g .  He 
s t r o n g l y  recommended re n e w a l  f o r  p o l i t i c a l ,  c o m m e rc ia l and  
h u m a n i t a r ia n  re a s o n s ,  and th e  T r e a s u r y  i n  due cou rse  r e l u c t a n t ­
l y  a p p ro v e d ,  because o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  and n o t  
b ecau se  i t  was c o n v in c e d  by th e  a rg um ents  a b o u t  th e  econom ic  
a d v a n ta g e s  to  be e x p e c te d .
W ith  r e g a r d  to  th e  c o n c e s s io n  scheme, M a ck in n o n  proceeded  
to  make an a g re e m e n t w i t h  B a rg h a s h  w hereby  h i s  company, th e  
E a s t  A f r i c a  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  o b t a in e d  c o n c e s s io n s  o v e r  th e  c o a s t a l  
a r e a  fro m  th e  r i v e r  £<mba to  K i p i n i .  I t  was u n d e rs to o d  t h a t  
f u r t h e r  c o n c e s s io n s  w ould  be made, and i n  S ep tem ber o f  th e  
f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  a R o y a l C h a r t e r  was g r a n te d  to  th e  company, 
w h ic h  was renamed th e  I m p e r i a l  B r i t i s h  E a s t  A f r i c a  Company 
( I . B . E . A . ) 1 .
S a l i s b u r y  a p p ro v e d  th e  C h a r t e r  f o r  th e  same re a s o n  t h a t  
he had a l lo w e d  M a ck in n o n  to  e n t e r  i n t o  an ag re e m e n t w i t h  
B a rg h a s h  i n  1 8 8 7 .  He hoped t h a t  th e  company w ould  s ta k e  
c la im s  i n  th e  r e g io n s  th ro u g h  w h ic h  German p e n e t r a t i o n  to  th e  
U p p e r N i l e  was p o s s i b l e .
The R o y a l N ig e r  Company p r o v id e d  a p r e c e d e n t  i n  A f r i c a  
and t h e r e  was a ls o  th e  c h a r t e r e d  B r i t i s h  N o r t h  Borneo Company 
w h ic h  had been fo rm ed  even e a r l i e r .
1 .  F o r  d e t a i l s  o f  th e  C o n c e s s io n  see a p p e n d ix  I I .
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The I . B . E . A ,  Company was a u t h o r i z e d  to  r e t a i n  th e  
b e n e f i t s  o f  a l l  g r a n t s ,  c o n c e s s io n s  and t r e a t i e s ,  and c h a rg e d  
w i t h  th e  d u ty  o f  c o m b a tin g  s l a v e r y ,  g u a r a n te e in g  r e l i g i o u s  
fre e d o m  and r e s p e c t  f o r  l o c a l  la w s  and c u s to m s. Any g r a n t s ,  
t r e a t i e s  o r  c o n c e s s io n s  w e re ,  h o w e v e r ,  s u b je c t  to  a p p r o v a l  by 
th e  F o r e ig n  S e c r e t a r y ,  and th e  company had to  a c t  i n  acco rd an ce  
w i t h  h is  p o l i c y  i n  i t s  d e a l in g s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  p o w e rs . The 
g o vern m en t th u s  had a means f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  
w i t h o u t  b e in g  co m m itted  to  e x e r c i s i n g  d i r e c t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
The company was c o n c e rn e d  to  prom ote  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e ,  
b u t  i t  was a ls o  i n s p i r e d  by c o m m e rc ia l  and p h i l a n t h r o p i c  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  a l l  o f  w h ic h  w ere  r e f l e c t e d  i n  th e  c o m p o s it io n  
o f  i t s  bo ard  o f  d i r e c t o r s .  T h is  in c lu d e d  b u s inessm en  such as 
M a c k in n o n , H u t to n  and J .M .  H a l l ;  p h i l a n t h r o p i s t s  such as  
F o w e l l -B u x to n  and B u r d e t t - G c u t t s , and men who had g a in e d  
d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  p u b l i c  s e r v ic e  such as S i r  John K i r k ,  G e n e r a l  
S i r  L e w is  P e l l y  and G e n e r a l  S i r  A r n o ld  K e m b a l l .  The V i c e -  
P r e s i d e n t ,  L o rd  B r a s s e y ,  had been a d i r e c t o r  o f  th e  N o r th  
Borneo Company so he b ro u g h t  u s e f u l  e x p e r ie n c e  f o r  ru n n in g  
a c h a r t e r e d  company. As th e  son o f  Thomas B r a s s e y ,  th e  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  r a i l w a y  m ag n a te , he was a ls o  k n o w le d g e a b le  
a b o u t  r a i l w a y  c o n s t r u c t i o n  w h ic h  was an a t t r a c t i o n  fro m  
M a c k in n o n f s p o in t  o f  v ie w .
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A m a jo r  c h a r t e r e d  company was th e  g o a l  f o r  w h ic h  
M a ck in n o n  had been a im in g  i n  A f r i c a  f o r  a lo n g  t im e ,  b u t  
when i t  was fo rm ed  he was n o t  as c o n f id e n t  a b o u t i t s  p r o s p e c ts  
as one m ig h t  have e x p e c te d .  I n  Decem ber, 1 8 8 8 ,  he s a id  to  
Euan S m ith ,  who was th e n  C o n su l G e n e r a l  i n  Z a n z ib a r :
*fWe a re  p u s h in g  ahead w i t h  th e  com pany’ s a f f a i r s  i n  
London w i t h  a l l  th e  speed we c a n . I  hope i t  wont 
p ro v e  much money and l a b o u r  w a s te d .  The p u b l ic  
m a in ta in e d  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  i n  u s ,  b u t  know l i t t l e  o f  
th e  u n d e r c u r r e n t  o f  o p p o s in g  German i n f l u e n c e .  I  
have  re a s o n  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  we have th e  p e r s o n a l  
sym pathy o f  h ig h  p e rs o n a g e s  i n  o u r  v ie w s  and e f f o r t s ,  
b u t  o f  co u rs e  h ig h  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  must be 
s u p re m e . 11
The company was th u s  la u n c h e d  w i t h  M a ck in n o n  a p p re h e n ­
s iv e  a b o u t German c o m p e t i t io n ,  and p e rh a p s  u n d u ly  h o p e f u l  a b o u t  
th e  h e lp  w h ic h  he w ould r e c e i v e  fro m  th e  B r i t i s h  G o vern m en t.  
S a l i s b u r y  a f t e r  a l l  w anted  th e  company to  s e c u re  f o r  B r i t a i n  
w hat P a r l i a m e n t  w ou ld  n o t  a u t h o r i s e  th e  go v e rn m e n t to  o b t a i n  -  
a p o s i t i o n  i n  E a s t  A f r i c a  w h ic h  w ou ld  p r o t e c t  a p p ro a c h e s  fro m  
th e  e a s t  to  Uganda and th e  U p p e r  B i l e .  He may even have  
c o n te m p la te d  u s in g  th e  company as a s h o r t  te rm  m ea s u re ,  
because  i n  S e p te m b e r , 1 8 8 8 ,  he s a id  he th o u g h t  i t  w ou ld  
p r o b a b ly  go b a n k ru p t  one d a y .  The b e g in n in g s  w e re ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
n o t  s u s p ic io u s .  M ack in n o n  and S a l i s b u r y  each  e x p e c te d  a 
c o n s id e r a b le  amount o f  s u p p o r t  fro m  th e  o t h e r ,  and each was 
to  be d is a p p o in t e d .
1. MP. Mackinnon to Euan Smith, 26 December 1888.
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The company began w i t h  a n o m in a l  c a p i t a l  o f  one m i l l i o n  
pounds. £ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0  was r a i s e d  fro m  th e  f i r s t  is s u e  o f  s h a r e s ,  
w i t h  M a c k in n o n , who was P r e s i d e n t ,  as th e  l a r g e s t  s u b s c r ib e r  
w i t h  £ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ,  and P e t e r  M a ck in n o n  w i t h  £ 1 5 ,0 0 0  as th e  second  
l a r g e s t  s o u rce  o f  money.
G eorge M a c k e n z ie ,  th e  b r o t h e r  o f  E .N .  M a c k e n z ie ,  th e  
Z a n z ib a r  a g e n t  o f  S m ith /M a c k e n z ie ,  was a p p o in te d  as th e  
com pany’ s A d m i n i s t r a t o r .  W i th  th e  e x c e p t io n  o f  F r e d e r i c k  
L u g a rd ,  who jo in e d  th e  company two y e a rs  l a t e r ,  M a c k e n z ie  was 
th e  a b l e s t  em ployee th e  company e v e r  g o t  i n  A f r i c a ,  and h i s  
a b i l i t i e s  w ere soon t e s t e d  by German r i v a l r y ,  and by th e  
com pany’ s d e c i s i o n ,  w h ic h  was e n c o u ra g e d  by th e  B r i t i s h  
G o vern m en t, to  e x te n d  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  i n t o  th e  i n t e r i o r .
German p la n s  had d e v e lo p e d  a t  a pace s i m i l a r  to  th o s e  o f  
th e  B r i t i s h .  They had o b ta in e d  c o n c e s s io n s  and l a t e r ,  i n  
A ugust 1 8 8 8 ,  fo rm ed a German E a s t  A f r i c a  Company, b u t  
i n s u r r e c t i o n s  had b ro k e n  o u t  w i t h i n  th e  com pany’ s a r e a  a lm o s t  
im m e d ia t e ly .  The Germans r e a c t e d  by im p o s in g  a n a v a l  b lo c k a d e ,  
and th e  B r i t i s h  go vern m en t a g re e d  to  c o o p e r a te  by e x te n d in g  i t  
a lo n g  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company’ s s e c t i o n  o f  th e  c o a s t ,  o s t e n s i b l y  
to  p r e v e n t  th e  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  a rm s . M a ck in n o n  p r o t e s t e d  to  
th e  B r i t i s h  g o vern m en t on th e  grounds t h a t  th e  b lo c k a d e  was 
i n j u r i o u s  to  t r a d e ,  and i n  any case u n n e c e s s a ry  as f a r  as th e  
B r i t i s h  sp h e re  was c o n c e rn e d , because  t h e r e  was no t r o u b l e
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w i t h i n  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company’ s a r e a .  I n  a l e t t e r  to  M a c k e n z ie  
he s a id :
” . . .  The o n ly  re a s o n  f o r  B r i t i s h  a c t i o n  i n  c o m b in a t io n  
w i t h  th e  German was th e  d e s i r e  to  p r e v e n t  them fro m  
d e p o s in g  th e  S u l t a n  and t a k i n g  p o s s e s s io n  o f  w hat i s  
l e f t  o f  h is  d o m in io n s .  I  f e a r  o u r  g o vern m en t f e e l s  
i t s e l f  so weak i n  i t s  d e f e n s iv e  power and i t s  p o s i t i o n  
i n  E g y p t t h a t  no m a t t e r  w hat B is m a rc k  asks f o r  he i s  
p r e t t y  s u re  to  g e t  i t  . . . " 1
The go vern m en t r e j e c t e d  M a c k in n o n ’ s p r o t e s t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  and 
a rg u e d  t h a t  i t  had to  g u a rd  a g a i n s t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  arms 
p a s s in g  th ro u g h  th e  B r i t i s h  i n t o  th e  German s p h e re .
The r e l a t i v e  peace i n  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company’ s t e r r i t o r y
was due m a in ly  to  G eorge M a c k e n z ie ’ s more i m a g i n a t i v e  p o l i c y .
E a r l y  on , f o r  e x a m p le , a l a r g e  number o f  s la v e s  r a n  away and
fou nd  r e f u g e  i n  C h r i s t i a n  m is s io n  s t a t i o n s .  T h e i r  A rab
owners demanded them b a c k ,  b u t  th e  m is s i o n a r ie s  r e f u s e d  to
s u r r e n d e r  them . M a c k e n z ie  c o u ld  n o t  buy th e  s la v e s  and s e t
them f r e e ,  because i t  was i l l e g a l  f o r  a B r i t i s h  s u b je c t  to
p u rc h a s e  s l a v e s ,  so he p e rs u a d e d  th e  owners to  r e g a r d  t h e i r
s la v e s  as l o s t  p r o p e r t y .  They th e n  a g re e d  to  a c c e p t  com pensa-
2t i o n  f o r  them and g r a n te d  ’’ fre e d o m  p a p e r s ” f o r  th e  s la v e s  .
T h is  c o s t  th e  company £ 3 ,5 0 0  b u t  s e c u re d  th e  g o o d w i l l  o f  th e  
A rab com m unity . M a ck in n o n  a p p ro v e d  o f  M a c k e n z ie ’ s a c t i o n  and 
s a id  t h a t  he w ould  i f  n e c e s s a ry  have p a id  f o r  th e  fre e d o m  o f
th e  s la v e s  h im s e l f  ._________________________________ ___ __________
1 .  MP. M a ck in n o n  to  M a c k e n z ie ,  30 November 1 8 8 8 .
2 .  M c D e rm o tt ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  2 5 .
3 .  The f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  f r i e n d s  o f  th e  C .M .S .  p a id  £ 1 3 0 0  to  th e
Company and th e  B r i t i s h  go v e rn m e n t p a id  £ 8 0 0 .
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T r o u b le  i n  th e  German s p h e re  i n e v i t a b l y  had re p e rc u s s io n *  
i n  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company’ s a r e a ,  b u t  w hat was more s e r io u s  was 
th e  e f f e c t  o f  German r i v a l r y  i n  o b l i g i n g  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company 
to  e x te n d  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  n o r th w a rd s  and w e s tw a rd s  b e f o r e  i t  was 
r e a l l y  s t r o n g  enough. B e s id e s  fo r m in g  t h e i r  company to  th e  
s o u th  o f  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company’ s t e r r i t o r y ,  th e  Germans had a ls o  
e s t a b l i s h e d  a p r o t e c t o r a t e  o v e r  th e  s m a l l  s u l t a n a t e  o f  W itu  and  
l a i d  c la im  to  th e  i s l a n d  and p o r t  o f  Lamu, w h ic h  had th e  e f f e c t  
o f  c o n f i n i n g  th e  Company b e tw e e n  two German p r o t e c t o r a t e s ,  to  
n o r t h  and s o u th .  K h a l i f a ,  who had succeeded  to  th e  S u l t a n a t e  
o f  Z a n z ib a r  on B a r g h a s h ’ s d e a th  i n  M arch  1 8 8 8 ,  c o n te s te d  th e  
German c la im  to  Lamu, as d id  M a c k in n o n . E a r l y  i n  1 8 8 9 ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  S a l i s b u r y  a g re e d  t h a t  th e  is s u e  s h o u ld  be s u b m it te d  
f o r  a r b i t r a t i o n  by B a ro n  Lam berm ont, M i n i s t e r  o f  S t a t e  to  K in g  
L e o p o ld  o f  B e lg iu m . M ack in n o n  o b je c te d  to  S a l i s b u r y ’ s a c t i o n  
and s a i d :
” . . .  I  f e e l  v e r y  s t r o n g l y  th e  l a c k  o f  s u p p o r t  f ro m  HMG 
so g r e a t l y  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  th e  v ig o r o u s  s u p p o r t  a f f o r d e d  
to  th e  German Co. by th e  go vern m en t o f  Germany . . . ” 1
H o w e v e r , B aro n  Lambermont d e c id e d  t h a t  th e  Germans had  
no v a l i d  c la im  to  Lamu, so K h a l i f a  ceded i t  to  th e  I . B . E . A .  
Company. T h is  l a r g e l y  d e s t r o y e d  th e  v a lu e  o f  W itu  f o r  Germany 
by d e p r i v i n g  i t  o f  a p o r t ,  and she gave up h e r  p r o t e c t o r a t e  
o v e r  i t  th e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  as p a r t  o f  th e  A n g lo -G e rm a n  A g re e ­
ment o f  1 J u ly  1 8 9 0 .  K h a l i f a  a ls o  ceded to  th e  I . B . E . A .
1. MP. Mackinnon to Mackenzie, 9 February 1889.
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Company s i x  s m a l l  p o r t s  n o r t h  o f  Lamu: K is m a y u , B r a v a ,  M e rc a ,
M o g a d is h u , W a rs h e ik  and M r u t i ,  b u t  i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  th e  
company w ou ld  n o t  have th e  r e s o u r c e s  to  a d m i n is t e r  them , so 
M a ck in n o n  a r ra n g e d  w i t h  S ig n o r  C a t a l a n i ,  th e  I t a l i a n  Charge  
d fA f f a i r e s  i n  London, to  t r a n s f e r  th e  c e s s io n s  to  th e  I t a l i a n  
g o v e rn m e n t.  K h a l i f a  a g re e d  to  th e  a r ra n g e m e n t  and fo r m a l  
t r a n s f e r  was e f f e c t e d  i n  A u gu st 1 8 8 9 *
The K in g  o f  I t a l y  h o n o u red  M ack in n o n  by c o n f e r r i n g  on 
him  th e  ra n k  o f  B aro n  M a ck in n o n  o f  I t a l y ,  and a ls o  th e  G re a t  
C ross o f  th e  A n c ie n t  O rd e r  o f  S a i n t  M a u r ic e  and L a z a r e , an  
O rd e r  w h ic h  was fo rm ed  i n  1 4 3 4 .  I n  th e  same y e a r  M a ck in n o n  
a c c e p te d  a S c o t t i s h  B a r o n e tc y ,  and a d o p te d  th e  t i t l e  o f  S i r  
W i l l i a m  M a c k in n o n , B a r t . ,  C . I . E . ,  o f  Loup and S t r a t h a i r d ,  
h a v in g  many y e a rs  e a r l i e r  d e c l in e d  a k n ig h th o o d  w h ic h  had been  
o f f e r e d  to  him  by L o rd  P a lm e r s to n .
The f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  w h ich  o b t a in e d  b e tw e e n  th e  
company and th e  I t a l i a n s  l e d  to  an a m ic a b le  b o u n d a ry  s e t t l e ­
ment w h ic h  e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  r i v e r  Juba as th e  b o u n d ary  b e tw een  
them as f a r  as 6 d e g re e s  l a t i t u d e  n o r t h .  Prom t h e r e  i t  r a n  
due w es tw a rd s  as f a r  as l o n g i t u d e  35 e a s t  and th e n  n o r th w a rd s  
to  th e  B lu e  N i l e .  The I . B . E . A .  Company th u s  a c c e p te d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a v a s t  a r e a ,  th o u g h  a l e s s  t ro u b le s o m e  
one th a n  i t  g a in e d  b;y i t s  v e n t u r e  i n t o  U ganda .
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M c D e rm o tt ,  i n  h i s  h i s t o r y  o f  th e  company a rg u e s  
p e r s u a s i v e l y  t h a t  th e  move i n t o  Uganda was made more to  s u i t  
th e  p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  g o vern m en t th a n  f o r  any l i k e l y  
c o m m e rc ia l  b e n e f i t  to  th e  company. The go v e rn m e n t v a lu e d  i t  
f o r  i t s  s t r a t e g i c  p o s i t i o n  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  E g y p t .  As S i r  
E v e ly n  B a r in g ,  th e  B r i t i s h  C o n s u l -G e n e r a l  i n  E g y p t s a id :
11. . . w h a te v e r  pow er h o ld s  th e  U p per N i l e  must by th e  . 
f o r c e  o f  i t s  g e o g r a p h ic a l  p o s i t i o n  d o m in a te  E g y p t .
Uganda a ls o  o f f e r e d  a k e y  to  th e  E q u a t o r i a l  P r o v in c e  
and i t  was f e a r e d  t h a t  th e  Germans w ere s e e k in g  to  a c q u i r e  b o th  
a r e a s .  C a r l  P e t e r s ’ Emin Pasha e x p e d i t io n  was on i t s  w ay, and 
t h e r e  was a d a n g e r  t h a t  F re n c h  m is s io n a r ie s  i n  Uganda, i n  t h e i r  
r i v a l r y  w i t h  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  w ou ld  s u p p o r t  German 
a t te m p ts  a t  p e n e t r a t i o n .  M a c k in n o n , o f  c o u rs e ,  was r e a d y  to  
b e l i e v e  a n y t h in g  a b o u t German m a c h in a t io n s  and s a id  to  Euan  
Smi t h :
” . . .  The Germans have no r e g a r d  f o r  man o r  b e a s t ,  
and t h e i r  n a t u r a l  d is r e g a r d  f o r  any i n t e r e s t  e x c e p t  
t h e i r  own i s  coming o u t  as n a s t i l y  as i t  can do i n  
E a s t  A f r i c a  . . .  My f e a r  i s  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  i n  
E a s t  A f r i c a  must be c o m p le te ly  s a c r i f i c e d ,  as 
Germany i s  b e n t  on t a k i n g  e v e r y t h in g  as i t  s u i t s  
h e r  c o n v e n ie n c e  . . . ”
1 .  B a r in g  to  S a l i s b u r y ,  15 December 1 8 8 9 .  G i f f o r d  and
L o u is ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  1 2 3 .
2 .  LP . M ack in n o n  to  Euan S m ith ,  26 December 1 8 8 8 .
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I n  f a c t  M a c k in n o n 1s f e a r s  w ere n o t  u n r e a s o n a b le ,  
because P e t e r s  l a t e r  s a id  t h a t  h i s  e x j j e d i t i o n  had been
"no p l e a s u r e - ^ t r i p , b u t  a l a r g e  s c a le  c o l o n i a l  p o l i t i c a l  
e n t e r p r i s e "  .
A lth o u g h  c o m m e rc ia l c o n s id e r a t io n s  w ere  o f  s e c o n d a ry  
im p o r ta n c e ,  Uganda was re g a rd e d  as a p o t e n t i a l l y  w e a l t h y  
and t h e r e f o r e  a t t r a c t i v e  c o u n t r y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  because  
i t  was a m a jo r  s o u rc e  o f  i v o r y ,  th e  one com m odity  w h ic h  
was s u f f i c i e n t l y  v a l u a b l e  to  be w o r th  c a r r y i n g  to  th e  c o a s t  
by human p o r t e r a g e .
T h is  f a c t  u n d e r l in e d  th e  g r e a t  need f o r  a much 
b e t t e r  system  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n s .  H a v in g  f a i l e d  w i t h  
h i s  ro a d  b u i l d i n g  scheme and w i t h  th e  a t te m p t  to  use  
e le p h a n ts  f o r  t r a n s p o r t ,  M ack in n o n  had come to  th e  
c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  E a s t  A f r i c a  c o u ld  o n ly  be opened up 
a d e q u a t e ly  by th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  a r a i l w a y .  Soon a f t e r  
th e  company was fo rm e d , t h e r e f o r e ,  F r e d e r i c k  J a c k s o n , who 
had a l i t t l e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  A f r i c a ,  was s e n t  as th e  l e a d e r  
o f  a c a ra v a n  to  s u rv e y  a r o u t e  to  Lake V i c t o r i a .  He was 
away f o r  n e a r l y  two y e a rs  and th e  r e s u l t s  o f  h i s  jo u r n e y  
w ere d i s a p p o i n t i n g . He d id  n o t  f i n d  any n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s
1. Gifford and Louis, op.cit., p. 130.
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w h ic h  c o u ld  r e a d i l y  he e x p l o i t e d ,  he showed t h a t  i t  w ou ld  
be e x p e n s iv e  and d i f f i c u l t  to  s e t  up s t a t i o n s  i n  th e  
i n t e r i o r ,  and th e  i v o r y  w h ic h  he b ro u g h t  back  o n ly  j u s t  
c o v e re d  th e  c o s t  o f  th e  e x p e d i t i o n .  H o w ever , by th e  t im e  
he r e t u r n e d  to  th e  c o a s t  i n  1 8 9 0  th e  company was a l r e a d y  
c o m m itted  to  t r y i n g  to  e s t a b l i s h  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  i n  U ganda.
C a p ta in  lu g a r d  had s e t  o f f  f o r  Uganda e a r l i e r  i n  
th e  y e a r  a t  th e  head o f  an e x p e d i t i o n  as th e  com pany’ s 
a g e n t ,  a l th o u g h  d o u b ts  w ere  a l r e a d y  b e in g  e x p re s s e d  a b o u t  
th e  com pany’ s f u t u r e  and i t s  Uganda v e n t u r e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .
? o r  e x a m p le , S t a n l e y ,  who re a c h e d  th e  c o a s t  w i t h  Emin  
b e f o r e  L u g a rd  d e p a r t e d ,  a d v is e d  M a c k e n z ie  t h a t  th e  o c c u p a t io n  
o f  Uganda s h o u ld  be p o s tp o n ed  t i l l  th e  r a i l w a y  was b u i l t " L.
He e s t im a te d  t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  o c c u p a t io n  w ou ld  r e q u i r e  f i v e
2
h u n d red  E n g lis h m e n , two th o u s a n d  p o r t e r s  and c o s t  £ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  . 
M a c k in n o n  had a p p a r e n t ly  been t h i n k i n g  a lo n g  s i m i l a r  l i n e s ,  
because  i n  December 1889  he had t o l d  S t a n le y  t h a t  i t  w ou ld  
be im p o s s ib le  to  do a n y th in g  a b o u t  Uganda u n le s s  g o vern m en t  
a l lo w e d  th e  company to  g e t  f i v e  o r  s i x  h u n d re d  I n d i a n  
t r o o p s .
1. Surprisingly Stanley did not see Lugard.
1 .  MP. S t a n le y  to  M a c k in n o n , 6 F e b r u a r y  1 8 9 0 .
328
A t  th e  end o f  M arch  Euan S m ith  t o l d  th e  F o r e ig n  
O f f i c e  t h a t  th e  company w ould  have  to  d e c id e  w h e th e r  i t  
was re a d y  and w i l l i n g  to  s u s t a i n  a c o n f l i c t  w i t h  German 
e n t e r p r i s e .  As t h in g s  s to o d ,  he s a i d ,  th e  c o n f l i c t  was 
m ost u n e q u a l .  He th o u g h t  M a c k e n z ie  was v e r y  a b le  and 
e n e r g e t i c ,  b u t m ost o f  h is  E u ro p e a n  a s s i s t a n t s  w ere  
i n e x p e r i e n c e d , he had no p o l i c e  and no m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  
o f  any k i n d .
11 F o r  e v e ry  r u p e e , ” he s a i d ,  "w h ic h  th e  B r i t i s h  
spend i n  Z a n z ib a r  th e  Germans spend a t  l e a s t  two 
th o u s a n d . C o n t r a s t  t h i s  w i t h  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  
M a jo r  Wissrnann, He m a in t a in s  a t  Z a n z ib a r  a c o s t l y  
h e a d q u a r t e r s ,  w i t h  a numerous and i n t e l l i g e n t  s t a f f .
He has an a b s o l u t e l y  u n l i m i t e d  amount o f  money . . . " .
Euan S m ith  th o u g h t  th e  company c o u ld  o n ly  t r iu m p h
a g a in s t  th e s e  odds i f  i t  im m e d ia t e ly  s e t  a b o u t  b u i l d i n g  a
r a i l w a y  fro m  Mombasa to  Lake V i c t o r i a  and i f  i t  e s t a b l i s h e d
i t s e l f  u n a s s a i l a b l y  i n  Uganda and on th e  l a k e .  I t  w ou ld
have to  change i t s  p o l i c y  and s t r i v e  a f t e r  th e  t r u e  s u b s ta n c e
i n  th e  i n t e r i o r  i n s t e a d  o f  a t t e m p t in g  to  g r a p p le  w i t h  th e
shadow w h ic h  e t e r n a l l y  e lu d e d  i t  on th e  c o a s t .  He s a id  i t
was u s e le s s  f o r  th e  go vern m en t to  a t te m p t  to  s u p p o r t  th e
2
company i n  a s e r i e s  o f  n e v e r  e n d in g  p e t t y  d is p u t e s  .
1 .  Wissmann was th e  German I m p e r i a l  C o m m iss io n er i n  E a s t
A f r i c a .
2 .  MP. Copy o f  l e t t e r  fro m  Euan S m ith  to  F . O . ,  31 M arch
1890.
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The s e q u e l  to  t h i s  a p p a r e n t l y  a u t h e n t i c  l e t t e r  was 
s t r a n g e .  When M a c k in n o n  r e c e iv e d  a copy o f  i t ,  he s e n t  a 
t e le g r a in  to  Euan S m ith  s a y in g  t h a t  th e  l e t t e r  c o n ta in e d  th e  
s o r t  o f  comments w h ic h  he w ou ld  have e x p e c te d  fro m  ’Wissmann, 
and Euan S m ith  t e le g r a p h e d  ba c k  s a y in g s
11. . . Cannot r e c a l l  p r i v a t e  l e t t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o .
I  have  no cop y . W ith  r e g a r d  to  I . E . S . A .  Co. 
my c o n s c ie n c e  p e r f e c t l y  c l e a r ,  have n o t  w r i t t e n ,  
spo ken , a c t e d ,  save f u r t h e r a n c e  t r u e s t  i n t e r e s t s  
o f ,  to  o b t a i n  f ro m  g o v t ,  t h e i r  s u p p o r t .  W a it  
u n t i l  a f t e r  c o n s u l t in g  M a c k e n z ie  . . .  A f t e r  th e  
r e t u r n  o f  M a c k e n z ie  i f  you t h i n k  I  am d i s l o y a l  
to  I . B . E . A .  Co, s h a l l  r e q u e s t  t h a t  I  am removed  
fro m  h e r e ,  as p o s i t i o n  w ou ld  im m e d ia t e ly  become 
i n s u p p o r t a b l e .
K i r k  o f t e n  c o m p la in e d  t h a t  Euan S m i t h ’ s p o l i c y  was 
h a r m fu l  to  th e  company, b u t  t h e r e  a p p e a rs  to  be no f u r t h e r  
c o rre s p o n d e n c e  a b o u t t h i s  l e t t e r ,  p re s u m a b ly  because  
M a c k e n z ie ,  who had handed o v e r  to  S i r  F r a n c is  de W in to n  
and r e t u r n e d  to  E n g la n d  t h a t  summer, was a b le  to  m e d ia te .  
M a ck in n o n  was no d o u b t annoyed by th e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  
com pany’ s s t r a t e g y ;  on th e  o t h e r  hand th e  l e t t e r  d id  r e ­
e n fo r c e  h i s  r e p e a te d  c o m p la in t  t h a t  th e  German company 
r e c e iv e d  f a r  more go v e rn m e n t s u p p o r t  th a n  th e  I . B . E . A .  
Company. T h is  c o n t r a s t  became v e r y  m arked a f t e r  th e  
i n s u r r e c t i o n  i n  th e  German s p h e re ,  because  th e  Germans had  
r e a c t e d  n o t  o n ly  by b lo c k a d in g  th e  c o a s t  b u t  a ls o  by
1. MP. Euan Smith to Mackinnon, 12th May 1890.
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a p p o in t in g  Wissmann as t h e i r  C o m m iss io ner i n  E a s t  A f r i c a .
T h is  gave German i n t e r e s t s  acc e s s  to  go v e rn m e n t s u p p o r t  and  
fu n d s  i n  a way w h ic h  was d e n ie d  to  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company. 
M a ck in n o n  was f u l l y  aw are o f  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  and n o t  v e r y  
h o p e f u l  a b o u t th e  f u t u r e  i n  c o n s e q u e n c e . I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
he f e a r e d  t h a t  a f o r c e  u n d e r  Wissmann and Emin m ig h t  com pel 
Hwanga to  s u b m it  to  German d o m in a t io n ,  and i n  A p r i l  1 8 9 0  he 
s a id  to  L o rd  S a l i s b u r y :
u . . .  The German company w i t h  w h ic h  a lo n e  we had  
to  re c k o n  two y e a rs  ago has p r a c t i c a l l y  d is a p p e a r e d  
and i t  i s  w i t h  th e  German E m p ire  we have to  r e c k o n  
w i t h  now. W ith  i t  we c a n n o t c o n te n d  and I  f e e l  
t h a t  w i t h o u t  know ing  s o m e th in g  o f  y o u r  L o rd s h ip s  
w is h e s  i t  i s  u s e le s s  f o r  us to  a t te m p t  a n y t h in g  
more i n  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  Uganda . . .  I n  a l l  d i r e c t i o n s  
we a r e  o v e rb o rn e  by German p la n s  and I  f e e l  so 
d is h e a r t e n e d  by th e  a p p a r e n t  lukew arm n ess  o f  th e
s u p p o r t  we r e c e i v e  fro m  H .lv I . ’ s go v e rn m e n t i n  th e
w ork  we have been t r y i n g  to  do f o r  o u r  c o u n t ry  
t h a t  I  b e g in  to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  th e  p r o s p e c ts  f o r  
u s e f u ln e s s  w h ic h  en co u ra g e d  us to  u n d e r ta k e  and  
e a r n e s t l y  and p e a c e f u l l y  to  p r o s e c u te  th e  w ork  
a re  so r a p i d l y  d is a p p e a r in g  t h a t  I  f e e l  g r e a t  . 
d i f f i c u l t y  as to  o u r  p la n s  f o r  th e  f u t u r e  . . . r,~
M a c k in n o n 1 s v ie w  t h a t  go v e rn m e n t v/as weak i n  th e  fa c e  
o f  German p r e s s u r e ,  and g e n e r a l l y  p a r s im o n io u s ,  was o n ly  too  
w e l l  known to  L o rd  S a l i s b u r y ,  who a t t r i b u t e d  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  
th e  blam e f o r  th e  s e t - b a c k s  to  M a ck in n o n  h i m s e l f .  I n  th e
m onth t h a t  he r e c e iv e d  M a c k in n o n ’ s l e t t e r  q u o te d  above he
s a id  to  Goschen, who was C h a n c e l lo r  o f  th e  E x c h e q u e r ;
1. IIP. Mackinnon to Lord Salisbury $ April 1890.
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” . . .  The g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  h e re  ( i n  th e  E a s t  A f r i c a  
P ro b le m ) i s  th e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  M ack in n o n  • . .  He 
has none o f  th e  q u a l i t i e s  f o r  p u s h in g  an e n t e r p r i s e  
w h ic h  depends on d e c is io n  and s m a r tn e s s .  He has  
g o t  th e  f i n e s t  h a r b o u r  on th e  c o a s t  -  has had i t  
f o r  f i v e  y e a r s  -  y e t  t h e r e  i s  n o t  even a j e t t y  t h e r e .
H is  hopes o f  t r a d e  depend on h i s  e n a b l in g  th e  c a ra v a n s  
to  g e t  o v e r  a w a t e r le s s  b e l t  o f  f i f t y  m i le s  w h ic h  
s e p a r a te  him  fro m  th e  p r o f i t a b l e  c o u n t r y .  Y e t ,  
a l th o u g h  he has had a mass o f  r a i l w a y  m a t e r i a l  t h e r e  
a lo n g  t im e ,  he has n o t  y e t  l a i d  a y a rd  o f  i t .  He 
has no e n e rg y  f o r  a n y t h in g  e x c e p t  q u a r r e l l i n g  w i t h  
G-ermans
T h is  was an u n d u ly  h a r s h  jud gem ent on M a c k in n o n , b u t  
o v e r  th e  y e a rs  S a l i s b u r y  had r e c e iv e d  a g r e a t  many a p p l i c a t i o n s  
p e t i t i o n s  and c o m p la in ts  fro m  h im . These d a te d  fro m  th e  
y e a rs  1 8 7 4 -7 8  when S a l i s b u r y  had been S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  
I n d i a ,  b u t  th e y  had c o n t in u e d  to  re a c h  h im  l a t e r  when he 
became F o r e ig n  S e c r e t a r y  and P r im e  M i n i s t e r .  A l t o g e t h e r  
S a l i s b u r y  must have become v e r y  t i r e d  o f  M a c k in n o n , and i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  o f  th e  way i n  w h ic h  he so o f t e n  d e p ic t e d  th e  
B r i t i s h  g o vern m en t as weak and v a c i l l a t i n g  by c o n t r a s t  w i t h
t h a t  o f  Germ any. I n  e f f e c t  he was t o l d  t h a t  he l e d  a f e e b l e ,
p a rs im o n io u s  and i n d e c i s i v e  g o vern m en t and th e n  asked to  
p r o v id e  s u p p o r t .  T h is  n a t u r a l l y  made him  u n s y m p a t h e t ic , 
and he c o n c lu d e d  among o t h e r  t h in g s  t h a t  M a ck in n o n  la c k e d  
i n i a t i v e ,  b u t  w hat he f a i l e d  to  m e n t io n  i n  th e  passage q u o te d
above was t h a t  M a ck in n o n  w anted  to  b u i l d  a r a i l w a y  b u t  c o u ld
n o t  r a i s e  enough money, l a r g e l y  because  th e  company la c k e d  
go v e rn m e n t b a c k in g .
1 .  S a l i s b u r y  to  G oschen, 10 A p r i l  1 8 9 0 .  Quoted by C e c i l ,  
o p . c i t . ,  p .  2 8 1 .
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I n  A ugust 1889  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  o f  a m i l l i o n  pounds 
w o r th  o f  s h a re s  had been is s u e d  on th e  open m a rk e t  bu t o n ly  
a b o u t  a t h i r d  had been ta k e n  u p , b r i n g i n g  th e  com pany's  
c a p i t a l  to  a l i t t l e  o v e r  h a l f  a m i l l i o n  pounds1 , T h is  was 
d i s a p p o i n t i n g , b u t  M a c k in n o n  n e v e r t h e le s s  had t h i r t y  m i le s  
o f  l i g h t  r a i l  s h ip p e d  o u t  to  th e  c o a s t ,  p a r t l y  i n  th e  hope  
t h a t  S t a n l e y  w ould  r e t u r n  w i t h  success  fro m  th e  Emin Pasha  
R e l i e f  E x p e d i t i o n  and so s t i m u l a t e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  and s u p p o r t  
f o r  th e  company. I n  f a c t  th e  e x p e d i t i o n  ended i n  a n t i ­
c l im a x ,  e f f o r t s  to  r a i s e  money i n  1890  w ere  no more s u c c e s s f u l ,  
and as i s  e v id e n t  fro m  th e  passag es  q u o te d  above M a ck in n o n  
and S a l i s b u r y  had become t h o r o u g h ly  d i s i l l u s i o n e d .  M a c k in n o n ,  
who had hoped to  e s t a b l i s h  a v i a b l e  company and to  s e c u re  
B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s ,  f e l t  t h a t  he had n o t  r e c e iv e d  fro m  g o v e rn ­
ment th e  k in d  o f  s u p p o r t  to  w h ic h  he th o u g h t  he was e n t i t l e d  
o r  w h ic h  th e  German company had e n jo y e d  fro m  i t s  g o v e rn m e n t.  
S a l i s b u r y  f o r  h is  p a r t  had been d is a p p o in t e d  by th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  
o f  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company.
By th e  autumn o f  1889  t h e r e  w ere  f o u r  im p o r t a n t  a re a s  
o f  d is p u t e  b e tw een  B r i t a i n  and Germany w h ic h  w ere  o f  some 
c o n c e rn  to  th e  company. T h e re  was th e  i s l a n d  o f  Z a n z ib a r ;  
th e  A n g lo -G e rm a n  b o u n d a ry  to  th e  w e s t  o f  Lake V i c t o r i a ;  th e  
a r e a  to  th e  w e s t  o f  Lake N yasa ; and th e  h i n t e r l a n d  o f  W i tu ,
1. I)e Kiewiet, op.cit., p. 271.
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w h ic h  m ig h t  g iv e  acc e s s  to  th e  U p p er N i l e ,  and th e  new German 
p r o t e c t o r a t e  to  th e  n o r t h  o f  i t ^ .  I n  a d d i t i o n  ;th e  p o s i t i o n  
i n  Uganda had become u n s t a b l e .  Kabaka Mwanga o f  Buganda had  
been deposed i n  O c to b e r  1 8 8 9 ,  and i n  December S t a n le y  had  
r e t u r n e d  to  th e  c o a s t  w i t h  th e  E q u a t o r i a l  P r o v in c e  aban do ned .  
A d m i t t e d ly  Mwanga r e g a in e d  h is  t h r o n e ,  b u t  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he 
had been o b l ig e d  to  f l e e  r e v e a le d  th e  weakness o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n .  
M o re o v e r ,  fro m  B r i t a i n *  s p o i n t  o f  v ie w  th e  s i t u a t i o n  was made 
to  a p p e a r  more dan g ero u s  i n  F e b r u a r y  1 8 9 0 ,  when P e t e r s  
p e rs u a d e d  Mwanga to  s ig n  an a g re e m e n t to  open h is  t e r r i t o r i e s  
to  a l l  E u ro p e a n s , to  a c c e p t  fre e d o m  o f  t r a d e  and to  have  
f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  v / i th  th e  German E m p e ro r .
By A p r i l  1 8 9 0 ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  S a l i s b u r y  had d e c id e d  t h a t  
th e  t im e  had come to  e n t e r  i n t o  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  
Germ any. B is m a rc k  had been d is m is s e d  i n  M a rc h , and t h e r e  
was no c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  h i s  s u c c e s s o rs  w ould  a d h e re  to  th e  
a s s u ra n c e  g iv e n  th e  p r e v io u s  y e a r  t h a t  Uganda and W a d e la i  
w ere o u t s id e  G erm any*s s p h e re  o f  c o l o n i s a t i o n .  A ls o  he had  
c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company w ou ld  n o t  s e rv e  h i s  
p u rp o s e .  I t  had n o t  a d e q u a t e ly  s e c u re d  th e  h i n t e r l a n d  a re a s  
o f  acc e s s  to  th e  U p per N i l e ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand M ack in n o n  was 
m akin g  w hat S a l i s b u r y  re g a rd e d  as e x c e s s iv e  c la im s  i n  
dem anding t h a t  th e  t e r r i t o r y  b e tw e e n  th e  Congo S t a t e  and
1. Sanderson, op.cit., pp. 49-50.
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Lakes V i c t o r i a  and T a n g a n y ik a  s h o u ld  fo rm  p a r t  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  
s p h e re .  M ack in n o n  s u p p o r te d  J o h n s to n  and Rhodes i n  t h e i r  
d e s i r e  f o r  an 11 a l l  r e d  r o u t e ” to  j o i n  Uganda w i t h  th e  S o u th  
A f r i c a  Company’ s a r e a  as p a r t  o f  a B r i t i s h  c o n t r o l l e d  
t e r r i t o r y  fro m  th e  Cape to  th e  N i l e ,  and b e tw e e n  A p r i l  and 
November 1 8 8 9 ,  he and h i s  a g e n t  N i c o l  w ro te  a number o f  l e t t e r s  
to  S t a n le y  u r g in g  upon him
“ th e  im p o r ta n c e  to  B r i t i s h  commerce and to  o u r  company 
o f  s e c u r in g  a l l  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  n o r t h  o f  th e  l i n e  draw n  
f ro m  th e  s o u th  end o f  V i c t o r i a  N yanza  . . .  to  a n o th e r  
p o i n t  on Lake T a n g a n y ik a .
These l e t t e r s  caused some e m b a rra s s m e n t,  because  f o u r
o f  them f e l l  i n t o  German hands when th e y  c a p tu r e d  A b u s h i r i ,
2
th e  l e a d e r  o f  th e  r e b e l l i o n  a g a i n s t  them ; b u t  when S t a n le y  
met M a ck in n o n  a t  C annes, i n  A p r i l  1 8 9 0 ,  he was a b le  to  
d e l i v e r  s i x  t r e a t i e s  w hereby  a l a r g e  a r e a  to  th e  w e s t o f  
Lake V i c t o r i a  was supposed to  have been a c q u i r e d  f o r  th e
I . B . E . A .  Company^. From Cannes th e y  w ent to  B r u s s e ls ,  w here  
th e y  d is c u s s e d  w i t h  L e o p o ld  th e  d i v i s i o n  o f  s p h e re s  o f  
i n f l u e n c e  b e tw e e n  th e  company and th e  Congo S t a t e ,  and on 
6 May th e y  d in e d  w i t h  S a l i s b u r y ,  who on May 13 in c lu d e d  th e  
a r e a  f o r  th e  ’’a l l  re d  r o u t e ” among h is  p r o p o s a ls  f o r  r e s o l v i n g  
A n g lo -G e rm a n  d i f f e r e n c e s ^ .  The Germans, n o t  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,
1 .  P .O .  8 4 /2 0 3 6 .  M a ck in n o n  to  N i c o l ,  A ugust 1 ,  1 8 8 9 .
Fo rw a rd e d  to  S t a n l e y .
2 .  I ) .R .  G i l l a r d ,  S a l i s b u r y ’ s A f r i c a n  p o l i c y  and th e  H e l i g o l a n d
o f f e r  o f  1 8 9 0 r  E n g l is h  H i s t o r i c a l  R e v ie w , LXXV, 2 9 7 ( 1 9 6 0 ) ,  
p . 6 4 7 .
3 .  C o l l i n s ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  1 4 0 .
4 . C o l l i n s ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  14*1.
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r e j e c t e d  B r i t i s h  c la im s  to  t h i s  “wedge" o f  t e r r i t o r y ,  because  
i t  more l o g i c a l l y  fo rm ed  p a r t  o f  th e  h i n t e r l a n d  o f  t h e i r  
p r o t e c t o r a t e .  H o w e v e r , on May 20 a d r a f t  was s u b m it te d  to  
S a l i s b u r y  o f  an A g reem en t be tw e e n  M a ck in n o n  and L e o p o ld  w h ic h  
w ould  a l lo w  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company to  use a " c o r r i d o r "  o n ly  f i v e  
m ile s  w id e ,  b u t  w i t h i n  th e  b o rd e rs  o f  th e  Congo F re e  S t a t e ,  to  
p r o v id e  access  b e tw e e n  th e  s p h e re s  o f  th e  I . B . E . A .  and S o u th  
A f r i c a  c o m p an ies . I n  r e t u r n  th e  Congo S t a t e  w ould  g e t  access  
to  th e  N i l e  as f a r  as L ad o ^ . On May 14 M ack in n o n  had t o l d  
S a l i s b u r y  t h a t
" th e  K in g  o f  th e  B e lg ia n s  . . .  ipost g e n e r o u s ly  
e x p re s s e s  h is  d e s i r e  to  h e lp  us i n  e v e r y  w ay^to  
f a c i l i t a t e  o u r  acc e s s  to  (L a k e )  T a n g a n y ik a ."
T h is  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  h a v in g  a 
" c o r r i d o r "  i n s i d e  th e  Congo S t a t e  may have  been  raised w i t h  
S a l i s b u r y  b e f o r e  th e  d r a f t  A greem ent was s u b m it te d  to  him  on 
May 2 0 .  I n  any e v e n t  he w ro te  to  L e o p o ld  th e  f o l l o w i n g  day  
and s a id  t h a t  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  w ou ld  r a i s e  no o b j e c t i o n  to  
th e  engagem ent w h ic h  h e ,  as head o f  th e  Congo S t a t e ,  had  
e n t e r e d  i n t o  w i t h  M a c k in n o n f s company . When he w ro te  t h i s ,  
S a l i s b u r y  had f o r g o t t e n  a b o u t th e  a g re e m e n t b e tw een  F ra n c e  
and L e o p o ld  w h ic h  gave F ra n c e  th e  r i g h t  o f  p r e - e m p t io n  i n
1 .  T h is  came to  be known as th e  M a ck in n o n  T r e a t y .
2 .  S .P .  M a ck in n o n  to  S a l i s b u r y ,  14 May 1 8 9 0 .
3 . C o l l i n s ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  1 4 2 .
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th e  e v e n t  o f  th e  Congo S t a t e  r e l i n q u i s h i n g  any o f  i t s  
t e r r i t o r y .  When A n derso n  r e t u r n e d  fro m  B e r l i n  and re m in d e d  
him  o f  i t  a few  days l a t e r ' * ' , he t r i e d  to  p e rs u a d e  M a ck in n o n
p
to  change h i s  d r a f t  A greem ent w i t h  L e o p o ld  , bu t on June 2 
M ack in n o n  s a id :
" I  am a f r a i d  i t  i s  to o  l a t e  to  p ro p o se  any a l t e r a t i o n  
o f  t h a t  A greem ent and I have  re a s o n  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
th e  K in g  o f  th e  B e lg ia n s  e x p e c ts  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  to  
be exchanged n o t  l a t e r  th a n  tom orrow  e v e n in g .
A t  a c a b in e t  m e e t in g  on June 3 , S a l i s b u r y  was o v e r r u le d  
i n  h is  o p p o s i t io n  to  M a c k in n o n 's  c la im s ,  so l a t e r  i n  th e  day  
he met M ack in n o n  and t o l d  him  t h a t  th e  M a c k in n o n  T r e a t y  c o u ld  
be r a t i f i e d ,  b u t  t h a t  an A d d i t i o n a l  D e c l a r a t i o n  s h o u ld  be 
a t t a c h e d .  T h is  was to  e x p l a i n  t h a t  th e  company w ou ld  n o t  
a c q u i r e  s o v e r e ig n  r i g h t s  o v e r  th e  t e r r i t o r y  such as w ould  
p e r m i t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  by P ra n c e .
On June 7 M a ck in n o n  t o l d  S a l i s b u r y  t h a t  he had r a t i f i e d  
th e  T r e a t y  and t h a t  he w ould  a c c e p t  th e  1 d e g re e  s o u th  l a t i t u d e  
as th e  b o u n d a ry  b e tw e e n  B r i t i s h  and German s p h e re s  to  th e  w es t
o f  Lake V i c t o r i a ^ .  By J u ly  18 th e  te rm s  o f  th e  A d d i t i o n a l
D e c l a r a t i o n  had been a g r e e d ,  b u t  a few  days l a t e r  M a ck in n o n
1 .  P .O .  8 4 /2 0 8 6 .  Memo, by A n d e rs o n , 27 May 1 8 9 0 .
2 .  S a l i s b u r y  s a id  to  ^ueen V i c t o r i a ,  M a ck in n o n  "has a l l  t h a t
he r e a l l y  has a r i g h t  to  w h ic h  i s  U g a n d a ,"  June 1 1 8 9 0 .  
C i t e d  by C o l l i n s ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  143*
3 .  P .O . 8 4 /2 0 8 3 *  M a ck in n o n  to  S a l i s b u r y ,  2 June 1 8 9 0 .
4 .  P .O .  8 4 /2 0 8 3 *  Mackinnon to  S a l i s b u r y ,  7 June 1 8 9 0 .
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r e t u r n e d  to  London fro m  B r u s s e ls  h a v in g  l o s t  h is  e n th u s ia s m  
f o r  th e  T r e a t y .  On J u ly  25 A nderson  m in u te d :
" S i r  W i l l i a m  M ack in n o n  c a l l e d  y e s t e r d a y .  He had seen  
th e  K in g  o f  th e  B e lg ia n s  whom he fo u n d  v e r y  much 
d is t u r b e d  a b o u t th e  F re n c h  c la im .
S i r  W i l l i a m  and h i s  c o u n c i l ,  a r e ,  I  g a t h e r e d ,  now 
d is p o s e d  to  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e i r  b e s t  p la n  w i l l  be to  
c a n c e l  t h e i r  A greem ent w i t h  H is  M a je s t y .
I  e n c o u rag ed  t h i s  i d e a ,  s a y in g  t h a t  m ig h t  be th e  
s im p le s t  way o f  s o lv in g  th e  d i f f i c u l t y . " 1
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  e x a c t l y  w hat t r a n s p i r e d  i n  B r u s s e ls ,  
b u t i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  th e  F r e n c h ,  by v i r t u e  o f  th e  p r e - e m p t io n  
a g re e m e n t,  p u t  so much p r e s s u r e  on L e o p o ld  t h a t  he asked  
M a ck in n o n  n o t  to  p u rs u e  th e  M a ck in n o n  T r e a t y .  The f a c t  t h a t  
M a ck in n o n  a c q u ie s c e d  so r e a d i l y  adds to  th e  im p r e s s io n  t h a t  
he was v e r y  much u n d e r  L e o p o ld ’ s i n f l u e n c e  i n  h i s  a t t i t u d e  to  
th e  " a l l  r e d  r o u t e " ,  and to  th e  " c o r r i d o r " .  I n  a d v o c a t in g  
th e  " a l l  r e d  r o u t e "  he had been e c h o in g  J o h n s to n  and R hodes,  
b u t  a ls o  c o o p e r a t in g  w i t h  L e o p o ld  who had s a id  i n  A p r i l  1 6 8 9 :
" I  am a n x io u s  t h a t  no u n o c c u p ie d  t e r r i t o r i e s  s h o u ld  
s ta n d  be tw een  y o u r  s t a t i o n s  and m in e ." ^
I t  was p r o b a b ly  no c o in c id e n c e  t h a t  M a ck in n o n  w ro te  
th e  f i r s t  o f  h i s  s e r i e s  o f  l e t t e r s  to  S t a n l e y ,  a b o u t  th e  " a l l  
re d  r o u t e " ,  i n  th e  same m onth , and c e r t a i n l y  th e  id e a  o f  
h a v in g  a " c o r r i d o r " ,  th ro u g h  th e  Congo S t a t e ,  a ro s e  fro m  
d is c u s s io n s  w i t h  L e o p o ld .
1 .  F . O .  8 4 / 2 0 8 7 .  Memo, by A n d e rs o n , 25 J u ly  1 8 9 0 .
2 .  L e o p o ld  to  M a c k in n o n , 18 A p r i l  1 8 8 9 .  Q uoted by S m ith ,
o p . c i t . ,  p . 1 3 6 .
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Prom th e  p o i n t  o f  v ie w  o f  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company, h o w e v e r,  
th e  case f o r  a c q u i r i n g  th e  " a l l  re d  r o u t e ” o r  th e  " c o r r i d o r ” 
was n o t  c o n v in c in g .  The a n t i -G e r m a n  a s p e c t  o f  th e  " a l l  re d  
r o u t e ” no d o u b t a p p e a le d  to  M a c k in n o n , b u t  w hat th e  company 
needed was some p o l i c y  w h ic h  w ou ld  e s t a b l i s h  i t  as a v i a b l e  
c o n c e rn .  T h e re  was no e v id e n c e ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h a t  much t r a d e  
w ould  f lo w  a lo n g  th e  " c o r r i d o r ” , w h i le  on th e  o t h e r  hand i t  
was c l e a r  t h a t  th e  c o s t  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  i t  w ould  add to  th e  
bu rd ens  o f  th e  company, w h ic h  was a l r e a d y  o v e r -c o m m it t e d .
T h is  p re s u m a b ly  e x p la in s  why M a ck in n o n  so q u i c k l y  abandoned  
h is  e n th u s ia s m  f o r  th e  T r e a t y .  The a d v a n ta g e s  w h ic h  i t  
o f f e r e d  w ere  more o b v io u s ly  i n  f a v o u r  o f  L e o p o ld ,  who two 
y e a rs  l a t e r  c i t e d  i t  as a p r e t e x t  f o r  la u n c h in g  an e x p e d i t i o n  
i n t o  th e  r e g io n  o f  th e  U p per N i l e ,  a l th o u g h  as f a r  as 
M a ck in n o n  was c o n c e rn e d  i t  was a dead l e t t e r .  The A d d i t i o n a l  
D e c l a r a t i o n  was n e v e r  s ig n e d ,  h is  company d id  n o t  a t te m p t  to  
use th e  " c o r r i d o r ” , and " S a l i s b u r y  seems to  have in t e n d e d  
fro m  th e  o u t s e t  to  p r e v e n t  any o c c u p a t io n  o f  th e  c o r r i d o r  by 
th e  company, and he u n d o u b te d ly  gave th e  Germans a s s u ra n c e s  
to  t h i s  e f f e c t . V e r y  much more s i g n i f i c a n t  th a n  t h i s  
T r e a t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  was th e  A n g lo -G erm an  A greem ent o f  1 J u ly  
1 8 9 0 ,  a b o u t o u t s t a n d in g  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  th e  two c o u n t r ie s  
i n  A f r i c a .  f t  was a w id e  r e a c h in g  s e t t l e m e n t ,  w i t h  th e  
f o l l o w i n g  im p o r t a n t  f e a t u r e s  f o r  th e  company: Germany gave
1. Sanderson, op.cit., p. 93.
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up h e r  c la im s  to  W itu  and to  th e  c o a s t  b e tw e e n  th e  Tana and  
Juba r i v e r s ,  and she r e c o g n is e d  Uganda and Z a n z ib a r  as b e in g  
w i t h i n  B r i t a i n ’ s s p h e r e .  I n  r e t u r n  B r i t a i n  ceded th e  s m a l l  
i s l a n d  o f  H e l i g o l a n d ,  w h ic h  commands th e  sea  a p p ro a c h e s  to  th e  
r i v e r s  E lb e  and Weser on th e  n o r t h  c o a s t  o f  Germ any. She 
a ls o  a g re e d  to  u rg e  th e  S u l t a n  o f  Z a n z ib a r  to  s e l l  th e  German 
s p h e re  o f  th e  E a s t  A f r i c a n  c o a s t  o u t r i g h t .
The A greem ent o f  J u ly  1 s e c u re d  Uganda and a p o r t  on th e  
e a s t  c o a s t ,  w h ic h  w ere  among S a l i s b u r y ’ s o b j e c t i v e s ,  b u t  i t  d id  
n o t  s o lv e  th e  com pany’ s f i n a n c i a l  p ro b le m s . V a r io u s  a t te m p ts  
w ere made to  ease th e  s i t u a t i o n ^ ,  b u t  M a c k in n o n  was a g a in  
u n s u c c e s s fu l  i n  t r y i n g  to  r a i s e  s u f f i c i e n t  c a p i t a l  and seemed 
to  have a f e e l i n g  o f  p e r s o n a l  f a i l u r e  a b o u t i t ,  because i n  
A u gu st he s a id  to  S i r  F r a n c is  de W in to n :
’’D u r in g  th e  p a s t  fe w  weeks i n  London I  f e l t  so o p p re s s e d  
w i t h  w o rk ,  and so w o r r ie d  and worn o u t  t h a t  I  c o u ld  
h a r d l y  u n d e r ta k e  any c o rre s p o n d e n c e  o f  any s o r t ,  and 
I  was u n a b le  to  push m a t t e r s  i n  c o n n e c t io n  w i t h  th e  
com pany’ s c a p i t a l  i n  th e  way I  w is h e d  to  . . . ” ^
I n  f a c t  th e  o b s ta c le  to  r a i s i n g  money was n o t  so much 
M a c k in n o n ’ s p o o r  h e a l t h  as t h a t  w i t h o u t  a g o vern m en t g r a n t  
o r  s u b s id y  th e  company d id  n o t  o f f e r  enough s e c u r i t y  to  
a t t r a c t  i n v e s t o r s .  S a l i s b u r y ,  who hoped t h a t  th e  company 
w ou ld  be a b le  to  b u i l d  a r a i l w a y  fro m  th e  c o a s t  to  U ganda,
1 .  See M c D e rm o tt ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p . 1 7 8 -1 9 1  ana De K i e w i e t ,  o p . c i t . ,
p p . 2 8 1 -2 9 j .
2 .  I IP .  M ack in n o n  to  de W in to n ,  1 A ugust 1 8 9 0 .
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t r i e d ,  i n  December 1 8 9 0 ,  to  p e rs u a d e  th e  T r e a s u r y  to  g u a ra n te e  
5c/o i n t e r e s t  on c a p i t a l  o f  l£  m i l l i o n  pounds w h ic h  M a ck in n o n  was 
to  r a i s e ^ .  Goschen, th e  C h a n c e l lo r  o f  th e  E x c h e q u e r ,  was 
i n i t i a l l y  s y m p a th e t ic ,  b u t  changed h i s  m ind when he was 
p e rs u a d e d  by o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  i t  w ou ld  be im m o ra l to  s u b s id is e  
a company w h ic h  was s l i d i n g  to w a rd s  i n s o lv e n c y .
The d i r e c t o r s  o f  th e  company, f o r  t h e i r  p a r t ,  a p p l i e d ,
to w a rd s  th e  end o f  th e  y e a r ,  f o r  an a n n u a l g o vern m en t s u b s id y
o f  £ 2 5 ,0 0 0  o r  a g u a r a n t e e .  They c i t e d  o t h e r  co m p an ies , and
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e i r  German r i v a l ,  w h ic h  r e c e iv e d  s u b s t a n t i a l
h e lp  fro m  t h e i r  g o v e rn m e n ts .  They a ls o  c la im e d  t h a t  th e y  had
u n d e r ta k e n  a d d i t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  such as th e  a c q u i s i t i o n
o f  more t e r r i t o r y ,  i n  o r d e r  to  f u r t h e r  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  and
n o t  f o r  c o m m e rc ia l r e a s o n s .  I n  o t h e r  words th e y  had made
f i n a n c i a l  s a c r i f i c e s  i n  th e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .  I n  many ways
th e y  r e s t a t e d  p o in t s  w h ic h  had been made by M ack in n o n  i n  a
2
p r i v a t e  l e t t e r  to  S a l i s b u r y  , b u t  th e s e  re a s o n s  w ere  u n l i k e l y  
to  sway P a r l i a m e n t ,  so th e  company a ls o  a rg u e d  t h a t  a r a i l w a y  
s h o u ld  be b u i l t  as a means o f  c o m b a tin g  th e  i n l a n d  s la v e  t r a d e .  
T h is  was an argum ent w h ic h  c a r r i e d  w e ig h t  because i t  was 
d i r e c t l y  s u p p o rte d  by th e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  th e  B r u s s e ls  Conference  
a t  th e  end o f  J u l y ,  1 8 9 0 .  The C o n fe re n c e  had been c a l l e d  to  
c o n s id e r  m easures f o r  e n d in g  th e  s la v e  t r a d e ,  and among th o s e
1 .  M c D e rm o tt ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  1 8 1 .
2 .  S . P .  M ack in n o n  to  S a l i s b u r y ,  3 J u ly  1 890  ( C o l l e c t i o n  o f
unbound l e t t e r s ) .
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w h ic h  i t  had. recommended was th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  r a i l w a y s .  
S in c e  B r i t a i n  was a s i g n a t o r y  o f  th e  G e n e r a l  A c t  o f  th e  
C o n fe re n c e  w h ic h  em bodied t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n , M a ck in n o n  and 
th e  o t h e r  d i r e c t o r s  a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  g o vern m en t was m o r a l l y  
o b l ig e d  to  a s s i s t  w i t h  th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a r a i l w a y .  They  
th o u g h t  t h a t  th e  company c o u ld  r a i s e  th e  n e c e s s a ry  fu n d s  i f  
i t  had a s u b s id y  o r  a g u a r a n te e .  I t  c e r t a i n l y  d id  n o t  s ta n d  
a chance w i t h o u t  some e v id e n c e  o f  go vern m en t c o n f id e n c e  and 
b a c k in g .
S a l i s b u r y  s u p p o r te d  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  a s u b s id y ^ , and 
th e  T r e a s u r y  was f a v o u r a b ly  d is p o s e d ,  p a r t l y  because  i t  hoped  
t h a t  an e f f e c t i v e  p o l i c y  a g a i n s t  th e  s la v e  t r a d e  i n l a n d  w ould  
save money on th e  squadrons w h ic h  w ere m a in ta in e d  a t  sea  a t  an 
a n n u a l c o s t  o f  £ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 .  The C a b in e t ,  h o w e v e r ,  d e c id e d  t h a t  
i t  w ould  be more p r u d e n t  to  s eek  £ 2 0 ,0 0 0  to w a rd s  th e  c o s t  o f  a 
s u rv e y  f o r  th e  r a i l w a y ,  b u t  th e  O p p o s i t io n  r e f u s e d  to  a c c e p t  
t h i s  as an u n c o n te n t io u s  m easure and so th e  go vern m en t had to  
w ith d r a w  i t .  By th e n  i t  was J u ly  1891  and th e  com pany’ s 
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  had d e t e r i o r a t e d  s t i l l  f u r t h e r .
I t  u n d e r to o k  to  p ro c e e d  w i t h  th e  s u rv e y  on th e  u n d e r ­
s ta n d in g  t h a t  the  g o vern m en t w ou ld  r e - a p p l y  f o r  th e  money 
e a r l y  i n  th e  n e x t  s e s s io n  o f  P a r l i a m e n t ,  b u t  i t  a ls o  r e s o lv e d  
to  w ith d r a w  t e m p o r a r i l y  fro m  U ganda. l u g a r d  was n o t i f i e d
1. F.O. 84/2097* P.O. to Treasury, 20 December 1890.
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i n  a l e t t e r  o f  th e  l ( T o f  A u g u s t ,  and l a t e r  th e  company t o l d  
S a l i s b u r y  t h a t  i t  had ta k e n  th e  d e c i s i o n  because  o f  th e  e v e n ts  
i n  P a r l i a m e n t ;  because  r a p i d  e x p a n s io n  had been f o r c e d  upon i t  
by i t s  German n e ig h b o u r ,  and becau se  t h r e e  f i f t h s  o f  th e  
s u b s c r ib e d  c a p i t a l  had been s p e n t .
When th e  d e c i s io n  became p u b l i c  t h e r e  was a 
c o n s id e r a b le  o u t c r y .  The Tim es , f o r  e x a m p le , s a id  
t h a t  w i t h d r a w a l  w ou ld  be a n a t i o n a l  c a l a m i t y .  The c a p i t a l  
a l r e a d y  s p e n t  w ou ld  be w a s te d ,  th e  a n t i - s l a v e r y  p o l i c y  
w ould  be d e f e a t e d ,  th e  m is s i o n a r ie s  w ould be p e r s e c u t e d ,  
and B r i t i s h  power and p r e s t i g e  w ou ld  s u f f e r  a s e r io u s  
blow  th r o u g h o u t  c e n t r a l  A f r i c a ,  becau se  th e  company w o rk in g  
u n d e r  a R o y a l  C h a r t e r  was c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  n a t i o n a l  
p o l i c y 1 .
B is h o p  T u c k e r ,  who was p a r t i c u l a r l y  co n c e rn e d  
a b o u t th e  f a t e  o f  th e  A n g l ic a n  m i s s i o n a r i e s ,  had made 
th e  l a s t  p o i n t  v e r y  f o r c i b l y  i n  a l e t t e r  to  T . P .  B u x to n .
A f t e r  t e l l i n g  B u x to n ,  v/ho was one o f  th e  com pany's  
d i r e c t o r s ,  t h a t  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company had a d u ty  to  
m a in t a in  i t s  p o s i t i o n  i n  Uganda, he s a id :
1 .  M c D e rm o tt ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  1 99*  P assag es  q u o te d  fro m  
The T im e s .
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” . . .  The g o v e rn m e n t by a so lem n t r e a t y  w i t h  Germany  
has a c q u ir e d  th e  c o u n t r y  o f  Uganda as p a r t  o f  i t s  
s p h e re  o f  i n f l u e n c e .
W ith  a R o y a l  C h a r t e r  th e  I . B . E . A .  has been  
engaged i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  a p o l i c y  o f  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e  
and e x e r c i s i n g  th e  powers o f  go v e rn m e n t i n  E a s t  
A f r i c a .  I n  o t h e r  words th e  company i s  d o in g  th e  
w ork o f  th e  I m p e r i a l  G overnm ent whose r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
( t o  th e  n a t i v e  m in d ) i t  i s .  H .M .G . i t  seems to  me 
i s  as much r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  a c t i o n  o f  th e  company 
i n  Uganda as i t  w ou ld  be f o r  th e  a c t i o n  o f  i t s  
s e r v a n ts  i n  Downing S t r e e t  o r  i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  
any o f  th e  c a p i t a l s  o f  E u ro pe  . . . " 1
The g o vern m en t was aw are  t h a t  i t  had some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
b u t  i t  c o u ld  n o t  p r o v id e  money w h ic h  was th e  im m e d ia te  n e e d ,  
and i n  S ep tem b er M a ck in n o n  t o l d  th e  Church M is s io n a r y  S o c ie t y  
t h a t  th e  company w ould  have to  w i th d r a w  fro m  Uganda u n le s s  i t  
r e c e iv e d  £ 4 0 , 0 0 0 .  F r ie n d s  o f  th e  C .M .S .  c o l l e c t e d  £ 1 6 ,0 0 0  
and M a ck in n o n  fo u n d  th e  b a la n c e  by c o n t r i b u t i n g  £ 1 0 ,0 0 0  
h i m s e l f  and r a i s i n g  a f u r t h e r  £ 1 5 ,0 0 0  fro m  among h i s  f r i e n d s .  
T h is  e n a b le d  th e  company to  counterm and i t s  p r e v io u s  o r d e r  
to  L u g a rd ,  who was t o l d  t h a t  th e  money s u b s c r ib e d  to  m a i n t a i n  
th e  f o r c e  i n  Uganda f o r  a n o th e r  y e a r  had come l a r g e l y  f ro m  
f r i e n d s  o f  th e  C hurch  M is s io n a r y  S o c ie t y  who w ere  a f r a i d  t h a t  
th e  m is s i o n a r ie s  and t h e i r  f o l l o w e r s  m ig h t  be i n  d a n g e r  i f  
he and h i s  f o r c e  w i th d r e w .  H o w e v e r , th e  a c u te  f i n a n c i a l  
c r i s i s  re m a in e d  as M ack in n o n  em phasised  i n  a lo n g  l e t t e r  
w h ic h  he w ro te  to  L u g a rd  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  N ovem ber. A f t e r  
e x p r e s s in g  warm a p p r e c i a t i o n  f o r  w h a t L u g a rd  had done he s a id :
1. MP. Bishop Tucker to T.F. Buxton, 50th July 1891.
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” . . .  I n  o r d e r  to  b r i n g  i t  w i t h i n  th e  f i n a n c i a l  
pow er o f  th e  company to  m a i n t a i n  th e  o c c u p a t io n  
t i l l  1 s t  J a n u a ry  1893  you m ust do e v e r y t h i n g  p o s s ib le  
to  re d u c e  th e  expense o f  o c c u p a t io n .  W ith  t h i s  
o b j e c t  I  w ou ld  im p re s s  upon you th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  
m aking  th e  c o u n t r y  p r o v id e  as f a r  as p o s s ib le  f o r  
y o u r  o c c u p a t io n  o f  i t .  Y o u r  p re s e n c e  i n  Uganda  
i s  I  am s u re  w o r th  much more to  Mwanga and h is  
p e o p le  th a n  th e  c o s t  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  you t h e r e .
R e p o r ts  say t h a t  t h e r e  a re  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  
i v o r y  h id d e n  i n  th e  c o u n t r y ,  and Mwanga ou gh t to  
s u r r e n d e r  th e s e  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t s  w h ich  
he and h i s  p e o p le  a re  d e r i v i n g  fro m  y o u r  p re s e n c e  
i n  th e  c o u n t r y  . . .  T h e re  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  o f  
o p in io n  h e re  as to  th e  d is a s t r o u s  r e s u l t s  w h ich  
w o u ld  f o l l o w  fro m  a t o t a l  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  th e  com pany's  
f o r c e s ,  even f o r  a t im e ,  fro m  U ganda, and th e  o n ly  
way i n  w h ic h  t h i s  c a l a m i t y  can be a v e r t e d  i s  by 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  th e  o c c u p a t io n  o f  th e  c o u n t r y  on such a 
b a s is  as to  re d u c e  to  th e  s m a l le s t  l i m i t s  th e  
expense o f  such o c c u p a t io n  to  th e  company . . .  I  
have  a lw a y s  had i t  i n  my m ind to  o r g a n is e  a t r a n s p o r t  
s e r v i c e  betv /een  th e  c o a s t  and th e  l a k e .  Had t h i s  
been done two y e a rs  ago th e  c o s t  o f  t r a n s p o r t  now 
w ould  have been re d u c e d  I  s h o u ld  t h i n k  p r o b a b ly  5 0 ^ .
You know I  was f u l l y  i n  sym pathy w i t h  y o u r  p la n  o f  
f o r t s  a lo n g  th e  S a b a k i and a ro a d  c o n n e c t in g  th e s e  
f o r t s  p a s s a b le  f o r  c a r t s  and o t h e r  w h e e le d  c o n v e y a n c e s .  
As you a re  aw are  o r d e r s  w ere  g iv e n  to  S i r  F r a n c is  de 
W in to n  to  f o l l o w  up and c o m p le te  y o u r  w o rk ,  b u t  he 
o b s t i n a t e l y  r e f u s e d  to  obey th e s e  o r d e r s  because he 
b e l i e v e d  i t  w ou ld  be money w a s te d .  C o n s e q u e n t ly  
n o t h in g  has been do ne , v e r y  much to  my r e g r e t ,  b u t  
we hope to  b e g in  a f r e s h  to  w ork  on th e  same l i n e s .  
E v e r y t h in g  ho w ever depends on money and h a v in g  
s p e n t  so much u n p r o f i t a b l y  a l r e a d y  we a r e  o b l ig e d  
to  r e t r e n c h  to  th e  v e r y  s m a l le s t  p o s s ib le  am ount. 
I n s t e a d  o f  s p e n d in g  £ 1 2 0 ,0 0 0  o r  £ 1 3 0 ,0 0 0  a y e a r  
we m ust be c o n te n t  to  spend b e tw een  £ 3 0 ,0 0 0  and 
£ 4 0 ,0 0 0  o n ly ,  and o u r  e s ta b l is h m e n t s  m ust be re d u c e d  
so as to  f i t  i n t o  t h a t  maximum o u t l a y  . . . " ^
l u g a r d  was a l i t t l e  p u t  o u t  by t h i s  l e t t e r ,  because  
he th o u g h t  he was a d m i n i s t e r i n g  Uganda v e r y  e c o n o m ic a l ly  and
1. MP. Mackinnon to lugard, 6th November 1891.
34£
t h a t  th e  d e f i c i t  l a r g e l y  a ro s e  fro m  o t h e r  o p e r a t io n s  such  
as th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  s t a t i o n s  on th e  way to  th e  c o a s t .
B u t  w h a te v e r  th e  d e t a i l s  o f  th e  b a la n c e  s h e e t  i t  was c l e a r  
by th e n  t h a t  th e  com pany’ s days w ere  num bered , and th e  passage  
i n  M arch  1892  o f  th e  v o te  f o r  £ 2 0 ,0 0 0  f o r  th e  r a i l w a y  s u rv e y  
d id  n o t  a l t e r  th e  s i t u a t i o n .
D u r in g  th e  d e b a te  th e  g o vern m en t a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  
r a i l w a y  was e s s e n t i a l  f o r  th e  cam paign a g a in s t  th e  s la v e  
t r a d e  and i t  c i t e d  th e  B r u s s e ls  C o n fe re n c e ,  b u t  th e  fu n d a m e n ta l  
q u e s t io n  was w h e th e r  P a r l i a m e n t  s h o u ld  s u b s id is e  a c h a r t e r e d  
company and so commit B r i t a i n  more d e e p ly  i n  B a s t  A f r i c a .
Many members f e l t  t h a t  by p a y in g  f o r  a s u rv e y  go vern m en t  
w ould  be t a k i n g  one more s te p  to w a rd s  th e  a n n e x a t io n  o f  a 
l a r g e  a r e a  o f  t e r r i t o r y .  The g o vern m en t d e n ie d  t h i s ,  and  
th e  O p p o s i t io n  l e a d e r s  a b s t a in e d  fro m  v o t i n g ,  so th e  q u e s t io n  
was n o t  s e t t l e d  and i t  was im p o s s ib le  to  f o r m u la t e  a p o s i t i v e  
p o l i c y  d u r in g  th e  e n s u in g  fe w  months becau se  a G e n e r a l  
E l e c t i o n  was to  be h e ld  i n  J u l y .
P o l i t i c i a n s  w ou ld  g l a d l y  have ig n o r e d  th e  p ro b le m  b u t  
t h i s  c o u ld  n o t  be done because Uganda became a m a jo r  is s u e  
d u r in g  th e  summer when r e p o r t s  re a c h e d  Europe f ro m  th e  F re n c h  
B is h o p  i n  Uganda a l l e g i n g  t h a t  F re n c h  m is s i o n a r ie s  had been  
m a l t r e a t e d  by th e  company. l u g a r d ,  whose r e p o r t s  a r r i v e d  
l a t e r ,  d e n ie d  th e  a l l e g a t i o n s ,  b u t  th e  go v e rn m e n t a p p o in te d
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C a p ta in  M acd on a ld  to  i n v e s t i g a t e ,  and i t  to o k  a n o th e r  s te p  
to w a rd s  a c k n o w le d g in g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i 'o r  Uganda by a g r e e in g  
to  pay c o m p e n s a tio n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  any a l l e g a t i o n s  w h ic h  w ere  
p r o v e d .
The f u t u r e  was made even  more u n c e r t a i n  ho w ever by th e
f o r m a t i o n ,  i n  A u g u s t ,  o f  G la d s t o n e 's  L i b e r a l  g o v e rn m e n t.  On
th e  w ho le  i t  was even  le s s  i n c l i n e d  to  g e t  in v o lv e d  i n  E a s t
A f r i c a  th a n  i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r  had b e e n , b u t  M a ck in n o n  th o u g h t
t h a t  p u b l i c  o p in io n  w ould  f o r c e  G la d s to n e  to  abandon h i s
o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  Uganda^ , and t h e r e  was some
hope o f  r e c e i v i n g  a s s is t a n c e  fro m  L o rd  R o s e b e ry ,  th e  F o r e ig n
S e c r e t a r y ,  who fa v o u r e d  a more fo r w a r d  p o l i c y  th a n  h is  c a b in e t
2c o l le a g u e s  d id  .
U n t i l  th e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  November M a ck in n o n  s t i l l  
s e r i o u s l y  th o u g h t  t h a t  th e  company m ig h t  be r e p r i e v e d .  T h is  
em erges , r a t h e r  i r o n i c a l l y ,  f ro m  p r i v a t e  c o rre s p o n d e n c e  w h ic h  
he was th e n  c o n d u c t in g  w i t h  S a l i s b u r y .  On November 15 he 
t o l d  S a l i s b u r y  t h a t  th e  company was w i l l i n g  to  c o n t in u e  i n  
Uganda p r o v id e d  i t  r e c e iv e d  s u f f i c i e n t  s u p p o r t  fro m  g o v e rn m e n t,  
and a 3/^ g u a ra n te e  fro m  P a r l i a m e n t  f o r  th e  r a i l w a y .
" I  b e l i e v e  we s h a l l  be asked  to  p r o lo n g  th e  o c c u p a t io n ,  
b u t  w h e th e r  a r e q u e s t  o f  t h i s  k in d  w i l l  be accom pan ied  
by any a s s u ra n c e  f o r  th e  f u t u r e  i s  u n c e r t a i n .  Our 
d e c is i o n  w i l l  depend g r e a t l y  on w hat go vern m en t may 
say on t h i s  p o i n t . ’15
1 .  S . P .  M a ck in n o n  to  S a l i s b u r y ,  5 November 1 8 9 2 .
2 .  M . P .  K i r k  to  M a c k in n o n , 9 A u gu st 1 8 9 2 .
3 .  S . P .  M a ck in n o n  to  S a l i s b u r y ,  15 November 1 8 9 2 .
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Two days l a t e r ,  d u r in g  th e  c o u rs e  o f  a d i f f i c u l t  
i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  R o s e b e ry ,  he g o t  h is  a n s w e r .  R o s e b e ry  d i d ,  
in d e e d ,  s u g g e s t  t h a t  th e  com pany’ s o c c u p a t io n  be p ro lo n g e d  
to  a s s i s t  th e  o p e r a t io n s  o f  th e  C om m iss ioner i f  one w ere  
a p p o in te d " 1". B u t M ack in n o n  th o u g h t  t h a t  th e  tw e lv e  m onths  
s u g g e s te d  w ould  be to o  s h o r t  a p e r io d  and p ro p o s e d  two y e a r s  
i n s t e a d .  H o w ever, t h i s  was u n a c c e p ta b le  to  R o s e b e ry ,  who 
s u s p e c te d  t h a t  M a ck in n o n  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i f  th e  company c o u ld  
re m a in  f o r  two y e a r s  i t  w ould  re m a in  f o r  e v e r  a t  g o v e rn m e n t  
e x p e n s e .
M a c k in n o n ’ s o t h e r  id e a s  w ere  n o t  r e c e iv e d  any more  
f a v o u r a b l y .  He asked  t h a t  th e  company be p a id  eb200,000 as 
c o m p e n s a tio n  f o r  expenses  w h ic h  i t  had i n c u r r e d  f o r  i m p e r i a l  
p u rp o s e s  a t  th e  i n s t i g a t i o n  o f  th e  l a t e  g o v e rn m e n t,  b u t  
R o s e b e ry  s im p ly  r e t o r t e d  t h a t  he had no r e c o r d  o f  such  
i n s t i g a t i o n  and c o u ld  n o t  h o ld  o u t  th e  s l i g h t e s t  hope o f  
c o m p e n s a t io n ,  M a ck in n o n  th e n  p ro p o sed  t h a t  th e  company 
s h o u ld  be bought o u t ,  b u t  l a t e r  a p p a r e n t ly  s a id  t h a t  he w ould  
soon be 7 0 ,  t h a t  h i s  w ork was done and t h a t  he d id  n o t  c a re  
a b o u t th e  lo s s  o f  h is  money.
R o s eb e ry  c l e a r l y  r e c o rd e d  th e  i n t e r v i e w  i n  such a way 
as to  c a s t  h i m s e l f  i n  th e  most f a v o u r a b le  l i g h t ,  b u t  h i s
1 .  R .O . 8 4 /2 2 6 3 .  Memo, o f  17 November by R o s e b e ry .  Mackinnon’ s 
v e r s i o n  o f  th e  i n t e r v i e w  i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  b u t  R o s e b e ry  
r e c o r d e d  i t  i n  a f a i r l y  lo n g  memorandum. On 3 Novem ber  
R o s e b e ry  had recommended to  th e  C a b in e t  t h a t  a 
C o m m iss io n er be a p p o in t e d .  R o b in s o n  and G a l l a g h e r ,  
o p . c i t . , p .  319*
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summing up o f  M a c k in n o n ’ s a t t i t u d e  a t  t h a t  t im e  was p r o b a b ly  
n o t  u n f a i r .  He sa ic t:
" S i r  Wm. M a ck in n o n  d u r in g  t h i s  i n t e r v i e w  so l i g h t l y  
bounded fro m  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  p h i l a n t h r o p i s t  to  t h a t  
o f  f i n a n c i e r ,  t h a t  i t  was e x t r e m e ly  d i f f i c u l t  to  
a p p r e c i a t e  w hat h i s  r e a l  p o s i t i o n  w a s . " !
M a ck in n o n  f e l t  a l l  a lo n g  t h a t  th e  company was a 
c o m m e rc ia l e n t e r p r i s e ,  a v e h i c l e  f o r  b r i n g i n g  c i v i l i s a t i o n  
to  A f r i c a  and an in s t r u m e n t  f o r  p ro m o t in g  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s ,  
b u t a lm o s t  fro m  th e  t im e  t h a t  th e  C h a r t e r  was g r a n te d  he was 
on th e  one hand d is a p p o in t e d  by th e  l a c k  o f  b a c k in g  fro m  th e  
B r i t i s h  G overnm ent, and on th e  o t h e r  d is c o u r a g e d  by th e  w e a l th  
and h e lp  e n jo y e d  by h i s  German r i v a l s .  f t  was so s e l f - e v i d e n t  
to  him  t h a t  go vern m en t s h o u ld  s u p p o r t  h i s  com pany’ s w o r th y  aims  
t h a t  he c o n t in u e d  to  g ra s p  a t  s t ra w s  lo n g  a f t e r  i t  was o b v io u s
t h a t  i t  w ould  n o t  be s a lv a g e d .
R o s e b e ry  who was i n  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  po w er, and had a 
more r e a l i s t i c  v ie w  o f  w hat c o u ld  be o b t a in e d  fro m  P a r l i a m e n t ,  
g o t  h i s  w ay. The r e s u l t  o f  d e b a te s  i n  th e  c a b in e t  was on th e  
f a c e  o f  i t  a com prom ise, because  g o vern m en t a g re e d  to  s u b s id is e  
th e  company f o r  t h r e e  m onths, t i l l  th e  end o f  M arch  1 8 9 3 ,  and 
i n  th e  m eantim e i t  a p p o in te d  S i r  G e ra ld  P o r t a l  to  r e p o r t  on th e  
b e s t  way o f  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  th e  t e r r i t o r y * - . I n  p r a c t i c e  th e  
a p p o in tm e n t  was a v i c t o r y  f o r  R o s e b e ry  becau se  P o r t a l  was
1 .  P .O .  8 4 /2 2 6 3 .  Memo, o f  17 November by R o s e b e ry .
2 .  T h is  was th e  com prom ise p r o p o s a l  b ro u g h t  j o i n t l y  by R o s eb e ry
and H a r c o u r t  f o r  C a b in e t  a p p r o v a l  on 23 November 1 8 9 0 .  
R o b in s o n  and G a l l a g h e r ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  3 1 9 .
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known to  s h a re  h i s  v ie w s .  The a p p o in tm e n t  a ls o  r e c o g n is e d  
t h a t  th e  company was coming to  an end , and th e  d i r e c t o r s  w ere  
a l r e a d y  d e v o t in g  t h e i r  e n e r g ie s  to  s e e k in g  maximum c o m p e n s a tio n  
fro m  th e  g o v e rn m e n t.  M a ck in n o n  was in v o lv e d  i n  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n  
fro m  th e  b e g in n in g ,  b u t  a g re e m e n t was n o t  re a c h e d  u n t i l  1 8 9 5 ,  
when th e  company was bought o a t  a t  th e  r a t e  o f  t e n  s h i l l i n g s  i n  
th e  pound. The f a c t  t h a t  he engaged i n  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  shows 
t h a t  he f u l l y  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  th e  company had f a i l e d ,  a l th o u g h  on 
o c c a s io n s ,  a lm o s t  u n t i l  h i s  d e a t h ,  he seemed to  hope t h a t  
g o vern m en t m ig h t  come to  th e  com pany’ s r e s c u e 1 .
He l a r g e l y  blam ed German r i v a l r y  and l a c k  o f  s u p p o r t  f r o  
th e  B r i t i s h  g o v e rn m e n t . S a l i s b u r y ,  as a l r e a d y  m e n t io n e d ,  
th o u g h t  t h a t  th e  m ain  d i f f i c u l t y  was M a c k in n o n fs  c h a r a c t e r ,  and 
S t a n l e y  s a id  t h a t  b a n k ru p tc y  was i n e v i t a b l e  when th e  go vern m en t  
w h ic h  was a lw a y s  e x t r a v a g a n t ,  d ip p e d  t h e i r  hands i n t o  th e  
c o f f e r s  o f  a  p r i v a t e  company"1. T h e re  w e re ,  h o w e v e r ,  a number 
o f  o t h e r  re a s o n s  w h ic h  can be seen by c om paring  th e  I . B . E . A .  
Company w i t h  th e  c o n te m p o ra ry  c h a r t e r e d  com panies i n  A f r i c a  
w h ic h  d id  n o t  f a i l  i n  th e  same way -  th e  R o y a l  N ig e r  Company 
and th e  S o u th  A f r i c a  Company.
I n  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  th e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  o f  th e  t h r e e  
p r i n c i p a l  c h a r a c t e r s  w ere v e ry  d i f f e r e n t .  M a c k in n o n 's  
company g o t  i t s  c h a r t e r  when he was s i x t y  f i v e ,  and h i s  
a b i l i t i e s  w ere c l e a r l y  i n  d e c l i n e .  C e c i l  Rhodes and S i r
1 .  H • ivi. S t a n l e y ,  Auto  b i o g ra p h y , p .  4 4 8 .
2 .  i b i d . , p .  4 4 8 .
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George G o ld ie ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand w ere  t h i r t y  s i x  and t h i r t y  
e i g h t  y e a rs  o ld  r e s p e c t i v e l y  when th e  So uth  A f r i c a  and R o y a l  
N i g e r  com panies w ere  g r a n te d  c h a r t e r s ,  and th e y  w ere  a t  th e  
h e i g h t  o f  t h e i r  p o w e rs . M ack in n o n  r e a c t e d  to  th e  i n c r e a s i n g  
i l l - h e a l t h  o f  h i s  o ld  age by t r y i n g  to  re d u c e  th e  amount o f  
w ork w h ic h  he d i d ,  and by s p e n d in g  more o f  h i s  t im e  a t  
B a l i n a k i l l  w h ic h  was n o t  a s u i t a b l e  p la c e  fro m  w h ic h  t o  r u n  
m a jo r  b u s in e s s e s .  Rhodes r e a c t e d  to  h i s  i l l - h e a l t h  by  
d r i v i n g  h i m s e l f  to  g r e a t e r  e f f o r t s  because he f e a r e d  t h a t  he 
had l i t t l e  t im e  i n  w h ic h  to  a c c o m p lis h  h i s  a im s . B u t t h e r e  
were o t h e r  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  more im p o r t a n t  th a n  th o s e  o f  
p e r s o n a l i t y .
The I . B . E . A .  Company, u n l i k e  th e  o t h e r  tw o , was u n a b le  
to  d o m in a te  t r a d e  w i t h i n  i t s  a r e a .  I t  d id  n o t  have  a l a r g e  
r i v e r  l i k e  th e  N i g e r  to  g iv e  c o n t r o l l e d  a c c e s s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c o m m e rc ia l  m onopoly i n  th e  i n t e r i o r ,  and  
i t  was burd ened  fro m  th e  o u t s e t  w i t h  th e  c r i p p l i n g  c o s t  o f  
c a r r y i n g  goods by human p o r t e r a g e .  T h e re  was no m a jo r  t r a d e  
such as e x i s t e d  i n  West A f r i c a  on w h ic h  th e  company c o u ld  
b u i l d .  The t e r r i t o r y  c o n ta in e d  no n u c le u s  o f  E u ro p e a n  
c o l o n i s t s  to  s t i m u l a t e  commerce, as i n  S o u th  A f r i c a ,  and no 
r e a d i l y  e x p l o i t a b l e  m in e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  w ere  fo u n d .  B e s id e s  
l a c k i n g  th e s e  a s s e t s ,  th e  company was s a d d le d  w i t h  th e  m a jo r  
l i a b i l i t y  o f  h a v in g  to  pay £ 1 0 ,0 0 0  a y e a r  to  th e  S u l t a n  o f  
Z a n z ib a r ,  and i t  was h a n d ic a p p e d  i n  t r y i n g  to  re c o u p  t h i s
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r e c u r r e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  because i t s  powers o f  t a x a t i o n  w ere  
l i m i t e d .  E q u a l l y  i t s  fre e d o m  to  r a i s e  customs dues was 
c i r c u m s c r ib e d  because Z a n z ib a r  was i n  th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F re e  
Zone. F i n a l l y  th e  company was u n d e r c a p i t a l i s e d ,  s t a r t i n g  
w i t h  £ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0  compared w i t h  th e  S o u th  A f r i c a  Company’ s 
£ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  The N i g e r  Company a d m i t t e d l y  began w i t h  o n ly  
£ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  b u t  t h i s  was in v e s t e d  i n  a p r o s p e r in g  b u s in e s s ^ ,  
w h ereas  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company was o b l ig e d  to  t r y  and l a y  th e  
v e r y  f o u n d a t io n s  f o r  commerce and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  When i t  
i s  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  i t  had a c c e p te d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a t e r r i t o r y  
r o u g h ly  e q u a l  i n  s i z e  to  th e  com bined a re a s  o f  B r i t a i n  and 
F r a n c e ,  i t  i s  h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  i t  c o l l a p s e d .
M a ck in n o n  was c e r t a i n l y  v e r y  d is a p p o in t e d  by th e  f a i l u r e  
o f  th e  company, and i t  i s  p e rh a p s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h e r e  was no 
r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company i n  th e  o b i t u a r y  w h ic h  
a p p e a re d  a b o u t him  i n  th e  Cam pbeltow n C o u r i e r . The e d i t o r  
o f  th e  new spaper o f  h i s  n a t i v e  town p r o b a b ly  th o u g h t  i t  
seem ly  on t h a t  o c c a s io n  to  r e f e r  o n ly  to  w hat w ere  r e g a rd e d  as 
M a c k in n o n ’ s s u c c e s s e s .  B u t ,  i f  M ack in n o n  had l i v e d  f o r  a few  
more y e a r s  he m ig h t  have f e l t  t h a t  th e  company had a c h ie v e d  
s o m e th in g , because i n  June 1 8 9 4 ,  a y e a r  a f t e r  h is  d e a t h ,  a 
p r o t e c t o r a t e  was d e c la r e d  o v e r  Uganda and o v e r  E a s t  A f r i c a  i n  
1 8 9 5 .  T h is  was p o s s ib le  o n ly  because  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company
1 .  M. Perham , L u g a rd ,  The Y e a rs  o f  A d v e n tu r e ,  V o l .  I ,  London, 
1 9 5 6 ,  p .  1 6 7 .
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had m a in ta in e d  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t y  i n  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  o v e r  a
p e r io d  o f  y e a rs  d u r in g  w h ic h  B r i t i s h  g o vern m en ts  had been
u n a b le  o r  u n w i l l i n g  to  m eet th e  c o s t  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  an
E m p ire  i n  E a s t  A f r i c a .
The p a r lo u s  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company n a t u r a l l y  
ab s o rb e d  most o f  M a c k in n o n 1s a t t e n t i o n  d u r in g  h is  l a s t  y e a r s ,  
and he was s t i l l  head o f  th e  B . I . ,  b u t  he sou gh t r e s t  and  
r e l a x a t i o n  by s p e n d in g  an i n c r e a s in g  amount o f  t im e  a t  
B a l i n a k i l l .  To a t t e n d  to  h i s  v a r io u s  b u s in e s s  i n t e r e s t s ,  he 
o f t e n  t r a v e l l e d  to  G lasgow i n  h i s  y a c h t  C o r n e l i a ,  and a s u i t e  
was a v a i l a b l e  f o r  him  a lw a y s  a t  th e  B u r l i n g t o n  H o t e l  i n  London, 
but he r e t u r n e d  to  B a l i n a k i l l  w h en ever he c o u ld  and d id  h i s  
b e s t  to  prom ote  th e  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  th e  a r e a .
N e a r  h is  e s t a t e s ,  he d e v e lo p e d  th e  l i t t l e  v i l l a g e  o f  
C la c h a n  w i t h  h i s  nephews John and Duncan M a c k in n o n . A F re e  
Church was b u i l t ,  a m anse, a p o s t  o f f i c e  and a r e a d in g  room . 
These w ere  to  f u r t h e r  th e  cause o f  th e  F re e  Church o f  S c o t la n d  
and to  en co u rag e  r e a d in g  and l e a r n i n g  among th e  v i l l a g e r s .
He a ls o  had th e  o ld  c o t ta g e s  im p ro v e d  and new ones b u i l t  and  
some o f  them a re  o c c u p ie d  to  t h i s  d a y ^ .
I n  many ways he e n jo y e d  th e  l i f e  o f  a S c o t t i s h  l a i r d ,  
and e n t e r t a i n e d  a number o f  e m in e n t  p e o p le  on h i s  e s t a t e ,
1. Personal letter from Mrs. G.M. Pollok, 9 February 1967.
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i n c l u d i n g  K in g  L e o p o ld  who s ta y e d  t h e r e  t w i c e .  D e s p i t e  h is  
w e a l t h ,  h o w e v e r ,  he n e v e r  became e x t r a v a g e n t  o r  f la m b o y a n t ,  
but re m a in e d  p io u s  and a b s te m io u s  i n  h i s  h a b i t s .  One v ie w  
o f  him and o f  th e  r o u t i n e  a t  B a l i n a k i l l  was g iv e n  by S i r  
H a r r y  J o h n s to n ,  a f t e r  a v i s i t  w h ic h  he p a id  to  M a c k in n o n ’ s 
home i n  1 8 8 3 .  He s a id  M a ck in n o n  was
M. . .  a l e e t l e  d a p p e r ,  u p r i g h t  man, w i t h  an a c q u i l i n e  n o s e ,  
s id e  w h is k e r s ,  a p o u t in g  m outh , and a s t r u t t i n g  m anner o f  
w a lk in g  and h o ld in g  h i m s e l f .  H is  r e c e p t i o n  o f  me a f t e r  
my lo n g  s te a m e r  jo u r n e y ,  lo n g  and t i r i n g  d r i v e  o f  e le v e n  
m ile s  fro m  T a r b e r t  ( M u l l  o f  C a n t y r e ) ,  was k i n d ,  b u t  
th r o u g h o u t  h i s  l a r g e  m odern house t h e r e  was no t r a c e  o f  
c o m fo r t ,  and th e  te m p e r a tu r e  o f  S c o t la n d  i s  a lw a y s  c o o l .  
I f  i t  i s n ’ t  c o ld ,  i t  i s  c h i l l y .  I t  i s  a c o u n t r y  w here  
you h a r d l y  d a re  l e t  th e  f i r e s  go o u t  i n  th e  d w e l l i n g  
room s. T h is  was e a r l y  S ep tem b er b u t  th e  Autumn had  
lo w e re d  th e  te m p e r a tu r e  a l r e a d y .
F o r t u n a t e l y  f o r  me t h e r e  w ere o t h e r  g u e s ts  s t a y in g  
t h e r e ,  l u r e d  l i k e  m y s e l f  f ro m  London, who f e l t  th e  c o ld  
as much as I  d i d .  I t  was a lm o s t  b e f o r e  th e  days o f  
b r i s k  games o u t  o f  doors  w h ic h  s t i r r e d  th e  c i r c u l a t i o n .
We w ere ta k e n  f o r  lo n g  d r i v e s  and r e t u r n e d  w i t h  b lu e  
noses and c h a t t e r i n g  t e e t h .  The m ea ls  w ere  s t r a n g e l y  
s p a r s e :  n e v e r  saw I  p a r t r i d g e s ,  g ro u s e  and c h ic k e n s  so
s m a l l .  B u t i t  was R e l i g i o n  w h ic h  made th e  v i s i t  so h a rd  
to  b e a r  . . .  A M i n i s t e r  p r e s id e d  a t  th e  s e r v i c e  (b y  th e  
g ra c e  o f  S i r  W i l l i a m ) ^ ,  c lo t h e d  i n  e v e ry d a y  g a rm e n ts .  
T h e re  m ust be no m usic  -  th e  o rg a n  was th e  l u r e  o f  th e  
S c a r l e t  Woman. You had to  s ta n d ,  s ta n d ,  s ta n d ,  y o u 
m u s n 't  k n e e l ;  you o c c a s i o n a l l y  s a t  -  I  suppose we must 
have  s a t  th ro u g h  th e  h o u r - lo n g  serm on; and th e  m o rn in g  
s e r v i c e  seemed to  l a s t  fro m  t e n  o ’ c lo c k  to  one . . .
Lady M a ck in n o n  th e  p r e v io u s  S a tu r d a y  n i g h t  ( a f t e r  we 
had r i s e n  fro m  a h a l f - h o u r  o f  p r a y e r s ,  d u r in g  w h ic h  S i r  
W i l l i a m  had passed a l l  h i s  g u e s ts  i n  r e v ie w  f o r  th e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  o f  h is  God) had g iv e n  us a t a s t e  o f  h e r  
m e t t l e .  B e fo r e  th e  e le v e n  fe m a le  d o m e s t ic  s e r v a n ts  had  
l e f t  th e  room she d e l i v e r e d  a b r i e f  o r d e r  to  th e  s e n io r  
o f  th e s e  D a u g h te rs  o f  th e  P lo w , and th e y  had gone f o r t h
1. Mackinnon received the baronetcy six years later.
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a b o u t th e  d ra w in g -ro o m s , l i b r a r y  and h a l l  and r e t u r n e d  
w i t h  th e  keys  o f  th e  l i b r a r y  and w i t h  a l l  th e  w o r l d l y  
e v e ry d a y  books and m ag a z in e s  s tre w n  a b o u t th e  s i t t i n g  
room s. These th e y  handed to  t h e i r  m is t r e s s  who s o le m n ly  
lo c k e d  them up i n  a l a r g e  cupboard  i n  th e  p r i n c i p a l  
d ra w in g -ro o m . The n e x t  day ( t h e  i n t o l e r a b l e  S a b b a th )  
when we w ere back  from  th e  t h r e e  h o u rs  s e r v i c e ,  and  
w a i t i n g  a b o u t f o r  announcem ent o f  lu n c h ,  I  i d l y  tu r n e d  
o v e r  th e  le a v e s  o f  B radshaw , th e  o n ly  fo rm  o f  n o n -s a c r e d  
l i t e r a t u r e  exposed to  v ie w .  uE r - e r - w h a t  have you t h e r e ? 1 
asked  M rs .  M a c k in n o n . ,?A B rad sh aw ” , I  r e p l i e d .  She 
h e s i t a t e d  and g u lp e d ,  b u t  d e c id e d  to  say  n o t h in g  and l e t  
me go to  my do om .”!
J o h n s to n  may have e x a g g e ra te d  i n  p a i n t i n g  t h i s  p i c t u r e
o f  p i e t y  and p l a i n  l i v i n g ,  because  S t a n l e y ,  who met h i s  f u t u r e
w i f e  a t  B a l i n a k i l l ,  to o k  a l e s s  h a rs h  v ie w  o f  l i f e  t h e r e .  He
2
m e n tio n e d  k i n d l y  h e a r t e d  g a t h e r in g s  and h o s p i t a b l e  f e a s t s  , 
w h i le  K i r k  and Kaye r e f e r r e d  a t  v a r io u s  t im e s  i n  t h e i r  
c o rre s p o n d e n c e  to e n jo y a b le  h o l id a y s  s p e n t  a t  B a l i n a k i l l .
These c o n f l i c t i n g  im p re s s io n s  a b o u t l i f e  a t  M a c k in n o n f s 
home w ere  p a r a l l e l e d  by c o n t r a s t i n g  v ie w s  a b o u t  h im . Some 
p e o p le ,  n o t a b ly  S a l i s b u r y ,  had a p o o r  o p in io n  o f  h is  a b i l i t y ,  
b u t  he e n jo y e d  th e  e s te e m , and i n  many cases th e  e n d u r in g  
f r i e n d s h i p  o f  such d i f f e r e n t  and d i s t i n g u i s h e d  c o n te m p o ra r ie s  
as F r e r e , K i r k ,  K a y e , G ordon, W a l l e r ,  S t a n le y  and th e  B u r d e t t -  
C o u t t s ’ . Borne o f  h i s  a c q u a in ta n c e s  w ere draw n to  h im  by  
s h a re d  C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h  and e x p e r ie n c e ,  b u t  he c l e a r l y  had a 
s t r o n g  p e r s o n a l i t y  w h ic h  e n a b le d  h im  to  c o n t r o l  l a r g e  c o n c e rn s .
1 .  H .H .  J o h n s to n , S t o r y ,  pp . 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 .
2 .  3 t a n l e y , A u t o b iogra p h y , p . 449*
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The so u rc e  o f  h is  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  p e o p le  i s  a m a t t e r  f o r  
c o n je c t u r e ,  b u t  p e rh a p s  i t  a ro s e  p r i m a r i l y  fro m  h i s  r e l i g i o u s  
com m itm ent. The r e g u l a t i o n s  w h ic h  he made f o r  Sunday  
o b s e rv a n c e  on h is  s h ip s ,  and th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a t  B a l i n a k i l l  
d e s c r ib e d  by J o h n s to n ,  seem s t r a n g e  now, b u t  he was n o t  
m e r e ly  c o n cern ed  w i t h  o b s e rv a n c e .  He t r i e d  v e r y  s i n c e r e l y  to  
l i v e  a c c o r d in g  to  h i s  b e l i e f s ,  w h ic h  i n  i t s e l f  commanded 
r e s p e c t ,  and he t r i e d  e q u a l l y  s i n c e r e l y  to  c o n fe r  w hat he 
re g a rd e d  as th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  C h r i s t i a n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  upon le s s  
f o r t u n a t e  p e o p le .  H is  g r e a t  h o n e s ty  i n  b u s in e s s  was w e l l
i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  C i t y  Bank c a s e ,  a t  th e  end o f  w h ic h  th e
ju d g e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  rem a rk e d  on h is  i n t e g r i t y .  S i m i l a r l y  th e  
s t o r y  o f  th e  I . B . E . A .  Company r e v e a l s  how he c o u ld  embark upon  
an e n t e r p r i s e  and w ork  h a rd  f o r  i t ,  w i t h o u t  hope o f  im m e d ia te  
p e r s o n a l  g a i n .  When i t  was wound up K i r k  s a id
" W ith  a l l  i t s  f a i l i n g s  i t  has been an h o n e s t  c o n c e rn ,  
n o t  a m oney-m aking  one , and b u t  f o r  i t s  w ork  we w ould  
n o t  now possess a f o o t i n g  i n  E a s t  A f r i c a . I,J-
T h e re  were a number o f  m e m o r ia ls  to  M a ck in n o n  i n  E a s t  
A f r i c a .  A s t a t u e  was e r e c t e d  to  h im  i n  Mombasa, a ro a d  and
m a rk e t  w ere named a f t e r  him  t h e r e  and so w ere  some m o u n ta in s
i n  th e  R u w e n zo r i  R ange. B u t i n  some ways th e  most enduring-  
m e m o ria l  to  him  i s  K e i l  S c h o o l ,  i n  S c o t la n d .
1. Coupland, Exploitation, p. 486.
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The day b e f o r e  he d ie d  he d i c t a t e d  a l e t t e r  to  h is  
s o l i c i t o r s  a b o u t th e  f o u n d a t io n  o f  a " K in t y r e  T e c h n ic a l  
S c h o o l " I t  must have  been one o f  th e  l a s t  t h in g s  on h is  
mind because  he was to o  weak to  s ig n  th e  l e t t e r .  I n  so f a r  
as he e v e r  f o r m u la t e d  h is  b e l i e f s ,  th e y  a r e  em bodied i n  th e  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  th e  s c h o o l whose m o tto  i s  " p e r s e v e r e  i n  h o p e " .  
A p p r o p r i a t e l y  h is  s t a t u e  was moved fro m  Mombasa to  th e  s c h o o l  
i n  1 9 6 4 .
The p r o j e c t  was c o n c e iv e d  by h im  and h i s  nephew Duncan  
M c N e i l ,  b u t  n e i t h e r  o f  them l i v e d  to  see i t .  M c N e i l  d ie d  
b e f o r e  th e y  had s e t  o u t  th e  d e t a i l s ,  and M a c k in n o n  d ie d  s i x  
months a f t e r  h im , w h i le  th e  s c h o o l was n o t  opened t i l l  1 9 1 5 *
When th e  s c h o o l  was f i n a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s  p u rp o se  and 
th e  p r i n c i p l e s  w h ich  w ere  to  g u id e  i t  w ere  known fro m  w hat th e  
two men had s a i d ,  and fro m  M a c k in n o n 's  l e t t e r .  P r i m a r i l y  i t  
was
" . . .  a scheme f o r  a s s i s t i n g  th e  e d u c a t io n  o f  d e s e r v in g  
H ig h la n d  la d s  . . . " 2
because  o f  i t s  c lo s e  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  th e  West H ig h la n d s  o f  
S c o t la n d  i t  was s t a r t e d  a t  K e i l  n e a r  th e  end o f  th e  K i n t y r e  
p e n in s u la  i n  a m ansion  w h ic h  was bo u g h t f o r  th e  p u rp o s e .  When 
t h i s  was burned  down i n  December 1 9 2 4 ,  th e  s c h o o l was moved to  
a v e r y  n ic e  s i t e  a t  D um barton n e a r  G lasgo w . The s c h o o l had
1 .  The name was l a t e r  changed to  K e i l  S c h o o l .
2 .  W eek ly  Scotsm an o f  12 M arch  1 9 5 9 *
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one more move. T h a t  was d u r in g  th e  Second W o rld  W ar, when 
i t  was f i t t i n g l y  moved to  M a c k in n o n ’ s o ld  home o f  B a l i n a k i l l ,  
w h ic h  i s  now a h o t e l .
The K i n t y r e  T e c h n ic a l  S c h o o l ,  as i t  was f i r s t  c a l l e d ,  
was n o t  j u s t  a n o th e r  c o n v e n t io n a l  S c o t t i s h  s c h o o l .  I n  a d d i t i o i  
to  c h a r a c t e r  b u i l d i n g  th e  s c h o o l a ls o  p la c e s  g r e a t  em phasis on 
s c ie n c e  and t e c h n o lo g y ,  to  w h ic h  M ack in n o n  a t ta c h e d  much 
im p o r ta n c e .  I t  b e l i e v e s  t h a t
” . . .  d i s c i p l i n e ,  l e a d e r s h i p ,  in d e p e n d e n c e , and i n i t i a t i v e  
a r e  j u s t  as im p o r t a n t  as E n g l i s h ,  L a t i n ,  M a th e m a t ic s  and 
S c i e n c e . ”
The boys a r e  ta u g h t  n o t  to  r e l y  on th e  l a b o u r  o f  o t h e r s ,  and 
C h r i s t i a n  i d e a l s  a r e  a lw a y s  k e p t  i n  f r o n t  o f  them 1 . M a ck in n o n  
had b e t t e r e d  h i m s e l f  i n  th e  w o r ld  by th e s e  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  
c h a r a c t e r  and d e v o t io n  to  r e l i g i o n ,  so he w anted  to  en co u rag e  
o t h e r  H ig h la n d  la d s  i n  th e  same d i r e c t i o n .
1 .  The Butem an and West C o ast C h r o n ic l e ,  20 J u l y  1 9 5 0 .  
From sp e e c h  by th e  r e t i r i n g  h e a d m a s te r .
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APPENDIX I
B R IT IS H  IN D IA  STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY " L IM IT E D " .
CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IN D IA  IN  
COUNCIL AND THE B R IT IS H  IN D IA  STEAM 
NAVIGATION COMPANY 11 L IM IT E D 11
D a te d  1 4 t h  A p r i l  1875
THIS INDENTURE made th e  f o u r t e e n t h  day o f  A p r i l  One th o u s a n d  
e i g h t  h u n d red  and s e v e n t y - f i v e  BETWEEN THE B R IT IS H  IN D IA  
STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY " L IM IT E D ” b e in g  a J o i n t  S to c k  
Company w i t h  l i m i t e d  l i a b i l i t y  r e g i s t e r e d  u n d e r  th e  
P r o v is io n s  o f  th e  A c t  o f  P a r l ia m e n t  made and p assed  i n  
th e  2 5 th  and 2 6 th  y e a rs  o f  th e  R e ig n  o f  Queen V i c t o r i a  
e n t i t l e d  "An A c t  f o r  th e  I n c o r p o r a t i o n  R e g u la t io n  and  
w in d in g  up o f  t r a d i n g  Companies and o t h e r  A s s o c ia t io n s "  
o f  th e  one p a r t  and THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IN D IA  
IN  COUNCIL o f  th e  o t h e r  p a r t  WITNESSETH t h a t  th e  s a id  
B r i t i s h  I n d i a  Steam N a v i g a t i o n  Company L im i t e d  
( h e r e i n a f t e r  c a l l e d  th e  s a id  Company) do f o r  th e m s e lv e s  
and t h e i r  S u c c e s s o rs  c o v e n a n t and a g re e  w i t h  th e  s a id  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  I n d i a  i n  C o u n c i l  h is  S u c c e s s o rs  
and A s s ig n s  i n  m anner f o l l o w i n g  t h a t  i s  to  s a y : -
T h is  document i s  f ro m  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  R e c o rd s ,  I n d i a  P u b l i c  
C o l l e c t i o n s  to  d e s p a tc h e s ,  v o l .  60 ( 1 8 7 5 ) .
1 .  THAT th e y  th e  s a id  Cgmpany s h a l l  and w i l l  a t  a l l
Good and t im e s  d u r in g  th e  c o n t in u a n c e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t
e f f i c i e n t
S te a m e rs  o r  so lo n g  as th e  w ho le  o f  any p a r t  o f  th e  s e v e r a l
to  be
p r o v id e d .  s e r v ic e s  h e re b y  a g re e d  to  be p e r fo rm e d  o u g h t to
be p e r fo rm e d  i n  p u rs u a n c e  t h e r e o f  p r o v id e  m a i n t a i n  k e e p  s e a ­
w o r th y  and i n  c o m p le te  r e p a i r  and r e a d in e s s  f o r  th e  p u rp o s e  
o f  c o n v e y in g  a l l  th e  m a i ls  o f  H e r  M a j e s t y ’ s G overnm ent  
p a s s e n g e rs  and goods and s p e c ie  as h e r e i n a f t e r  p r o v id e d  a 
s u f f i c i e n t  number o f  good and e f f i c i e n t  s team  v e s s e ls  f o r  
th e  l i n e s  o f  c o m m u n ic a tio n  h e r e i n a f t e r  m e n t io n e d .
2 .  THAT a l l  th e  v e s s e ls  to  be em ployed u n d e r  t h i s
S u p p ly  o f  c o n t r a c t  s h a l l  be f i t t e d  up w i t h  m a g a z in e s  
m ag a z in e s
p r o p e r  c a p a b le  o f  h o ld in g  gun powder o r  o t h e r
m a c h in e ry
& c . c o m b u s t ib le s  to  th e  e x t e n t  n o te d  b e lo w *  and
s h a l l  be a lw a y s  s u p p l ie d  and f u r n is h e d  w i t h  a l l  n e c e s s a r y  
and p r o p e r  m a c h in e ry  e n g in e s  a p p a r e l  f u r n i t u r e  s t o r e s  t a c k l e  
b o a ts  f u e l  o i l  t a l l o w  p r o v is io n s  a n c h o rs  c a b le s  f i r e  pumps 
and o t h e r  p r o p e r  means f o r  e x t i n g u i s h i n g  f i r e  c h a r ts  
c h ro n o m e te rs  p r o p e r  n a u t i c a l  in s t r u m e n ts  and w h a ts o e v e r  e ls e  
may be r e q u i s i t e  and n e c e s s a ry  f o r  e q u ip p in g  th e  s a id  v e s s e ls  
and r e n d e r in g  them c o n s t a n t l y  e f f i c i e n t  f o r  th e  s e v e r a l  
s e r v ic e s  h e re b y  c o n t r a c t e d  to  be p e r fo rm e d  and a ls o  manned
*  F i f t e e n  to n s  f o r  v e s s e ls  u n d e r  1000  to n s  g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  
to n n a g e .  Tw enty  to n s  f o r  v e s s e ls  o f  1000  to n s  g ro s s  
r e g i s t e r  to n n a g e  o r  u p w a rd s .
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and p r o v id e d  w i t h  co m p e te n t o f f i c e r s  w i t h  a p p r o p r i a t e  
c e r t i f i c a t e s  g r a n te d  p u rs u a n t  to  th e  A c t  o r  A c ts  i n  f o r c e  
a t  th e  d a te  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  o r  f o r  th e  t im e  b e in g  r e l a t i v e  
to  th e  g r a n t i n g  c e r t i f i c a t e s  to  o f f i c e r s  i n  th e  m e rc h a n t  
s e r v i c e  and w i t h  a s u f f i c i e n t  number o f  e f f i c i e n t  e n g in e e r s  
and a s u f f i c i e n t  crew  o f  a b le  seamen and o t h e r  men to  be i n  
a l l  r e s p e c ts  as to  v e s s e ls  e n g in e s  e q u ip m e n ts  e n g in e e r s  
o f f i c e r s  and crew  s u b je c t  i n  th e  f i r s t  in s t a n c e  and fro m  
t im e  to  t im e  and a t  a l l  t im e s  a f t e r w a r d s  to  th e  a p p r o v a l  o f  
th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  on b e h a l f  o f  th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
i n  C o u n c i l .
3 .  THAT th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  a t  a l l  t im e s  d u r in g
R e p la c e m e n t th e  c o n t in u a n c e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  have i n  c o n s ta n t  
o f  d is a b le d
v e s s e ls .  r e a d in e s s  f o r  th e  due e x e c u t io n  o f  th e  s e v e r a l
s e r v ic e s  h e re b y  c o n t r a c t e d  to  be p e r fo rm e d  v e s s e ls  e q u a l  i n  
to n n a g e  and e f f i c i e n c y  to  th o s e  h e re b y  s t i p u l a t e d  to  be 
p r o v id e d  and s h a l l  i n  e v e ry  case o f  any o f  th e  s a id  v e s s e ls  
becom ing d is a b le d  im m e d ia t e ly  a t  t h e i r  own c o s t  and c h a rg e  
r e p la c e  th e  same by a n o th e r  good and e f f i c i e n t  v e s s e l  o f  
e q u a l  to n n a g e  and p o w e r.
4 .  THAT th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  and w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  and
L in e s  o f  m a i n t a i n  th e  l i n e s  o f  c o m m u n ic a tio n  by such  
communica­
t i o n .  s team  v e s s e ls  as a f o r e s a i d  b e tw e e n  th e  s e v e r a l
p o r t s  and p la c e s  h e r e i n a f t e r  m e n t io n e d  t h a t  i s  to  s a y : -
3b t
L IN E  No. 1 .  S h a l l  be a f o r t n i g h t l y  c o m m u n ic a tio n  b e tw e e n
C a l c u t t a ,  C h i t t a g o n g ,  A kyab , Kyouk Phyoo w i t h  
a f o u r  w e e k ly  e x t e n s io n  to  Sandoway d u r in g  th e  
f a i r  season o n ly  and back by th e  same r o u t e  
p e r fo rm e d  by S te a m e rs  o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  320 Tons  
g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  Tonnage w i t h  E n g in e s  o f  80 H o rs e  
P o w e r .
L IN E  No. 2 .  S h a l l  be a f o r t n i g h t l y  c o m m u n ic a tio n  b e tw e e n
C a l c u t t a ,  Jtkyab, Rangoon and back  by th e  same 
r o u t e  p e r fo rm e d  by S team ers  o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  
500 Tons g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  Tonnage w i t h  E n g in e s  o f  
100 H o rse  P ow er.
L IN E  No. 5* S h a l l  be a w e e k ly  c o m m u n ic a tio n  b e tw een  C a l c u t t a ,  
Rangoon, M o u lm e in  and back by th e  same r o u t e  
p e r fo rm e d  by S te a m e rs  o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  800 Tons  
r e g i s t e r  Tonnage w i t h  E n g in e s  o f  120 H orse  
P o w er. B u t w i t h  th e  o p t io n  o f  th e  Company o f  
c o n n e c t in g  Rangoon and M o u lm e in  by a s m a l l e r  
S te a m e r .
L IN E  No. 4 .  S h a l l  be a c o m m u n ic a tio n  e v e ry  f o u r  weeks b e tw e e n
C a l c u t t a ,  C h i t t a g o n g ,  A kyab , Kyouk Phyoo,  
Sandoway, B a s s e in ,  Rangoon, M o u lm e in , T a v o y ,  
M e r g u i ,  P ak c h a n , Kopah, J u n k s e y lo n ,  P enang ,  
M a la c c a ,  S in g a p o re  and back  by th e  same r o u t e  
p e r fo rm e d  by S te a m e rs  o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  320 Tons
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g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  Tonnage w i t h  E n g in e s  o f  80 H orse  
P o w er.
N o te  -  A t  th e  o p t io n  o f  th e  Company t h i s  l i n e  s h a l l  e i t h e r  
commence a t  C a l c u t t a  as a s e p a r a te  s e r v ic e  o r  be an e x t e n s io n  
o f  L in e  No. 1 fro m  Kyouk Phyoo o r  t e r m in a t e  a t  Penang  
c o n n e c t in g  t h e r e  w i t h  l i n e  No. 5*
L IN E  No. 5 .  S h a l l  be a f o r t n i g h t l y  c o m m u n ic a tio n  be tw e e n  
M o u lm e in , Penang , M a la c c a ,  S in g a p o re  and back  
by th e  same r o u t e  p e r fo rm e d  by S team ers  o f  n o t  
l e s s  th a n  800 Tons g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  Tonnage w i t h  
E n g in e s  o f  120  H o rse  P ow er.
N o te  -  T h is  s e r v i c e  to  be an e x te n s io n  o f  L in e  No. 3 and  
p r o v id e  a c o n t in u o u s  s e r v ic e  b e tw e e n  C a l c u t t a  and th e  S t r a i t s .
L IN E  No. 6 .  S h a l l  be a f o r t n i g h t l y  c o m m u n ic a tio n  be tw e e n
M adras and N o r t h e r n  P o r t s  to  Rangoon, and back
by th e  same r o u t e  p e r fo rm e d  by S team ers  o f  n o t
l e s s  th a n  800 Tons g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  ton n ag e  w i t h
E n g in e s  o f  120  H o rs e  Pow er.
N o te  -  The Company to  have th e  o p t io n  o f  w o rk in g  t h i s  
s e r v i c e  once o n ly  i n  e v e ry  f o u r  weeks o r  o f  d i s c o n t i n u i n g  
i t  a l t o g e t h e r  s h o u ld  G overnm ent em ploy i t s  own S te a m e rs  to  
do any c o n s id e r a b le  p a r t  o f  i t s  w ork  i n  th e  conveyance  o f  
t ro o p s  and s t o r e s  on t h i s  l i n e .
L IN E  No. 7 .  S h a l l  be a w e e k ly  c o m m u n ic a tio n  b e tw een  C a l c u t t a
and Bombay c a l l i n g  a t  p o r t s  on th e  C orom andel 
and M a la b a r  C o a s ts ,  and back  by th e  same r o u t e  
p e r fo rm e d  by S te a m e rs  o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  700  to n s  
g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  to n n a g e  and 100  H o rse  P o w er.
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N o te  -  The Company to  have th e  o p t io n  o f  e m p lo y in g  s m a l le r  
S team ers  b u t  n o t  l e s s  th a n  500 to n s  g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  to n n a g e  
to  c a l l  a t  some o f  th e  l e a s t  im p o r t a n t  p o r t s  on th e  M a la b a r  
C o ast t im in g  t h e i r  a r r i v a l  to  m eet th e  r e g u l a r  S team ers  a t  
one o f  th e  p r i n c i p a l  p o r t s  and t r a n s h i p  c a rg o  and p a s s e n g e rs  
and th u s  m a in t a in  th e  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  th e  s e r v i c e .
L IN E  No. 8 .  S h a l l  be a s e m i-w e e k ly  c o m m u n ic a tio n  b e tw een
Bombay, K u rra c h e e  and back  p e r fo rm e d  by S team ers
o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  500 to n s  g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  ton nage
w i t h  E n g in e s  o f  100  h o rs e  P o w er.
LINE No. 9* S h a l l  be a w e e k ly  c o m m u n ic a tio n  be tw e e n  Bombay
and B u s re h  c a l l i n g  a t  i n t e r m e d i a t e  p o r t s  and
back by th e  same r o u t e  p e r fo rm e d  by S team ers
o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  700 to n s  g ro s s  r e g i s t e r  ton nage
w i t h  E n g in e s  o f  100  H o rse  P o w er.
N o te  -  A t  th e  o p t io n  o f  th e  Company t h i s  l i n e  to  be w orked  
e i t h e r  by way o f  K u rra c h e e  as p a r t  o f  th e  s e m i-w e e k ly  s e r v ic e
o r  d i r e c t  to  G uader o r  M u s c a t a l t e r n a t e l y  g i v i n g  a f o r t n i g h t l y
s e r v ic e  to  th e s e  two p o r t s .  G overnm ent ho w ever to  have th e  
power to  send th e  S te a m e r v i a  K u rra c h e e  on any v o y a g e , (s u c h  
voyage to  c o u n t as one o f  th e  r e g u l a r  u n t i l  voyages  to  
K u r r a c h e e )  and a ls o  to  r e q u i r e  w e e k ly  c o m m u n ic a tio n  w i t h  
M u s c a t .
The Company s h a l l  a ls o  on r e c e i v i n g  18 m onth4s n o t ic e  
fo rm  e s t a b l i s h  and m a i n t a i n  w e e k ly  steam  c o m m u n ic a tio n  
be tw e e n  B u s re h  and Bagdad i f  r e q u i r e d  to  do so by th e  
G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  and f u r n is h e d  w i t h  th e  n e c e s s a ry  
a u t h o r i t y  fro m  th e  T u r k is h  G overnm ent f o r  w h ic h  c o m m u n ic a tio n  
th e y  s h a l l  r e c e i v e  a s p e c i a l  s u b s id y  a t  th e  r a t e  o f  Hupees  
two th o u san d  p e r  mensem.
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L IN E  No. 1 0 .  S h a l l  he a c o m m u n ic a tio n  e v e r y  f o u r  weeks
b e tw een  Aden, K u rra c h e e  and P e r s ia n  G u l f .
N o te  -  The P e r s ia n  G-ulf p o r t i o n  o f  t h i s  s e r v i c e  may he 
p e r fo rm e d  by one o f  th e  r e g u l a r  w e e k ly  S te a m e rs .
5 .  T h a t  th e  p o r t s  to  he c a l l e d  a t  by and th e  t im e s  o f
P o r t s  o f  d e p a r t u r e  o f  th e  s a id  steam  v e s s e ls  on t h e i r
c a l l  and
Tim es o f  s e v e r a l  voyages  i n  th e  s a id  l i n e s  o f  comrnunica-
d e p a r t u r e
& c . t i o n  r e s p e c t i v e l y  and th e  t im e s  w i t h i n  w h ic h  th e
s p e c i f i e d
i n  ru n s  i n  th e  s a id  voyages  s h a l l  he made fro m
S c h e d u le  A.
p la c e  to  p la c e  and th e  p e r io d s  o f  t im e  th e y  
s h a l l  he d e t a in e d  and s t a y  a t  th e  s a id  p o r t s  and p la c e s  
s h a l l  he th o s e  w h ic h  a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d e f in e d  and s p e c i f i e d  
i n  th e  S c h e d u le  h e r e u n to  annexed m arked A , w h ic h  s a id  p o r t s  
o f  c a l l  t im e s  and p e r io d s  s h a l l  he o b s e rv e d  by and s h a l l  he 
o b l i g a t o r y  on th e  s a id  Company s u b je c t  n e v e r t h e le s s  to  th e  
s e v e r a l  p r o v is io n s  h e r e i n  c o n ta in e d  f o r  th e  a l t e r a t i o n  o f  
th e  s a id  t im e s  and th e  d e t e n t i o n  o f  th e  s a id  v e s s e ls .
6 .  T h a t  i f  n e v e r t h e le s s  a t  any t im e  o r  t im e s  d u r in g
G overnm ent th e  c o n t in u a n c e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  th e  s a id  
may a l t e r
t im e s  o f  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  s h a l l  deem i t  r e q u i s i t e  to
d e p a r t u r e
& c . a l t e r  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  days o r  to  d e f i n e  w i t h i n
p a r t i c u l a r  l i m i t s  th e  h o u rs  o f  d e p a r t u r e  fro m  a l l  and e v e ry  
o r  any o f  th e  p o r t s  o r  p la c e s  to  o r  fro m  w h ic h  th e  s a id  m a i ls  
a r e  to  he conveyed u n d e r  o r  by v i r t u e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  th e
s a id  G overnm ent s h a l l  he a t  l i b e r t y  so to  do a t  any t im e  o r  
t im e s  and fro m  t im e  to  t im e  on g i v i n g  one c a le n d a r  M o n th ’ s 
n o t i c e  o f  such i n t e n t i o n  to  th e  s a id  Company and th e  
p a r t i c u l a r  days and h o u rs  o f  d e p a r t u r e  fro m  a l l  and e v e ry  
o r  any o f  such p o r t s  o r  p la c e s  w h ic h  may he a p p o in te d  hy any  
such a l t e r a t i o n  i n  f o r c e  f o r  th e  t im e  b e in g  s h a l l  he deemed
to  he th e  days and h o u rs  o f  d e p a r t u r e  o f  th e  s a id  m a i ls
u n d e r  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  and s h a l l  he o b s e rv e d  and k e p t  hy th e  
s a id  Company a c c o r d i n g l y .
7 .  T h a t  s h o u ld  i t  he deemed hy th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a
D e la y  o f  24 o r  th e  P o s t  M a s te r  G e n e r a l  o f  B e n g a l o r  th e  P o s t
h o u rs  may he
o r d e r e d  o r  M a s te r  o f  C a l c u t t a  o r  th e  G overnm ent o f  M adras  
p e r m i t t e d  hy
th e  C h ie f  o r  th e  Governm ent o f  Bombay o r  th e  C h ie f  
C o m m iss io ner
G o v e rn o r  o r  C o m m iss io ner o f  B r i t i s h  Burmah o r  th e  G o v e rn o r  
C h ie f  C i v i l
O f f i c e r .  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n t s  o r  i n  t h e i r  absence
r e s p e c t i v e l y  hy th e  p e rs o n s  e x e r c i s i n g  t h e i r  f u n c t io n s  o r  hy  
th e  C h ie f  C i v i l  O f f i c e r  a t  any o f  th e  s a id  p o r t s  o r  p la c e s  
r e s p e c t i v e l y  r e q u i s i t e  f o r  th e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  t h a t  any v e s s e l  
em ployed u n d e r  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  s h o u ld  d e la y  h e r  d e p a r t u r e  fro m  
C a l c u t t a  o r  fro m  any o f  th e  p o r t s  o r  p la c e s  a f o r s a i d  as th e  
case may he beyond th e  p e r io d  h e r e i n  a g re e d  upon and m e n t io n e d  
i n  th e  s a id  S c h e d u le  A ( o r  i f  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  so 
r e q u e s t )  th e  s a id  G overnm ent o r  P o s t  M a s t e r  G e n e ra l  o r  P o s t  
M a s t e r  o r  th e  s a id  C h ie f  C o m m iss io ner G o v e rn o r  o r  C h ie f  C i v i l
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O f f i c e r  s h a l l  have power and be a t  l i b e r t y  to  o r d e r  o r  p e r m i t  
such d e la y  n o t  no w ever e x c e e d in g  t w e n t y - f o u r  ho urs  by l e t t e r  
a d d re s s e d  to  th e  m a s te r  o f  any such v e s s e l  o r  p e rs o n  a c t i n g  
as such and w h ic h  s h a l l  be deemed a s u f f i c i e n t  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  
such d e t e n t i o n .
8 .  T h a t  d u r in g  th e  c o n t in u a n c e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  th e
Conveyance s a id  steam  v e s s e ls  s h a l l  on e v e r y  voyage d u ly  
o f  m a i ls
and s a f e l y  c a r r y  a l l  m a i ls  o f  th e  G overnm ent  
( i n c l u d i n g  P o s t  O f f i c e  s t o r e s  and a l l  a r t i c l e s  s e n t  by p o s t  
as w e l l  as th e  bags o r  boxes i n  w h ic h  th e y  a r e  co n veyed )  
w h ic h  by th e  Governm ent o f  I n d i a  o r  th e  l o c a l  P o s t  M a s t e r  
G e n e r a l  o r  th e  G overnm ent o f  M adras  o r  th e  G overnm ent o f  
Bombay o r  th e  C h ie f  C o m m iss io ner o f  B r i t i s h  Burmah o r  th e  
G o v e rn o r  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n t s  o r  th e  p e rs o n s  e x e r c i s i n g  
t h e i r  f u n c t io n s  r e s p e c t i v e l y  o r  th e  C h ie f  C i v i l  O f f i c e r  o r  
P o s t  M a s te r  o f  any o f  th e  p o r t s  o r  p la c e s  h e r e i n  m e n t io n e d  
s h a l l  be r e q u i r e d  to  be conveyed on such voyage be tw e e n  any  
o f  th e  p o r t s  and p la c e s  a f o r e s a i d .
9 .  T h a t  th e  s a id  m a i ls  s h a l l  be d u ly  and s a f e l y  and
D e l i v e r y  and w i t h  a l l  p o s s ib le  d e s p a tc h  d e l i v e r e d  and r e c e i v e d
r e c e i p t  o f
m a i ls  by a t  each  o f  th e  p la c e s  to  w h ic h  th e  s a id  v e s s e ls
b o a ts  o f  th e
Company. a re  to  p ro c e e d  i n  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  t h i s
c o n t r a c t  and t h a t  th e  s a id  m a i ls  s h a l l  i n  e v e r y  case be 
conveyed to  and fro m  s h o re  i n  a s u i t a b l e  and s e a -w o r th y  b o a t
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o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  f o u r  o a rs  to  be f u r n is h e d  w i t h  e f f e c t u a l  
c o v e r in g  f o r  m a i lb a g s  and p r o p e r l y  p r o v id e d  manned and 
e q u ip p e d  by th e  s a id  Company.
1 0 .  T h a t  th e  s a id  Company and a l l  commanding and o t h e r
L a n d in g  O f f i c e r s  o f  th e  v e s s e ls  to  be em ployed i n  th e
d e l i v e r i n g
and p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  and a l l  a g e n ts
r e c e i v i n g  o f
m a i ls  -  seamen and s e r v a n ts  o f  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l
O rd e rs  o f
Governm ent a t  a l l  t im e s  d u r in g  th e  c o n t in u a n c e  o f  t h i s
& c . to  be
a t te n d e d  t o .  c o n t r a c t  p u n c t u a l l y  a t t e n d  to  th e  o r d e r s  and  
d i r e c t i o n s  o f  th e  s a id  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  o r  l o c a l  P o s t  te s te r  
G e n e r a l  o r  (a s  r e s p e c ts  th e  s a id  p la c e s  o t h e r  th a n  C a l c u t t a )  
o f  th e  G o v e rn o r  C h ie f  C om m iss io ner o r  o t h e r  C h ie f  C i v i l  
O f f i c e r  o r  th e  P o s t  M a s te r  ( o r  th e  p e rs o n  e x e r c i s i n g  h i s  
f u n c t i o n s )  o f  th e  s a id  p o r t s  o r  p la c e s  as to  th e  l a n d i n g  
d e l i v e r i n g  and r e c e i v i n g  o f  th e  s a id  m a i l s .
1 1 .  T h a t  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  n o t  n o r  s h a l l  any o f
P e n a l t y  f o r  th e  m a s te rs  o f  any o f  th e  v e s s e ls  em ployed o r  
r e c e i v i n g
l e t t e r s  to  be em ployed u n d e r  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  r e c e i v e  o r
o th e r w is e
th a n  u n d e r  p e r m i t  to  be r e c e iv e d  on b o a rd  any o f  th e  v e s s e ls  
C la u s e  8 o f
th e  em ployed u n d e r  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  any l e t t e r s  f o r
C o n t r a c t .
conveyance  o t h e r  th a n  th o s e  r e q u i r e d  to  be  
conveyed u n d e r  o r  by v i r t u e  o f  th e  8 t h  C la u s e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  
and such l e t t e r s  as a re  p r o v id e d  f o r  i n  th e  I n d i a n  P o s t  O f f i c e  
A c t o f  1866  S e c t io n  V . and i n  case o f  any and e v e r y  b r e a c h
369
of  t h i s  C la u s e  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  f o r f e i t  and pay to  th e  
s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  h i s  S u c c e s s o rs  and A s s ig n s  
th e  sum o f  Rupees te n  f o r  e v e r y  l e t t e r  so im p r o p e r ly  
r e c e i v e d  on b o a rd  any such v e s s e l .
1 2 .  T h a t  i f  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  a t  any t im e  f a i l
P e n a l t y  to  p r o v id e  an e f f i c i e n t  v e s s e l  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  
f o r  f a i l u r e
to  p r o v id e  w i t h  th e  te rm s  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  re a d y  to  p u t
e f f i c i e n t
v e s s e l  r e a d y  to  sea  fro m  any one o f  th e  t e r m i n a l  p o r t s  on 
to  p u t  to
s e a .  th e  l i n e s  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n  h e r e i n b e f o r e  m e n t io n e d
i n c l u d i n g  M adras Bombay and Rangoon on and a t  th e  d u ly  
a p p o in te d  day h o u r  o r  t im e  th e n  and i n  each case and as o f t e n  
as th e  same s h a l l  happen th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  f o r f e i t  and 
pay u n to  th e  s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  h is  S u c c e s s o rs  
and A s s ig n s  as and by way o f  l i q u i d a t e d  damages th e  sum o f  
Rupees f i v e  h u n d re d  f o r  each and e v e ry  s u c c e s s iv e  t w e n t y - f o u r  
h o u rs  up to  th e  s e v e n th  day i n c l u s i v e  w h ic h  s h a l l  e la p s e  fro m  
and a f t e r  th e  d u ly  a p p o in te d  h o u r  u n t i l  such v e s s e l  s h a l l  
a c t u a l l y  p ro c e e d  to  sea  on h e r  voyage i n  th e  due p e r fo rm a n c e  
o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  and i n  c a l c u l a t i n g  such d e la y  any f r a c t i o n  
o f  a day s h a l l  r e c k o n  as a c o m p le te  t w e n t y - f o u r  h o u rs  b u t  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  so t h a t  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  n o t  i n  any case  
be l i a b l e  to  any p e n a l t i e s  u n d e r  t h i s  C la u s e  i f  th e  d e f a u l t  
be p ro v e d  to  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  
(w h ic h  s h a l l  be n o t i f i e d  i n  w r i t i n g  to  th e  s a id  Company by
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one o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i e s  to  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  o r  by th e  
D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  th e  P o s t  O f f i c e ) t o  have  a r i s e n  fro m  
c irc u m s ta n c e s  o v e r  w h ic h  th e  s a id  Company and t h e i r  s e r v a n t s  
had n o t  and c o u ld  n o t  have had any c o n t r o l .
1 5 .  T h a t  i n  case any v e s s e l  em ployed o r  to  be em ployed
P e n a l t y  i n  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  L in e s  N os. 2 ,  3 and 8 o f  
f o r  v e s s e l
on l i n e s  2 ,  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  n a m e ly  th e  d i r e c t  f o r t n i g h t l y
3 and 8
f a i l i n g  to  s e r v i c e  be tw e e n  C a l c u t t a  and Akyab th e  d i r e c t  
a r r i v e  i n
due t im e .  w e e k ly  s e r v ic e  b e tw e e n  . C a lc u t t a  and Rangoon and  
th e  d i r e c t  s e m i-w e e k ly  s e r v i c e  b e tw e e n  Bombay and K u rra c h e e  
s h a l l  n o t  a r r i v e  a t  th e  s e v e r a l  p o r t s  o r  p la c e s  a t  th e  t im e s  
a t  w h ic h  h a v in g  r e g a r d  to  th e  s t i p u l a t e d  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
s e v e r a l  passag es  th e  same v e s s e l  ou gh t so to  a r r i v e  th e n  and 
i n  each  and e v e r y  o f  such cases and as o f t e n  as th e  same 
s h a l l  happen th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  f o r f e i t  and pay u n to  th e  
s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  h i s  S u c c e s s o rs  and A s s ig n s  
as and by way o f  l i q u i d a t e d  damages th e  sum o f  Rupees t w e n t y -  
f i v e  f o r  e v e ry  h o u r  and f r a c t i o n  o f  an h o u r  d u r in g  w h ic h  th e  
s a id  v e s s e l  s h a l l  f a i l  to  a r r i v e  a t  th e  n e x t  p o r t  o f  
d e s t i n a t i o n  b u t  n e v e r t h e le s s  so t h a t  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  
n o t  i n  any case be l i a b l e  to  any p e n a l t i e s  u n d e r  t h i s  C la u s e  
i f  th e  l a t e  a r r i v a l  i s  n o t  exceed ed  by s i x  h o u rs  o r  n in e  
h o u rs  i n  th e  case o f  a r r i v a l s  a t  Rangoon o r  a t  Akyab fro m  
Rangoon u n d e r  l i n e  N o . 2 o r  i f  th e  d e f a u l t  be p ro v e d  to  th e
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s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  o r  o f  th e  D i r e c t o r  
G e n e r a l  o f  th e  P o s t  O f f i c e  (w h ic h  s h a l l  he n o t i f i e d  i n  
w r i t i n g  to  th e  s a id  Company hy one o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i e s  o f  th e  
G overnm ent o r  hy th e  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  th e  P o s t  O f f i c e )  to  
have  a r i s e n  fro m  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  o v e r  w h ic h  th e  s a id  Company 
and t h e i r  s e r v a n ts  had n o t  and c o u ld  n o t  have  had any c o n t r o l .
T h a t  i n  case any V e s s e l  em ployed o r  to  he em ployed i n  
th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  l i n e s  D os. 1 ,  4 ,  5 ,  6 ,  7 ,  9 and 10 o f  t h i s  
C o n t r a c t  s h a l l  n o t  a r r i v e  a t  th e  t e r m i n a l  P o r t  o r  P la c e  f o r  
any voyage a t  o r  w i t h i n  th e  t im e  a t  w h ic h  th e  same V e s s e l  
o u g h t so to  a r r i v e  t h e r e  p u r s u a n t  to  t h i s  C o n t r a c t  th e n  and  
i n  each  and e v e ry  o f  such cases  and as o f t e n  as th e  same s h a l l  
happen th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  f o r f e i t  and pay u n to  th e  s a id  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  h i s  S u c c e s s o rs  and A s s ig n s  as 
and hy way o f  l i q u i d a t e d  damages th e  sum o f  Rupees T w e n t y - f i v e  
f o r  e v e r y  h o u r  and f r a c t i o n  o f  an h o u r  d u r in g  w h ic h  th e  s a id  
v e s s e l  s h a l l  n o t  a r r i v e  a t  such t e r m i n a l  p o r t  o r  p la c e  a t  o r  
w i t h i n  th e  t im e  a f o r e s a i d  h u t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  th e  Company s h a l l  
n o t  i n  any case he l i a b l e  to  p e n a l t y  i f  th e  l a t e  a r r i v a l  does  
n o t  exc e e d  s i x  h o u r s .
T h a t  f o r  th e  p u rp o s e s  o f  t h i s  C la u s e  th e  voyage s h a l l  
mean th e  s i n g l e  jo u r n e y  o n ly  and n o t  th e  jo u r n e y  fro m  one 
t e r m i n a l  p o r t  o r  p la c e  and h a c k  to  th e  same and a ls o  t h a t  f o r  
th e  p u rp o s e s  o f  t h i s  C la u s e  so f a r  as l i n e s  N os. 1 ,  4 ,  5 ,  6 ,
7 ,  9 and 10 a re  c o n c e rn e d  and b e f o r e  any p e n a l t y  s h a l l  be
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i n c u r r e d  t h e r e u n d e r  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  to  th e  
f o l l o w i n g  p e r io d s  o f  t im e  n a m e ly  th e  t im e  a l lo w e d  by t h i s  
c o n t r a c t  f o r  th e  voyage fro m  th e  p o r t  o r  p la c e  o f  commencement 
t h e r e o f  to  th e  t e r m i n a l  p o r t  o r  p la c e  a t  th e  r a t e  o f  7 t  m i le s  
an h o u r  b e s id e s  t h r e e  t im e s  th e  p e r io d  a l lo w e d  i n  th e  S c h e d u le  
as minimum s t a y  a t  th e  s e v e r a l  p o r t s  m e n t io n e d  t h e r e i n  as 
i n t e r m e d i a t e  be tw e e n  th e  t e r m i n a l  p o r t s  w h e th e r  th e  o c c a s io n a l  
p o r t s  have been c a l l e d  a t  o r  n o t  and w h e th e r  o r  n o t  such t im e  
be o c c u p ie d  i n  s t a y i n g  as a f o r e s a i d .  B u t n e v e r t h e le s s  so 
t h a t  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  n o t  i n  any case be l i a b l e  to  any  
p e n a l t i e s  u n d e r  t h i s  C la u s e  i f  th e  d e f a u l t  be p ro v e d  to  th e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  (w h ic h  s h a l l  be 
n o t i f i e d  to  th e  Company by one o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i e s  to  th e  
G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  o r  by th e  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  th e  P o s t  
O f f i c e )  to  have a r i s e n  fro m  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o v e r  w h ic h  th e  s a id  
Company and t h e i r  s e r v a n ts  had n o t  and c o u ld  n o t  have any  
c o n t r o l .
1 4 .  T h a t  i n  case any such v e s s e l  s h a l l  f a i l  to  re m a in
P e n a l t y  a t  any o f  th e  p o r t s  o f  c a l l  f o r  th e  spaces  o f  
f o r  f a i l u r e
to  re m a in  t im e  m e n t io n e d  i n  th e  s a id  S c h e d u le  A h e r e u n to
f o r  th e
s t i p u l a t e d  annexed o r  s h a l l  commence th e  voyage b e f o r e  th e  
t im e  a t
p o r t s .  t im e  a p p o in te d  i n  th e  s a id  S c h e d u le  ( u n le s s  th e
e a r l i e r  d e p a r t u r e  o f  such v e s s e l  s h a l l  be a u t h o r i z e d  i n  
w r i t i n g  by th e  G overnm ent o r  th e  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  th e  P o s t
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O f f i c e  o r  th e  l o c a l  P o s t  M a s t e r  G e n e r a l ,  o r  th e  G o v e rn o r  o r  
C h ie f  C i v i l  O f f i c e r  a t  th e  s a id  p o r t  o r  p l a c e )  th e  s a id  
Company s h a l l  f o r f e i t  and pay u n to  th e  s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
i n  C o u n c i l  h i s  S u c c e s s o rs  o r  A s s ig n s  as and by way o f  
l i q u i d a t e d  damages th e  sum o f  Rupees one h u n d re d  f o r  e v e r y  
h o u r  and f r a c t i o n  o f  an h o u r  w h ic h  such v e s s e l  s h a l l  so f a i l  
to  r e m a in  le s s  th a n  th e  s p e c i f i e d  t im e .  B u t w i t h  a v ie w  to  
th e  p u n c t u a l  a r r i v a l  o f  th e  S te a m e rs  a t  th e  P r e s id e n c y  c i t i e s ,  
th e  M a s te r s  o f  th e  S te a m e rs  s h a l l  be p e r m i t t e d  to  e x e r c is e  
d i s c r e t i o n  i n  c u r t a i l i n g  th e  s t a y  a t  th e  m in o r  p o r t s ,  
G overnm ent ho w ever o r  th e  C h ie f  C i v i l  O f f i c e r  s h a l l  have  th e  
power to  d e t a i n  th e  S te a m e rs  th e  f u l l  S c h e d u le  t im e  i f  th e  
e x ig e n c ie s  o f  th e  p u b l i c  s e r v ic e  r e q u i r e  i t .
1 5 .  T h a t  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  s h a l l  a ls o  have  f u l l
Power o f  power a t  such s t a t e d  i n t e r v a l s  as G overnm ent may 
G overnm ent
to  s u rv e y  deem i t  r e q u i s i t e ,  to  s u rv e y  a t  C a l c u t t a ,  M adras
and m easure
v e s s e ls .  o r  Bombay o r  such o t h e r  p o r t  o r  p o r t s  as
G overnm ent may fro m  t im e  to  t im e  a p p o in t  by d u ly  q u a l i f i e d  
o f f i c e r s  o r  s e r v a n ts  a l l  and e v e r y  th e  v e s s e ls  em ployed and  
to  be em ployed i n  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  and th e  
h u l l s  t h e r e o f  and th e  e n g in e s  m a c h in e ry  f u r n i t u r e  t a c k l e  
a p p a r e l  s t o r e s  e q u ip m e n ts  o f f i c e r s  e n g in e e r s  and crew  t h e r e o f  
and to  m easure  th e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  t r o o p s  o r  p a s s e n g e rs  o f  th e  
s a id  v e s s e ls  o r  f o r  o t h e r  th e  p u rp o s e s  f o r  w h ic h  such v e s s e ls
373
a r e  r e q u i r e d  u n d e r  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  and t h e i r  h u l l s  s h a l l  be 
opened w h e n e v e r  th e  s a id  o f f i c e r s  o r  s e r v a n ts  o f  Governm ent  
a u t h o r i z e d  to  s u rv e y  as a f o r e s a i d  may r e q u i r e  and t h a t  i f  
any such v e s s e ls  o r  any p a r t  t h e r e o f  o r  any e n g in e  m a c h in e ry  
f u r n i t u r e  t a c k l e  a p p a r e l  b o a t  s t o r e  o r  e q u ip m e n t t h e r e o f  
s h a l l  on any such s u r v e y  be d e c la r e d  by any o f  such o f f i c e r s  
o r  a g e n ts  u n s e a w o r th y  o r  n o t  a d a p te d  to  th e  s e v e r a l  s e r v ic e s  
h e re b y  c o n t r a c t e d  to  be p e r fo rm e d  such v e s s e l  s h a l l  be deemed 
i n e f f i c i e n t  f o r  any s e r v i c e  h e re b y  c o n t r a c t e d  to  be p e r fo rm e d  
and s h a l l  n o t  be em ployed a g a in  i n  th e  con veyance  o f  th e  
s a id  m a i ls  u n t i l  such d e f e c t  o r  d e f i c i e n c y  s h a l l  have been  
r e p a i r e d  o r  s u p p l ie d  to  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  s a id  G overnm ent  
o f  I n d i a  and t h a t  i f  such v e s s e l  s h a l l  be em ployed f o r  th e  
c a r r i a g e  o f  th e  m a i ls  b e f o r e  such d e f e c t  o r  d e f i c i e n c y  s h a l l  
have  been r e p a i r e d  o r  s u p p l ie d  to  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  
s a id  G overnm ent th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  f o r f e i t  and pay to  
th e  s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  h i s  S u cc e s so rs  o r  
A s s ig n s  th e  sum o f  Rupees two th o u s a n d .  And th e  Company 
i f  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  th e  G overnm ent s u r v e y o r ’ s r e p o r t  o r  
m easurem ent s h a l l  have  th e  power to  r e q u i r e  a s p e c i a l  s u rv e y  
by two in d e p e n d e n t  s u r v e y o r s  to  be a p p o in te d  by G overnm ent  
whose d e c i s i o n  s h a l l  be a c c e p te d  as f i n a l .
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1 6 .  T h a t  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  and w i l l  when and so
Conveyance o f t e n  as th e y  o r  (a s  r e s p e c ts  p la c e s  o t h e r  th a n
o f  G o v e rn ­
ment C a l c u t t a )  when and as o f t e n  as th e y  o r  any o f
p a s s e n g e rs
goods and th e  m a s te rs  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  v e s s e ls  s h a l l
s p e c ie  -
S c h e d u le s  by n o t i c e  i n  w r i t i n g  he r e q u i r e d  so to  do by
B and C .
th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  o r  by any o f  t h e i r  C i v i l  
o r  M i l i t a r y  o r  N a v a l  s e r v a n ts  o r  a g e n ts  a c t i n g  u n d e r  t h e i r  
a u t h o r i t y  o r  by th e  G o v e rn o r  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n t s  
r e c e i v e  provide f o r  v i c t u a l  and convey on b o a rd  such v e s s e ls  
o r  v e s s e l  to  and fro m  and b e tw e e n  any o f  th e  p la c e s  to  w h ic h  
such v e s s e l  i s  a b o u t  to  p ro c e e d  and a t  th e  s e v e r a l  r a t e s  o f  
passage money s p e c i f i e d  i n  th e  S c h e d u le s  h e r e a f t e r  w r i t t e n  
m arked B and C r e s p e c t i v e l y  a c c o r d in g  to  th e  s e v e r a l  c la s s e s  
o f  p a s s e n g e rs  t h e r e i n  p r o v id e d  f o r  such p e rs o n s  as s h a l l  be 
c e r t i f i e d  as p r o c e e d in g  on p u b l i c  d u ty  and s h a l l  and w i l l  
i n  l i k e  m anner on th e  r e q u i s i t i o n  i n  w r i t i n g  o f  th e  P o s t  
M a s te r  o r  o f  th e  C h ie f  C i v i l  a u t h o r i t y  a t  any p o r t  o r  p la c e  
r e c e i v e  and convey any P o s t a l  O f f i c e r  p r o c e e d in g  on d u ty  
f r e e  o f  a l l  c h a rg e  a c c o r d in g  to  th e  c la s s  by w h ic h  u n d e r  
th e  r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  th e  P o s t  O f f i c e  D e p a r tm e n t  f o r  th e  t im e  
b e in g  he may be e n t i t l e d  to  t r a v e l  ( t o g e t h e r  w i t h  such  
s e r v a n t  o r  s e r v a n ts  as he may be e n t i t l e d  to  ta k e  w i t h  h im  
u n d e r  th e  r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  th e  P o s t  O f f i c e  D e p a r tm e n t  f o r  th e  
t im e  b e in g  a ls o  f r e e  o f  c h a rg e s )  p r o v id e d  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h a t  
n o t  more th a n  one such f r e e  passag e  s h a l l  be c la im a b le  a t
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one and th e  same t im e  and s h a l l  a ls o  i n  l i k e  manner convey  
such p u b l i c  s t o r e s  goods g u n -p o w d e r  o r  o t h e r  c o m b u s t ib le s  
e x c e p t  n i t r o  g l i c e r i n e  and d y n a m ite  n o t  e x c e e d in g  th e  
c a p a b i l i t y  o f  th e  m a g a z in e  o f  th e  v e s s e l  and s p e c ie  as th e y  
may be r e q u i r e d  by th e  s a id  a u t h o r i t i e s  o r  any o f  them  
c h a r g in g  f o r  f r e i g h t  i n  r e s p e c t  t h e r e o f  a t  th e  r a t e  s p e c i f i e d  
i n  t h a t  b e h a l f  i n  th e  s a id  l a s t  m e n t io n e d  S c h e d u le s  and such  
p a s s e n g e rs  on p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  and such p u b l i c  s t o r e s  h o rs e s  
c a t t l e  goods g u n -p o w d e r o r  o t h e r  c o m b u s t ib le s  and s p e c ie  
s h a l l  be so conveyed a t  a l l  t im e s  i n  p r e f e r e n c e  to  p r i v a t e  
p a s s e n g e rs  o r  o r d i n a r y  f r e i g h t .  P r o v id e d  t h a t  r e a s o n a b le  
n o t i c e  be g iv e n  o f  th e  i n t e n t i o n  to  fo r w a r d  such p a s s e n g e rs  
s t o r e s  goods g u n -p o w d e r  and o t h e r  c o m b u s t ib le s  and s p e c ie .  
P r o v id e d  f u r t h e r  t h a t  i n  cases  o f  u n u s u a l em ergency and  
u n d e r  th e  s p e c i a l  o r d e r s  o f  G overnm ent th e  Company may be 
r e q u i r e d  to  p r o v id e  accom m odation  f o r  G overnm ent p a s s e n g e rs  
and goods w i t h o u t  n o t i c e  as a f o r e s a i d  i f  i t  can be done 
w i t h o u t  r e - l a n d i n g  any p a s s e n g e rs  o r  goods a c t u a l l y  on b o a rd .  
P r o v id e d  f u r t h e r  t h a t  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  and w i l l  when­
e v e r  r e q u i r e d  so to  do by th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  o r  th e  
C h ie f  C o m m iss io n er o f  B r i t i s h  Burrnah as fro m  th e  1 2 th  day  
o f  J a n u a ry  1875  convey  fro m  C a l c u t t a  to  Burrnah as deck  
p a s s e n g e rs  on th e  s a id  l i n e s  c o n n e c te d  w i t h  t h a t  P r o v in c e  
v i z : N o s . 1 ,  2 ,  5 and 4 S t a t e  E m ig r a n ts  o f  th e  age o f
seven  y e a r s  and u n d e r  t h a t  age f r e e  o f  c h a rg e  and f o r  a l l
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S t a t e  E m ig ra n ts  above th e  age o f  s even  y e a r s  a t  th e  r a t e  o f  
Rupees s even  and annas e i g h t  f o r  each  E m ig r a n t  e x c l u s i v e  o f  
fo o d  and s h a l l  and w i l l  convey fro m  C a l c u t t a  to  B r i t i s h  
Burrnah a l l  l i v e  and dead s to c k  and good and g r a i n  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p u rp o s e s  i n  c o n n e c t io n  w i t h  th e  S t a t e  
E m ig ra n ts '  r e f e r r e d  to  a t  o n e - h a l f  o f  th e  r a t e s  m e n t io n e d  
and s p e c i f i e d  i n  th e  S c h e d u le  B h e r e t o  annexed and t h a t  th e  
s te a m e rs  o f  th e  s a id  Company a lo n e  s h a l l  be em ployed f o r  
th e  p u rp o s e .
1 7 .  T h a t  i f  a t  any t im e  d u r in g  th e  c o n t in u a n c e  o f
G overnm ent t h i s  c o n t r a c t  and so o f t e n  as th e  G overnm ent  
may ta k e  up
th e  o f  I n d i a  o r  th e  G overnm ent o f  M adras  o r  th e
Company’ s
s te a m e rs  f o r  G overnm ent o f  Bombay s h a l l  r e q u i r e  any o f  th e  
conveyance
o f  t r o o p s  & c»steam  v e s s e ls  o f  th e  s a id  Company em ployed  o r  
to  be em ployed u n d e r  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  f o r  th e  con veyance  o f  
t ro o p s  f o r  to w in g  v e s s e ls  o r  f o r  o t h e r  p u rp o s e s  and s h a l l  
cause n o t i c e  o f  such r e q u i r e m e n t  to  be g iv e n  to  th e  s a id  
Company by w r i t i n g  u n d e r  th e  hand o f  any o f  th e  s a id  
S e c r e t a r i e s  to  th e  s a id  G overnm ents  th e n  th e  s a id  Company 
s h a l l  and w i l l  p e r m i t  th e  s a id  v e s s e ls  o r  any o f  them to  be 
ta k e n  up used and em ployed f o r  th e  con veyance  o f  t r o o p s  f o r  
to w in g  v e s s e ls  o r  f o r  o t h e r  p u rp o s e s  e x c l u s i v e l y  by th e  
s a id  G overnm ent f o r  any p e r io d  o f  t im e  d u r in g  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  
on th e  te rm s  f o l l o w i n g  -  t h a t  i s  to  say t h a t  a l l  th e  c o a l
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w h ic h  s h a l l  be consumed s h a l l  be s u p p l ie d  by th e  s a id  
G overnm ent and th e  s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  
s h a l l  m o re o v e r  pay  to  th e  s a id  Company by way o f  h i r e  f o r  
th e  use o f  each v e s s e l  so em ployed by th e  s a id  Governm ent  
a t  th e  r a t e  o f  Rupees tw e n ty  p e r  to n  a c c o r d in g  to  th e  g ro s s  
r e g i s t e r e d  to n n a g e  o f  th e  s a id  v e s s e l  f o r  e v e r y  m onth o r
p o r t i o n  o f  a m onth d u r in g  w h ic h  th e  same s h a l l
R a te  o f  h i r e
and G e n e r a l  e g0 em ployed and a t  th e  r a t e  o f  Rupees  
C o n d i t i o n s .
e ig h t e e n  p e r  to n  p e r  m onth a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  s i x  
m o n th s . P r o v id e d  t h a t  a v e s s e l  t a k e n  up u n d e r  t h i s  
S e c t io n  s h a l l  be r e g a rd e d  as u n d e r  h i r e  u n t i l  i t  s h a l l  
have r e t u r n e d  to  th e  p o r t  o f  o r i g i n a l  d e p a r t u r e  th e  t im e  
so re c k o n e d  fro m  th e  d a te  o f  d is c h a r g e  f ro m  a c t u a l  s e r v i c e  
to  th e  d a te  o f  r e t u r n  to  th e  p o r t  o f  o r i g i n a l  d e p a r t u r e  n o t  
e x c e e d in g  i n  any case th e  t im e  r e q u i r e d  to  p e r fo rm  th e  
r e t u r n  voyage a t  th e  speed o f  7^  m i le s  p e r  h o u r  and s h a l l  
be e n t i t l e d  to  h i r e  f o r  a t  l e a s t  one m onth and t h a t  th e  
s a id  Company s h a l l  be f r e e  on b e h a l f  o f  v e s s e ls  so ta k e n  
up o f  a l l  c h a rg e s  f o r  P o r t  dues use o f  M o o r in g s  H a rb o r  
M a s t e r ' s  s e r v ic e s  L i g h t  dues & P i l o t a g e  and s h a l l  n o t  be 
r e q u i r e d  to  tow more th a n  one v e s s e l  a t  a t im e  u n le s s  to  
p r e v e n t  d i s a s t e r  s h ip -w r e c k  o r  to  escape th e  f i r e  o f  an 
enemy and s h a l l  n o t  be r e q u i r e d  to  c a r r y  more t ro o p s  o r  
P a s s e n g e rs  th a n  th e  P a s s e n g e r  A c t  o r  G overnm ent c e r t i f i c a t e  
p r o v id e s  f o r  e x c e p t in g  i n  cases o f  u n u s u a l  em ergen cy .
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When v e s s e ls  a r e  ta k e n  up f o r  th e  con veyance  o f  t ro o p s
u n d e r  t h i s  S e c t io n  th e  s a id  Company m ust a r r a n g e  i f  r e q u i r e d
so to  do f o r  th e  m ess in g  o f  p a s s e n g e rs  and t ro o p s  on such
s c a le s  and a t  such r a t e s  o f  c h a rg e  as may f ro m  t im e  to  t im e
be a g re e d  upon b e tw e e n  th e  G overnm ent and th e  Company.
F u r t h e r  i t  i s  p r o v id e d  t h a t  no p e n a l t i e s  s h a l l  be
i n c u r r e d  by th e  Company u n d e r  C la u s e  X I I  o f  t h i s  a g re e m e n t
s h o u ld  th e  Company be c o m p e lle d  t e m p o r a r i l y  to  d is c o n t in u e
p a r t  o r  th e  w ho le  o f  th e  s e r v ic e s  ow ing  to  G overnm ent t a k i n g
, , . up th e  Company’ s S te a m e rs  -under th e  te rm s o f
No d e a u c t io n  17
fro m  th e  t h i s  C la u s e  b u t  a r a t e a b l e  m i le a g e  d e d u c t io n
s u b s id y  f o r
llon7 s h a l l  be made fro m  th e  s u b s id y  s h o u ld  th ep e r fo rm a n c e
o f  s e r v ic e s  company i n  such c i rc u m s ta n c e s  n o t  m a i n t a i n  a t  
ow ing to  J
G overnm ent l e a s t  a l l  th e  s e r v ic e s  p r o v id e d  f o r  u n d e r  th e
h i r i n g  th e
s te a m e rs .  c o n t r a c t s  i n  f o r c e  i n  1872  as s t a t e d  i n  th e  
m a r g in *  and a l l  th e  c o n d i t io n s  and p e n a l t i e s  o f  t h i s
*  The f o l l o w i n g  i s  th e  i n f o r m a t i o n  g iv e n  i n  th e  m a rg in  o f
th e  o r i g i n a l  docum ent:
1 .  C a l c u t t a  and B r i t i s h  Burrnah w e e k ly  w i t h  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  
to  th e  S t r a i t s  once e v e r y  f o u r  w eeks .
2 .  Bombay and K u rra c h e e  w e e k ly  w i t h  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  to  th e  
P e r s ia n  G u l f  once a f o r t n i g h t .
3 .  C a l c u t t a  Bombay and I n t e r m e d i a t e  p o r t s  on th e  E a s t  and 
W est C o asts  f o r t n i g h t l y .
4 .  M a d ra s ,  Rangoon & I n t e r m e d i a t e  p o r t s  on th e  E a s t  C o ast  
once e v e r y  f o u r  w eeks .
5 .  Akyab to  Kyouk Phyoo and ba c k  f o r t n i g h t l y  w i t h  a f o u r  
w e e k ly  e x t e n s io n  to  Sandoway.
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a g re e m e n t s h a l l  a t t a c h  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  such s e r v ic e s  as th e  
Company c o n t in u e  to  p e r fo r m .
1 8 .  T h a t  e v e r y  sum o f  money s t i p u l a t e d  to  he f o r f e i t e d
M o n ies  by th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  he c o n s id e r e d  as
f o r f e i t e d
may he l i q u i d a t e d  o r  a s c e r t a i n e d  damages and s h a l l  he
d e d u c te d
fro m  m onies  d e d u c te d  o u t  o f  any m onies  th e n  p a y a b le  o r  w h ic h  
p a y a b l e .
may t h e r e a f t e r  become p a y a b le  to  th e  c o n t r a c t o r s  
o r  th e  paym ent t h e r e o f  may he e n fo r c e d  w i t h  f u l l  c o s t  o f  s u i t  
and no paym ent on a c c o u n t  o f  th e  c o n t r a c t  s h a l l  he deemed as 
v /a iv e r  o f  th e  r i g h t  to  r e c o v e r  any a n t e c e d e n t  to  w h ic h  th e  
c o n t r a c t o r s  may he l i a b l e .
19 *  T h a t  a l l  n o t ic e s  and d i r e c t i o n s  w h ic h  th e  s a id
N o t ic e s  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  o r  th e  S e c r e t a r i e s
and
d i r e c t i o n s  o f  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  o r  th e  D i r e c t o r  
u n d e r  t h i s
c o n t r a c t  how G e n e r a l  o f  th e  P o s t  O f f i c e  o r  th e  O f f i c e r s  o r  
to  be
d e l i v e r e d .  o t h e r  p e rs o n s  o f  th e  s a id  G overnm ents  o f  I n d i a ,  
M adras  and Bombay o r  th e  G o v e rn o r  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n t s  
a re  by th e s e  p r e s e n t s  a u t h o r i z e d  and empowered to  g iv e  to  
th e  s a id  Company t h e i r  o f f i c e r s ,  s e r v a n ts  o r  a g e n ts  may as 
r e s p e c t s  p la c e s  o t h e r  th a n  C a l c u t t a  a t  th e  o p t io n  o f  th e  
s a id  a u t h o r i t i e s  be e i t h e r  d e l i v e r e d  to  th e  m a s te r  o f  any  
o f  th e  s a id  v e s s e ls  o r  o t h e r  o f f i c e r  o r  a g e n t  o f  th e  s a id  
Company i n  th e  c h a rg e  o r  management o f  any v e s s e l  em ployed  
i n  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  o r  may be l e f t  f o r  th e
3 SO
s a id  Company a t  t h e i r  l a s t  known o f f i c e  o r  p la c e  o f  b u s in e s s  
i n  I n d i a  and t h a t  as r e s p e c ts  C a l c u t t a  a l l  such n o t ic e s  
s h a l l  be so l e f t  f o r  th e  s a id  Company a t  t h e i r  l a s t  known 
o f f i c e  o r  p la c e  o f  b u s in e s s  i n  C a l c u t t a .
2 0 .  AMD TH IS  INDENTURE FURTHER WITNESSETH t h a t  i n
S u b s id y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  th e  p re m is e s  and o f  th e  due
f o r  th e
s e v e r a l  and f a i t h f u l  p e r fo rm a n c e  by th e  s a id  Company
l i n e s .
o f  a l l  th e  s e v e r a l  s e r v ic e s  h e re b y  c o n t r a c t e d  
to  be p e r fo rm e d  by them th e  s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  
C o u n c i l  f o r  h i m s e l f  h i s  S u c c e s s o rs  and A s s ig n s  d o th  h e re b y  
c o v e n a n t  t h a t  t h e r e  s h a l l  be p a id  to  th e  s a id  Company t h e i r  
S u c c e s s o rs  and A s s ig n s  so lo n g  as th e y  p e r fo r m  th e  s a id  
s e v e r a l  s e r v ic e s  i n  th e  m anner and w i t h  such v e s s e ls  as 
h e r e i n  p r o v id e d  th e  a n n u a l  s u b s id y  o f  Rupees seven  la c s  
and t w e n t y - f i v e  th o u s a n d *  o n ly  such s u b s id y  to  be p a y a b le  
f o r  each  month o r  o t h e r  p e r io d  o r  f r a c t i o n  t h e r e o f  on th e  
1 5 t h  day o f  each s u c c e e d in g  m onth on p r o d u c t io n  o f  c e r t i f i c a t e s  
fro m  th e  P o s t  M a s t e r  o r  D e p u ty  P o s t  M a s t e r  o f  th e  s e v e r a l  
P o r t s  s i g n i f y i n g  th e  due c a r r i a g e  and d e l i v e r y  o f  th e  s a id  
m a i ls  a c c o r d in g  to  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  d u r in g  th e  p r e c e d in g  m onth  
o r  o t h e r  p e r io d  and t h e r e  s h a l l  a ls o  be p a id  to  th e  s a id  
Company m o n th ly  on th e  1 5 th  day o f  each  m onth and a f t e r
*  T h is  was a p p r o x im a t e ly  £ 5 5 , 7 7 0 .  I  am g r a t e f u l  to  
D r .  K .H .  C h a u d h u r i ,  o f  th e  S c h o o l o f  O r i e n t a l  and 
A f r i c a n  S t u d i e s ,  f o r  t h i s  e s t i m a t e .  I . K . O .
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p r o d u c t io n  o f  p r o p e r  B i l l s ,  V o u c h e rs  ana R e c e ip t s  f o r  th e  
same th e  amount o f  th e  passage money and f r e i g h t  o f  a l l  such  
p a s s e n g e rs  n a t i v e  d o c to r s  and w a r r a n t  o f f i c e r s  t ro o p s  h o rs e s  
c a t t l e  goods s t o r e s  and s p e c ie  as s h a l l  f o r  any p r e v io u s  
m onth have Been c a r r i e d  and conveyed  by th e  s a id  Company on 
b e h a l f  o f  G overnm ent by v i r t u e  o f  o r  u n d e r  th e  p r o v is io n s  
o f  th e s e  p r e s e n ts  a t  and a f t e r  th e  r a t e s  s p e c i f i e d  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
i n  th e  s a id  S c h e d u le s  B and C h e r e u n d e r  w r i t t e n .  And t h a t  
t h e r e  s h a l l  be a ls o  p a id  th e  s a id  s p e c i a l  s u b s id y  o f  Rupees  
two th o u s a n d  p e r  m onth b e f o r e  m e n t io n e d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  
L in e  betv /een  B u s re h  and Bagdad h o .  9 i n  case th e  same s h a l l  
become p a y a b le .
2 1 .  A O  i t  i s  h e re b y  a g re e d  and d e c la r e d  t h a t  t h i s
C o n t r a c t  to  c o n t r a c t  s h a l l  commence on 1 s t  May 1874  and  
c o n t in u e  up
to  3 0 th  s h a l l  c o n t in u e  i n  f o r c e  up to  th e  3 0 th  A p r i l
A p r i l  1 8 8 4 .
188 4  and s h a l l  th e n  t e r m in a t e  i f  e i t h e r  th e  
s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  o r  th e  s a id  Company s h a l l  
have g iv e n  n o t ic e  i n  w r i t i n g  on o r  b e f o r e  th e  3 0 th  A p r i l  1883  
o f  h is  o r  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  to  p u t  an end to  th e  c o n t r a c t  and 
i n  th e  absence  o f  such n o t i c e  s h a l l  c o n t in u e  i n  f o r c e  u n t i l  
th e  e x p i r a t i o n  o f  tw e lv e  c a le n d a r  m onths fro m  th e  t im e  when 
such n o t i c e  s h a l l  have  been  o r  may be g i v e n .
3&Z
2 2 .  And i t  i s  f u r t h e r  a g re e d  and d e c la r e d  t h a t  
w i t h o u t  th e  c o n s e n t o f  th e  s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  s i g n i f i e d  
i n  w r i t i n g  u n d e r  th e  hand o f  one o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i e s  f o r  th e  
t im e  b e in g  to  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  s h a l l  
n o t ,  n o r  s h a l l  any p a r t  t h e r e o f  be a s s ig n e d  u n d e r l e t  o r  
d is p o s e d  o f  and i n  case o f  th e  same o r  any p a r t  t h e r e o f  
b e in g  a s s ig n e d  u n d e r l e t  o r  o t h e r w is e  d is p o s e d  o f  v / i th o u t
th e  c o n s e n t  s i g n i f i e d  as a f o r e s a i d  o r  o f  any g r e a t  and
h a b i t u a l  b re a c h  o f  t h i s  a g re e m e n t on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  s a id
Company t h e i r  o f f i c e r s  a g e n ts  o r  s e r v a n ts  and w h e th e r  t h e r e
be o r  be n o t  any p e n a l t y  o r  sum o f  money p a y a b le  
by th e  Company f o r  any such b r e a c h  i t  s h a l l  be
l a w f u l  f o r  th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  I n d i a  i n
C o u n c i l  i f  he s h a l l  t h i n k  f i t  by w r i t i n g  u n d e r  
h i s  hand o r  u n d e r  th e  hand o f  one o f  th e  
S e c r e t a r i e s  f o r  th e  t im e  b e in g  to  th e  G overnm ent  
o f  I n d i a  to  d e te r m in e  t h i s  C o n t r a c t  w i t h o u t  any p r e v io u s  
n o t ic e  to  th e  Company o r  t h e i r  A g e n ts  n o r  s h a l l  th e  Company 
be e n t i t l e d  to  any c o m p e n s a tio n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  such d e t e r m in a ­
t i o n .
23. If at any time during the continuance of this
D is p u te s  to  c o n t r a c t  o r  a f t e r  th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t h e r e o f  
be r e f e r r e d
to  any d is p u t e  s h a l l  a r i s e  b e tw e e n  th e  p a r t i e s
a r b i t r a t i o n .
h e r e t o  t h e i r  S u c c e s s o rs  o r  A s s ig n s  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
c o n c e rn in g  any b r e a c h  o r  a l l e g e d  b r e a c h  by o r  on th e  p a r t  o f
C o n t r a c t  
n o t  to  be 
a s s ig n e d . 
Power to  
d e te rm in e  
i t  i n  th e  
e v e n t  o f  a  
b re a c h  by  
th e
Company.
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th e  Company o f  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  o r  th e  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  any such  
b re a c h  to  j u s t i f y  th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  I n d i a  i n  p u t t i n g  
an end to  th e  same o r  c o n c e rn in g  any o f  th e  c o n v e n a n ts  m a t t e r s  
o r  t h in g s  t h e r e i n  c o n ta in e d  o f  i n  any ways r e l a t i n g  t h e r e t o  
and n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  th e  power h e r e i n  c o n ta in e d  to  d e te rm in e  
t h i s  a g re e m e n t and any e x e c u t io n  o r  a t te m p te d  e x e c u t io n  o f  
such pow er such d is p u t e  s h a l l  be r e f e r r e d  to  two a r b i t r a t o r s  
one to  be chosen by th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  and th e  o t h e r  by 
th e  Company and i f  such a r b i t r a t o r s  s h o u ld  a t  any t im e  o r  
t im e s  n o t  a g re e  i n  th e  m a t t e r  o r  q u e s t io n  r e f e r r e d  to  them  
th e n  such q u e s t io n  o r  d i f f e r e n c e  s h a l l  be r e f e r r e d  by them  
to  an u m p ire  to  be chosen by such a r b i t r a t o r s  b e f o r e  th e y  
p ro c e e d  w i t h  th e  r e f e r e n c e  to  them and th e  j o i n t  and 
c o n c u r r e n t  award o f  th e  s a id  a r b i t r a t o r s  o r  th e  s e p a r a te  
aw ard o f  th e  s a id  u m p ire  when th e  s a id  a r b i t r a t o r s  c a n n o t  
a g re e  s h a l l  be b in d in g  and c o n c lu s iv e  upon b o th  p a r t i e s .
24. If on the termination of this contract by effluxion
I f  when o f  t im e  o r  o t h e r w is e  any v e s s e l  o r  v e s s e ls  have
a g re e m e n t
t e r m in a t e s  s t a r t e d  o r  s h a l l  s t a r t  w i t h  th e  m a i ls  i n  
any v e s s e ls
have s t a r t e d  c o n fo r m i ty  w i t j i  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  such voyage o r  
voyage to  be
c o n t in u e d  as voyages  s h a l l  be c o n t in u e d  o r  p e r fo rm e d  and  
i f  c o n t r a c t
re m a in e d  i n  ; arh c o m p le te d  to  th e  te rm in u s  and th e  m a i ls  be 
f o r c e .
d e l i v e r e d  and r e c e i v e d  d u r in g  th e  same as i f  
t h i s  a g re e m e n t had re m a in e d  i n  f o r c e  w i t h  r e g a r d  to  any such  
v e s s e l  o r  v e s s e ls  and s e r v ic e s  and w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  any such
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v e s s e ls  and s e r v ic e s  l a s t  a f o r e s a i d  t h i s  a g re e m e n t s h a l l  be 
c o n s id e r e d  as h a v in g  t e r m in a t e d  when such v e s s e ls  and s e r v ic e s  
s h a l l  have re a c h e d  t h e i r  p o r t  o r  p la c e  o f  d e s t i n a t i o n  and 
been p e r fo r m e d .  And s u b s id y  a t  a p r o p o r t i o n a t e  m i le a g e  r a t e  
( c a l c u l a t e d  upon th e  m i le a g e  r a t e  o f  s u b s id y  p a y a b le  u n d e r  
t h i s  c o n t r a c t )  s h a l l  a c c ru e  and be p a id  f o r  on th e  voyage  
o r  vo yag es  so c o m p le te d .
2 5 .  And l a s t l y  th e  s a id  Company do h e re b y  b in d  them ­
s e lv e s  and t h e i r  S u c c e s s o rs  u n to  th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  
I n d i a  i n  C o u n c i l  and h i s  S u c c e s s o rs  i n  th e  sumDamages m
case o f  ^ Hupees two la c s  as and by way o f  l i q u i d a t e d
d e t e r m in a -  ^
b re a c h ^  <fc damages to  be p a id  to  th e  s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f
S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  h i s  S u c c e s s o rs  o r  A s s ig n s  by  
th e  s a id  Company upon and i n  case o f  th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  
t h i s  C o n t r a c t  by n o t i c e  as a f o r e s a i d  i n  consequence o f  a 
b re a c h  o f  c o n t r a c t  o r  th e  w in d in g  up o f  th e  s a id  Company 
a g a in s t  whose e s t a t e s  th e  s a id  sum o f  Rupees two la c s  s h a l l  
and may be p ro v e d  as a d e b t .
I n  w i tn e s s  w h e re o f  th e  s a id  B r i t i s h  I n d i a  Steam  
N a v i g a t i o n  Company " L i m i t e d ” have  h e r e u n to  a f f i x e d  t h e i r  
s e a l  and one o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i e s  to  G overnm ent i n  th e  F i n a n c i a l  
D e p a r tm e n t  by o r d e r  o f  th e  R ig h t  H o n ! b le  th e  V ic e r o y  and  
G o v e r n o r -G e n e r a l  o f  I n d i a  i n  C o u n c i l  a c t i n g  f o r  and on b e h a l f  
o f  th e  s a id  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  C o u n c i l  has h e r e u n to  s e t  
h i s  hand and s e a l  th e  day and y e a r  f i r s t  above w r i t t e n .
S ig n e d ,  S e a le d  and d e l i v e r e d  )
)
by th e  B R IT IS H  IN D IA  STEAM j 
NAVIGATION COMPANY L IM IT E D  j
by t h e i r  a t t o r n e y s  N E IL  
MACMICHAEL and THOMAS 
MELVILLE RUSSELL i n  th e  
p re s e n c e  o f
CHAR. SANDERSON
S o l r .  to  G overnm ent
B R IT IS H  IN D IA  STEAM NAVIGATION
COMPANY L IM IT E D  /  \
( S e a l !
by t h e i r  a t t o r n e y s  
N . MACMICHAEL 
T .M . RUSSELL
S e a l
S ig n e d ,  S e a le d  and d e l i v e r e d  )
by R . B . CHAPMAN, S e c r e t a r y  )
to  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d i a  )
)
i n  th e  F i n a n c i a l  D e p a r tm e n t )
)
a c t i n g  f o r  and on b e h a l f  o f )
th e  G o v e rn o r  G e n e r a l  o f  )
)
I n d i a  i n  C o u n c i l ,  a c t i n g  ) 
f o r  and on b e h a l f  o f  th e  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  
I n d i a  i n  C o u n c i l  i n  th e  
p re s e n c e  o f
J .W . TWALLING
R .B .  CHAPMAN
N o te  -  T h is  a p p e n d ix  i s  u n p u b l is h e d  Crown c o p y r ig h t  m a t e r i a l  
i n  th e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  R e c o rd s .  I t  i s  t r a n s c r i b e d  i n  
t h i s  t h e s i s  by p e r m is s io n  o f  th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
f o r  F o r e ig n  and Commonwealth A f f a i r s .
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APPENDIX II.
CONCESSION GIVEN BY THE SULTAN OP ZANZIBAR TO 
THE B R IT IS H  EAST AFRICAN ASSOCIATION
PREAMBLE
H is  H ig h n e s s  th e  SEYYID BARGrHASH-BIN-SAID, S u l t a n  o f  
Z a n z ib a r  and i t s  E a s t  A f r i c a n  d e p e n d e n c ie s ,  h e re b y  g r a n t s  
th e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n c e s s io n s  f o r  a te rm  o f  f i f t y  y e a rs  to  th e  
C o r p o r a t io n  o r  A s s o c i a t i o n  u n d e r  th e  p r e s id e n c y  o f  
M r.  Y/ILLIAM MACKINNON, h e r e i n a f t e r  to  be c a l l e d  th e  
B r i t i s h  E a s t  A f r i c a n  A s s o c i a t io n ,  o r  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  
who, on t h e i r  p a r t ,  a g re e  to  a c c e p t  th e  accom panying  
o b l i g a t i o n s .
ARTICLE I
H is  H ig h n e s s  th e  S u l t a n  makes o v e r  to  th e  B r i t i s h  
E a s t  A f r i c a n  A s s o c i a t i o n  a l l  th e  pow er w h ic h  he p o ss e s s es  
on th e  m a in la n d  i n  th e  M rim a , and i n  a l l  h i s  t e r r i t o r i e s  
and d e p e n d e n c ie s  f ro m  Wanga to  K i p i n i  i n c l u s i v e ,  th e  w h o le  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  w h ic h  he concedes to  and p la c e s  i n  t h e i r  
hands to  be c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  h i s  H ig h n e s s ’ s name, and u n d e r  
h i s  f l a g ,  and s u b je c t  to  h i s  H ig h n e s s ’ s s o v e r e ig n  r i g h t s ;  
b u t  i t  i s  u n d e rs to o d  t h a t  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  i s  to  be r e s p o n ­
s i b l e  f o r  a l l  th e  a f f a i r s  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h a t  p a r t
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o f  h i s  H ig h n e s s ’ s d o m in io n s  in c lu d e d  i n  t h i s  c o n c e s s io n ,  
and t h a t  h is  H ig h n e s s  th e  S u l t a n  s h a l l  n o t  he l i a b l e  f o r  
any expenses  c o n n e c te d  w i t h  th e  same, n o r  f o r  any w ar o r  
’ d i y a ' (b lo o d -m o n e y ) ,  o r  f o r  any c la im s  a r i s i n g  t h e r e f r o m ,  
none o f  w h ic h  h i s  H ig h n e s s  s h a l l  be c a l l e d  upon to  s e t t l e .
No o t h e r  b u t  th e m s e lv e s  s h a l l  have  th e  r i g h t  o f  p u rc h a s in g  
p u b l i c  la n d s  on th e  m a in la n d  o r  anyw here  i n  h i s  H ig h n e s s ’ s 
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  p o s s e s s io n s ,  o r  d e p e n d e n c ie s  w i t h i n  th e  l i m i t s  
above named e x c e p t  th ro u g h  them , as i n  th e  case  now w i t h  
h i s  H ig h n e s s .  He a ls o  g r a n t s  to  th e  A s s o c ia t i o n  o r  to  
t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  th e  f a c u l t y  o f  l e v y i n g  ta x e s  upon th e  
p e o p le  o f  th e  m a in la n d  w i t h i n  th e  l i m i t s  above named. H is  
H ig h n e s s  f u r t h e r  a g re e s  to  do a l l  a c ts  and deeds t h a t  may 
be n e c e s s a ry  to  g iv e  f u l l  e f f e c t  to  th e  te rm s  o f  t h i s  
c o n c e s s io n ,  to  a id  and s u p p o r t  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o r  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w i t h  a l l  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  and f o r c e ,  so as to  
s e c u re  to  them th e  r i g h t s  and pow ers h e re b y  g r a n t e d .
I t  i s  f u r t h e r  a g re e d  upon by th e  c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  
t h a t  n o t h in g  c o n ta in e d  i n  th e  f o l l o w i n g  A r t i c l e s  o f  
C o n c e s s io n  s h a l l  ±11 any way i n f r i n g e  o r  le s s e n  th e  r i g h t s  
a c c o rd e d  by h i s  H ig h n e s s  to  th e  s u b je c t s  o r  c i t i z e n s  o f  
G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r ic a ,  P ra n c e ,  Germ any, 
o r  any o t h e r  f o r e i g n  powers h a v in g  t r e a t y  r e l a t i o n s  v / i t h  
h i s  H ig h n e s s ,  o r  th e  o b l i g a t i o n s  w h ic h  a re  o r  may be im posed  
upon h im  by h i s  a d h e s io n  to  th e  B e r l i n  G e n e r a l  A c t .
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ARTICLE II
H is  H ig h n e s s  a u t h o r is e s  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  o r  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to  a p p o in t  i n  h i s  name and on h i s  b e h a l f  
c o m m iss io n ers  to  a d m i n i s t e r  any d i s t r i c t s  i n  h i s  H ig h n e s s ’ s 
p o s s e s s io n s  in c lu d e d  i n  th e  l i m i t  o f  t e r r i t o r i e s  named a b o v e ,  
e x c e f j t  as h e r e i n a f t e r  p r o v id e d ;  to  a p p o in t  such s u b o r d in a te  
o f f i c e r s  as may be r e q u i r e d ;  to  pass la w s  f o r  th e  g o vern m en t  
o f  d i s t r i c t s ;  to  e s t a b l i s h  c o u r t s  o f  j u s t i c e ;  and g e n e r a l l y  
to  a d o p t such m easu res  as may be n e c e s s a ry  f o r  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  
o f  th e  d i s t r i c t s  and i n t e r e s t s  u n d e r  t h e i r  r u l e .
H is  H ig h n e s s  f u r t h e r  a u t h o r is e s  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  o r  
t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to  make t r e a t i e s  w i t h  s u b o r d in a te  and  
o t h e r  n a t i v e  c h i e f s ,  such t r e a t i e s  and engagem ents to  be 
r a t i f i e d  and c o n f irm e d  by him  i n  such cases as th e y  a r e  made 
i n  th e  name o f  h i s  H ig h n e s s .  H is  H ig h n e s s  a ls o  a g re e s  to  
cede to  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o r  to  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a l l  th e  
r i g h t s  w h ic h  he h i m s e l f  p o s s e s s es  o v e r  th e  la n d s  i n  th e  
w ho le  o f  h i s  t e r r i t o r y  on th e  m a in la n d  o f  A f r i c a  w i t h i n  th e  
l i m i t s  o f  t h i s  c o n c e s s io n ,  o n ly  e x c e p t in g  th e  p r i v a t e  la n d s  
o r  ’ sham bas1, and g iv e s  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  a l l  f o r t s  and  
u n o c c u p ie d  p u b l i c  b u i l d i n g s ,  e x c e p t in g  such b u i l d i n g s  as 
h i s  H ig h n e s s  may w is h  to  r e t a i n  f o r  h i s  own p r i v a t e  u s e ,  a 
s c h e d u le  o f  such b u i l d i n g s ,  p l a n t a t i o n s ,  o r  p r o p e r t i e s  to  
be draw n up and a g re e d  to  b e tw e e n  h i s  H ig h n e s s  and th e
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A s s o c i a t i o n .  F u r t h e r ,  he a u t h o r is e s  them to  a c q u i r e  and 
r e g u l a t e  th e  o c c u p a t io n  o f  a l l  la n d s  n o t  y e t  o c c u p ie d ;  to  
l e v y  and c o l l e c t  l o c a l  o r  o t h e r  t a x e s ,  d o e s , and t o l l s ;  to  
do a l l  th e s e  and such o t h e r  a c ts  as may he n e c e s s a ry  f o r  
th e  m a in te n a n c e  and s u p p o r t  o f  such l o c a l  g o v e rn m e n ts ,  
f o r c e s ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  j u s t i c e ,  th e  m ak in g  and im p ro v in g  
o f  ro a d s  o r  w a te r  c o m m u n ic a t io n s , o r  o t h e r  p u b l i c  w o rk s ,  
d e f e n s iv e  o r  o t h e r w is e ,  and f o r  th e  l i q u i d a t i o n  o f  d e b ts ,  
and paym ent o f  i n t e r e s t  upon c a p i t a l  e x p e n d e d . The ju d g e s  
s h a l l  be a p p o in te d  by th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  
s u b je c t  to  th e  S u l t a n ’ s a p p r o v a l ;  b u t  a l l  K a t h is  s h a l l  be 
n o m in a te d  by h i s  H ig h n e s s .
I n  a b o r i g i n a l  t r a c t s  th e  la w  s h a l l  be a d m in is t e r e d  
by th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o r  t h e i r  o f f i c i a l s .
The s t ip e n d s  o f  th e  G o v e rn o rs ,  and a l l  o t h e r  o f f i c i a l s  
i n  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  o c c u p ie d  and c o n t r o l l e d  by th e  A s s o c ia t io n  
o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  s h a l l  be p a id  by them .
ARTICLE III
H is  H ig h n e s s  g r a n t s  to  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o r  to  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  th e  r i g h t  to  t r a d e ,  to  h o ld  p r o p e r t y ,  to  
e r e c t  b u i l d i n g s ,  and to  a c q u i r e  la n d s  o r  b u i l d i n g s  by 
p u rc h a s e  o r  n e g o t i a t i o n  anyw here  w i t h i n  h i s  H ig h n e s s ’ s 
t e r r i t o r i e s  in c lu d e d  i n  th e  l i m i t s  o f  t h i s  c o n c e s s io n ,  w i t h  
th e  c o n s e n t  o f  th e  p r o p r i e t o r s  o f  any such la n d s  and h o u s e s .
ARTICLE IV
H is  H ig h n e s s  g r a n t s  to  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  o r  to  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  s p e c i a l  and e x c l u s iv e  p r i v i l e g e s  and pow ers  
to  r e g u l a t e  t r a d e  and commerce; a ls o  th e  n a v i g a t i o n  o f  
r i v e r s  and l a k e s ,  and c o n t r o l  o f  f i s h e r i e s ;  th e  m ak in g  o f  
r o a d s ,  tra m w a y s , r a i l w a y s ,  c a n a ls ,  and t e le g r a p h s ,  and to  
l e v y  t o l l s  and dues on th e  same; a ls o  th e  pow er to  c o n t r o l  
o r  p r e v e n t  th e  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  any m e rc h a n d is e ,  a rm s,  
a m m u n it io n  o f  a l l  s o r t s ,  i n t o x i c a t i n g  l i q u o r s ,  o r  any o t h e r  
goods w h ic h ,  i n  th e  o p in io n  o f  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  o r  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  a r e  d e t r i m e n t a l  to  la w ,  o r d e r ,  and m o r a l i t y ,  
and i n  w h a ts o e v e r  h is  H ig h n e s s  i s  n o t  bound to w a rd s  o t h e r  
G o v e rn m e n ts . B u t i t  i s  c l e a r l y  u n d e rs to o d  t h a t  a l l  e x e r c i s e  
o f  th e s e  p r i v i l e g e s  and pow ers s h a l l  be i n  c o n fo r m i ty  w i t h  
e x i s t i n g  t r e a t i e s  b e tw e e n  h i s  H ig h n e s s  and f o r e i g n  s t a t e s .
ARTICLE V
H is  H ig h n e s s  a u t h o r is e s  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o r  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to  occupy i n  h i s  name a l l  p o r t s  a t  th e  m outh  
o r  m ouths o f  any r i v e r  o r  r i v e r s ,  o r  e ls e w h e re  i n  h i s  
d o m in io n s  in c lu d e d  i n  th e  l i m i t s  o f  t h i s  c o n c e s s io n ,  w i t h  
th e  r i g h t  to  e s t a b l i s h  c u s to m -h o u ses  and to  l e v y  and c o l l e c t  
dues on any v e s s e ls ,  go od s , e t c . ,  a r r i v i n g  a t  o r  d e p a r t i n g  
fro m  such p o r t  o r  p o r t s ,  and to  ta k e  a l l  n e c e s s a ry  m easu res  
f o r  th e  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  s m u g g lin g ,  s u b je c t  i n  a l l  cases  to  th e  
t r e a t i e s  above named.
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ARTICLE VI
H is  H ig h n e s s  g r a n t s  to  th e  A s s o c i a t io n  o r  to  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  th e  e x c lu s iv e  p r i v i l e g e  to  s e a rc h  f o r  and 
w o rk , o r  to  r e g u l a t e ,  l e a s e ,  o r  a s s ig n ,  i n  any p a r t  o f  h i s  
H ig h n e s s ’ s t e r r i t o r i e s  w i t h i n  th e  l i m i t s  o f  t h i s  c o n c e s s io n ,  
any m in es  o r  d e p o s i t s  o f  l e a d ,  c o a l ,  i r o n ,  c o p p e r ,  t i n ,  g o ld ,  
s i l v e r ,  p r e c io u s  s t o n e s ,  o r  any m e t a l  o r  m i n e r a l ,  o r  m in e r a l  
o i l s  w h a ts o e v e r ;  a ls o  th e  e x c l u s i v e  r i g h t  to  t r a d e  i n  th e  
same, f r e e  fro m  a l l  ta x e s  and d u e s , e x c e p t in g  such m o d e ra te  
r o y a l t y  on m in e r a ls  o n ly ,  n o t  e x c e e d in g  f i v e  p e r  c e n t ,  on 
th e  f i r s t  v a lu e  o f  th e  a r t i c l e ,  l e s s  th e  w o r k in g  e x p e n s e s ,  
as may he h e r e i n a f t e r  a g re e d  by th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  and t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  to  be p a id  to  H is  H ig h n e s s ;  a ls o  th e  r i g h t  
to  use a l l  f o r e s t  t r e e s  and o t h e r  woods and m a t e r i a l s  o f  any  
k in d  w h a ts o e v e r  f o r  th e  p u rp o s e  o f  th e  w orks  a f o r e s a i d ,  and 
a ls o  f o r  t r a d e .  B u t th e  wood used  f o r  b u i l d i n g  and f o r  
b u r n in g ,  commonly known as f b o r t i ' ,  may be c u t  on th e  m a in la n d  
by o t h e r s ,  as now, by paym ent o f  such dues to  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  
o f  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  as th e y  may a g re e  upon; b u t  no such  
dues s h a l l  be r e q u i r e d  f o r  wood c u t  f o r  h i s  H ig h n e s s f s u s e .
ARTICLE V I I
H is  H ig h n e s s  g r a n t s  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e s  th e  r i g h t  to  e s t a b l i s h  a bank o r  banks anyw here  i n  
h i s  H ig h n e s s ’ s t e r r i t o r i e s  above m e n t io n e d ,  w i t h  th e  e x c lu s iv e  
p r i v i l e g e  o f  i s s u i n g  n o t e s .
3?2
ARTICLE VIII
A l l  th e  a f o r e s a i d  pow ers and p r i v i l e g e s  to  e x te n d  o v e r  
and be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  th e  p u rp o s e s  and o b je c t s  o f  th e  A s s o c ia ­
t i o n  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  d u r in g  th e  w ho le  o f  th e  te rm  
o f  f i f t y  y e a rs  n e x t ,  and d a t i n g  fro m  th e  t im e  o f  t h i s  
c o n c e s s io n  b e in g  s ig n e d .
A t  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  th e  s a id  te rm  a l l  th e  p u b l i c  w o rk s ,  
b u i l d i n g s ,  e t c . ,  s h a l l  r e v e r t  to  th e  S u l t a n ,  h i s  h e i r s  and  
s u c c e s s o r s ,  i f  d e s i r e d ,  a t  a v a l u a t i o n  to  be f i x e d  by
a r b i t r a t o r s  chosen by b o th  p a r t i e s .
ARTICLE I X
H is  H ig h n e s s  g r a n t s  to  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  o r  to  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  th e  r e g i e  o r  l e a s e  o f  th e  customs o f  a l l  th e  
p o r t s  th r o u g h o u t  t h a t  p a r t  o f  h i s  H ig h n e s s 's  t e r r i t o r i e s  
above d e f i n e d ,  f o r  an e q u a l  p e r io d  o f  t im e  to  th e  o t h e r  
c o n c e s s io n s ,  upon th e  f o l l o w i n g  te rm s ,  v i z . : -  The 
A s s o c i a t i o n  h e re b y  g u a r a n te e  to  pay  to  h i s  H ig h n e s s  th e  
S u l t a n  th e  w ho le  amount o f  th e  custom  d u t ie s  w h ic h  he now 
r e c e i v e s  b o th  fro m  th e  im p o r t  and e x p o r t  t r a d e  o f  t h a t  p a r t  
o f  h i s  H ig h n e s s 's  d o m in io n s  in c lu d e d  i n  t h i s  c o n c e s s io n ,  b u t  
i t  i s  u n d e rs to o d  t h a t  h is  H ig h n e s s  s h a l l  n o t  c la im  th e  d u ty
o r  any p a r t  o f  t h i s  t r a d e  t w ic e  o v e r ,  and t h a t  th e  A s s o c ia t io n
s h a l l  t h e r e f o r e  be e n t i t l e d  to  c la im  a d raw b ack  f o r  th e  
amount o f  any d u t ie s  w h ic h  may h e r e a f t e r  be p a id  d i r e c t  to
h is  H ig h n e s s  on any im p o r ts  t o ,  o r  e x p o r ts  f ro m , th e  p o r t s  
in c lu d e d  i n  t h i s  c o n c e s s io n ;  and th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  f u r t h e r  
g u a ra n te e s  to  pay to  h i s  H ig h n e s s  f i f t y  p e r  c e n t ,  o f  th e  
a d d i t i o n a l  n e t  r e v e n u e ,  w h ic h  s h a l l  come to  them fro m  th e  
custom d u t ie s  o f  th e  p o r t s  in c lu d e d  i n  t h i s  c o n c e s s io n ,  and  
h i s  H ig h n e s s  g r a n t s  to  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n  a l l  r i g h t s  o v e r  th e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  w a te r s  i n  o r  a p p e r t a i n i n g  to  h i s  d o m in io n s  
w i t h i n  th e  l i m i t s  o f  th e s e  c o n c e s s io n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  
r i g h t  to  s u p e r v is e  and c o n t r o l  th e  c o n v e y a n c e , t r a n s i t ,  
l a n d i n g ,  and s h ip m e n t o f  m e rc h a n d is e  and p ro d u c e  w i t h i n  th e  
s a id  w a te r s  by means o f  a c o a s tg u a rd  s e r v i c e  b o th  on la n d  
and w a t e r .
ARTICLE X
I n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  th e  f o r e g o in g  c o n c e s s io n s ,  p o w e rs ,  
and p r i v i l e g e s  b e in g  g r a n t e d  by h i s  H ig h n e s s ,  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  
o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  a l l o t  to  h i s  H ig h n e s s ,  f r e e  o f  
c o s t ,  one f o u n d e r ’ s s h a r e ,  w h ic h  s h a l l  e n t i t l e  h im  to  such  
p r o p o r t io n  o f  th e  n e t  p r o f i t s ,  as shown by th e  books o f  th e  
Company, a f t e r  i n t e r e s t  a t  th e  r a t e  o f  e i g h t  p e r  c e n t ,  s h a l l  
have been p a id  upon th e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ’ p a id - u p  c a p i t a l ,  as 
s h a l l  a t t a c h  to  th e  one f o u n d e r ’ s s h a r e .
ARTICLE X I
These c o n c e s s io n s  do n o t  r e l a t e  to  h is  H ig h n e s s ’ s 
p o s s e s s io n s  i n  th e  I s l a n d s  o f  Z a n z ib a r  and Pemba, n o r  to
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h i s  t e r r i t o r i e s  s o u th  o f  Wanga o r  n o r t h  o f  K i p i n i ;  and i t  
i s  u n d e rs to o d  t h a t  a l l  p u b l i c ,  j u d i c i a l ,  o r  g o vern m en t  
pov/ers and f u n c t i o n s  h e r e i n  conceded to  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  o r  
to  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  s h a l l  be e x e r c is e d  by them o n ly  i n  
th e  name and u n d e r  th e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  th e  S u l t a n  o f  Z a n z i b a r .
ARTICLE X I I
I t  i s  h e r e b y  a g re e d  by b o th  p a r t i e s  t h a t  th e s e  
c o n c e s s io n s  and th e  c o r re s p o n d in g  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  as s e t  f o r t h ,  
s h a l l  be b in d in g  upon b o th  p a r t i e s ,  t h e i r  h e i r s ,  s u c c e s s o rs  
and a s s ig n s ,  d u r in g  th e  te rm  o f  f i f t y  y e a r s  f o r  w h ic h  th e y  
have  been a g re e d  up o n .
Z a n z i b a r ,  May 2 4 ,  1 8 8 7 *
F o r  th e  B r i t i s h  E a s t  A f r i c a n  A s s o c i a t i o n ,
(S ig n e d )  E .N .  MACKENZIE.
Z a n z i b a r ,  May 2 4 ,  1 8 8 7 *
I  w i tn e s s  th e  above s i g n a t u r e  o f  M r .  E .N .  M a c k e n z ie .
(S ig n e d )  FREDC. HOLMWOOD.
R e g is t e r e d  No. 1 4 6 4 A .
( S ig n e d )  FREDC. HOLMWOOD.
B r i t i s h  C o n s u la t e - G e n e r a l ,  Z a n z ib a r ,
May 2 5 ,  1 8 8 7 .
N o te  -  T h is  a p p e n d ix  i s  f ro m  B r i t i s h  E a s t  A f r i c a  o r  
I . B . E . A .  , by P . L .  M c d e rm o tt .
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C h a p te r  by R .E .  Tyson ( F r a n k  Cass & C o . ,  
London, 1 9 6 7 )
E a s t e r n  I n t e r l u d e  (T h a c k e r  6c S p in k ,
C a l c u t t a ,  1 9 5 4 )  '
L u g a rd ;  The Y e a rs  o f  A d v e n tu re  ( C o l l i n s , 
London, 1 9 5 6 .
3ff
R o b in s o n  & 
G a l l a g h e r
A f r i c a  and th e  V i c t o r i a n s  ( M a c m i l la n ,  
London, 1 9 ^ 5 )
B r i t a i n ’ s Economy i n  th e  N in e t e e n t h  C e n tu ry  
(C la r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  O x fo r d ,  1 9 6 3 ]
E n g la n d ,  E u ro pe  and th e  U p per N i l e ,  1 8 8 2 -1 8 9 9  
E d in b u rg h  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  19 6 5 )
R o sto w , W.W. 
S a n d e rs o n , G .N .
O rdnance G a z e te e r  o f  S c o t la n d ,  V o l .  I
The H i s t o r y  o f  S m ith /M a ck e n z i e  & C o . ( P u b l is h e d  i n  1958  by th e  
company, b u t  now o u t  o f  p r i n t .  "A copy was k i n d l y  l e n t  to  
me by M r .  A .C .  L e d g e r  who r e t i r e d  fro m  th e  company a few  
y e a r s  a g o ) .
T h o r n e r ,  B. In v e s tm e n t  i n  E m p ire :  B r i t i s h  R a i lw a y  &
Steam S h ip p in g  E n t e r p r i s e  i n  I n d i a .[fi
1 8 2 3 -1 8 4 9  ( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  P e n n s y lv a n ia  
P r e s s ,  P h i l a d e l p h i a ,  1 9 5 0 )
T r e v e ly a n ,  G .M . B r i t i sh H i s t o r y  i n  th e  N in e t e e n t h  C e n tu ry  
(Longm ans, L o n d o n 71946" ed • 7~
Unpub l is h e d  Theses
' '  /-* ft M .J .  Be K i e w i e t  H i s t o r y  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  E a s t  A f r i c a  Company
( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  London, P h .D .  t h e s i s  1 9 5 5 )
I . R .  S m ith  'T h e  Emin P asha r e l i e f  e x p e d i t i o n  1 8 8 6 -9 0  '
(O x fo r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P h .D .  t h e s i s ,  1 9 6 9 )
P a r l i a m e n ta ry  P a p e rs  ( I n  th e  B r i t i s h  Museum, A b b r e v ia t e d
as P . P . )
L I V ,  1 8 7 2 ;  I X ,  1 8 7 3 ;  L X I , 1 8 7 3 ;  L X I I ,  1 8 7 4 ;  L X X I , 1 8 7 5 ;  
LXX, 1 8 7 6 ;  L X X X V I I I ,  1 8 7 7 ;  L X V I , 1 8 7 8 - 9 ;  L X IX ,  1 8 8 0 ;  
LXXXV, 1 8 8 1 ;  LXV, 1 8 8 2 ;  L X V I ,  1 8 8 3 -
4  °°
C o n te m p o ra ry  Pr ess S o urces
The S co ts m a n , 24 December 1881  )
) A bout th e  C i t y  o f  
The S t a n d a r d , 11 11 " )
) G lasgow Bank case  
N o r th  B r i t i s h  D a i l y , 26 December 1881 )
The T im e s . 2 December 1886  (A b o u t Emin P ash a)
The T im e s , 23 June 1893
The S c o tsm an . 23 June 1893
The Campbeltown C o u r i e r , 23 June 1893
A r g y l l s h i r e  H e r a l d , 9 J a n u a ry  1915
The Camobe l to w n  C o u r i e r , 20 and 27 
J a n u a ry  1 9 3 4 ~ I^ o n ta T n  a r t i c l e s  a b o u t  
M a c k in n o n )
The Duteman & W ee k ly  C h r o n i c l e , 20 J u ly  
1950
W eekly  S co ts m a n , 12 M arch  1959  
G lasgow  H e r a l d , 6 M arch  1965  ( C o n ta in s  a r t i c l e  a b o u t M a c k in n o n )
M a c k in n o n 1s 
o b i t u a r i e s
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